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SYNOPSIS
In January 1912, the Bolsheviks became a separate Party, as 
opposed to being merely a faction of the RSDLP. Lenin's initial 
problem was to convince both the leaders of the Second International 
and his own middle echelon leaders inside Russia that Bolshevism was 
distinct from Menshevisn. This proved di/ficult before August 1914. 
The War made the distinction clearer, but also gave rise to an 
international tendency, with support inside the Bolshevik Party, to 
the Left even of Lenin  Inside Russia too, joint work with SR 
Maximalists fostered a kind of Left Populist Bolshevism among some 
of the Party rank and file 0 After the February Revolution, the 
Right Bolsheviks were pushing for a reunification with the Mensheviks, 
the Left Populist Bolsheviks began to organise nationally and, as the 
Russian Bureau of the Central Conmittee lacked authority, the Party 
was on the verge of a split. Lenin was urgently recalled from 
abroad. His intervention in the faction fight marked the end of 
one period of Party history and the beginning of the next. For the 
first time, the Party leadership was on the spot, and this contact 
with the rank and file enabled Lenin to clarify and develop ideas 
he had been formulating in his disputes abroad, Ihe result was a 
new policy for the Party, quite unmistakeably distinct from 
Menshevism.
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INTRODUCTION
-ii-
In April 1917, Bolshevik policy took a new turn that 
was to lead to the seizure of power in October. Lenin's 
April Theses, first delivered to a group of leading Bolshevik 
Party members on the evening of the third of April, and then 
to the delegates to the joint Bolshevik/Menshevik Unification 
Conference on the fourth of April, were the first public 
announcement of the new policy. Historians usually agree that 
the Theses mark a turning point for the Party. However, 
they are usually unable to agree on where they are different 
from previous Party policy.
The problem arises principally because the April Theses 
are examined exclusively in terms of Lenin's own thought. At 
the very most, Lenin's theoretical discussions with other Marxists 
(most notably Bukharin) are found to be relevant. This approach 
ignores the fact that Lenin was not primarily a philosopher, nor 
even a social thinker, but a practical politician, who saw his 
chief contribution to the Socialist Movement as being the 
building of a revolutionary party. For Lenin, everything was 
secondary to this, and he engaged in theoretical disputes (which 
might or might not lead to changes in policy), in order to solve 
specific practical problems of party building. It is in this 
light that I shall examine the genesis of the April Theses here.
I shall argue that the Theses were the result of the conflict 
between a number of different groups in the Bolshevik Party and 
in the International: the leadership of the Second International 
(Karl Kautsky, Rosa Luxemburg and co.), the left socialists inside 
the Zimmerwald Left (Radek, Pannekoek and co.), those emigre 
Bolsheviks influenced by this left group (Bukharin, Pyatakov 
and co.), the Conciliator-Bolsheviks who pr-.-v-orninated iji the
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Party leadership inside Russia (the editors of Pravda, the 
leaders of the Petersburg Committee, and part of the Central 
Conmittee), that section of the rank and file whose practical 
cooperation with the SRs was leading them to adopt left 
populist ideas, (the Vyborg District and Baltic Fleet 
Bolsheviks are looked at here, but this phenomenon was 
possibly much more widespread), and Lenin who acted through- 
out as a separate faction.
The normal centre-periphery problem that besets all 
political parties was complicated for the pre-1917 Bolshevik 
Party in that there were two centres, one in Russia and one 
abroad, and that communication between these two centres and 
between them and the rank and file was extremely difficult, 
and occasionally broke down altogether. Indeed, the Left 
Populist Bolshevism in the rank and file apparently developed 
as a result of this difficulty. It was relatively easy to 
communicate and work with rank and file members of other 
parties who worked in the same factory, or served on the same 
ship, difficult and sometimes impossible to establish any kind 
of contact with Petersburg. Thus, whichever local party managed 
to make contact with Petersburg tended to act as courier for all 
local revolutionaries, bringing back literature now of one, now 
of the other party. On the spot, all revolutionaries followed 
a line that was an amalgam of different party views, but 
with those of one party predominant (and for most of the period 
examined here, the predominant party was the PSR). By 1915, 
the Fleet Bolsheviks had been able to wrest this predominance 
(ideologically but not numerically) from the PSR because of 
their Party's opposition to the War. The April Theses,
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widely interpreted by the SR rank and file as embodying the 
Left Populist tradition that their own leadership had abandoned, 
confirmed this Bolshevik ideological predominance.
Throughout the period from January 1912 to April 1917, 
Lenin was concerned with two major problems. The first was 
to convince the leaders of the Second International, and 
his own Bolshevik leadership inside Russia, that Bolshevism 
was sufficiently different from Menshevism to have the right to 
exist as a separate party. The leaders of the Second International 
could not accept that the split with the Mensheviks was caused 
by anything other than personality differences, and they were 
on the verge of arraigning the Bolsheviks before a Congress 
of the International, when the First World War intervened. 
Similarly, the leading Bolsheviks inside Russia, with a few 
exceptions, were reluctant to press the split too far, and 
indeed were constantly attempting to bring the two halves of 
the Party back together. This tendency reaches its height 
at the end of March/beginning of April 1917, when a Conference 
of Bolshevik Party workers led to a joint Bolshevik/Menshevik 
Conference that was to reunite the Party. It was this Conference 
that Lenin interrupted by reading the April Theses.
Lenin's other main concern was the maintenance of contact 
with and, if possible, control of the Party inside Russia, 
without which he could have no political influence. As his 
relations with the editors of Pravda had shown before the War, 
this was extremely difficult to achieve. During the War, contact 
became even more difficult. The problem became critical when 
a group in the Zimmerwald Left which was critical of Lenin's 
itlLMS gained support inside the tiolshevik emigre f-ojtJon which
controlled the illegal transport system in and out of Russia. 
Until that moment, Lenin had tried to minimize the differences 
inside the Zimmerwald Left. He now had to undertake a serious 
faction fight with the group of Bolsheviks concerned (Bukharin, 
Pyatakov and Bosh) and with those they supported in the 
Ziirroerwald Left (Radek, Pannekoek and co.) Although this led 
to a tactical victory by Lenin, it also led to what he had hoped 
to avert. Bukharin and Shlyapnikov, who had been the chief 
organisers of the transport system, became demoralised. Bukharin 
left Sweden for the USA, Shlyapnikov returned to Russia, and 
Lenin was completely cut off from the Russian Party from December 
1916 until after the February revolution. This political isolation 
forced him to look again at the criticisms raised by Bukharin, 
Radek and co. and this in turn led to a major revision in his 
thought, which becomes evident for the first time fully in the 
April Theses.
While Lenin was cut off from the Russian Party and engaged 
in rereading Marx and Engels, the February Revolution took 
place. The Party inside Russia became legal, and ideological 
differences assumed immediate importance in practical politics. 
The Right Conciliator Bolsheviks worked for reunification with 
the Mensheviks, and conditional support for the Provisional 
Government. Some even went so far as to support the War, now 
that it was being fought by a free Russia. Meanwhile, the Left 
BDpulist Bolsheviks of the Vyborg District were pressing for 
Soviet powsr, and were establishing a network of sympathetic 
organisations in the Baltic Fleet. By the end of March, the 
Bolshevik Party was on the verge of a split, and possibly of 
disappearing altogether.
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At first, Lenin was unaware of all this. After the February 
Revolution, he was able to get some (but not many) of his writings 
into Russia, but was still unable to receive Party material from 
Russia. His views of the revolution were based on incomplete 
and inaccurate accounts in the Western press, and possibly of 
Russian papers like Rech*. Thus, even the material that he 
did get into Russia was of limited influence, as the Party Right 
was able to point to Lenin's obvious lack of knowledge of Russian 
affairs. However, once alerted to the crisis in the Party, he 
decided to take the major risk of returning through Germany and 
a possible charge of treason, to prevent the union with the 
Mensheviks.
Before he reached Russia, Lenin was quite unaware of the 
Left Populist Bolshevism of the rank and file, and of the extent 
to which local Soviets had sprung up and assumecl local power 
throughout the country. At some point between the frontier 
post at Torneo and Beloostrov, just outside Petrograd, however, 
he was informed of the different tendencies in the Party, given 
back numbers of Pravda to read, and told of the power assumed 
by the local Soviets. The most probable source of this informa- 
tion were the Baltic sailors organised by Shlyapnikov to accompany 
Lenin from the border to Beloostrov, to prevent his arrest for 
treason by the Provisional Government. This constitutes the 
final element in the formation of the April Theses , for it enabled 
him to clarify the ideas he had been formulating in emigration, and 
make a clear and informed intervention in the faction fight that 
was tearing the Party apart.
The number of groups involved and their geographical and 
ideological isolation mean that the development of ideas in the 
Party cannot sJ^i^ly lo d-\-*l t v.v.th chronologically. The three;
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chapters of Section One will deal with the development of the 
main factions before the February Revolution. The first tv\o 
chapters which deal with Lenin's disputes with the leaders of 
the International, with the editors of Pravda and with the 
Zimmerwald Left are fairly straight forward. All these groups 
were in at least intermittent contact, and there is a clear, 
chronological development of ideas. However, the Left Populist 
Bolshevism of the rank and file developed in isolation from the 
leadership inside and outside Russia. Also, as it has been 
ignored or denied by traditional scholarship, and especially 
Soviet scholarship, it demands separate and lengthy treatment. 
Thus, after the second chapter has taken the argument up to 
December 1916 abroad, the third will have to return to the end 
of the Nineteenth Century, inside Russia, to trace the origins 
of the Social-Democratic Organisations in the Fleet, and their 
relationship with the Fleet SRs. The two chapters of Section Two 
will deal with the effect that these different factions inside 
Russia had on the course of the February Revolution in the 
different areas covered by this study.
The three chapters of Section Three will describe the faction 
fight as it developed after February and until Lenin's return in 
April. Chapters six and seven, which describe the efforts of 
the Vyborg District Bolsheviks to build sympathetic committees 
in Kronstadt and Helsingfors follow naturally from section TWD, 
and present no problems of chronology. The problem in this section 
arises because, at this stage, it was Lenin who was isolated from 
the rest of the Party. Thus .In order to explain why the April Theses
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were delivered at all, it will be necessary to go back to the 
beginning of 1917 and trace Lenin's thought in emigration, the 
information that leads to the decision to return, and the means 
whereby he was able to arrive in Petrograd so well informed of 
Party affairs.
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THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TEE DIFFEREM* 
TRADITIONS IN THE BOLSHEVIK PARTY
CHAPTER ONE
RIGHT BOLSHEVISM AND EVOLUTIONARY SOCIALISM: 1912-14
Part One
Bolshevism and the Second International
-2-
Qn 10 March 1912, Lenin sent Camille Huysmans, the Secretary 
of the International Socialist Bureau, an innocent-seeming letter
<
asking him to circulate an official statement from the Central 
Committee of the RSDLP to all members of the Second International. 
Not suspecting that anything was amiss, Huysmans did so, and the 
statement appeared shortly after in a number of Socialist newspapers 
all over the world. There was an immediate uproar, for the innocent- 
seeming statement was the Bolshevik justification for the Prague 
Conference of January 1912 which had finalised the split in the 
Russian Party;
Very quickly, Huysmans received a resolution signed in Paris 
by members of the Foreign Corrmittee of the Bund, the Party Mensheviks, 
the Vpered Group, the Party Bolsheviks, Golos Sotsial-demokrata, and 
the Vienna Pravda castigating the Prague Conference as "an obvious 
attempt by a group of persons who have quite consciously led the
party to a split, to usurp the party's banner". As requested,
2Huysmans circulated this statement also. Inmediately Lenin sent a
reply demanding that this too should be circulated, Huysmans did so,
but then declared the matter closed as "the Bureau cannot be used to
3 transmit polemical material".
Although he put a stop to the circulars, Huysmans was con- 
cerned about the acrimony within the RSDLP that the matter had
 
1. Correspondance entre Lenine et Camille Huysmans 
19O5-14. Paris 1963, pp 103-O5 0
2. ibid., pp 144-46.
3. ibid., pp 105-11.
revealed, and took the trouble to consult Plekhanov. Plekhanov 
replied that the Prague Conference could very likely lead to a 
split in the Russian Party, and suggested that the ISB could write 
both to Lenin's faction and to the other groups about to hold a 
rival conference, and suggest that they take steps to restore 
unity, stressing that the problem was not to establish who was to
*
blame but to preserve a balance in the party. In the event, both 
Mensheviks and Bolsheviks rejected the idea of a joint conference, 
only Plekhanov who considered both sides to be at fault, remaining 
in favour.
Another dispute involving the Russians then broke out. The 
German Socialist Party decided to allot 80,000 marks to the Russian 
Social Democratic Labour Party to help it fight the elections to 
the Fourth Duma, to be held in the following Autumn. It asked the 
Lettish Social Democratic Party to organise a meeting of all Russian 
groups at which the money could be apportioned and the conditions of 
the gift (the most important of which was that only one Socialist 
candidate should stand in each constituency) explained. The meeting 
was called for 5 May in Brussels but was not held because of a dis- 
agreement between the Mensheviks. The German party then proposed a 
meeting in September of eleven Russian groups. This time the 
invitation was turned down by Lenin, who wrote:
...objectively, the intention of the Presidiun 
fof the German Socialist PartyJ is merely an 
attempt to promote the split in the Party 0 .. 
and the formation of a new, hostile party. 
This, so far, is without precedent in the 
International.
1. Correspondance entre Lenine et Carnillo Huysmans 
19Q5-14, Paris 1963, pp 96-97, 111,
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Plekhanov and the Social Democracy of Poland and Lithuania also 
refused the invitation, Martov's group, however, this time was 
eager to attend and in the event, despite Martov's pessimism 
when he heard that the other groups had refused, the Germans 
gave some of the money to the Menshevik Organising Committee and 
to the national groups. The sharpness of Lenin's reply, however, 
led Huysmans to drop temporarily his plans for reuniting the 
Russians.
This was not all, for Lenin was to be involved in yet a 
third controversy in the International. In 1911 a dispute had 
broken out between the Main Presidium of the Social Democracy of 
the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (Rosa Luxemburg and Jan Tyszka) 
and a group known as the Rozlamowcy, centered on the Warsaw 
Committee (Karl Radek, Jacob Furstenberg-Hanecki, and A 0 Malecki). 
In the early suraner of 1912 the Main Presidium dissolved the Warsaw
1. 00 H0 Gankin and H0 H0 Fisher, The Bolsheviks and the World
War, Stanford, 1960, pp 88-89; Correspondence entre Lenlne 
et Camille Huysmans, p 98; Pis'ma P.B0 Aksel ; roda i 
Yu 0 Oo Martova, The Hague, 1967, pp 25O-51; PSS, vo! 0 21, 
pp 441-65,, Lenin's hostility was possibly enhanced by the 
fact that despite Hiysmans 1 announcement on 5 April that he 
would close discussion on the Prague Conference, he did 
circulate a hostile resolution from the Lettish SDs on 
" 24 April (Correspondance entre Lenine et Huysmans, 
pp 146-47)o I have not been able to establish whether this 
money was what remained of the Schmidt inheritance, which 
Lenin had been actively trying to get for the Bolsheviks 
since the Prague Conference (Schapiro, The Conrnunist Party 
of the Soviet Union, p 131),
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Committee and declared it "no longer part of the RSDLP" (to which 
the SDKPIL was affiliated as an autonomous section. On 9 June, 
the Rozlamowcy elected a Provisional ConraLttee and called a 
conference of their supporters for 4 August. On 22 June, Lenin 
arrived in Cracow whence he intended to keep a firmer hand on the 
Russian praktiki 0 Almost immediately he was met by Hanecki, as 
the Rozlamowcy had made Cracow their centre and edited their paper 
Gazeta Robotnicza there. He learnt of the split and decided to 
support the Rozlamowcy 0 The immediacy of his response was 
probably prompted by the fact that Rosa Luxemburg's theories on
the party made her a supporter on that issue of the liquidators,
2
and an opponent of the Prague Conference,
On 8 July, Rosa Luxemburg sent a letter to Camille Huysmans 
about the affair, asking him to circulate it in the International. 
Huysmans did so, although he must have had reservations about its 
content. It claimed that there were no political disagreements 
between the Main Presidium and the Rozlamowcy, that the split was 
the work of the lack of discipline and disorganising tactics of
a few individuals with the collaboration of the Okhrana, to
3disrupt the Party's work in the forthcoming Duma elections.
1. PSS, vo! 0 22, p 45; R0A 0 Ermolaeva, "V.I. Lenin i 
t '. pol'skaya revolyutsionnaya sotsial-demokratiya v 1912- 
1914 godakh", NiNI, I960, no 0 3, p 78,
2. ibid., p 77; Va l. Lenin: biograficheskayikhronika, 
vol.3, M. 1972, p 9,
3. Correspondance entre Lenine et Camille Huysmans, 
pp 147-48.
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The defence of the Rozlamowcy was undertaken by Lenin in a 
document to the International which pointed out i) that the Main 
Presidium was not entitled to expel anyone from the RSDLP and, 
indeed, was not even part of the RSDLP; ii) that the split had not 
come suddenly before the Duma elections, as the Main Presidium had 
dropped Hanecki from the Party leadership two years previously and 
thus must have been aware of differences; and iii) that the state- 
ment about the Okhrana was hypocrisy; attached was a longer state- 
ment by the Rozlamowcy0 Huysmans duly circulated this.
Lenin was struck by the similarity between the Main 
Presidium's attack on the Rozlamowcy and the attacks made on the 
Bolsheviks by other Russian Social Democrats . For the next five
-i
years, he was to fight against charges that there were no political 
differences between the Bolsheviks and other groups, that the split
was the result of irresponsible individuals helped by the police.
2If for no other reason, here was a bond between him and the Poles.
Rosa Luxemburg's reply was even more virulent than her 
original attack on the Rozlamowcy, so much so that Huysmans refused 
at first to pass it on 0 Rosa Luxemburg would only make one change, 
however, and that was to call Lenin 'comrade' rather than 'that 
individual 1 . This document, which described Lenin as an intriguer, 
a provocateur and a faction-monger, was handed out to delegates 
attending the International Socialist Bureau meeting on
 
1. Correspondance entre Lenine et Camille Huysmans, pp 112-16; 
PSS, vol.22, pp 45-46.
2. PSS, vol.54, pp 361-66.
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28 October 1912.
Lenin was not directly represented at this meeting, as the 
Russian delegates were Plekhanov and the Socialist Revolutionary 
I.A. Rubanovich. Nor were any minutes circulated. It was with 
some concern, then, that Lenin read in the pages of Martov's Luch 
about a week after the meeting that the "Russian question" had 
been discussed there and that Plekhanov had predicted an early 
unification to include not only all Social democratic groups, but 
the Socialist Revolutionaries as well. His suspicions about the
German party were confirmed by the report that Hugo Haase had told
o
the Bureau that Lenin was deceiving the International. Careful
preparation was all the more necessary for the forthcoming 
Conference of the International, also to be held at Basel in late 
November.
At this Conference, Lenin was more concerned with trying to 
get the other members of the International to understand the differ- 
ences between the Bolsheviks and the liquidators, and to present 
his party's work in the best possible light, than with influencing
1. Correspondance entre Lenine et Camille Huysmans, pp 101-Q2, 
148-52o Huysmans did, however, refuse to have it trans- 
lated into English and French, pointing out that Lenin's 
note had only been circulated in German and that, in any 
case, the Bureau was too busv 0 This might explain why 
interest in the Russian question was confined almost 
entirely to the German Party at this period (see below). 
"Lenin sent a further reply from the Rozlamowcy on 
24 October. Correspondance, pp 119-21; PSS, vol 0 48, 
pp 101-O2 0
2. Correspondance entre Lenine et Camille Huysmans, p 103; 
PSS, vol.18, pp 469-70,
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the pronouncement on the Balkan Wars that the Conference had been 
convened to discuss. Thus he agreed without apparent difficulty to 
Plekhanov, and when Plekhanov fell ill, to the Socialist 
Revolutionary I C A 0 Rubanovich representing Russia on the six-man 
Committee set up to draft the Conference resolution. On the other 
hand; one of his letters to Kuysmans about the drafting ccmnittee has
this post-script:
I ;have just received news of the election of 
deputies for the Fourth Duma in the Moscow 
Gubernia. I can now tell ou that all deuties
. . - - .... .... in -f-j-,,0 workers' curia (Arbeiterkurie) are 
 -........ _~
Social Democrats! Twelve Social Democrats have 
already been elected despite the completely 
unprecedented election rigging
thereby stressing that Russian Social Democracy was not just a group 
of emigre cliques.
Kamenev's instructions were that he should circulate the 
Bolshevik statement on the war as well as Lenin's report on the 
significance of the Duma elections among the delegates, but Lenin's 
_ instruct jk>ns tp hinh-for his speech are very revealing, Ke was to 
prepare himself in a business_-like way, as this would make •a. good 
impression on the delegates (doubtless by contrast to the kind of 
insults he could expect Rosa luxemburg to be using ) 0 He was to make 
.clear to the delegates the special conditions of Russia, and how 
these must affect any assessment of the strength of the Social 
Democrats, Bow, in the first place, the mere nuirLer of votes cast
1- gnjrrcsjX)ndance entre Lenine et Camijlo IJnysmans, pp 121-24; 
JPSS, vol.48", p 103o
2. PSS, vol.,48, pp 106-O9; Cc)rrf.-s]-)ondnnco onl.ro T/mino ct 
cnTiiiJle HiI.V>-M:-ins, p 123 0
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for. the Social Democrats was not in itself an indicator, and he was 
to stress the importance of the Bolshevik seats in the workers' 
curia. He was to explain the significance of the Socialist Press, 
and how much stronger Pravda was than Luch. Finally, he was to 
explain why the legal press could not give an adequate account of 
the work of the Duma deputies, as their illegal party work could 
not be mentioned. It was a case that Lenin was to repeat again 
and again over the next few years,,
At the Conference itself, the behaviour of the Bolsheviks 
followed the same theme. They voted against the inclusion of the
delegate of the Menshevik Petersburg Initiative Group in the Social
2Democratic subsection .of the Russian delegation. Although the
Plekhanovites voted with them on this, the Bolsheviks were defeated, 
hereupon they withdrew to form their own subsection. This was 
joined by the five Rozlamowcy who were attending the Conference. 
The Main Presidium of the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland 
and Lithuania had refused to validate their mandates. They appealed 
to the Bolsheviks, who immediately included them in their delegation 
as consultative members. The Bureau did not object to this as it, 
unlike Lenin, was more concerned with the resolution on the Balkan 
War. Only after the Conference, when the Main Presidium made a
1. PSS, vol 48, p 112.
2. O.K. Gankin and H.H. Fisher, The Bolsheviks and the Yforld War, 
p 80. The Initiative Groups had been set up by the 
Mensheviks in 1910 and were supposed to adjust their 
activities to the legally possible, thus representing the 
summim of liquidationism to Lenin.
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formal protest, did Huysmans decide that the RSDIP had acted 
illegally and that the names of the Rozlamowcy were not to be 
included in the official minutes. The affair of the five |TXs" as
it was called was to be another stick with which to beat the Main 
Presidium.
 
All in all, though, Lenin was pleased with the results of 
the Conference. He felt that the affair of the Petersburg Initi- 
ative Group had compromised the other anti-Bolshevik groups, and he 
was satisfied with parity with the other Russian Social Democrats 
on the ISB. Here, however, he felt that the Bolsheviks should only
"accept" this on condition that Hugo Kaase be excluded^because of
2his insulting remarks about Lenin in October. He was also delighted
with the Conference resolution which threatened to respond to the 
outbreak of an imperialist war with revolution. "They have given
us a large promissory note; let us see how they use it", he is
3 
reported as saying.
Although the Basel Conference had been forced to accept the 
split in the RSDIP by giving Bolsheviks and Menshevilis parity of
representation on the ISB, Huysmans stressed to Lenin that this was
4 
only expected to prevail until the next Conference,
1. Correspondence entre Lenine et Camille Huysmans, p 126.
2.   PSS, vol 48, pp 114-15.
3. Gankin and Fisher, op cit, pp 79, 84.
4. Correspondence entre Lenine et Cair.llle Huysmans, p 125.
The Bolshevik nominee was L 0 B. Kainenev with the Rozlamowec 
A.M. Malecki as his alternate. Kamenev was, however, 
instructed not to allow Malecki to speak on anything but 
the Polish question; ibid, pp 124-25; PSS, vol 48, p 111.
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and that the International Socialist Bureau had decided to inter- 
vene decisively to reunite the RSDLP.
The German Party then offered its good offices in organising 
a reunification conference 0 Lenin refused this offer, for a 
number of reasons. First, he believed the German Party to be 
biased in favour of the liquidators  Karl Kautsky was known to
 
believe that there were no serious differences between the various 
Russian groups, indeed that the differences inside the German Party 
were more significant, and that the problem was really one of 
personal animosity with Lenin being most responsible 8 The Left Wing 
of the German Party, which might have been thought to support Lenin, 
was influenced by Rosa Luxemburg's hostility to him0 Lenin found 
confirmation of this in the fact that the Germans had finally 
given money for election expenses to Martov's Organising Comnittee 
and to the Caucasian groups who returned Menshevik Deputies to the 
Duma, and in Haase's outburst on the ISB. Haase in fact wrote to
Lenin denying that he had ever said such a thing, and this letter
2was published in Pravda on 11 January 1913. Kautsky f s attitude
was more of an obstacle, however, and Lenin confined himself to 
writing a polite letter declining the invitation and explaining 
briefly the differences between the Bolsheviks and the liquid- 
ators.
1. Correspondance entre Lenine et Camille Huysmans, pp 98-100; 
PSS, vol.48, pp 118-22 e
2. PSS, vol.22, pp 277-78.
3. PSS, vol 0 23, pp 5-9; the letter claims that the matter was 
discussed at the Cracow meeting in December 1912 (as do the 
editors of KPSS v Rozolyutsiyakh, vo! 0 l, p 369). Possibly so, 
but I can find no confirmatory evidence for this (e u g. 
Tsyavlovskii, Bol'sheviki, pp 120-23).
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The rest of the year Lenin spent in improving has relations 
with the Roziamowcy, 1 and the image of the Bolshevik Party in the
International by activities like the collection of money, organised
2by the Bolshevik Duma Deputy Muranov, to aid Belgian strikers.
Also, he devoted much time to the creation of a distinct, stable, 
non-conciliationist Bolshevik leadership inside Russia by pushing 
through the split in the Duma fraction. Once this was successfully
 ».
accomplished he hoped to hold a Party Congress as a show of strength
3to the International and to consolidate the leadership inside Russia.
It was the split in the Duma fraction that led to the next 
confrontation in the Internationale Rosa Luxemburg demanded that 
the 'unification of the Russian party should be discussed at the 
December meeting of the ISB. She complained of the "frivolous" v/ay 
in which the Duma split had been brought about, of Lenin's system- 
atic incitement of splits in other Social Democratic organisations 
and of the irregularity of the Russian delegation to the ISB "where
one of the representatives actually represents only one separate
4 
organisation, which he himself has called into being". This was
followed by the resignation of Plekhanov, who declared himself
1. R0Ao Ermolaeva, "V0 Io Lenin i pol'skaya revolyutsionnaya 
sotsial-demokratiya v 1912-1914 godakh", NiNI, 1960, no 0 3, 
P 83; RU C. Elwood, The Russian Social Darocratic Labour 
Party ISES-October 1917, Toronto, 1974, p 177; PSS, 
vol.24, pp 169-72; ibid., vol.48, pp 171, 214-15.
2. PSS. vol.48, pp 183-84.
3. I am indebted to Professor R.C. Elwood for his most
interesting unpublished paper, "The Congress that Never Was",
4. Gankin.and Fisher, The Bolsheviks and the V.brld War, p 89. 
Presumably the last" phrase reier.^ to Alalccki.
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disillusioned at the split as "this last blow struck at our unity". 1
Ibis time the Bolshevik Party was represented by M0 M. Litvinov, 
as Kamenev did not enjoy these International wrangles. Indeed, he 
had tried to persuade Lenin to take his place on the ISB immediately 
after the Basel Conference. Lenin, however, wisely refused as he was 
not capable of being as calm as Kamenev when discussing ticklish
questions, and thus might destroy the picture he was working so hard
2to create. Kamenev's position was reconfirmed by Lenin in a letter
to Huysmans in early November. Ifowever, Kamenev visited Cracow 
immediately after this and presumably managed to persuade Lenin to
remove him, and by early December Lenin had replaced him with
3M.M.Ldtvinov, an equally good choice whose talent for diplomacy was
to become renowned.
Yet, if the Russian question excited the Germans, Poles and 
Russians to the extent that Lenin feared a scene which would destroy 
the sober image he was trying to project, it left the other 
delegates to the ISB unmoved 0 As Litvinov was to report, the 
Russian business was squeezed in between five and half-past right
at the end of the meeting, giving those who were interested barely
4 time to speak, Kautsky introduced a resolution calling for a
1. ibid.. pp 92-93.
2 « PSS. vol. 48, p 121.
3. 'ibido, vol 24, p 403; vol.48, p 221; It may well have been 
at this time that the decision was taken to send Kamenev 
into Russia to edit Pravda.
4. Correspondance entre JLenine et Camille Huysmans, p 127; 
"Neopublikovannye pis'ma Litvinova", NiNI, 1966, no.4, 
pp 122-23.
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conference of eleven different Russian groups 7where an exchange of 
opinion should take place. If this was to reveal divisions too 
deep for the groups to deal with themselves, then the matter 
should be referred to the Vienna Congress in August. In deference 
to this milder proposal, Rosa Luxemburg withdrew her own resolution 
for a 'unification conference 1 and Kautsky's resolution was adopted 
unanimously. The only protest came from the SR, I.A. Rubanovich, 
who regretted, in the light of Plekhanov's statement a year
previously, that the Conference was not open to the Socialist
o 
Revolutionaries. He nonetheless voted for the resolution.
For Lenin, it was a satisfactory result since, as he pointed 
out, an exchange of views which committed no-one was better than 
Rosa Luxemburg's proposal which would have forced him to choose
between uniting with what he considered to be a lot of meaningless
* . *
emigre generals-without-armies, or being expelled from the
3International.
However, although he liked Kautsky's resolution, Lenin was 
stung by Kautsky's speech. There is nothing to be expected from 
the emigres, he was reported as saying, the old Russian Social 
Democratic Party was dead, and unity must be made to come from the
1. Gankin and Fisher, The Bolsheviks and the World War,
" pp 9O-91, 93-94; Correspondance entre Lenine et Camille 
Huysmans, p 128.
2. Gankin and Fisher, op.cit., p 95.
3. PSS, vol 24, pp 211-12.
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working cla.ss inside Russia. Vfoat was particularly galling about 
this7 was that it was a denial of all that Lenin had stood for, and 
had tried to convince the International of since January 1912: that 
.the Prague Conference marked the rebirth of the Russian Social 
Democracy, not because it included all tendencies but because it 
alone had built a base in the industrial working class of the 
country and was alone capable of giving sustained, socialist 
political leadership.
Lenin prepared carefully for the "Exchange of Views" 
Conference. In January he visited Belgium and France, giving 
lectures explaining his position. While in Brussels he took the 
opportunity to assure Huysmans that the Bolsheviks would participate
in the Conference, and there and then wrote for Huysmans a statement
2of the Bolshevik position. This is a very restrained document,
stating clearly and unemotionally the basic tenets of Bolshevism: 
the need for illegality in Russia, the dangers to an illegal party 
created by a party that does not believe in illegality and wishes to 
expose it, the complications of the National question in Russia, and 
the support that the Bolsheviks had gained among the Russian workers. 
In Brussels,, he also attended the IV Congress of the Lettish Social 
Democrats, who not so long before had been so hostile to the Prague
1. ibid, loc.cit and pp 230-32; "Neopublikovannye pis'ma 
Litvinova", NiNI, 1966, no 4, p 123.
2. Correspondance entre Lenine et Camille Kuysmans, pp 129, 
136-4O; PSS, vol 24, pp 296-3O3.
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Conference. Certainly his speech indicates that he was still 
receiving sane opposition, but at the end of the Congress a new 
Central Committee was appointed, supporting the Bolsheviks, thus 
gaining an ally for the forthcoming Conference,
During the early Stunner, however, Lenin suffered a number 
of important setbacks 0 In May, Roman Malinovskii, the leader of 
the Bolshevik Group in the State Duma, resigned his seat suddenly 
and fled abroad 0 To lose him was bad enough for Malinovskii was, 
with Muranov, the hard core of the Bolshevik leadership in Russia.
In 1912, Malinovskii and Muranov had been the only two members of
othe Duma Fraction to vote against the merger of Pravda and Luch.
He was the Deputy for one of the two major industrial areas of the 
country: the Moscow Guberniya and thus was of great importance to 
Lenin's claims for working class support. From the very first
moment he met him, Lenin had been drawn to him as an excellent
3 working class leader, to whom he gave the most confidential tasks.
He had been the moving force inside Russia for the split in the 
Duma Fraction o What was worse was that his resignation was accomp- 
anied by strong rumours that he had been all along working for the
4 Gkhranao Worse still was the fact that it came so soon after the
5 Chernomazov affair. The Mensheviks were quick to see their chance,
with the leader of the Bolshevik Duma Fraction and the former editor
 
1. PSS, vol.24, pp 283-92, vol.48, pp 252, 4O4.
20 See below p 31.
3. PSS, vol.48, pp 114, 133, 139, 153, 268.
4. PSS, vol.48, p 293.
5. See below p 41.
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of Pravda suspected of being police spies 0 "All our affairs have 
become concentrated on one thing: the Malinovskii affair", wrote 
Martov to Akselrod in June 0
So long as this abscess has not been lanced, 
we cannot move decisively forward 0 ..almost 
all of us here £i.e. Petersburg'J are convinced 
that the whole Pravda organisation is being 
run by the Okhrana0 1
Unfortunately for Lenin, the scandal broke just before Enile 
Vandervelde, the Chairman of the ISB, visited Russia to judge for 
himself the state of the underground parties,, Although ostensibly 
maintaining neutrality, he made it clear to Martov that he found the 
Bolshevik claims somewhat suspect and in fact favoured the 
Mensheviks. He too, like Kautsky, was beginning to believe that 
there was nothing more than personality clashes between the different
factions, noting in particular that in the Duma, the two fractions
2invariably voted together.
At some time over this period, too, Lenin lost the allegiance 
of the Rozlamowcy. Possibly this began at the Poronin Meeting in 
September 1913, where the Poles disapproved of the Bolsheviks' new
line on the National question, granting distinct ethnic groups the
3 right to secede and form an independent state. If so, they would
have been further offended by Lenin's article, "The Right of
 
Nations to Self-Determination", published in Prosveshchenie in May
1. Pis'ma Aksel'roda i Martova, pp 291-92.
2. ibid., pp 29O-91.
3. Elwood, The Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, p 178.
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and June 1914, which apart from anything else, at one point equates 
Hanecki's views on this question with those of Rosa Luxemburg. 
In any case, by mid-July, Lenin was refusing what he called "an 
ultimatum" from Hanecki for some finance for the Rolamowcy to
attend the "Exchange of Views" Conference. "It will be even better
o 
if they don't come", he wrote to Zinoviev, As it turned out, he
was right.
Presumably for the same reason that he had not attended 
previous meetings of the ISB, Lenin did not attend the "Exchange of 
Views" which was held in Brussels on 17-18 July 1914. This time 
the decision was not a happy one. The leaders of the International 
were offended by Lenin's not choosing to turn up to such an
 
inportant gathering and Inessa Armand, the leader of the Bolshevik 
delegation, apparently did not have Kamenev's or Litvinov's 
diplomatic skills. Things were made worse by the behaviour of 
I.F. Popov, one of the Bolshevik delegates, who managed to be rude
o
both to Vandervelde and to Huysmans.
Inessa Armand read a speech prepared beforehand by Lenin. 
This was very much along the lines of previous Bolshevik statements, 
if somewhat longer. It was measured, unemotional, but quite uncom- 
promising in stating that the sine qua non for Bolshevik acceptance 
of unity was the recognition of the illegal party, the subordination
1. PSS, vol 25, pp 257-320, esp. pp 308-O9.
2. PSS, vol 48, pp 317-18.
3. Correspondance entre Leninc et Camille Huysmans, p 131.
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of all emigre" group:; to the Central Corrmittee, the abolition of 
"autonomous" groups like the Bund and the suppression of liquidat- 
ionist papers like Inch. It was a carefully argued case, even if 
an unpalatable one. Its arguments should have been reasonably
familiar to all present, Indeed, the only new note was struck by
2the defence of Malinovskii. Nonetheless, the delegates were
shocked by its "impudence" and Plekhanov even declared that Lenin's
intransigence was due to his unwillingness to give up money
3
obtained by thievery 
However, the two Polish Groups, the Main Presidium and the 
Rozlamowcy, agreed to merge and all delegates except the Bolsheviks 
and the Letts then signed the resolution proposed by Kantsky. 
Kuysmans then warned the Bolsheviks that they would be reported to
the Vienna Conference to be held in a month's time for not voting
4for the resolution,
Inside Russia, intensive campaigning among the workers took 
place both for the Vienna Congress of the International and for the
c
Sixth Bolshevik Congress that was to follow it. The nine parties 
that had signed the Kantsky resolution issued a manifesto pointing
.??> vo! 0 25, pp 363-96 o Inessa's instructions including 
answers to possible questions run for a further nine 
printed pages (pp 397-405 ) 0
2 C jibKi, p 394 .
3 0 Tsyavlovskii, Pol ! shev i ki , p 147 „
4 e CforTo.spondanco cntre I/cnine et Qimjlle Iluysrmns, p 131;
"'
GalJkTn and JL''i slier",' The i^Isli^FnCs^iid'''uho'"VtC)r.Ul V.'^r, p 1CX3. 
5. A. )3:idaev, Po'l '.sheviki v_GvOF>ucIavs'(.vc-'!mom Dum?, pp 363ff 0
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to the Bolshevik refusal to vote for unity,. Even if Lenin were 
to produce a large delegation in Vienna, it seemed unlikely that 
he could win support in the Internationale In the words of 
L.Bo Schapiro, he seemed "to have overplayed his hand".
As it was, events overtook both parties. The anti- 
Bolshevik Manifesto could not be published because of the
o
suppression of legal newspapers in Russia in July, In August,
the First World War broke out and neither the Vienna Congress of 
the International nor the Sixth Bolshevik Congress was held.
1. Gankin and Fisher, op 0 cit., p 107.
2. ibid, loCpCito ; It was eventually published in 1915 in 
the Informal sionnyi listok zagranlchnoi organizatsii 
bunda, which cannot have given it very wide circulation,
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Part Two
Lenin v the Right Bolsheviks
-22-
The Prague Conference of January 1912 is generally accepted 
as marking the establishment of the Bolsheviks as a separate 
party, as opposed to a mere faction of the RSDLP. In Lenin's terms, 
it was to make a decisive break between revolutionary socialists, 
recognising the primacy of the illegal party, and those whom he 
called "Liquidators" - evolutionary socialists who believed the 
main activity of socialists should be within the bounds of legality. 
No Liquidators were invited to the Congress and Plekhanov, Trotsky, 
the Vpered Group and the national parties all refused to attend. 
Even so, it was far from being a well disciplined, or docile affair.
Before the Conference not all Bolshevik praktlki had been in favour
2of a definite split with the Mensheviks. At the Conference itself,
a sizeable minority of delegates opposed Lenin's attitude to the 
Liquidators.
This was compounded by the general hostility of the praktiki 
inside Russia towards the emigre's and their disputes: a hostility 
that had been a feature of the Russian Party long before the split
1. I am not concerned here to examine whether Lenin was right
in his assessment of the policies of his rivals. This would 
involve a study of the various Menshevik groups, which is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. It suffices to say that 
Lenin's writings are consistent in his definition of 
liquidationism and how it should be fought. I am here 
concerned with the extent to which he was able to implement 
this policy in the Party.
2. A.P9 Yakushina, "Parizhskoe soveshchanie bol'shevikov 
'(Dekabr' 1911g.) M , VIKPSS, 1964, no.12, p 49; 
D.M. Shvarts-Shvartsman, "Iz revolyutsionnogo proshlogo", 
VIKPSS, 1967, no.l, p 117.
3. L.A. Slepov and S.A. Andronov, "Prazhskaya konfcrentsiya 
RSDRP i bor'ba za edinstvo partii", VIKPSS, 1965, no.2, 
p 33, list Zevin, Shvartsman, Zinoviev "and some other partic- 
ipants in the Conference"; Shvarts-Shvartsman, opoC.it., p 119.
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between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks had ever taken place. 1 It had 
emerged very sharply at the Third Congress of the RSDIP in 1905?
and is possibly true of any underground party with an emigre leader-
3 
ship. At the Prague Conference even such 'hard 1 Bolsheviks as
Qrdzhonikidze and Spandaryan showed remarkable hostility to the 
emigres, Qrdzhonikidze describing them as "nonentities" (nuli) and 
Spandaryan even demanding that they be wound up altogether. "Let 
anyone who wants to work", he concluded, "join us inside Russia". 4
These differences came to a head over the issue of whether 
or not the Party should publish a legal daily inside Russia. This 
was not a new idea. Lenin and Plekhanov had got together with the 
Duma deputy Poletaev at the Copenhagen Congress of the International 
in September 1910 and agreed to the publication of a legal weekly 
in the name of the Duma Group. The first issue of Zvezda had 
appeared in December of that year. 5
6 Lenin's aim was that the Bolshevik-Party Menshevik alliance
1. Allan Ko Wildman, The Making of Workers' Revolution, Chicago, 
1967, p 167; Iskra, no 0 12, 6 December 1901, p 2.
2. Tretii S"ezd RSDRP, Aprel'-Mai 1905 ; goda, Protokoly, M 1959, 
esp 0 the sixteenth session pp 276ff; N0 K. Krupskaya, 
Reminiscences of Lenin, M 1959, pp 124-25.
3. cf 0 e 0 g«, M. Djilas, Memoirs of a Revolutionary, N.Y0 1973, 
p 69.
4 0 Istoriya KPSS, vol.2, M 1967, p 369.
5. PSS, volo48, p 356 0
6. i.e 0 Social-Democrats who supported the Mensheviks on most
issues, but agreed with the Bolsheviks on the primacy of the 
underground illegal party  Their main spokesman abroad 
was Plekhanov.
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on the editorial board of Zvezda would strengthen his fight against 
the Liquidators, Even before the first issue appeared, however, he 
began to have doubts about the venture. The problem was that a 
legal newspaper was a powerful instrument for forming policy. 
However, Lenin's control over what policies the paper would put
 
forward, was slighto The editor in St. Petersburg could refuse to 
publish, ignore or cut articles sent him by Lenin, and accept 
articles sent by ideological rivals. Even if some kind of confront- 
ation could be arranged, the editor could claim that his actions had 
been dictated by the demands of the Tsarist censors. The de facto 
editors of Zvezda were the Party-Menshevik N.I. lordanskii, who 
subsequently became a Liquidator, and the Bolshevik Duma Deputy 
N.G. Poletaev, who was making his distaste for emigre disputes clear 
to Lenin. Instead of strengthening his hand against the Liquid- 
ators, Zvezda could, and did, give a mouthpiece to those Bolsheviks 
who wanted to reunite with them.
Inside Russia, however, Zvezda was considered a great success 
and in April 1911, its editors set up a commission to examine the 
possibility of bringing out a daily paper. The idea met with some
1. PSS, vol.47, pp 278-79; vol.48, pp 8, 22, 28-29,
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enthusiaan among Zvezda's readers, with one proviso: the daily
would be welcome if it were a "real, workers' paper" and not a dull 
journal full of disputes between intellectuals, like the socialist 
newspapers of 1905-07.
This coincided with the closure by the censors of a public- 
ation which Lenin did approve of: Mysl 1 , a thick journal published 
in Moscow, which carried precisely those long, disputative articles 
that Zvezda's readers did not want in a daily. Lenin wrote to
t
Gorky to ask if he could help in establishing some sort of successor
~ 2to Mysl*, based in Petersburg. To his dismay, Gorky's response
was to write to Poletaev suggesting some sort of joint publication 
with Martov. Lenin's reply was categorical: there was no chance 
of his even attending a meeting if Martov was to be present. 
However, it was not clear if Gorky was referring to a successor to 
Mysl 1 , or to the daily that Zvezda was currently thinking of. Lenin 
was far from enthusiastic about the latter. He wrote:
If you are speaking of a daily, you must 
bear in mind that we had constant problems 
with Zvezda: they have no line, they are 
afraid to go along with us, they are afraid 
to go along with the Liquidators, they 
hesitate, they give themselves airs, they 
vacillate. 3
Nonetheless, the praktiki were anxious to have their paper 
and brought the matter up both at the party school at Longjumeau
«
1. R.C. Elwood, "Lenin and Pravda 1912-14", SR, 1972, no 2, 
p 356.
2. PSS. vol 48, p 31.
3. PSS, vol 48, p 33.
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in the Suirmer of 1911 and at the Prague Conference. Here, Lenin 
was outmanoeuvred by the praktiki, and had to accept when, on the 
third day of the Conference, eight of the praktiki, including 
Qrdzhonikidze, wrote to Gorky inviting him to the Conference to 
discuss the establishment of a daily., Confronted with the possi- 
bility of the praktiki and Gorky getting together and reviving 
Gorky's plan of a joint publication with Martov, Lenin gave way.
^
Possibly he calculated that a concession on this point was necessary
/*•"
if he was to overcome opposition to his policies towards the Liquid- 
ators. Possibly he felt that the venture would never get off the
3 ground anyway through lack of funds.
His only apparent involvement in the preparations for Pravda 
was to attend a meeting in Leipzig, immediately after the Prague 
Conference, to discuss the funding of the paper. This meeting
\
1. Elwood, op.cit., p 357,
2. "0 podgotovke Prazhstoi Kbnferentsii RSDRP", IA, 1958, no 5, 
p 20.
3. Elwood, op.cit., P 357, thinks that Lenin changed his mind 
because he now felt that he controlled the party machinery 
and that a daily would help him expel non-Bolsheviks from 
the RSDLP. His experience with Zvezda would have given him 
no reason to believe this. It would seem that Elwood over- 
looks the significance of the letter, written after the 
Conference was started, by Ordzhonikidze, who had expressed 
* contempt for the emigres and signed by only some of the 
delegates, including Zevin, who also created trouble for 
Lenin at the Conference. Not all the delegates signed. 
Neither, significantly, did Lenin, nor does this proposal 
recur in any of his letters to Gorky after the Conference; 
PSS, vol 48, pp 44ff; "0 podgotovke Prazhskoi Konferentsii 
RSDRP", Ik, 1958, no 5, p 2O-21; 'Sawa 1 is Zevin, 'Viktor 1 
is Shvartsman, 'Sergo 1 is Qrdzhonikidze; O Piatnitsky, 
Memoirs of a Bolshevik, London, n.d., p 160.
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estimated that some ten to twelve thousand rubles would be necessary 
for the venture. Lenin pledged one thousand rubles from the 
Central Conmittee and it was agreed that the editors must find the 
balance. As the more modest Zvezda had run into quite a lot of 
financial trouble, Lenin probably felt safe enough.
His relations with Zvezda in the early months of 1912 con- 
firmed his doubts about the wisdom of a daily. In April, in fact, 
he wrote threatening to break off relations unless they sent him 
the proofs of any article Plekhanov should write attacking the 
Prague Conference, especially as he was not being allowed to publish 
articles in favour of it. The editors disagreed. They found that 
Plekhanov T s letters to Zvezda were being interpreted inside Russia
Q
as support for the Bolsheviks. ;
r"~
As he had expected, Lenin's position inside Russia, as far 
as the fight against the Liquidators was concerned, was weakened by 
the appearance of Pravda. The very first issue on 22 April 1912 
carried a leading article, written by J.V. Stalin, calling for 
"unity in the proletarian class struggle, for unity at all costs...
q
Peace and co-operation within the movement". One of the paper's 
editors was M.S. Ol'minskii, who had just joined with a number of 
other Conciliator-Bolsheviks in publishing a resolution in the 
Menshevik-Liquidator journal Zhivoe delo calling for "the united
1. Elwood, op.cit., p 358; V.I. Lenin: bionraficheskaya 
. khronika, vol 2, M 1971, pp 601, 616, 638, 639.
2. PSS, vol 48, p 61; E.D B Stasova, Vospominanii, M 1969, p 98.
3. Pravda, no 1, 22 April 1912.
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action of Social Democrats of all tendencies, not excluding even 
the 'Liquidators'". Pravda No 1 carried no article or message of 
greetings from Lenin. His first article did not appear until 
8 May; his second not until 12 June. The paper nowhere used the 
word "Liquidator" and, indeed, cut it out of those articles from 
Lenin that they did accept. 2
These points did not escape the emigre Mensheviks. In May, 
Martov wrote to Akselrod:
The Bolshevik daily Pravda has adopted a 
very moderate tone and even speaks of unific- 
ation (progovarivaetsya ob"edinitel'nymi 
frazami). They have taken a conciliator like 
Ol'minskii onto the editorial board.
He drew the conclusion that Kautsky, Rosa Luxemburg and Vandervelde 
were also to draw:
The tone adopted by Pravda shows quite clearly 
that almost no-one is prepared to be Lenin's 
conscience inside Russia. 3
The entire raison d'etre of the Prague Conference, and Lenin's 
standing in the Second International were being threatened.
Lenin was very reticent about Pravda in these first months. 
Indeed, his first mention of it after he had seen it ; came only in 
July when he referred to it as "tolerably well organised" and "able
1. Pis'ma P.B. Aksel'roda i Yu. O, Martova, The Hague, 1967, 
n 232.
2. Elwood. op.cit... D 365. Elwood has established that Pravda 
accepted 284 articles by Lenin, and rejected 47 between 
April 1912 and July 1914.
3. Pis'ma Aksel'roda i Martova, pp 231, 235.
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to reflect, however faintly, the views of democratic workers". 
Nonetheless, his reticence did not mean that he was not thinking 
about it and how he was going to reverse so dangerous a trend in
the Bolshevik Party. In March 1912, Lenin was still thinking of
o
spending the sunnier in Fontenay, near Paris. In May (NS) Pravda
appeared. In early June, Krupskaya was trying to find out what it 
would be like to move to CCracow. On 17 June the Ul'yanovs left 
Paris and on 22 June they arrived in Cracow. The move had been 
made because Cracow was close to the Russian border and, from there,
tenin hoped to be able to wield some influence over the Conciliator-
4 Bolsheviks and Pravda.
During the stunner, indeed, he did manage to achieve a slight 
change in the paper's tone. In this he was helped by the paper's 
falling circulation, and by tha editors' problems in finding enough 
material to fill it every day. Lenin was quick to recommend more 
polemical articles (against the Liquidators) as a solution for both
problems. In July, Pravda duly published its first article
5 
attacking the Liquidators.
Nonetheless, the editors were not happy with the change. 
Ol'minskii wrote to Lenin that the change of tone towards the 
Liquidators was quite wrong, and generally the editors thought that
1. PSS, vol.21, p 375.
 
2. ibid, vol 0 55, p 323 
3. V0 I 0 Lenin: biograficheskay khronika, vol.3, pp 6, 8.
4. PSS, vo! 8 48, p 73.
5. G.V. Petryakov, "Deyatel'nost' V,I 0 Lenina po rukovodstvu 
Pravdoi w 1912-14 godakh", VI, 1956, no.ll, p 4; 
cf. also PSS, vo! 0 48, pp 137, 139.
-3Q-
that kind of article was more suited to the weekly Nevskaya Zvezda 
than to Pravda, In July, they refused to go to Cracow to discuss 
the "problems" of Pravda with Lenin. By August, Lenin was complain- 
ing again that they were cutting his attacks on the Liquidators out 
of his articles.
Ol'minskii's influence had in fact increased, as Poletaev 
and IoP. Pokrovskii withdrew from active participation in the paper 
once the Third Duma came to the end of its term in June 1912. Lenin 
tried to exercise control by sending "trusted agents of the Central
Committee" to impose his line. These either proved ineffective, or
2
were arrested. The matter was of extreme urgency to Lenin, as the
elections to the Fourth Duma were to take place in the autumn, and 
he wished to use these to confront the Liquidators. As he saw it, 
Pravda*s job was to prevent Bolsheviks helping Liquidators from 
being elected. In the event, Pravda conducted the election campaign 
"like a sleepy old spinster. Pravda does not know how to fight. It
does not attack, it does not persecute either the Cadets or the
3 ' 
Liquidators".
Things were to get even worse after the elections. Just 
after Lenin had managed to get the Second International to accept,
1. . Petryakov, op.cit., p 5; PSS, vol 48, pp 76-80.
2. Elwood, op.cit, pp 367-68.
3. PSS. vol 48, pp 95, 97-99. There is some irony in this, 
for, as L.B. Schapiro points OUL, three out of the six 
Bolsheviks elected in the Workers Curia owed their election 
to Liquidator votes  L0 BU Schapiro, The Cotrmunist Party 
of the Soviet Union, London, 1970, pp 135--36.
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however reluctantly and temporarily, the de facto separation of 
the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks at the Basel Congress, severe doubt 
was cast on Lenin's ability to speak for the Russian Party0 On 
11 December, the paper inserted the name of A.A. Bogdanov, the 
leader of the Vpered group which had opposed the Prague Conference, 
into its list of regular contributors. Cn 15 December, four of the 
six Bolshevik Duma Deputies voted to merge Pravda with the 
Menshevik-Liquidator Luch. In the interim, both Bolshevik and 
Menshevik Deputies would write for both papers. On 18 December, 
the names of the seven Menshevik Deputies were included in the list 
of Pravda's regular contributors.
The six Bolshevik Duma Deputies were summoned to Cracow 
along with a number of leading praktiki. Here, the first steps were 
taken to convince the Deputies that they needed to split from the 
Unified Bolshevik-Menshevik Duma Fraction and set up a separate 
Bolshevik Duma Fraction. They were instructed to withdraw from
Jjqch, and measures were taken to "strengthen" Pravda' s editorial
2boardo Sverdlov was sent into Russia to reorganise Pravda. He
encountered some opposition from the Bolshevik Duma Deputies who 
had not been entirely convinced by Lenin in Cracow, but managed to
1. u Elwood, op.cit,, pp 369-70; Schapiro, op.cit 0 , p 136, 
The two Bolshevik Deputies voting against this were 
R.V. Malinovskii and M.K. Muranov a Bogdanov's name had 
been inserted without his consent and he requested its 
removal, although he did contribute articles to the paper.
2. KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s"ezdQV, konferentsii
i plenumov TsK, vol 1, M 197O, pp 361-G5; Petryakov, op.cit, 
P 7;
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accompiish the necessary' reforms of the board by the end of January
*
1913. On 10 February, he was arrested, and Stalin, who was far 
from convinced by Lenin's policy, took his place. Stalin was 
arrested four days after his arrival in St. Petersburg, 1 After this; 
two leading Bolsheviks, S.G. Sliaumyan and I.I. Skvortsov-Stepanov 
were offered the editorship. Both declined.
In May'1913, however, Miron Chernomazov, an emigre \vho had 
worked for Sotsial Demokrat in Paris, returned to Russia and became 
editor of Pravda. The exact circumstances of his appointment are
f ~ * *
obscure, and Soviet sources are very reticent, presumably not 
wishing to credit Lenin with the appointment of a police agent to
the editorial chair. One modern historian places the responsib-
3 ility on Kamenev. Nonetheless, whether or not Lenin originally
proposed Chernomazov, the latter did visit him in Cracow on his way
4 to take up the editorship.
As vrell as placing an emigre jji charge of Pravda t 
Chernomazov's appointment indirectly affected the balance within 
the party, shifting it in favour of Lenin . It was the stability of 
Pravda that allowed it to oust the emigre press, and hence gavp» 
authority to the praktildU Chernomazov's editorship saw grave
* vol.48, p 157; Elwood, op.,cit. , p 371; Yu 0 Berne ,v 
.and A. Manusevich, Lenin v Krakovc, M 1972, p 83; I!K 2O l
smerti Ya.M. Svcrdlova", KA/ 1939, no. 1(92), p. GOm^r ™ t
2. Petrj^aliov, op.cito, p 9 0
3. VoT. Loginov, Leninskaya Pravda, M 1972, p 800 ;
4. N.K. Krupsl^aya, Reminiscences of I/^nin. M 1959, p 260.
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disruptions of the Paper's stability. During the eight months 
from May 1913 to Chernomazov's dismissal in January 1914, the paper 
was seized and fined continually and closed down five times (only 
to reappear each time with a different name). Between July and 
September 1913, 80% of the issues were seized. 1
The paper's finances were weakened by the continual fines 
and by loss of revenue, and by the end of 1913 there was a deficit 
of 3,000 rubles. The irregular appearance also caused circulation
to drop from 42,000 in April to 18,000 in the autumn, thus compound-
2ing the financial problems and decreasing its influence.
This is not to say that Lenin actively wanted Pravda to 
collapse. On the contrary, in spite of all his initial reservations 
and of his continuous problems with Pravda, the paper was necessary 
to him. The fact that the Bolshevik paper, even a Conciliator one, 
had a much larger circulation than the Menshevik daily Luch could 
be used in the International to support his case that the Russian 
worker was Bolshevik. Also, whilst not all of his articles were 
being published, many were and this meant that some of his policies, 
at least, were reaching the Russian workers.
Nevertheless, his reaction to Chernomazov's adventurous 
editorial policy was markedly restrained. He made no direct response 
at all until late August 1913, by which time 80% of the paper's
1. Istoriya KPSS, vol.2, M 1967, pp 407-08; PSS, vol.48,
pp 398, 4O2 0 The names were Rabochaya Pravda, Severnaya 
Pravda, Pravda Truda, Za Pravdu and Proletarskaya Pravda.
2; RIC: Elwood, op.cit., p 374; "Zhandarmy o Pravde", PR, 
1923, no 0 2(14), p 458, PSS, volo48, p 255.
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issues were being seized by the police. His response then was 
not to suggest ways by which the editors should avoid police action, 
Instead, he suggested that Pravda should become a weekly paper, as 
this would be more in keeping with its finances, and, as if to 
reinforce this point, he complained that he had not been paid for 
articles he had submitted and that "this is getting to be worse 
than a joke".
It is not possible to explain Lenin's odd reaction to
Pravda's precariousness, by his concern for Krupskaya's health and
o
the move to Berne in July so that she could have an operation,
for he was taking steps to reactivate the emigre press. In June, 
Okhrana agents in Paris reported preparations to revive Sotsial 
Demokrat, and gave as the reason for this the police action against 
Pravda. In July, Lenin held a conference of emigre' organisations
in Berne, which discussed the strengthening of the illegal emigre
3press, and improved ways of transporting it to Russia. When he
returned to Poland at the end of July, he held a Central Committee 
meeting which again discussed Sotsial Demokrat and contrasted its 
role with that of Pravda, No recommendations were made to Pravda
1. PSS, vol 48, p 207. This contrasts to his letter to Gorky- 
.ten months earlier, urging him to write for Pravda, although 
it "usually pays two kopeks a line and more frequently pays 
nothing, and cannot attract anyone by its fees"; 
ibid., p 100.
2. As Elwood does, op.cit., p 373.
3. "Arkhivnye dokumenty i biografii V.I 0 Lenina", KA, 1934, 
no 1, pp 241--43.
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on how to avoid seizure.
On the other hand, the discussion at that meeting does 
reveal how Lenin saw Pravda's deleterious effect on the emigre' 
leadership and, consequently, on Party policy:
Despite the large amount of legal workers' 
publications, the absence of illegal literature 
is strongly making itself felt and in fact 
brings to nought all attempts to organise 
underground work. The attention of the con- 
scious masses is focussed on the legal workers' 
organs, as a result of which no reports from 
the areas are coming abroad and there is no 
possibility of assessing the current situation; 
it is even unknown where and how party groups 
and cells exist and function. Besides which, 
the legal press suffers from the disadvantage 
that it cannot allot space to organisational ~ 
questions, in the special meaning of this term.
The conclusion that Lenin drew from this is that discussion of organ- 
isational and Party matters should become the preserve of Sotsial 
Demokrat, which as an illegal paper could discuss them with more 
freedom. Polemics against the Liquidators should become the preserve 
Of Pravda. In other words, he was proposing that Pravda should 
become the kind of paper its editors and readers had always opposed.
His attitude to Chernomazov personally was remarkable, too. 
In 1912, Lenin had done what he could to draw into line editors 
whom he described as "not men, but sad spineless creatures and
o
wreckers of our cause" because they wanted unity with the Mensheviks.
1. M,A0 Tsyavlovskii (ed 0 ), Eol'sheviki: dokumenty po istorii 
bol'shevizma s 1903 po 1916 god, M 1918, pp 131-36.
2. ibid, p 135.
3. PSS, vol.48, p 157 0
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Furious letters were written, organisers sent into Russia, new 
editors found. Yet at no stage in 1913 does he suggest, or accede 
to any suggestion that Chernomazov be replaced even when, in July, 
Malinovskii came out with a strange story, hinting that 
Chernomazov had some kind of contact with the Okhrana.
Chernomazov might not be ideal but, as Lenin wrote to Gorky,
it had taken him a whole year of great trouble to find a tolerable
2
editoro To Lenin, of course, this meant an editor who could make
Pravda the mouthpiece of pro-illegal party, anti-Liquidationist 
policy. The only alternative to Chernomazov, after the arrests 
earlier in the year, was M.S. Ol'minskii who would turn the paper
back into a Conciliator pro-unification paper. At present, there
3was simply no-one else who would do.
The danger of Ol'minskii taking over as editor was shown in 
May 1913, when Pravda published an article by Bogdanov explaining 
the attitude of the Vpered Group towards the Duma. Lenin was
furious, and his anger increased when Pravda refused to publish
4 his reply. The affair caused bad blood between Lenin and the
Russian.praktiki until well into 1914. 5 Chernomazov's role in all 
this is obscure. Possibly he was outmanoeuvred by Ol'minskii 
here. Possibly he engineered the affair
1. -Tsyavlovskii (ed e ), op.cit., p 131.
2. PSS, vol.48, p 211.
3. PSS, vol.31, p 80.
4. PSS, vol.48, pp 190, 201; Petryakov, op 0 cit., p 9.
5. PSS, vol.48, pp 262, 266.
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to create more disruption between the Leninists and the Vperedists 
in accordance with Okhrana policy to divide the RSDLP as much as
 
possible. This would seem to be borne out by his suppression of 
a letter from Aleksinskii, the one Vperedist with whom Lenin, at 
this stage, saw some chances of unity. Most probably, he allowed 
the affair to develop, to bring home to Lenin what would happen to 
Pravda, and hence to Lenin's authority over the Party inside Russia, 
should he be removed and Ol'minskii replace him as editor.
Certainly, Chernomazov was aware of and took full advantage 
of the patronage he enjoyed  He treated his fellow editors with 
contempt, drove them to resign, refused to let them see before 
publication the contentious articles that were causing all the
police attention, and insisted on receiving all correspondence from
2 Lenin unopened. The editors complained to Lenin, they were told
that he was "satisfied with the paper and its editor, and in all 
this time the only bad thing I have heard about him is that he
works like an ox". They complained again, and again, but were
3 merely told "not to be awkward".
*  
Thus, although undoubtedly unhappy in some ways about the 
fall off in Pravda's circulation.,(which weakened his claims to the 
International of a mass following for Bolshevism), and about the
1.   PSS, vol 48, pp 190, 194.
2. "Deyatel'nost' TsK RSDRP po rukovodstvu gazetoi Pravda", 
^lA, 1959, no 4, pp 45-48.
3. "Lenin i Pravda". KL, 1924, no 1 (10), p 78; "Iz
peripiski TsK RSDRP s mestnymi partiinymi organizat- 
siyami (1912-14)", IA, I960, no 2, p 30.
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rumours surrounding Chernomazov, Lenin used them to restore his 
control over the Russian Party. The fall in circulation and 
police seizures shifted the balance somewhat back towards the 
emigre leaders. Chernomazov was prepared to fight the Liquidators 
and was a useful stick with which to beat Ol'minskii. When a good 
editor could be found,and Pravda firmly putting forward Lenin's 
policies, then would be time enough to aim for a higher circul- 
ation o
By the late sunnier of 1913. Lenin was ready to push through 
a complete split with the Mensheviks inside Russia, by splitting 
the Duma Fraction. In September, five of the Bolshevik Duma 
Deputies and a number of praktiki attended a conference in the 
Galician village of Poronin. Lenin had originally intended this to
be a Party school, with lectures on Marxism etc., like that held
2two years before at LongjumeaU". However, with Pravda more to his
liking, and with Malinovskii emerging as a more than competent
leader, he decided to make the Conference a briefing session for
3the Duma split.
Pravda had an important role to play in winning public 
opinion to the split for, as Badaev records, it was not clear that
1. In June he called for a readership of 100,000 (PSS, vol 48, 
p 188) then the Bogdanov dispute worsened (ibid,, p 201); 
this was followed by his suggestion that the paper become 
a weekly (ibid., p 207.)
2. "Iz perepiski TsK...", IA, 1960, no 2, p 27.
3. KPSS v rezo]yutsiyakh..,voi i, p 386; A. Badaev,
Bol'sheviki v gosudarst vnmom Dump, M 1954, pp 183-8-1.
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the workers understood that unity with the Liquidators was 
detrimental to their interests. Now it became very important to 
Lenin that Pravda should not be seized by the police, and that 
its circulation should increase. The change in attitude is 
reflected in his correspondence with Chernomazov 0 In the five
months between the end of April'and the Poronin Conference, Lenin
2had written him only four letters 0 None of these mentioned the
paper's 'tone 1 which was getting into trouble with the censors. 
Three of them are concerned in one way or another with the 
Bogdanov affair; two of them congratulate Pravda on its improvement 
and three of them ask for money.
Immediately before or even during the Poronin Conference
Lenin wrote to Chernomazov asking him, for the first time, to
3moderate the tone of the paper. The Duma split took place on
25 October. Over the following two months, Lenin wrote no fewer 
than fifteen letters to Chernomazov. In these appeals to moderate
the tone of the paper alternate with instructions on how to
4 
conduct the campaign and congratulations on work well done.
1. Badaev, op.cit., p 183.
2. PSS, vol 48, pp 182-83, 188-91, 20O01, 207.
3. m PSS, vol 48, p 212. The letter is dated by the editors of 
PSS as "not before 30 September 1913". It is not possible 
to deduce from the letter itself how they arrive at this 
date. Presumably, the letter could even post-date the 
Poronin Conference.
4. PSS. vol 48, pp 212-23, 225, 229-30, 236-37, 241.
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The creation of the independent Bolshevik Russian Social- 
Democratic Workers' Fraction in the Duma was to be the culmin- 
ation of Lenin's anti-Liquidationist policies. It meant that for 
the first time there existed in Russia an anti-Conciliationist 
Bolshevik leadership, whose immunity as Duma Deputies gave them 
great stability and the ability to carry out illegal work with 
little fear of arrest. During the Christmas recess, therefore, 
the Central Committee met to discuss future plans and what they 
meant for the management of Pravda without which "all Duma work 
loses 99 per cent of its significance". The Deputies were now 
to shift their main sphere of activity outside the Duma and assume 
their primary role as Party organisers, propagandists and 
agitators. It was now more important than ever that Pravda should 
remain v/ithin the Iaw 0 Strict rules were drawn up for Chernomazov's 
conduct, giving the other editors the right to refer to Lenin any 
article they mi^it be worried about. Ol'minskii in particular was 
given the personal right to defer the publication of any article. 
In addition, the Duma Deputies were to keep a strict eye on all the 
editors. The paper was to be made more attractive so that its 
circulation could be enhanced.
Either Chernomazov did not understand the change in his 
status, or he was under too much pressure from the Okhrana to 
continue to disrupt Pravda. During December, he had been replaced 
as editor by M.A. Savel'ev, and the Central Committee meeting noted
1. KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh..., vol 1, pp 391-95.
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that this had been followed by a marked drop in police interest 
in the paper 0 However, three weeks later, Savel'ev had been 
arrested, and Chernomazov had to be reinstated.
In early February 1914, on returning from his tour of 
Europe, to prepare for the "Exchange of Views" Conference, Lenin 
received a very disturbing letter from K0 N,, Samoilova in 
Petersburg. Pravda had been closed yet again, and this time the 
Bolshevik Deputy Petrovskii, the paper's publisher, was being 
called to account for the claim made in an article written by
Chernomazov, that all the various variants of Pravda were really
2one paper representing 'one ideological organisation*.
Chernomazcv had gone too far and must be dismissed. The problem 
was how to replace him. Savel'ev had been arrested, and Ol'minskii 
was a conciliator, Lenin decided to risk sending Kamenev back to 
take charge. The fact that he was prepared to;risk the arrest of 
so important an emigre testifies to the importance that Pravda had 
assumed. Ol'minskii was allowed to confront Chernomazov with his 
evidence and the latter was removed to other work, although not 
expelled from the party as the evidence was considered
1. ibid., p 393.
2. "Deyatel'nost TsK RSDRP po rukovodstvu gazetoi 'Pravda' 
(1912-1914)", IA, 1959, no 4, p 4g.
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inconclusive 0 The Okhrana avenged itself on 18 February by 
arresting E 0F 0 Rozmirovich, the Secretary of the Duma Fraction, 
and KoN, Samoilova, Secretary of the editorial board, and Lenin's 
principal informants on Chernomazov.
Kamenev's appointment created the problem of whether the 
elaborate rules evolved by the Central Committee in December 1913, 
to control Chernomazov, remained in force, or whether they could 
be changed without a formal CC meeting. A letter had to be sent, 
presumably on Lenin's own initiative as no CC meeting is recorded,
giving the new editor more leeway. In return Pravda promised "to
3 publish everything you send, down to the last line" 0 In addition
to this satisfactory state of affairs, Pravda was restored to 
health, under Kamenev's editorship,, Circulation climbed to
1. ibid, pp 5Q-52 0 Elwood, op.cit., p 376, assumes that Lenin 
decided to send Kamenev only after Ol'minskii's confront- 
ation with Chernomazov c Presumably he bases this on the 
fact that neither Saimoilova nor Rozmirovich mention Kamenev 
in their letters describing the affair ("Deyatel'nost 1 Tsk 
...", pp 5O-52) 0 This is not conclusive as there would be 
very good conspiratorial reasons for not doing so 0 On the 
other hand, Lenin's own account written in March 1917 
clearly states that Kamenev was sent to Russia to get rid 
of Chernomazov (PSS, vo! 0 31, p 80) 0 This accords with 
Krupskaya's account that Lenin decided to send Kamenev 
"shortly after his (Lenin's) return from Paris", i a e 0 
shortly after 24 January (OS) (Krupskaya, Reminiscences of 
Lenin, p 271). In any case, Kamenev was in Petersburg by 
- 14 February as, by then, Lenin was writing to him there 
(PSS. vol.48, pp 262-63).
2. V.T. Loginoy, Lenin i Pravda, M 1962, p 190.
3 e y.i. Lenin: biopraficheskava khronika, vol.3, pp 189-207; 
Petryakov, Kollcktivnyi ap;itatoi:, p 134; idem, 
"Deyatel'nost V.I. Lenina po rukovodstvu 'Pravdoi 1 v 1912- 
14gg. M , VI, 1956, no.11, p 15.
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40,000 daily and on the paper f s second birthday 130,000 copies 
were sold, 75,000 of these in Petersburg alone  Lenin was, of
course, delighted that "for the first time we can see the
2intelligent direction on the spot by an editor who understands" 
Yet any such satisfaction was likely to prove short- 
lived o The stability of Pravda and the joint experiences of 
strikes, demonstrations and barricades in the summer of 1914, 
had the same effect on the Party as they had in 1912 0 From June 
onwards, Okhrana agents report strong grass-roots movements 
towards the reunification of the Party and that the Duma 
Deputies themselves were anxious to reunite, but were unwilling
to take the responsibility on thenselves, and were awaiting the
3 
decision of the forthcoming Conference of the Internationale
In the event, the outbreak of war prevented the Congress and 
thus the reunification from taking place  Nonetheless, the 
Okhrana took these reports seriously enough to issue an 
instruction to all controllers to ensure that their agents in 
the Social Democratic Party should "insistently and unswerv- 
ingly stress the idea of the absolute impossibility of any kind
of organisational merger 000 and especially of any union between
A 
Bolsheviks and Mensheviks".
1. 'V.T. Loginov, Leninskaya Pravda, p 354.
2. PSS, vol.48, p 272 0
3. Tsyavlovskii, Bol'sheviki, pp 143-46 0
4. ibid, p 148,
-44-
CHAPTER TUD
THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEFT BOLSHEVIK!
IN EMIGRATION 1914-17
-45-
The outbreak of the War, or rather the behaviour of his 
rivals on the outbreak of the War., gave Lenin a chance to recoup 
and to vindicate the policies he had fought for since the Prague 
Conference. The vote of the German Social-Democrats in the 
Reichstag for war credits gave him a clear issue on which to fight 
them, untainted by overtones of police provocation, or of greed 
for the Shmidt inheritance. (The rumour of German subsidy was as 
yet in the future.) The German Social-Democrats and the French 
and all the major leaders of the Second International had dis- 
regarded the resolutions of the 1907 Stuttgart Congress and of the 
1912 Basel Congress of the International on war. Instead of 
responding by the "indignation and revolt of the working class" 
and the "desperate moves" threatened by the Basel Congress, the 
Socialist leaders had voted to finance the War, thereby ensuring 
that statesmen could in future afford to disregard the expressed 
policies of organised labour. Kautsky, Vandervelde and the others 
had not only disregarded a few resolutions, they had destroyed the 
International.
The behaviour of the leaders of the International created a 
good deal of confusion in the RSDLP inside Russia and in emigration 
In Paris, a fair number of emigres, including some Bolsheviks, 
volunteered for the French Army. Before leaving for the Front, 
they were addressed by Plekhan>ov, who told them that if he had 
been younger, he too would have taken up arms.
1. V. Antonov-Ovseenko, V scmnadtsatom godu, M 1933, pp 45-47; 
M. Syromatnikova, "Bernskaya Konferentsiya Zagrtmichnykh 
organizatsiyakh RSDRP (b) v 1915 g", PR, 1925, no 5 (40), 
p 151.
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Vladimir Burtsev, the Socialist Revolutionary who had exposed 
Malinovsky, Boris Savinkov the famous SR terrorist, and Prince 
Kropotkin/the Anarchist, also declared their support for the War.
Inside Russia, too, there was disorganisation and demoralis- 
ation. The vote of the German Social-Democrats naturally received 
quite a lot of publicity in the press, as did the subsequent votes 
of the French and Belgian Socialists. This was followed by a 
telegram to the Russian workers from Bnile Vandervelde, now a 
minister in the Belgian government, calling for support for the War. 
Some Social-Democratic leaders declared their support for the War, 
most notably perhaps N0D. Sokolov (the future author of Order No 1 
of the Petrograd Soviet). Even those Social Democrats who did 
oppose the War; felt somewhat insecure in so doing? because of the
overwhelming support in other sections of the International and
2the absence of any news from the Bolshevik leadership abroad.
Nonetheless, the five Bolshevik Deputies and six Menshevik 
Deputies issued a joint statement denouncing the War as an
imperialist struggle,which they presented to the Duma and then
3 walked out rather than vote for war credits.
It was with some relief that the Russian Bolsheviks received
1. A.E. Senn, The Russian Revolution in Switzerland, p 18.
2. D. Baevskii, "Partiya v gody imperialisticheskoi voiny
in M.N. Pokrovskii (ed.), Qcherki po i^torii Oktyabr'skoi 
revolyutsii, M-L, 1927, pp 345, 349, 361;RM Arskii, 
"V Petrograde vo vremya voiny", KL, 1923, no 7, p 77; 
K. Kbndrat'ev, "Vospominanii o podpol'noi rabote", KL, 
1923, no 5, p 232.
3. Senn, op.cit,, p
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tenin's Theses on the War, brought back to Russia at the end of 
August by the Bolshevik Duma Deputy F.N. Samoilov,, Isolation 
was now not so complete. What is more, they had done the right 
thing. The Theses reiterated the view that the War was an
imperialist one and that the leaders of the German, French and
o
Belgian Socialists had betrayed the working class. If this was
all very reassuring, one section of the Theses did cause some 
confusion inside Russia. This was Lenin's tenet that:
... from the point of view of the working class 
and all the labouring masses of Russia the 
lesser evil would be the defeat of the Monarchy 
and its forces, which are oppressing Poland, 
the Ukraine and a whole number of the peoples 
of Russia, inflaming national hatred to 
strengthen the hold of the Great Russians over 
other nationalities and to stabilise the 
reactionary and barbarous Tsarist monarchy.
Nonetheless, it was with much more self-assurance that in 
mid-October a number of leading Bolsheviks met at Kamenev's house 
to draw up a rejection of Vandervelde's appeal. This appeal had, 
in fact, had the paradoxical effect of stiffening Bolshevik oppos- 
ition to the War, by bringing home the extent of the changes in
1. A. Shlyapnikov, Kanun Semnadtsatogo goda, M-P, 1923,
vol 1, p 33; Arskii, op 0 cit 0 , p 78; both these sources 
state that they appeared in Petersburg in August in 
No 33 of Sotsial-Demokrat. However, this was not published 
until Novembero V   I. Lenin: Biograficheskaya Khronika, 
vol 3, M 1972, p 276, records that Lenin gave Sanoilov 
  copies of the theses to take to Russia. Shlyapnikov, 
loc.cit.. recalls that it was Samoilov who brought the news,
2. PSS, vol 26, pp 1-3.
3. ibid., p 6; Shlyapnikov, op.cit,, p 37; Buevskii, op.cit. 
p 365.
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the position of the Western Socialists. Vandervelde, the Chairman 
of the International, was now a Minister in the Cabinet of the 
Belgian king. His message was delivered to Prince Kudashev, 
Russian Minister in Brussels, by the Belgian Ministry of War, and 
transmitted to Russia by the Tsarist Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
where the Deputies learnt of it from the bourgeois press before it 
was delivered to them. For some Bolsheviks, at least, the enemy 
was becoming easier to identify.
The Vandervelde message also brought out the differences 
which existed between the Bolshevik and Menshevik Deputies, despite 
their joint declaration on the War. Unlike the Bolsheviks, the 
Mensheviks did not reply to Vandervelde. Some indeed let it be
known that they did "not in our activities in Russia oppose the
2War". Here, then, was the difference that Lenin had been trying
to make clear to the International and to his own party before the 
War. Bolsheviks and Mensheviks might say the same things and 
vote the same way inside the Duma, but whereas the Menshevik 
Deputies saw that as the full extent of their duties, the Bolsheviks
saw it as only part of theirs 0 The Bolshevik Deputies began
3
agitating throughout the ccuntry for support for their policies.
In November, they and Kamenev were arrested, and after a trial, 
they were exiled to Siberia for life. The Menshevik Deputies
1. Gankin and Fisher, op.cit-,,, p 157; Arskii, op.cito, p 77; 
Shlyapnikov, op.cit a , pp 41-43.
2. Gankin and Fisher, loc.cit a
3. Baevskii, op.cit., pp 344, 352; Bol'shqviki v gody
imperiaiisticheskoi voiny.. Sbornik dokumcntov, M 1939, p 185,
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remained at liberty.
The outbreak of War found Lenin still in Austrian Galicia 
where he was interned as an eneny alien. Ironically, it was 
through the good offices of Viktor Adler, whose support for the 
War gave him the right sort of influence, that Lenin was released 
and allowed to move to Switzerland, where he arrived on 
5 September 1914 (N.S.).
Here he began the task of rallying the emigre Bolshevik 
groups, a task which he believed could only be done by combining 
the attack on the War with the attack on the Second International. 
As news from Russia came through, he was to add to this the attack 
on the Ghkheidze group of Menshevik Deputies, who spoke against 
the War but no more.
The day after his arrival in Berne, Lenin called a meeting 
of the local Bolsheviks which lasted two days and finally
approved his position on the War. It was the resolution from this
*•)
meeting that was taken into Russia by Samoilov. Then followed a
period of intense study of current newspapers and books on war, 
In early October, however, he was again giving lectures on the
War, culminating in a public confrontation with Plekhanov in the
3 Maison du Peuple in Lausanne, on 11 October.
1. V.I. Lenin: biograficheskaya khronlka, vol 3, pp 270, 273.
2. ibid., pp 275-76.
3 - ibid,, pp 276-84; PSS, vol 49, p 9; N.K. Krupskaya, 
Reminiscences of Lenin, pp 286ff.
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Lenin attached particular importance to this confrontation,
as Plekhanov's support for the War had had a particularly de-
1moralising'effect on anti-War Bolsheviks.
As well as rallying the emigres, Lenin had to re-establish
links with the Party inside Russia. At the beginning of the War,
oit seemed that all previous links had been broken. In the mean
»
time, he began reviving the emigre Central Organ Sotsial-Demokrat. 
This had been defunct since December 1913, when Lenin's attention 
had been concentrated entirely on Pravda inside Russia. Indeed, 
so defunct was it, that none of the Bolsheviks formerly involved in
it could remember when the last issue had been, thereby earning
3themselves a ticking off from Lenin as "Liquidators". The
proposal to revive the paper apparently came some time in 
September from V.A 0 Karpinskii, who was in charge of the Bolshevik 
archive in Geneva. He began to get this and other printing projects
in hand, and by 17 October preparations for No 33 of Sotsial-
4 Demokrat were well underway.
1. Syromatnikova, op.cit., pp 150-51.
2. G.L. Shklovskii, "Vladimir Il'ich nakanune Bernskoi 
konferentsii", PR, 1925, no 5 (20), p 142.
3. ibid., p 138; Syromatnikova, op.cit., p 151.
4. PSS, vol 49, pp 5, 8-11. As these are Lenin's letters in
response to Karpinskii's, it is not always clear what he is 
referring to. At first sight, the decision to revive 
Sotsial-Demokrat appears to be taken only on 16 or 17 October 
(ibid., p 11), but a footnote to an earlier letter explains 
that it refers to gotsial Dcnokrat (ibid.. pp 5, 483) although 
this does not seem justified by the text alone, nor from the 
summary of Karpinskii's letter to Lenin given in V.I. Lenin: 
biograficheskaya Khronika, vol.3, p 280.
(cont. overleaf)
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Qn 16 October Lenin's anxieties about contact with Russia were 
relieved when he received a letter from Shlyapnikov who had 
just reached Stockholm from Russia. Shlyapnikov' s mission was to 
re-establish links between the Russian Party and Lenin  
Shlyapnikov's letter was also heartening in that it contained
news of the acceptance of Lenin's thesis on the War by the Russian
2party, and the text of the Duma Deputies' reply to Vandervelde,
Shlyapnikov was told to stay in Stockholm and oversee the organ- 
isation of transport of letters, people and literature in and out 
of Russia.
In early November the first batch of Sotsial-Demokrat, no 33,
3 
arrived in Stockholm and by mid-November it was in Russia. Lenin
also made sure that one copy was sent to the International
4 Socialist Bureau in Brussels 
The Bolshevik position was now making itself heard in
(contd from previous page) ^
This is only important in that Lenin received Shlyapnikov's 
letter'between -the two letters he wrote to Karpinskii (see 
below). If the'editors of PSS are right Lenin took the 
decision before he knew that he could get the paper into 
Russia. The text of the letters themselves imply that he 
originally had intended to publish leaflets, but by 
17 October (i 0 e 0 after he knew that he could send material 
regularly into Russia, he decided to revive the CO.
1. Shlyapnikov, op.cit., p .44; V.I.. Lenin: bio^raficheskaya 
khronika, vol 3, p 285; Shklovskii, ojxcit., p 142".
2. PSS, vol 49, p 12.
3. PSS, vol 49, p 23; V.I. Lenin: biopyaf icheskaya khronika, 
vol 3, p 297.
4. PSS, vol 26, p 159.
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Western Europe as well. In late November, Shlyapnikov addressed 
the Congress of Swedish Social Democrats, making a speech that 
impressed Lenin very favourably. His pleasure was doubtless com- 
pounded by reports of the speech delivered to the Congress by 
Yu Larin, representing Martov's Organising Committee. According 
to Larin, the OC now represented, as well as the various national 
organisations and the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland 
and Lithuania, the Russian organisations led by Martov, Aksel'rod 
and.. .Plekhanov. Larin thus claimed to be speaking on behalf of 
organisations that opposed and of organisations that supported the 
War! L^nin was able to make quite a lot of this and also of the 
fact that on their own admission, for all their supposed opposition 
to the War, the OC was quite happy to speak on behalf of 
chauvinists.
After this auspicious beginning, however, Lenin suffered 
some setbacks. Inmediately after the Stockholm Congress, 
Shlyapnikov moved to Copenhagen, and links with Russia were broken
Q
again. At the same time, Lenin learnt of the arrest of the
1. PSS, vol.29, p 42.
2. PSS, vol.26, pp 111-18, 126-27; this gave rise to some
rather confused statements from the OC. Gankin and Fisher, 
op.cit., p 160; cf. Martov's reaction in Pis'ma Aksel'roda 
i Martova, p 307.
3. PSS, vol.49, p 42; Shlyapnikov, op.cit., p 64, claims 
that he was forced to leave Sweden after the Congress. 
However, Lenin knew of his intention to go to Denmark 
before 25 November, as on that date he wrote to 
Shlyapnikov telling him not to go (PSS, vol.49, p 35). 
Perhaps a clue to the mystery could be that Kollontai, 
with whom Shlyapnikov was then having an affair, had been 
deported to Copenhagen 0 ibido, loc.cit.: A 0 Kollontai, 
"Avtobiognifachcskii ocherk", PR, 1921, no.3, pp 291-92.
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Bolshevik Deputies. Although this could be used internationally 
to demonstrate that the Tsarist Government could see the differ- 
ence between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, even if Kautsky and 
Rosa Luxemburg could not, the fact remained that their arrest de- 
capitated the Party inside Russia. It was indeed followed by a 
severe decline in membership, the Petersburg Organisation 
numbering only between one hundred and one hundred and twenty 
members by the end of November. 3
Things deteriorated further with the trial of the Duma 
Deputies in February 1915. At the trial, Kamenev disassociated 
himself from Lenin and the Central Conmittee abroad and from the 
slogan of the defeat of Tsarism being the lesser evil. Apart 
from further allowing the legal non-socialist Russian press to add 
to the confusion inside the Party in Russia as to what its 
position on the War was, it also enabled it to say that there was
yet again a conflict between the Central Conmittee abroad and the
4 praktiki in Russia.
Yet again, it was the editor of Pravda who was responsible 
for highlighting this difference, and Lenin's whole position in 
opposing the old leadership of the International and the other 
tendencies in the RSDLP depended on his being able to prove 
precisely that he more than anyone else was in touch with the
1. PSS, vol.49, p 36.
2. ibid., pp 36-37.
3. Istoriya KPSS, vol.2, p 547.
4. PSS, vol.26, p 171; Baevskii, op.cit., p 356.
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Russian working class.
But not everything that came out of the trial was bad. 
Deputies G.I. Petrovskii and M 0 K. Muranov made a very good showing, 
enabling Lenin to give more details about the difference between 
revolutionary socialists using Parliament for revolutionary 
purposes (i.e. the Bolshevik Deputies) and evolutionary socialists, 
for whom Parliament was an end in itself. Until the Deputies had 
been tried and condemned, he had not been able to give actual 
examples of what he meant. From now on, he was to make much of 
what he called "work of the Muranov type" (muranovskogo tipa). 1 
In essence, what this came down to was that although the joint 
pronouncement in the Duma had been all very fine, it did not tell 
the workers what they should do. The Bolshevik Deputies did just 
that, and that is why they were exiled to Siberia for life.
Although Lenin had achieved a good deal in the first few 
months of the War to establish a rival centre of authority to that 
of the leaders of the Second International, there was still a good
deal of dissension between those who opposed the War. The 
Petersburg Committee declaration against the War, for example,
issued on 18 July 1914 (OS), called on workers to oppose the War 
because it was in the interests of Tsarism. The full implic- 
ations of this were only to be revealed in March 1917, when a
!  " PSS, vol.26, p 175; ibid,, p 262, it is used in an
attack on the Second International; and ibid,, pp 332-35, 
a whole section of his major pamphlet Sot.sializm i volna 
discusses the extra-parliamentary work of the Duma 
Deputies. A year later at the Kiental Conference the 
Bolsheviks cited Muranov's words at his trial to reinforce 
a point about revolutionary action to end the war. 
L.A. Slepov and Ya 0 G. Temkin, "Kintal'skaya konferentsiya", 
NiNI, 1966, no.3, p 27.
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considerable section of the Bolshevik leadership felt that it 
could support the War, now that the Tsarist Government no longer 
existed. But even in the short term, echoes of this sort of 
difference could be found in Kamenev's statement at his trial 
that he did not support defeatism. It was to sort out this kind 
of question that Lenin called a conference of Bolshevik groups 
abroad, which eventually met in Beme at the end of February 1915. 
Also pressing was the question of financing Sotsial-Demokrat . 
Lenin was anxious to make it a weekly, but this was made
difficult by printing problems, lack of funds and lack of
2 
articles. These difficulties threatened to be compounded by the
decision of a group of Bolsheviks living at Baugy to publish
3 their own newspaper. Lenin ordered them not to do so.
The Baugy Group, as it was called, was made up of 
N.I. Bukharin, N.V. Krylenko and E.F. Rozmirovich (the former 
secretary to the Duma Fraction). Bukharin was its prime mover, 
and he had two main points of difference with Lenin. First, he 
had suspected Malinovskii of being a police agent as early as 1912.
1. Bol'sheviki v gody mirovoi voiny, pp 1-2.
2. PSS, vol.49, pp 46, 48, 53, 59, 66, 495: ti e. cnlvj
they had been able to find in Switzerland with Russian type 
was run by a Ukranian nationalist who was sometimes drunk 
and usually gave precedence to Ukranian nationalist 
publications 0 Krupskaya, op 0 cit a , p 297.
3. V 0 I, Lenin: biograficheskaya khronika, vo! 0 3, pp 309-10; 
Gankin and Fisher, op 0 cit 0 , p 173, write that the Paris 
Section also wished to publish its own paper . I have been 
unable to trace any evidence to confirm this. However, there 
was a strong patriotic group in the Paris Section who volun- 
teered for the French Army 0 Ya u G u Tonkin, Bernskaya 
konforentsiya zagranichnykh sektsi i RSDRP(1915g 0 ), M 1961, 
pp 36ff .
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He and Lenin had rowed about it then, and again in the summer of 
1914, and the disagreement remained as a source of friction between 
them. Secondly, Bukharin was developing a theory (to be dubbed 
by I^nin as 'Imperialist Economism 1 ) according to which the devel- 
opment of Imperialism meant that the proletariat must now be aiming 
at taking power rather than aiming for a democratic revolution. 
Furthermore, Lenin's slogan of the transformation of the \forld War 
into a Civil War, while good, was not the sole one, and Bolsheviks 
should consider the revolutionary implications of the slogan 'Peace' 
and 'for the United States of Europe 7 .
The problem for Lenin here was that Bukharin's ideas were too 
closely allied to those of Trotsky (i.e. Permanent Revolution and the 
United States of Europe) and of Kautsky ('Peace') with whom Lenin was 
trying to draw a clear demarcation line. Equally dangerous was the
fact that these views were also being expressed by Bolsheviks inside
3Russia.
At first the Baugy Group were not going to attend the 
Bolshevik Conference called for the end of February in Berne. They 
felt that Lenin would not allow their views to be aired in Sotsial 
Demokrat, and were still hoping to get their own paper going, 
with the help of money from Rozmirovich's sister, E» Bosh
1. S. Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution, London,
1974, pp 18, 21; E. Bosh "Bernskaya konferentsiya 1915g", 
PR, 1925, no 0 5(40), p 180.
2. D. Baevskii, "Bor'ba Lenina protiv bukharinykh 'shatanii 
mysli'", PR, 1930, no.1(96), p 44; idem,, "Partiya 
v gody imperialisticheskoi voiny", p 366.
3. D. Baevskii, "Bor'ba...", p 24; idem0 , "Partiya v gody...", 
p 382.
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and Yurii Pyatakov who had escaped from Siberia via Japan and were 
now on their way to Switzerland.
The Conference was delayed both in the hope that the Baugy 
Group would change its mind, and in order to allow Pyatakov and Bosh, 
the only two delegates from Russia, to attend. In the event, the 
Conference began without them. However, the Baugy Group,with Bosh 
and Pyatakov, who had persuaded them to attend, did turn up towards 
the end of the Conference. The debate on the International situation 
was then held again, to allow them to contribute. Bukharin pre- 
sented his Theses, but no one, not even the other members of the 
Baugy Group, voted for them. He was made part of the commission to 
draft an agreed resolution, and a compromise seemed to have been 
reached. The Conference also agreed not to publish any other paper
except for Sotsial Demokrat for which all available resources were
2
necessary. Lenin had good reason to be satisfied in that E. Bosh
promised the money that the Baugy Group had been hoping to get for
3 their journal, to finance Central Comnittee material on the War,
Always in the back of Lenin's mind, as he again and again 
returned to his attacks on the leaders of the International and of 
the rival Russian emigre' groups, and as he tried to win support 
for his policies among the emigre' Bolsheviks, was the problem of 
the party inside Russia:
1. Bosh, opoCito, p 179; Shklovskii, opoCito, p 185; 
Syromatnikova, op 0 cit 0 , p 150.
2. Baevskii, "Bor'ba V 0 I 0 Lenina00 ", p 26; Krupskaya, 
op a cit a , p 297; Bosh, op a cit 0 , p 181.
3. Tsyavlovskii, Bol* sheviki t pp 159-60.
-58-
Half a century of Russian political 
emigration,(and thirty years of Social 
Democratic emigration), have these not 
shown that all declarations, conferences, 
etc. abroad are powerless, insignificant and 
and empty, unless they are supported by a 
lasting movement of some social stratum in 
Russia. 1
Thus the need to prevent the Baugy Group from publishing Zvezda 
was not motivated by a gratuitous desire to impose censorship 
but because the journal (i) weakened his attack on Kautsky, and 
on Trotsky whom he saw as softening the attack on Kautsky, and 
(ii) diverted funds from the Party's Central Organ.
There still remained one very serious problem to be solved 
if the movement abroad was to be linked to any kind of movement 
in Russia: the establishment of a reliable illegal transport 
system for people and publications in and out of Russia. 
Shlyapnikov and Kbllontai had now moved from Copenhagen to 
Christiana (Oslo), where some kind of negotiations were underway 
with Norwegian Socialists to set up a transport system. However 
Shlyapnikov was rapidly becoming demoralised. He could not get 
a job in Norway and began to wonder why the editors of Sotsial 
Demokrat could not move to Scandinavia, equally neutral and much 
more convenient for Russia, and give him some support. He 
threatened to go to America, and in the end, left for England 
towards the end of April 1915. The transport system was further
1. PSS. vol.26, pp 189-9O.
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away than ever. Bukharin was sent to Sweden to take 
Shlyapnikov's place. He arrived there at some time during June 
or July.
The transport question had arisen at the Berne Conference, 
where the solution proposed had been to approach all extreme 
left movements of the various European countries including 
Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, whose opposition status in Germany 
would be likely to make them more favourable to Lenin. They 
could be especially useful in the distribution of Bolshevik
o
material to Russian prisoners-of-war in Germany.
The first opportunity for this policy came at the Inter- 
national Youth Conference which was held in Berne in early April. 
The Bolsheviks hoped for much from this Conference, as "most of 
the Youth Sections of the Second International had opposed the 
War, regardless of the actions of their senior parties. Some 
thirteen delegates attended from six countries, Russia being 
represented by a youthful Inessa Armand (aged 40) and 
G.I. Safarov (aged 23), Lenin had managed to persuade the
1. Shlyapnikov, Ranun...vol.1, pp 76-77; Vol. Lenin: Biograf- 
icheskaya khronika,, vol.3, pp 328, 335; Krupskaya, 
Reminiscences..., p 319; G 0 D. Petrov, "A.M. Kbllontai 
nakanune i v gody pervoi mirovoi voiny", NiNI, 1969, no.l, 
p 79.   .
2. M. Futrell, Northern Underground, London, 1963, pp 90-92, 
100.
3. Tsyavlovskii, Bol'sheviki, p 160.
4. Nothing much had come out of the International Conference 
of Socialist Women held one week earlier. 
Gankin and Fisher, op.cit.., pp 288 ff.
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Rozlamowcy, who were uncertain of the Conference's value, to 
attend, and all seemed set for an opportunity to rally Europe's 
socialist youth under Bolshevik slogans. The youth, however, 
proved tougher than expected and at one stage the Bolshevik 
delegates walked out, but Lenin forced them to go back. The 
Bolshevik resolution was duly voted down, and the Conference 
decided to publish a regular paper Jugend-Internationale. This 
was both to rally the left of the European socialist parties, 
as Lenin had hoped, and to prove a thorn in his flesh by giving 
a mouthpiece to ideas he found uncongenial.
On the other hand, the promise given by Pyatakov and Bosh 
at the Berne Conference was taking the shape of a journal called 
Kbnmunist which was to group around it left socialists from 
various different parties. Radek, a Rozlamowec, Fannekoek from 
the Dutch left, and Kbllontai, still then a Menshevik, were to 
be among the contributors.
From the outset there was friction between Lenin on the 
one hand and Pyatakov and Bosh on the other who, to Lenin's fury,
i
apparently considered that their financial contribution entitled 
them to some measure of control over the journal. The first .
%
major dispute arose when Pyatakov and Bosh invited Trotsky to 
contribute to the journal, despite some opposition from Lenin.
1. V.V. Privalov, "Bor'baV.I. Lenina i bol'shevikov...",
VLU, 1962, no.14, p 6; M.M. Mukhamedzhanov, "V.I. Lenin 
i mezhdunarodnaya sotsialisticheskaya molodezh,..", 
NiNI, 1967, no.2, pp 4-5.
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ib I^nin's relief, Trotsky refused, but to his anger, he did 
so in an open letter in Nashe slovo, a paper that he and Martov 
were jointly publishing in Paris. In .this open letter Trotsky 
repeated the accusation that there was really no difference 
between the Bolshevik and Menshevik Fractions in the Duma, and 
added that there were far greater differences between Lenin and 
his new allies in Europe than between him and the other Russian 
Groups.
However, Pyatakov and Bosh visited Lenin to smooth things 
over and they "agreed splendidly" and the differences on the 
editorial board were to remain secret.
Trouble blew up again almost immediately, however, when
Pyatakov and Bosh objected to publishing Lenin's reply to
2Trotsky, and reached a head when they objected to yet another
of his articles. What annoyed Lenin most was the power that 
their money gave them:
The enclosed letter from Yurii.. O is stinking, 
stupid Kulachestvo a It was formally agreed here 
to publish \jthese articles3... 'The publishing 
commission is obliged to -carry out this decision1. 
But they are being wilful! ! 'Mine is the purse, 
I am a petty tyrant 1 It is clear that we cannot 
work like this. 3
1. PSS, vol.,49; pp 78, 501; Gankin and Fisher, op.cit., 
pp 171-73.
2. PSS, vol.49, pp 90, 504; "Est 1 li svoya liniya u OK i u 
fraitsii Chkheidze?" was eventually published in 
February 1916 in Sotsial Demokrat.
3. PSS, vol.49, p 108.
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In spite of the friction that it was giving rise to 
inside the Bolshevik emigration, the preparation of Kbmmunist 
was allowing Lenin to develop friendly, relations with the 
Rozlamowcy, and most notably Karl Radek. Thus, when Robert 
Grium, a leading Swiss Social Democrat and editor of the 
Berner Tagwacht, began organising a Conference of anti-war 
European socialists in the early summer of 1915, it was Radek 
who alerted Lenin to the fact that Grimm was hoping to avoid 
having the Bolsheviks there.
Radek was a good person for Lenin to ally with in his 
campaign against the leaders of the Second International. As well 
as being a member of the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland 
and Lithuania, he had been a member of the German Socialist Party 
and editor of its most radical paper, the Bremer Burgerzeitung. 
In 1912, he had become involved in a very bitter dispute with 
Kautsky over the nature of Imperialism and had been expelled from 
the German Party in that year. As well as having extensive con- 
tacts on the left of both the Polish and German parties, and
1. PSS. vol 0 49, p 81; W. Lerner, Karl Radek, the Last Inter- 
nationalist, Stanford, 197O, p 38. Apparently, Grinrn 
hoped to do this by inviting M. Litvinov, then living in 
London, who was the official Bolshevik representative on 
the International Socialist Bureau. Thus he would formally 
be doing the correct thing in the hope that Litvinov would 
not be able to pass the invitation back to Lenin in 
Switzerland in time. This manoeuvre was not without a 
certain irony, as Litvinov had not been officially notified 
at the time of the Inter-Allied Socialist Conference that 
had been held in London in February 1915  The reason given 
at the time was that his "standing as a delegate" was 
unclear. Gankin and Fisher, op.cit., p 274.
-63-
reasons to dislike the old leadership of both, Radek's period 
as editor of the Bremer Burgerzeitung had enabled him to build 
up wide contacts among the European Left generally, most notably 
perhaps, with Anton Pannekoek,. the Dutch Left Socialist. In 
addition, of course, Radek's experience and talents as a left 
wing German journalist, and his ability to translate Bolshevik 
material into German could greatly increase Lenin's influence. 
Nevertheless, although an alliance with Radek offered great poss- 
ibilities, Lenin treated him with some caution. He had not for- 
gotten his break with the Rozlamowcy in 1914 over the national- 
ities question: a question he had reason to believe that Radek
2
was still involved in.
In the period before the Zimmerwald Conference, however, 
relations remained good. Radek got material translated for 
Lenin, kept him informed of German affairs, put him in touch 
with an American publisher, and between them they tried to get
o
Pannekoek to Zimmerwald.
Indeed, in the last few weeks before the Conference, Lenin
i
used his new alliance with Radek to outmanoeuvre his opponents, 
Martov and Trotsky. On 11 July, Lenin learnt from Lyudmilla Stal', 
who came to see him on her way into Russia, that Trotsky was 
planning to discredit Lenin at Zimnerwald. Trotsky's plan, appar-
*
ently, was to get all the Russian groups at the Conference to vote
l e Lerner, op 0 cit 0 , pp 22-28, 39,
2. V Q I 0 Lenin: Diograficheskaya khronlka, vol.3, p 300.
3. ibid., pp 347, 368, 371, 378; PSS, vol.49, pp 10CMD1.
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for a generally leftist revolution, then once the 'left 1 creden- 
tials of all concerned had been established, to invite all groups 
to a Russian Conference imnediately after the main Zirrraerwald one 
closed. Lenin, it was assumed, would refuse and thereby lose 
credibility in the International.
Lenin's counter move was very cunning. He proposed to use 
Radek as the centre of a Left Bloc at the Conference. This 
might or might not take in the Mensheviks. If it did not, then 
their plan completely disintegrated. If it did, at least the 
Bolsheviks would not be left in isolation. Over the next few 
weeks, Lenin negotiated with Radek over an agreed text for a 
resolution for the Left. Ife drew up two drafts of his own, which 
he sent to Radek, and in return made various objections and 
additions to Radek ! s own proposals. In the end, agreement was 
reached on a text which did not differ too much from Lenin's 
drafts, except that all mention of "just"wars "waged l?y the
oppressed nations against their oppressors" and of the slogan of
2
"defeatism" had been cut out.
i 
Originally Lenin had anticipated a rather small Left Group
at Ziranerwald made up of the Dutch, the Left Germans, Radek and 
the Bolsheviks. The success of his manoeuvre against Trotsky 
however depended on his being able to build a credible Left Group.
t
1. PSS, vol.49, p 91.
2. PSS. vol.26, pp 282-85, 383-85; vol.49, pp 115-17, 125-26; 
Soch, vol.18, pp 416-19; V.I. Lenin: Biograficheskaya 
khronika, vol.3, p 366.
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Kbllontai was of great value at this point in that she was able 
to persuade T. Norman of the Norwegian Socialist Youth and 
Z. Hi>glund of the Swedish Socialist Youth to attend the Confer- 
ence. Lenin himself in the last week before the Conference 
did all that he could in the way of convincing delegates to 
support the Left.
When the delegates met at Zimmerwald on 5 September 1915, 
Lenin's Left Group was outnumbered, but still of a respectable 
size. He could count on eight votes out of a total of thirty-one 
(Lenin, Zinoviev, J. Borchardt (Germany), Z. Hoglund (Sweden), 
T. Norman (Norway), F. Flatten (Switzerland), K. Radek (Poland), 
J. Berzin (Latvia)). The Left's Manifesto was, predictably, 
defeated. Trotsky, Natanson, Chernov and H. Roland-Eblst voted 
for it in addition to the eight members of the Left. Martov 
voted against it. Lenin had both gained a very respectable new
alliance to fight against the Second International, and out-
2manoeuvred his Russian rivals.
The alliance between Radek and Lenin was cemented further
L 
at the Zimmerwald Conference by an incident curiously reminiscent
of the "affair of the five x's" at the 1912 Berne Conference. 
When it came to the signing of the Zirrmerwald Manifesto, which had
been passed unanimously (the Left issued a statement explaining why
1. PSS, vol.49, p 82; Muldiamedzhanov, "V.I. Lenin i
mezhdunarodnaya..,", NiNI, 1967, no 2, p 8; Gankin and 
Fisher, op.cit., p 347; A.M. Kollontai, "Avtobiograf- 
icheskii ocherk", PR, 1921, no.3, pp 292 ff.
2. Gankin and Fisher, op.cit., p 348.
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they voted for it and what their reservations were), the German 
delegation refused to allow Radek to sign, insisting on the 
validity of his expulsion from the German Party. Hanecki's name 
was substituted for Radek's, despite the fact that Hanecki was 
not at the Conference. Thus Radek had it brought home to him 
that his only hope of any kind of political future lay in 
identification with Lenin's Group.
Immediately after the Conference, the first issue of 
Kbmnnnist, a fat double issue at long last appeared, containing, 
among others, an article by Radek. The Berner Tagwacht for 
15 October carried an article by Radek in German containing a 
fierce attack on the Chkheidze Fraction in the Duma. In November 
he brought out the Internationales Flugblatt. the first of the
Zimnerwald Left publications, containing the documents they had
2presented to the Conference.
It was at this point, however, that the longstanding 
difference with Radek, which Lenin had been able to suppress in
the preparation of Zinmerwald and during the Conference, erupted.
k
On 28 and 29 October, the Berner Tagwacht carried a long, two- 
part article by Radek attacking the idea of the right of nations
\
to self-determination. Lenin reacted cautiously, by writing a 
reply - "The Revolutionary proletariat and the right of nations
*
1. Lerner, op.cito, p 42.
2. ibid., pp 43-44; A.E. Senn, The Russian Revolution in 
Switzerland, pp 116-17.
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to self-determination" - which was not published but circulated 
privately.
For some while after he had moved to Sweden in the 
summer of 1915 Bukharin's relations with Lenin remained osten- 
sibly good. He had passed through London on his way to Stockholm, 
and had met Shlyapnikov there. Perhaps as a result of this, or 
at least of further exhortations from Lenin, Shlyapnikov himself 
returned to Sweden. Pyatakov and Bosh promised some money
towards the illegal transport and material began again to pass in
2
and out of Russia. However, both Shlyapnikov and Bukharin felt
the need for more help and suggested again that Lenin and 
Zinoviev join them in Stockholm. Lenin did consider this, and 
the weird schemes suggested for his passage there, but eventually 
turned it down.
1. V.I. Lenin: Biograficheskaya khronika, vol 0 3, p 403;
PSS, vo! 0 27, pp 61-68 (it was not in fa.ct publisned until 
. 1927). There is a discrepancy of editing between vols.27 
and 49 of PSS on this matter, . Vol.27, p 68 states that 
the article was written "not before 29 October 1915", 
i.e. after the publication of Radek's article. Vol,49, 
has notes on pp 111, 112 and 118 to the effect that an 
unnamed article in the letters on these pages is 
"Revolyutsionnyi proletariate.." These letters were 
written in July and August. I have accepted the version 
in vol 0 27, especially as the article specifically refers 
to Radek's piece in Berner Tagwacht on 28 and 29 October 
1915.
2. PSS, vol.49, pp 88, 108; -V.I. Lenin: Biograficheskaya 
. khronika. vol.3, pp 357, 368, 38O-81, 387, 419; 
Shlyapnikov, Kanun.. 0 , vol.1, p 86.
3. PSS, vol.49, pp 108, 156, 399; Krupskaya, Reminiscences., 
p 319.
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While the matter was very much in the air, and in the 
course of the dispute with Lenin over what should go into 
Kbmmunist, Pyatakov and Bosh suggested that they should go to 
Sweden. So angry was he with them ("I do not wish even to reply 
to Pyatakov: his stupid, stinking letter is intolerable...'! am 
the master, I shall not pay!!' No, there is a limit to every- 
thing"), that Lenin agreed, overlooking the danger of placing 
a group of friends with known disagreements with the Central 
Committee at so vital a point in the party's communications.
Indeed, when they took their time leaving, he got even more
o
angry both with them and with Zinoviev, who tried to defend them.
He did, however, take the precaution of making Shlyapnikov a 
member of the Central Comnittee in September to ensure that he 
would be informed should anything develop, and also that he would
have some way of exercising authority in Stockholm, should the
~a "   3 need arise.
At the end of October, Shlyapnikov left for Russia, confid- 
ent that he could leave the transport work to Bukharin and
1. PSS, vol.49, p 108.\
2. ibid., pp 123-24. They did not leave before the end of
September, at the earliest,, V 0 Io Lenin: Biograficheskaya 
khronika, vol,3, p 386, Zinoviev evidently had trouble 
in assessing how to deal with them, as Lenin also took 
him to task for being too sharp with them and risking a 
split before he wanted one and on the wrong issue. 
Presumably, a split was to be avoided so long as they 
might contribute to the transport system. PSS, vol.49, 
p 153.
3. ibid., p 141.
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Pyatakov, and feeling that at last there was some kind of agree- 
ment between Lenin, Zinoviev, Pyatakov, Bukharin and Bosh. 1 
He had fairly good reason to think so. Bukharin's article,
"Imperialism and the World Economy"^ had been accepted for no.l
o
of Kbmnunist, even though Lenin had some reservations. Lenin and
Bukharin were corresponding on many practical details of party
work, and Lenin and Pyatakov were arranging the contents of no.3
3of Kbrmiunist.
The storm broke not long after Shlyapnikov had left for 
Russia, and ten days after Radek's attack on the idea of the 
Self-Determination of Nations had appeared in the BernerTagwacht. 
Lenin had got Krupskaya to translate his reply to Radek, "The 
Revolutionary Proletariat and the Right of Nations to Self-
Determination", into Russian and send it to Bukharin and company
4 in Stockholm. He had possibly done this because he feared that
Bukharin might be influenced by the article, as presumably Swiss 
papers were readily available in neutral Sweden, or possibly he 
had sent it in response to Pyatakov 7 s request the week before
for an article ty Lenin on the national question for Kbirrnanist,
5 
no.3 0 Whatever his motive in sending the article, the reaction
%
1. Shlyapnikov, Kanun,.,, vol.1, pp 86-89, 92.
2. PSS, vol.49, pp 88, 124 0
3. PSS, vol.49, pp 131, 155; V 0 I, Lenin: Biograficheskaya 
khronika, vol.3, pp 391, 4O2 0
4. V.I. Lenin: Biograficheskaya khronika, vol.3, p 4O4.
5. ibidc, p 402; Lenin certainly subsequently saw the actions 
of the Stockholm Group as the result of the influence of 
Radck's articles. PSS, vol.49, p 195.
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it provoked was extraordinary.
On 8 November 1915, Pyatakov sent Lenin a letter on behalf 
of himself, Evgeniya Bosh, Bukharin and a certain Yakov Bogrovskii. 
another Stockholm Bolshevik. The letter asked that the four of 
than be considered as a Special Commission of the Central Conmittee 
with the following functions: i) to inform the emigre section of 
the CC of Russian Affairs; ii) to inform the Russian Party of 
emigre affairs and of the affairs of the Western European Parties; 
iii) to publish and distribute literature; iv) to maintain con- 
tacts with the Swedish Left in the name of the Central Conmittee. 
On one level, all that was being asked for was independence from
the local Stockholm Bolshevik emigres, whom Bukharin described
o
as a "very grey lot". But the disturbing element in the request
for Lenin was that the group were obviously out to control the 
Party. Were the request granted, they would be able to decide 
just how much Lenin got to know about Russian affairs, or about 
the affairs of his Scandinavian allies on the Zinmerwald Left. 
Similarly they would be able to determine just what news of the 
Party's Central Conmittee was transmitted to the Russians and to 
the Swedes.
The affair became even more disturbing when it became 
clear that the group demanding this key position in the Party had 
serious political disagreements with Lenin. Pyatakov's letter
1. Baevskii, "Partiya...", p 445; V.I, Lenin: Biografich- 
eskaya khronika, vo! 0 3, p 405.
2. Baevskii, loc.cit.
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was followed within a few days by one from Bukharin, criticisng 
Lenin's "The Revolutionary Proletariat and the Right of Nations 
to Self-Determination" and promising a set of theses on the 
national question from all four of the group to follow. On 
19 November, Lenin received the theses "On the Slogan of the 
Right of Nations to Self Determination" and a fifteen point 
political platform. Between them these documents were a combin- 
ation of Radek's views on self-determination, and Bukharin's 
views on the State, first put forward at .the Berne Conference 
earlier in the year. Briefly stemming from an analysis of the 
nature of imperialism, they concluded that the struggle for 
National Independence was harmful and reactionary in that it 
obscured the need for the class war for Socialism; also, imperial- 
ism meant that the proletarian struggle must shift outside 
parliaments.
Lenin was thus simultaneously threatened with organisat- 
ional disruption, threatening to cut him off from the Party in 
Russia and ideological disruption threatening to associate part 
of the Bolshevik Party with that part of the Zimnerwald Left 
that appeared to be moving onto an anti-Leninist tack. This 
Lenin was determined to prevent .
His first move was to prevent the BolsheviJk Opposition and 
the potential anti-Lenin group in the Zinmerwald Left from having 
a forum that could reach the Russian Party. He thus wrote a
1. Baevskii, op.cit., pp 514-18.
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letter to Pyatakov and Bosh informing them that he and 
Zinoviev were withdrawing from Kbmmunist as they could not take 
Party responsibility for editors who had such a clearly non- 
Party attitude. In its place, he and Zinoviev were now to 
prepare a journal firmly under Central Conmittee control,
entitled Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata.—-——.————i—.——————_
To Bukharin he wrote a special letter explaining the
otricky relations with the Zimmerwald Left. His attitude to the 
"Special Commission''is best summed up in Krupskaya's notes:
We could not give them so important a right 
as correspondence [with Russia]]. The group 
was not very well suited to this kind of 
task, it had poor security, it was trying to 
take control, but was in essence rather 
unreliable...It was proposed to confirm the 
group, but as a group without the right of 
correspondence with Russia (each individual, 
of course, could write and express his own 
opinions, but they were not to write 
officially as a group). 3
As a consequence of this decision, Krupskaya continues, there was 
terrible anger. Business correspondence continued, but relations 
were strained and dissatisfaction with the Central Committee grew 
worse.
Lenin's suspicions that the request had not been solely 
about independence from the "very grey lot" of Stockholm Bolshevik 
emigres were confirmed when the Group dissolved itself on
1. V.I. Lenin: Biograficheskaya khronika, vol.3, p 414; 
PSS, vol.49, p 229.
2. PSS, vol.49, pp 195, 201.
3. Baevskii, op.cit., p 446„
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3 December, rather than accept their more limited autonomy.
Bukharin, however, continued to correspond with Lenin 
through the winter of 1915-16, sending news of Russia and 
Scandinavia, asking Lenin to write a preface to his "Imperialism 
and the \forld Economy", which he wanted the Party to issue as a 
separate pamphlet, and trying to reverse Lenin's decision to 
withdraw from Kbmmnist. Whatever his differences with Lenin, 
Bukharin was continuing to work as a loyal Party member. On the
other hand, there is no record of any correspondence from either
2Pyatakov or Evgeniya Bosh.
Lenin did not change his mind about Kbmnunist, probably 
because the situation in the Zirrmerwald Left became critical. A 
few days after the Stockholm Group had dissolved itself, Lenin 
read a further article by Radek attacking the idea of Self- 
Determiriation, this time in Lichtstrahlen, the paper of his ally
on the Zimnerwald Left from the German Socialist Party,
3J. Borchardt. As Radek seemed to be intent on spreading his
views throughout the Zimmerwald Left, Lenin felt justified in 
replying publicly, and consequently submitted an article, "The
1. V.I. Lenin: Biograficheskaya khronika, vol.3, p 414.
S. Cohen (Bukharin, p 36) in his account of this says that 
they "dissolved themselves as a Bolshevik section", 
implying an official break with the Central Committee. 
I do not think that this can be substantiated, and 
certainly not from his sole source, Gankin and Fisher, 
op.cit., pp 215-16.
2. V.I. Lenin: Biograficheskaya khronika, vol.3, pp 414, 
419, 420, 421, 453.
3. ibid., p 415.
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Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determin­ 
ation", to Vorbote, which, with the help of money from Anton 
Pannekoek and Henriette Roland-Hoist, had replaced the 
Internationales Flugblatt as the journal of the Zimnerwald 
Left. For some reason this greatly upset Radek,and at the 
meeting of the Bureau of the Zimmerwald Left (i.e. Lenin, 
Zinoviev and Radek) in mid January, he managed to persuade Lenin 
and Zinoviev to defer the publication of Vorbote, no.2, in which 
the article was to appear, until he had consulted Pannekoek and 
Roland-Hoist. What passed then between Radek and his old 
friends (he had known Pannekoek at least since his old days on 
the Bremer Burgerzeitung) is not clear. The outcome was, how­ 
ever, that Lenin's article did appear in Vorbote, no.2, but 
Lenin, Zinoviev, Trotsky and Radek, all of whom were to have 
been on the editorial board along with Pannekoek and Roland-Hoist 
were now dropped, leaving Pannekoek and Roland-Hoist as sole
editors. There was nothing that Lenin could do. The money for
2the publication was, after all, theirs.
Once again, Lenin had been deprived of ideological control 
of an international journal simply because he did not have the 
funds. Once again, as with the Karmunist affair, at the root of 
the dissension were his views on the National Question. What 
made this particularly frustrating was that at this precise
1. PSS, vol.49, pp 173, 231.
2. PSS, vol.49, p 177; Trotsky, in fact, refused to 
collaborate with Vorboto anyway, ibid., p 176.
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nonent, the Ziranerwald Left was gaining ground internationally. 
The problem was, would it gain ground on a Leninist prograrmie? 
One of Lenin's main problems in the Ziirmerwald Left, as 
it had been in the Second International before the War, was to 
convince people who might sympathise with him on all other 
points, that there was a real difference between Bolsheviks and 
Mensheviks inside Russia and that the small emigre Bolshevik: 
groups were a real force in the Russian working class. Time 
and again he stressed to his fellow Bolsheviks that for them
the split with Chkheidze was the "crux of the political
2situation". Pyatakov and Bosh's hesitations on this score,
indeed, had been one of the causes of Lenin's vehemence against
3them. Just at the time that Vorbote was slipping from his con­ 
trol, Lenin got news that Chkheidze was preparing to declare 
his support for the Zimmerwald Movement in an attempt to recoup 
the losses the Mensheviks were suffering in the Russian working
class and, in fact, Chkheidze did make an announcement to this
4 effect to the Duma in February 1916.
1. V.V. Privalov, "Bor'baV.I. Lenina...", VLU, 1962, no.14, 
vyp.3, p 7.
2. PSS, vol.49, pp 86, 88, 94, 1O9, 133, 141, etc.
i
3. ibid., pp 88, 193; they also refused publication in
Kbrrmunist to his article "Does the Chkheidze Fraction 
have a Political Line?", which was eventually published 
in Sotsial Demokrat in February 1916. PSS, vol.49, 
pp 90, 5O4.
4. PSS, vol.49, pp 183, 187-88; L. Schapiro, The Origin of 
the Communist Autocracy, London, 1977, p 22.
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If he was to maintain any kind of authority in the 
Zimmerwald Movement, and most particularly in the Zimmerwald 
Left, it was now more important than ever for Lenin to clarify 
and win support for his differences with Chkheidze. Yet it 
was at this very moment on 1 February 1916 that Radek chose to 
publish in Gazeta Robotnicza, now edited by him in Berne, a 
"Resolution of a Meeting of the Editorial Board, passed on 
1-2 June 1915". This, while declaring general sympathy with the 
Bolshevik position, criticised them for their stand on defeatism, 
and for their split with "less resolute elements", which Lenin at 
least understood as meaning with Chkheidze. In a curt note, 
Lenin broke off all joint work with Radek on Polish and Russian 
questions, saying that unless "The Polish Social-Democracy does 
not declare itself openly and specifically for the split in 
Russia", he anticipated "a new 16 July 1914" (when the 
Rozlamowcy voted against the Bolsheviks at the Brussels "Exchange 
of Views" Conference). N
On 11 March, Shlyapnikov returned to Sweden after spending 
some four and a half months in Russia, re-establishing contacts,
1. PSS, vo! 0 27, pp 275-78; vol.49, pp 181-82, 189. Radek 
and Lenin were reconciled only in early 1917, ibid., vol. 
49, p 378„ Senn, op.cit,, p 125, writes that in order to 
please Radek, Lenin had dropped the slogan on defeatism in 
the draft resolution presented by the Left to the 
Zimnerwald Conference, and that Gazeta Robotnicza then 
claimed that this meant that the Bolsheviks no longer 
attached significance to the slogan. This was in Lenin's 
early draft, and it was dropped. The text of the Gazeta 
Robotnicza resolution of February 1916 as cited" by Lenin 
does attack the Bolsheviks for defeatism, but there is no
word about them no longer attaching significance to the 
slogan; on the contrary. PSS, vol.26, pp 282-85; 
vol.27, pp 275-78.
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rebuilding conmittees, distributing Ziimierwald material, Sotsial 
Demokrat and Kbmnuriist. On his arrival in Stockholm, he was 
distressed to find that relations between Bukharin, Pyatakov 
and Bosh on the one hand and Lenin and Zinoviev on the other were 
extremely strained, and that Kbnminist had ceased publication. 
A typical praktik, Shlyapnikov disliked emigre disputes at the 
best of times. This one alarmed him more than ever as it 
appeared likely to jeopardise all his work in Russia, by inter­ 
fering with the contacts between the Russian Party and the Central 
Committee abroad. Furthermore, he was upset by the decision on 
Kbrnnonist, which had apparently been popular enough among party 
workers inside Russia for the newly constituted Russian Bureau 
of the Central Committee to have passed a resolution for its 
continued publication. He decided to act as a buffer between 
his friends in Stockholm and Lenin and Zinoviev, in an attempt to 
resolve the differences and get Kbnrnunist back into publication.
As might be expected, Lenin,was not prepared to start 
publishing Kbrmiunist again, and thereby give more publicity to 
the views of people like Radek, at a time when he was ideo­ 
logically in a very tight corner in the Ziimierwald Left. In 
addition to which, Radek's views on self-determination had many 
sympathisers in the Party. As well as the Stockholm Group, 
Aleksandra Kbllontai, who had just returned from a propaganda 
trip to the United States, and who was Lenin's main spokesman in
1. Shlyapnikov, Kanun..., vol.1, p 2O4; V.I a Lenin: Bio- 
graficheskaya khronika, vol.3, p 469.
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the Scandinavian Parties, held similar views, and in January 
the Central Comnittee had received a letter from the Moscow 
Party Conmittee along the same lines. So the dispute over 
Kbmnunist which had been dormant for four months, except in 
Rikharin's letters to Lenin, which apparently met with no 
response, flared up again. At the outset, Lenin took a very 
uncompromising stand. His position is admirably laid out in his 
first letter to Shlyapnikov, written some time after 11 March 
1916. This deserves quoting in extenso.'Tor us in Russia," he 
wrote,"in reply to Shlyapnikov f s complaint that he was being 
hard with Bukharin
(and now in the New International too), the question 
of the split [with the Liquidators] was fundamental. 
Any softness here would have been a crime. I know 
only too well that many good comrades...[my sister, 
Elizarova-Ul'yanova, Ol'minskii, our Petersburg 
"friends" from the intelligentsia] were opposed to 
the split in the Duma Fraction. They were, all of 
them, a thousand times wrong. The split was 
essential, and the split with Chkheidze and co. is 
absolutely essential now. Anyone wavering on this 
account is an enemy of the proletariat, and we must 
.be hard on him.
Who is wavering? Not just Trotsky and co. but 
£pyatakov and Boshj . 0 . (who last summer "made a scene" 
about Chkheidze!!) Then the Poles (the opposition). 
Their resolution is in no.25 of Gazeta Robotnicza: 
more prevarications, like those in Brussels on 
16 July 1914.
Hardness- is essential with than.
Radek is the best of them; working with him was 
useful (for the Ziirmerwald Left among other things) 
and we worked with him. But Radek wavers too. And
1. G.D. Petrov, "A.M. Kollontai...", ISSSR, 1968, no.3, p 90; 
Baevskii, "Partiya.„.", p 45O.
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our tactics here were two-fold...fand Pyatakov and 
Bukharin in no way either wanted or were able to 
understand this]: on the one hand, to help Radek 
move to the Left, and to unit everyone we could for 
the Zimmerwald Left, On the other hand not to allow 
the minutest wavering on the fundamental issue.
The fundamental issue was the split with 
Chkheidze and co.
The Poles wavered and issued the vilest of 
resolutions after Kbmnunist no.l.
Conclusion?
Either to keep the title Kbnmunist and open 
the gates to squabbles and waverings: to letters to 
the editor (from Radek, from Bronskii, and perhaps 
from Pannekoek and others) ? to complaints, to snivelling, 
to gossiping, and what have you.
Not on any account„
That would be harmful to the cause„
That would mean helping the rascals in the OC, 
Chkheidze and co.
Not on any account.
Kbnmunist was a temporary alliance to achieve 
specific ends. The end was achieved: the journal was 
issued, a rapprochement achieved (then, before Zimnerwald, 
this was possible). Now we need to go another way, we 
need to go further.
Kbmrnunist has become harmful. We need to end it. 
and replace it with a different title: Sbornik Sotsial- 
Demokrata (edited by the editors of Sotsial-Demokrat).
Only in this way will we avoid squabbles and 
waverings.
There is discord in Russia too? Of course there 
is! But it is not our job to increase it. Let 
Chkheidze and co,, Trotsky and co. keep themselves 
busy at increasing the discord (that is their 
"profession"). Oar job is to implement our line. The 
fruits of this are plaintly to be seen: the Petersburg 
workers are one hundred times better than the 
Petersburg intelligentsia (even those who sympathise 
with us...)
We had sto arrive at temporary compromises with 
the Troika...[Pyatakov, Bosh and Rikharin] because then 
there was na other way of publishing a journal (but 
now we can). More importantly, then, we had never 
seen [_Bosh and Pyatakovj at work and we could hope that 
work would carry them upwards.
In fact they went downwards.
And it is now essential to dissolve the temporary 
alliance. Only in this way will the cause not suffer. 
Only in this way will they learn too.
-60-
You see, we are not opposed to discussion. 
We are only opposed to giving editorial rights to 
people who have wavered unpardonably (because 
of their youth, perhaps? then we can wait. In 
five years or so they may possibly improve)„
^BukharinJ is a serious (zanirnayushchii) 
economist, ana we have always supported him in 
this. But he is (1) credulous of scandal and 
(2) devilishly unstable in politics. 1
1. PSS, vol.49, pp 193-94
(square brackets indicate passages where I have 
replaced pseudonyms in the original by real names)
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The point about Bukharin's "credulousness of scandal" 
was a reference to his conviction in 1912 that Malinovskii was 
an Okhrana agent. Lenin had raised this again at this point 
because Bukharin was gaining Shlyapnikov' s admiration on 
another spy hunt. Quite by chance, he had discovered that 
Yakov Eogrovskii, one of the four members of his group in 
Stockholm, had been accepting money from a certain A. Keskula, 
for which he had been issuing receipts on Party-headed notepaper 
stamped with the official Party stamp. On investigation, 
Bukharin became convinced that Keskula was working for the Germans 
and that there was at least one other spy at work among the 
Stockholm Russian emigres. The intensity of his investigations 
for some reason upset the Swedish police, who arrested him and 
Pyatakov at the end of March. After a few days in prison, they 
were deported to Norway, whither they were followed by 
Shlyapnikov and Kollontai. Shlyapnikov'recalls that relations
V
with Lenin deteriorated after the move to Norway and Leniri and
2Zinoviev's letters "became more and more overbearing". If this
is so, it was probably no more than a coincidence. Lenin was 
probably anxious to avoid another Malinovskii scandal, but there 
were other quite valid independent reasons why relations with
1. Shlyapnikov, Kanun.. ..vol.!, pp 2O4-O9; vo! 0 2, p 88;
Kollontai, "Avtcbiograficheskii ocherk", PR, 1921, no.3, 
p 294.
2. Shlyapnikov, Kanun. t ., vol.1, p 208.
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Bukharin and co. should deteriorate.
Although Lenin was determined from the beginning that 
there was to be no revival of Kbmmunist, and that Bukharin's 
and Pyatakov's views had to be exposed as false, he fully 
intended to keep the dispute secret, known only to Party 
members. This remained so, even after 20 March when he received 
Bukharin's criticisms of his "Socialist Revolution and the Right
of Nations to Self-Determination", criticisms which Lenin
o
described as "worse than swinish". This need to keep matters
within the Party indeed was one o± his reasons for not wanting
3any more issues of Kcmnunist.
But pressure on Lenin to revive Kbnmunist was mounting.
Shlyapnikov persevered, writing letter after letter until well
4 into June. His case had now found support from a new and
1. I have no wish to become involved in the German money 
controversy. Bukharin was convinced that Bogrovskii 
was taking German money. Keskula worked for Parvus and 
Parvus had met Lenin in 1915. However, Lenin's problems 
with Kbnrmmist and Vorbote were to a great extent caused 
.by his lack of funds, and in 1916 Sotsial Demokrat ceased 
publication for five months apparently because of a 
shortage of funds (Senn, The Russian Revolution in 
Switzerland, p 164). Also, In July 1916, although Lenin 
is talking about some alternative supply of funds, it is 
still in the future and will give inadependence from 
Pyata\kov and Bosh (PSS, vol.49, p 260). Given the 
• critical nature of the political struggles he was
engaged in, and the importance he attached to the Party 
press, it is hard to believe that Lenin had any readily 
tappable source at this time.
2. PSS, vol.49, pp 202, 205 0
3. ibid,, p 195.
4. V.I. Lenin: Biograficheskaya khronika, vol.3, pp 485, 499, 
5O5, 508, 513; PSS, vol.49, pp 233-35.
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unlikely source: Zinoviev. From the end of March onwards, 
initially apparently influenced by Shlyapnikov J s letters, 
Zinoviev began to urge Lenin to reconsider publishing 
Kbnmunist, a development which caused Lenin some annoyance. 
For the time being, however, Lenin remained firm, and inmedi- 
ately after Pyatakov and Bukharin's deportation to Norway sent 
them a formal notification from the Central Committee that
there would be no more issues of Komnunist. This was followed
o
by acrimonious letters from both sides.
. As a further complication it was becoming clear that 
Shlyapnikov was rapidly becoming demoralised by the affair: 
spending too much time with Kbllontai in Norway, complaining 
about Lenin's attitude, threatening to go to America , and even 
refusing to tell Lenin the membership of the Russian Bureau of
the Central Committee that he had established during the
3winter. Zinoviev then complicated matters by inviting
Shlyapnikov to come to Switzerland to attend the Second anti­ 
war conference which was to be held at Kiental late in April, 
Lenin was horrified at this especially as Shlyapnikov himself 
apparently welcomed the idea. Lenin wanted some wav of
*
!« ibid., pp 205, 209, 21O-11.
m \
2. ibid., vol.27, pp 279-81; vol 0 49, pp 214-15;
V.I. Lenin: Biograficheskaya khronika, vol.3, p 482.
3. PSS, vol.49', pp 205, 21O-12.
4. PSS, vol.49, pp 211-12; V.I a Lenin: Biografichoskaya 
khronika, vol.3, p 485„
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putting Shlyapnikov in storage while he sorted out the dispute 
with Bukharin and Pyatakov and now Zinoviev. The transport 
system had come to a halt, Shlyapnikov could not be sent back 
to Russia in the state he was in. Apart from the danger of 
arrest because of his demoralisation, he would have a bad 
effect on the Russian Party (from which, and from Lenin's 
sister, EMzarova.-Ul'yanova, Lenin suspected that the rot had 
initially set in). The problem was to destroy Rlkharin and 
Pyatakov's influence over Shlyapnikov, while avoiding conflict 
with the man himself. This could only be done by drawing 
Bukharin and Pyatakov out in the hope that they would discredit 
themselves. While this was going on, Shlyapnikov should go to 
England for a rest.
Meanwhile, the affair appeared to be having a bad effect 
on the Party's preparations for Kiental. A week before the 
Conference, Lenin wrote bitterly, and as it transpired,
V
correctly, that he did not "after the events in Stockholm" expect
2any Scandinavian delegations at Kiental. Whether or not their
absence was the result of bad relations between Lenin and 
Bukharin and co. is not clear, but the fact remains that neither 
the Swedes nor the Norwegians, prominent in the Left at 
Zinmerwald, did .manage to attend Kiental. Also, just before the
1. PSS, vol.49, pp 211-12, 216-17; Shlyapnikov, Kanun.,., 
vol.1, p 208.
2. PSS, vol.49, p 217.
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Conference, Vorbote, no.2 finally appeared, with Lenin's 
"Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self- 
Determination", but also with a new set of theses opposing this 
from the editors of Gazeta Robotnicza. 1
The Kiental Conference itself must have been particularly 
frustrating for Lenin. The Conference was somewhat longer than 
Zimmerwald, and the Left had gathered twelve delegates to 
Zimnerwald's eight. This was not quite the gain it appeared, 
however, as there were three .Bolsheviks instead of two, three 
Poles instead of one and three Swiss instead of one. Thus in 
strictly comparable terms, the Left had shrunk. However, on
one issue, the condemnation of the French Socialist Parliamentary
o
Group, the Left managed to attract nineteen votes. But it was
a Left that Lenin could not control, and one that he very nearly 
lost. The original draft of the Conference's Theses on Peace, 
drawn up by Robert Grimm, the Swiss Socialist editor of the
V
Berner Tagwacht in which Radek originally published his attack 
on "Self-Determination", contained an item against the "Self- 
Determination of Nations", which the Bolsheviks had to fight
t
hard to have removed. On the other hand, the Bolshevik draft
1. PSS, vol.27, pp 252-66; The Polish resolution is in
Gankin and Fisher, op.cit., pp 507-18, Part 1 only of 
it is in Soch, vol.19, pp 438-40.
2. Gankin and Fisher, The Bolsheviks and the World War, 
pp 407 ff.
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resolution was rejected on the grounds that the Conference was 
not prepared to deal with the question. Whether justifiably 
or not, Lenin saw Radek's hand behind these episodes.
It was possibly a combination of these things, the feel­ 
ing that the Zimmerwald Left was slipping away from him, the 
increased pressure from Zinoviev and others inside the Bolshevik 
Party, and his desire to draw Pyatakov and Bukharin out that 
led Lenin to accede to Zinoviev's renewed requests on Kbmmunist 
at the Kiental Conference. Lenin agreed that publication should 
be proposed; on condition that there was an agreement for each 
issue between Lenin and Zinoviev on the one hand, and Pyatakov, 
Bukharin and Bosh on the other, and that these latter should 
give up their group policies, which Lenin called "Imperialist 
Economism", and stop aggravating the differences between the 
Party and Radek. Zinoviev apparently thought these conditions 
too harsh and doomed to failure, and so proposed milder terms, 
dropping the demand that the group renounce "Imperialist 
Econornism". Instead he proposed that no.3 of Kbnmunist should 
be published in Berne. These proposals together with an out-
i
line of proposed contacts was sent to Shlyapnikov to transmit to
2Pyatakov, Bukharin and Bosh.
Shlyapnikov tried to negotiate, probably because the
1. Gankin and Fisher, op.cit., pp 441, 450; PSS, vol.49, 
pp 231-32.
2. PSS, vol.49, pp 222-23, 229.
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proposed contents were so humiliating for the group. There was 
to be an economic article from Bukharin, an article by Pyatakov 
on the cost of living, but Lenin's theses and article on the 
"Right of Nations to Self-Determination" without anything at 
all from the Stockholm Group in reply. Lenin declined to 
negotiate: this was his last word. This time Pyatakov wrote 
to Lenin and Shlyapnikov wrote to Zinoviev, this time proposing 
that the editorial board have a majority of pro-Lenin people on 
it, but that the journal should have a discussion section. 
Lenin was prepared to accept this on condition that the terms 
on which discussion could be started were very closely defined 
and also that a very strict financial agreement was drawn up, 
with Pyatakov and Bosh paying one half of the transport cost. 
In any case the journal must have a new name. By 25 June he had 
achieved his first objective. Shlyapnikov was quite dis­ 
enchanted by Pyatakov and Bukharin's rejection of what seemed
o
reasonable terms.
This first victory had had its cost, however. 
Shlyapnikov was now thoroughly demoralised and wanted to go to
X
America. Attempts were made to dissuade him, and when these 
failed, to find someone to take his place (apparently his 
statement that Kbllontai would look after the transport system 
while he was away was not considered acceptable, probably
1. ibid., loc.cit. and 224; V.I. Lenin: Biograficheskaya 
khronika, vol.3, p 499.
2. PSS, vol.49, pp 233-53.
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because of her known views on self determination). Lenin 
considered the most promising replacement to be Inessa Armand, 
and started trying to find ways of getting her from Switzerland 
to Sweden. In fact it proved impossible to negotiate, even 
through Germany. Also, Inessa herself was veering towards the 
Bukharin-Pyatakov position on the question of the Self- 
Determination of Nations. ShlyapnUkov left for America anyway 
on 25 June.
Lenin's second objective was both to draw Bukharin and 
Pyatakov out, and to separate them. To do this he tried to 
encourage them to write their views down and participate in an 
inner-Party discussion. This, he believed, would help Bukharin 
at least to change his views. After some discussion with 
Zinoviev, it was agreed that the first issue of Sbornik Sotsial- 
Demokrata should be given over to this and that Bukharin and
Pyatakov be formally invited to contribute discussion articles
2on the Self Determination of Nations. This plan nearly broke
down as a result of Lenin's fury, when he discovered that 
Bukharin and Pyatakov had informed Radek that they had severe
\
disagreements with Lenin and, even more seriously, that they
1. ibid., pp 224, 226, 227, 245-46, 328.ff, 528;
V.I 0 Lenin: Biograficheskaya khronika, vol.3, pp 5O5, 
507, 511, 516, 517. Shlyapnikov himself (Kanun 0 .., vol.1, 
p 209) says that he went' there to raise money for the 
transport system„ Possibly so, but he nonetheless went 
against the advice of the Central Committee.
2. PSS, vol.49, pp 208, 232, 252-53, 260.
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were taking advantage of Shlyapnikov's absence to establish 
their own independent links with Russia. Nevertheless, concil­ 
iatory letters were sent, in order to get them to produce their 
articles and send them to Switzerland. Lenin did, however, take 
the precaution of informing party groups of how things stood 
with Bukharin and Pyatakov.
When Bukharin's article did arrive towards the end of 
August, Lenin refused to publish it. It was not, as expected, 
on Self Determination. Buckharin's views on this were, in fact, 
a consequence of his views on imperialism. He chose to expand 
the basis of the argument rather than the consequences7 in an 
article entitled "Towards a Theory of the Imperialist State". 
Lenin waited a little while until Pyatakov T s article had 
arrived before sending Bukharin a letter of refusal, in case it 
should put Pyatakov off. Bukharin was then politely told that 
his article was unsuitable. Pyatakov T s was held over until 
Sbornik Sotsial Demokrata, no.3, which never appeared because 
the February Revolution intervened. Meanwhile, Lenin used the
two articles to write three of his own in reply, which were
2circulated inside the Party.
Bukharin was, understandably, upset about the rejection 
of his article, and wrote a very strong letter to Krupskaya on
1. PSS, vol.49 , pp 254, 264, 271, 278, 279.
2. PSS, vol.30, pp 59-67, 68-74, 77-130; vol.49, pp 283, 
287, 292, 293-94.
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the subject. Zinoviev was told to write calming him down, but 
this failed. At the end of September, Shlyapnikov returned 
from America, and advised Bukharin, who was obviously unhappy 
and bored, to go. Kollontai probably added her voice to 
Shlyapnikov's, to tell Bukharin that the New York Russian 
Social Democratic paper Novyi Mir were looking for a left 
winger to put some life into the editorial board. In any case, 
he- left for the USA in October 1916, worked in New York on 
Navyi Mir and by January 1917 became its de facto editor, at 
which time Trotsky joined him on the editorial board. 
Shlyapnikov returned to Russia. The transport system collapsed
<-' n 2entirely.
Although Lenin considered that "after Bukharin's depart­ 
ure to America and, more importantly, after {Pyatakov^ had sent 
us his article and accepted.. .my reply, their affairs as a group
were finished" and "...I now consider that strategically I have
3won in this business", it was an extremely costly victory. In
order to free his hands for manoeuvre in the Zimnerwald Left, 
he had cut himself off from the party in Russia, on which his
\
credibility and very existence as a politician depended. There
!• ibid., pp 297, 302, 305-10; Shlyapnikov, Kanun..., vol.1, 
p 217; Cohen, Bukharin, p 43; "Amerikanskie dnevniki", 
A.M. Kollontai", IA, 1962, no.l, p 155.
2. N.K. Krupskaya, "Iz emigratsii v Piter"in Fritz Flatten 
(ed.), Lenin iz emigratsii v Rossiyu, mart 1917, M 1925, 
p 111.
3. PSS, vol.49, p 333.
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was a further sting in the tail of Bukharin's departure. In 
December 1916, a shortened version of Bukharin's article that 
had been rejected for Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata appeared in 
Jugend-Internat ionale, the journal of the Left Youth Inter­ 
national set up at the Berne Youth Conference in early 1915, 
and simultaneously in the Bremen. Arbeiterpolitik, and in the 
New York Novyi-Mir. Bukharin's views were now getting a very 
wide hearing indeed 8
It was characteristic of Lenin that he should write an
inmediate reply to Bukharin, that was published in Sotsial-
o
Demokrat, no.2 that very month. It was also characteristic of
him that, isolated even within the Zimmerwald Left, and cut off 
completely from the Party in Russia, he should embark on a 
course of reading to get to the heart of his opponents' theories,
During January and February 1917 he read and annotated practic-
3 ally everything that Marx and Engels had written on the state.
This was to lead to a remarkable shift in his views.
1. PSS, vol.49, p 340.
2. PSS, vol.30, pp 225-29.
3. ibid., vol.33, pp 123ff.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE DEVEIDFMENT OF THE LEFT POPULIST
TRADITION IN THE BALTIC FLEET
-93-
The naval reforms of the 1860's and 1870's had given 
rise to some discontent among the officers of the Fleet. The 
Government was blamed, with some justification, as far as the 
Navy was concerned, for the defeat in the Criinean War. The 
reforms were found to be half-hearted and slow, as was the
programme for the rebuilding of the Fleet. Better education
n
for the lower decks, and better training were also sought after.
The rights of the sailors were also very restricted: their read­ 
ing was subject to the censorship of their officers and of the 
naval chaplains. Clubs, public lectures, evening entertainments, 
parks, certain streets and even churches frequented by officers
were out of bounds to them and infringements of these regul-
3 at ions were severely punished. Yet what discontent there was was
almost exclusively voiced by the officers and almost exclusively 
through official channels: in official reports, in contributions 
to the press, especially to the Navy's own journal Morskoi 
sbornik. Any unofficial protest was confined to private dis­ 
cussion with relatives or close friends, or to the pages of
4private diaries. Although seme officers were influenced by read­ 
ing populist and nihilist writers, populist organisations as such
1. D.W. Mitchell: A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power, 
London, 1974, pp 16Qff.
2. S.F. Naida, Revoiyutsionnoe dvizhenie v tsarskom flote, 
M-L 1948, p 57.
3. ibid., p 54.
4. ibid,, p 59.
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had very little support among the officers and even less among 
the men. The one exception to this was the implication of 
N.E. Sukhanov and a small group of officers in the assassin­ 
ation of Alexander II in 1881. Four of them were executed in
the following year, and a further number from the same group
2were arrested in 1883. Although this group were important in
that the act they accomplished was important, they were no more 
than an isolated phenomenon in the Russian Fleet at the time. 
What protest there was remained legal. This is very much what 
one should expect from a period in which, whatever its short-
•
comings, progress was being made and a mood of optimism pre­ 
vailed .
A number of Soviet historians claim that social democracy
3 became a-serious force in the Baltic Fleet from about 19O1.
According to this version, when the battleship Aleksandr II 
docked at Toulon in 1901, a crew member, one Ivan Kbrshunov, 
became friendly with a French workman who had lived in Odessa 
and spoke Russian. The Frenchman introduced Kbrshunov to Russian 
social-democratic literature, including Iskra, which Kbrshunov
1. "Moryaki v protsesse chetyrnadtsatyfc," KB, 1927, no.7, 
P 52.
2. David Footman, Red Prelude, London, 1968, p 157; this 
gives a figure of 66 arrested in 1883, but this 
includes army officers.
3. Naida, op.cit., p 67; p 2; Sivkov, Kronshtadt,
Leningrad, 1972, p 12; V.V. Petrash, Moryaki Baltii- 
skogo flota v bor'be za pobedu oktyabrya, M - L, 1966, 
p 33 (this source devotes one sentence only to the period, 
merely noting that "social democratic circles were 
founded...at the beginning of the century".
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took back on board. He used this to influence fellow crew 
members, and by the time the ship was on its way back to 
Kronstadt in 1902, a circle had been established. Back in 
Kronstadt, its influence spread thanks to further copies of 
Iskra obtained from workers in the Kronstadt shipyards. 
Kbrshunov also contacted a certain Zaplatkin, who together with 
one Sinel 1 nikov had a social-democratic group in the "Don 
trudolyubiya" in Kronstadt much patronised by sailors. 1
In 1902 f it is asserted, a Social-Democratic Military
Revolutionary Group made up of Iskra supporters had been estab-
o
lished in the Army and Navy 0 This body was reinforced by the
drafting into the Navy in 1903 of workers who were already 
members of the RSDLP..3 Thus, by 1903 there were established
s
social democratic organisations in both Kronstadt and Revel'. 
By 1904, there was a strong Kronstadt organisation of 9O 
members, predominantly sailors, controlled by an "Executive 
Committee of the all-town committee of the RSDLP(b)" composed 
of elected representatives from ships and naval and army shore
1. Naida, op.cit., p 68. This appears to be inconsistent 
with the earlier claim that such places were out of 
bounds to sailors,
«•
2. Voennye organizatsit rossiiskogo proletariata i opyt 
ego vooruzhennoi bor'by 1903-1917 gg, il 1974, pp 5O-51. 
This source gives this as the "beginning" of S-D work 
in the armed forces.
3. Naida, op.cit., p 72.
4. L.T. Senchakova, Revolyutsionnoe dvizheniev russkoi armii 
i flote v kontse XlX-nachale XXv, M 1972, p 1975.
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units. This is clearly a Bolshevik organisation of some con­ 
sequence. Indeed, it is credited with revolutionising the
o
Baltic Fleet sailors in 1903, and with revolutionary work 
among the sailors of Rozhdestvenskii's Second Pacific Squadron, 
and Nebogatov's Third Pacific Squadron in 1905. 3 It was also 
strong enough to.hold a public meeting in the Morskoi Manezh 
in Kronstadt in January 1904, and dangerous enough for the 
Fleet Commander to have to deal leniently with those involved. 4
This account is more systematic than that of the various 
Soviet sources on which it is based and, so far, has not taken 
any notice of the provisos with which they hedge their state­ 
ments. Nonetheless, it would be fair to say that they are con­ 
cerned to demonstrate a) that there was a social democratic 
presence .in the Fleet from 1901 onwards, b) that this was com­ 
posed first of all of Iskra supporters, subsequently of 
Bolsheviks, c) that this was a well organised, disciplined 
group> and d) that it exercised considerable influence. There 
are good reasons to doubt all these points.
There is little reason to doubt that, in its outline, 
the story of sailor Kbrshunov's experiences in Toulon are true.
!„ Senchakova, op.cito, p 191; Naida, op.cit., p 91, does 
not go into such detail but states that the organisation 
was "strong" and had "a developed network of circles in 
the crews and units of the garrison".
2. Voennye organizatsii..., p 51.
3. Senchakova, op.cit., p 192.
4. Naida, op.cit., p 90.
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That the outcome was a Social Democratic, let alone Iskraite 
or Bolshevik organisation is more doubtful. A very early post- 
revolutionary source, based on trial reports, states that 
because of the burning of the Petersburg Law Courts in February 
1917, evidence is fragmentary. The only revolutionary liter­ 
ature connected with Zaplatkin and Sinel'nikov's groups that
this source mentions is the Socialist-Revolutionary paper
o
Revolyutsionnaya Rossiya. Mention is made of revolutionary use
of Nekrasov's poetry and of lectures on the Decembrists. None 
at all of Social Democratic literature or agitators. This early 
article's use of sources, clearly explaining what they were and
what their limitations were, contrasts with the moderns:
3neither Sivkov nor Petrash document their claims at all. Naida
merely gives an archival reference not available to the present
4 writer, without either quotation or comment.
The claim that the "Social Democratic military revolution­ 
ary Group" was in fact Social Democratic appears equally dubious. 
The source cited for this claim is Tskra which apparently repro­ 
duced one of the Group's leaflets addressed to "soldiers and
1. "Revolyutsionnaya propaganda v Kronshtadte", KB, 1921, 
no.7, pp 45-48.
2. ibid., p 46, as also does I.V 0 Egorov (ed.), 1905, 
Vosstaniya v baltiiskom flote, L 1926, p 4.
3. Sivkov, op.cit., pp 11-13; Petrash, op.cit., p 33. 
It is true that Petrash deals with the affair in one 
sentence; nevertheless, the sentence summarises the 
Sivkov/Naida version.
4. Naida, op.cit., pp 67-68.
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sailors". Examination of Iskra, however, led the present 
writer to doubt whether the leaflet was issued by a Social- 
Democratic Group at all: 1) although the leaflet does mention 
the proletariat, it does so only briefly and after mentioning 
the plight of the peasantry; 2) it allocates no leading role to 
the proletariat in any plans it puts forward; 3) indeed the 
word "rabochii" appears in only one of the twenty paragraphs of 
the leaflet, the most common word used to describe the 
oppressed being "narod"; 4) the leaflet is not signed "Sotsial- 
demokraticheskaya voenno-revolyutsionnaya gruppa" but merely 
"Voenno-revolyutsionnaya gruppa"; 5) the leaflet is not 
addressed "to soldiers and sailors" at all, but very precisely 
"to officers"; 6) Iskra's conment welcoming the leaflet hopes
that the revolutionary work begun by the Group will bring it
2 
into agreement. with the Social Democracy: thus implying that
it was not yet either part of the Social Democracy or even fully
3 in agreement with it.
'Similar doubts can be cast on the claims that there were
strong Social Democratic organisations in Revel 1 and Kronstadt
4 during 1903„ Naida gives as his source another Iskra report.
Here again, examination of Iskra itself makes the case seem more
•
1. Voennye organizatsii..., pp 5O-51.
2. stress mine 0 .
3. Iskra, no.35, 1 March 1903, p 6.
4. Naida, op.cit., pp 72-73.
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flimsy: all that Iskra actually claims is that the Petersburg 
Ccmnittee (which was Iskraite/Bolshevik at the time) was in. 
contact with the sailors' organisations and supplied them with 
literature. This is not the same as saying that they were 
social democratic organisations. Of course, Iskra would not 
write that men who were about to stand trial were members of an 
illegal organisation. So the report cannot be taken as evidence 
that they were not members of the RSDLP. It is, at best, in­ 
conclusive.
The evidence that there was a strong organisation of some 
90 Bolsheviks in Kronstadt in 1904 is equally flimsy. Senchakova 
cites an article by Naida, which in turn cites the memoirs of 
Chuzhak, which refer to 1906, not 19O4 and, in any case, makes 
no mention of size. Naida himself cites a monograph published 
in 1941 which merely paraphrases Ivanov's account, without 
citing him. The sole foundation for the claim then appears to be
the memoirs of S. Ivanov, The figure 9O apparently comes out of
2Naida f s head. For all its size, its influence was limited as
the demands put forward by the meeting instanced as one of the
1. stress mine. Iskra, no.42, 15 June 1905, p 5
2. L.T. Senchakova,op.cit., p 191;. .S.F. Naida, "Voennaya 
i voenno-boevaya rabota bol'shevikov v gody pervoi 
russkoi revolyutsii", in Bol'sheviki vo glave pervoi 
russkoi revolyutsii, 19O5-19Q7gg, M 1956, p 265; 
N. Chuzhak, "V Voennom podpol'e bol'shevikov 1905-1906gg 
in V tsarskoi kazarme, M 1929, pp 41-42; S.F. Naida, 
Revol^/utsionnoo dvizhenie v tsarskom flote, p 91; 
M Akhun and A. Makovskii, Voennaya i boevaya rabota 
'si fvikov v 1905-1907gg, L 1941, p 12.
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high points of its activity in January 1904 show remarkably 
little social-democratic influence: reduction of the period of 
service from the present seven years; equal political rights 
for sailors and officers; clubs, lectures, theatres, etc. to be 
in-bounds for sailors.
Indeed, the fact that work among the troops was not dis­ 
cussed as such at the RSDLP's Second Congress in July/August 
1903 is perhaps an indicator that it was not rated highly by the 
Party leadership. 2
Up to 1904, in fact, there is little evidence of any major 
trouble in the Baltic Fleet of any kind. A circular from War 
Minister Kuropatkin dated August 1902 detailing trouble spots and 
warning comranders to watch for agitators lists the Black Sea 
Fleet, but not the Baltic Fleet. 3
With the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war in February 
1904, however, the political atmosphere in the Fleet began to 
change. An early source of discontent were the reservists re­ 
called to the colours once the war began. Naida describes an 
incident on the Moscow Nikolaevsky Station in April where 
the clumsy handling of naval reservists on their way to
Kronstadt, by an army officer and the station authorities? led to
4 a riot, followed.by arrests. Many formulae for trouble
1. Naida, Revolyutsionnoe dvizhenie v tsarkom flote, p 90.
2. Vtoroi s"ezd RSDRP Protokoly, M 1959, passim. .
3. Iskra, no.27, 1 November 1902.
4. Naida, op..cit., p 9O.
-101-
ccmbined here: distrust of one arm of the service for another, 
of civilian authorities for groups of servicemen, of other ranks 
for 'strange' officers, of civilian reservists for military 
discipline. That these were widespread is perhaps confirmed by 
the Tsar's order of the day issued seven months later in 
November 190k dealing with the disciplinary measures to be 
taken against troubles of this kind.
Such disturbances are inevitable at the beginning of a 
war involving conscription, unless the war is generally popular 
or victorious. The Russo-Japanese War was neither.
In addition to these more or less routine mobilisation 
troubles, the Government built up trouble for itself. First it 
transferred political and other undesirables to the Baltic
Fleet to .crew the unfortunate Admiral Nebogatov's Third Pacific
2Squadron. , Secondly, after Nebogatov's Squadron had sailed in
February 19O5, Kronstadt was used as a dumping place for un-
3desirables from all over the Fleet. In addition, trained
servicemen were taken out of Kronstadt and sent to the front and
replaced by men whose time had expired and who were being re-
4 • tained for the duration of the wari another source of trouble.
1. ibid.
2. Naida,, o'p.cit a> p 95, citing Proletarii, no^S, 17 July 
1906, and ppl01-O2 citing evidence of Captains 
Artshvager and Lishin at Nebogatov's trial,
3. Sivkov, op.cit., pp 18-19; "Vosstanie 26-27 Oktyabrya 
19O5g v Kronshtadte", KB, 1920, no u l, pp 36-37; 
Yu Zubilevich, Kronshtadt: vospominaniya revolyut- 
sionerki,1906 god, vol.l, Kronstadt, n 0 d., p 5.
4. "Vosstanie...", KB, 1920, no.l, pp 36-37.
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In fact, both Rozhdestvenskii's Second Pacific Squadron 
and Nebogatov's Third Pacific Squadron endured incident after 
incident from their discontented men. Naida puts this down to
the presence of revolutionaries among the crews, as did
2Nebogatov's captains at his trial. The presence of revolution­ 
aries may have helped, but this cannot be asserted on the basis 
of the captains 'evidence alone. There were other sources of 
discontent which would not have been so easily accepted by the 
Government of the day, or by the directors of the Admiralty: 
the low level of seaworthiness of the ships, the demoralising 
delays (especially the long halt at Nossi-be), the low level of 
training among the men, the low morale of the officers, the
demoralising news of defeats in the Far East and Revolution at
3home that greeted them every time they put into harbour.
There is ample reason to expect mutiny here.
It is certain that throughout 1905 the atmosphere in 
Kronstadt was tense: incidents in the capital, news of defeat in 
war, and minor incidents on the island itself provoked dis­ 
orders and riots, not all of which could be described as 
revolutionary. The events of Bloody Sunday in Petersburg
1. Naida, op.bit., pp 96ff.
2. ibido, pp 1O1-02.
*
3. Admiral Sir Reginald Custance, The Ship of the Line in 
Battle, Edinburgh and London, 1912, pp 115, 157, 167; 
Maurice Paleologue, Hie Turning Point, London, 1935, 
pp 109, 111, 185, 209, etc.; Captain A.T. Mahan U.S.N., 
Naval Administration and Warfare, Boston, 1913, pp 123, 
145-46, 164; Gabriel Darrieus, La guerre sur mer, 
Paris, 1907, pp 273-74, etc.
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(9 January 1905) for example were followed by a Black Hundreds' 
demonstration in Kronstadt, albeit a mild one (the worst 
occurrences being knocking off the hats of any students 
encountered by the marchers ) 0 Generally, the riots were very 
simple in their manifestations, but complex in their nature. 
A police report of 4 July 1905 states that on the preceding 
evening a crowd mainly composed of sailors had behaved in an 
unruly fashion in some streets of the town and had pelted
certain brothels with stones. Troops summoned to the area did
2not have to resort to arms as disorders soon ceased e The police
report concludes that although the imnediate cause of the riots 
was bad food, events in the Black Sea and in Libau had had a 
strong effect on the Kronstadt sailors. The policeman's report 
is diplomatically incomplete. To the mutiny on the Potemkin 
(14-25 June 19O5) and to the riots in Libau, then the main base 
of the Baltic Fleet (15 June 1905) ; we should add Bloody Sunday 
(9 January 1905) and the sinking of the Second and Third Pacific 
Squadrons, or in other words the great bulk of the Baltic Fleet
1. P.S. Shuvalov, "Iz bor'by za khleb i volyu", KL, 1923, 
no.5, p 272.
2. K. Zharnovetskii, "Kronshtadtskoe vosstanie v 1905- 
1906gg," KL, 1925, no.3, p 52.
-104-
off Tsushiuia (14 May 19O5). 1 It is not surprising that the 
months of June and July saw numerous disorders in Kronstadt, 
ranging from anonymous letters to the Commander to clashes 
between soldiers and sailors, attacks on property and the brief 
taking over of the battleship Aleksandr II. 2
The disturbances which were to develop into the October 
'mutiny in Kronstadt followed a similar pattern. On 7 October 
the railwayman's union called for a nationwide railway strike, 
and, as this spread, food prices rose rapidly. This was 
followed by a General Strike and on 13 October about 30 dele­ 
gates from various factories gathered in the St. Petersburg 
Institute of Technology to form the Soviet of Workers' Deputies. 
Qi 14 October senior boys from the Boys Gimnazium in Kronstadt
o
held a meeting in the school attended by many outsiders. On 
17 October the Tsar issued his manifesto promising constitut­ 
ional rights in Russia. This was met with confusion both in
1. Naida, op.cit., p 175 has a riot in Kronstadt on 9 July
which sounds very similar to Zharnovetskii's, His source 
is Proletarii, no 0 12, 3(16), August 1905; thus he could 
be describing the same incident , and Proletarii simply 
had its dates wrong, which is quite conceivable as it 
was published in Geneva. Or he could be describing a 
separate incident. In any case, it is symptomatic of 
the modern Soviet attitude towards "working class 
consciousness" that episodes like the stoning of 
brothels are not mentioned.
•
2. Naida, loc.cit., "Kak samoderzhavderaspravlyalos' s 
matrosami za uchastie v Kronstadtskikh besporyadkakh 
26-27 oktyabrya 1905g", KB, 1920, no 0 8, p 53.
3. "Vosstanie...", KB, 1920, no.l, p 37; Sivkov, op.cit., 
p 25 0
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St . Petersburg and in Kronstadt , as people wojidered precisely 
what the Manifesto had granted them. The Government hastily 
issued a booklet explaining to the troops that the Manifesto had 
not granted them the same rights as to other citizens. They
were henceforth entitled to freedom of religion, but not to
o
freedom of assembly or of the press. Three days later a crowd
of sailors, soldiers and other Kronstadt citizens again tried to 
hold a meeting in either the Gimnazium or the Morskoi Manezh. 
They were unable to get in, and on that night and the following 
one, meetings were held in the open air, with orators calling for
the rejection of the Manifesto, for a democratic republic and
3for an alliance between the people and the armed forces. On the
afternoon of the 23rd the crowd assembled again. This time 
Admiral Nikonov refused to allow a meeting to take place, but
stated that he would come round the units on the next day to
4 take the men's complaints » The crowd dispersed. late that
evening crowds of servicemen filled the streets around the 
brothels; three houses were set on fire, stones were thrown at
1. L.D. Trotsky, 1905, London, 1972, p 113.
2. Sivkov, opoCit. , pp 24-25; it is not clear how soon this 
booklet was issued, but the point being stressed here is 
the uncertainty and unease caused by the Manifesto.
3. Zhamovetskii , op 0 citc , p 53.
4 „ ' 'Vosst anie . . . " , KB, 1920 , no . 1 , p 37 ; Zharnovet ski i ,
, p 54, claims that Nikonov allowed a meeting in
the open air. I have preferred the "Vosst anie 0 ,„" account 
based as it is on the documents of the trial of the 
sailors who took part rather than Zharnovet skii's, who was 
not in Kronstadt at the time,
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offices and at the police, but the crowds eventually dispersed. 
During the next two days Admiral Nikonov went round all units 
on the island taking complaints. On the morning of the 25th 
the Third Battalion of Kronstadt Fortress Artillery presented 
a list of complaints in an orderly manner, through a represent­ 
ative. Towards evening, however, the regiment became disorderly
2and looted a wine warehouse. On the next morning,soldiers of
the Second Fortress Infantry Battalion assembled outside the
Naval Mines-Training Detachment calling on the sailors to join
3them in a meeting. Not long after, a group of gunners and
sailors gathered near the brothels and began to break their
windows and set fire to the curtains. Fifty-two men were
4 arrested, and placed on a train to be locked up in one of the
forts. A crowd of sailors surrounded the train, whose guard 
opened fire killing one man, wounding two. This'incident sparked 
off two days of extraordinary violence. The sailors ran to the 
barracks, seized weapons and went round from barracks to barracks 
calling on other units to join them, opening fire if they were 
met with refusal. Somewhat surprisingly, perhaps, some units, 
even some naval units, remained loyal to the Government. However,
• *
1. "Vosstanie...", loc.cit; Zharnovetskii, loc.cit.
_ t L l n
2. . Zharnovetskii, loc.cit; Naida, op.cit 0 , p 186.
3. ibid., pp 55-57; Naida's account makes the soldiers' 
actions more "conscious"; however Zharnovetskii cites 
both Nikonov ! s reports and those of the police of the 
time.
«
4. Naida, loc.cit. has the men wanting a meeting arrested.
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the authorities did not wish to test this loyalty by using them 
to put down the mutiny, so remained inactive whilst waiting for 
troops from Petersburg. The mutinous troops then went into the
town, which they pillaged. Buildings were set on fire and the
2 fire hoses were cut to prevent them being saved; shops were
smashed and looted; wine warehouses emptied and a general 
drinking bout began, with drunken soldiers and sailors running 
through the town firing in the air. This lasted for two days, 
after which troops from Petrograd were landed. At the sight of
them the mutineers ran away and order was restored with no
3difficulty. All in all about seventeen people had been killed,
seme eighty wounded.
1. The barracks were all outside the town proper.
»
2. Shuvalov, op.cit., p 272 states that the fireman joined in 
the riots especially the drinking bouts, emptying their 
water carriers to fill them with wine; Voennye 
vosstaniyac.., pp 5O-51 0
3. Many sources agree on the outlines of the affair a Naida, 
loc.cito; Zliarnovetski.i. Ioc 0 cit.; S. Ivanov, 
"V. Kronshtadte. 0 o", KL, 'l923, no 0~5, p 322; Shuvalov, 
loc^cit. (I am assuming his description does apply to 
the October meeting, as the details tally, despite his 
statement that it occurred "in the spring"); S 0 Vinogradov, 
Flot v revolyutsionnom dvizhenii, L 1925, pp 34-35* There 
are some notable differences of emphasis„ Naida'and 
Shuvalov blame the excesses on the Black Hundreds, although 
they have to admit that "unconscious elements" among the 
troops joined in a Vinogradov blames the followers of the 
priest Ivan Kronstadtskii, a well known divine who attracted 
pilgrims. There seems no good reason why either of these 
groups should have been so influential, although the Black 
Hundreds, especially, may well have had a catalyctic role 
Zharnovetskii ascribes the blame half to the Black Hundreds, 
half to the low political level of the sailors, A very 
early source, "Kak samoderzhavie.„.", KB,1920, no.8, p 53 
merely states that the affair degenerated into a drunken 
brawl.
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Armed and violent though this undoubtedly was, it was not 
the armed uprising the Social Democrats envisaged. What role 
then did the Social Democrats play? How strong were they in
Kronstadt? A number of sources claim that a social democratic
oorganization was formed in Kronstadt, sometime during 1904.
This organization had members in some six units and was directed 
by a committee which included representatives from the units and
«3
was at the same time "a circle of the highest type". The organ-
4 ization had developed out of the Iskra organizations of 190O-19Q3.
Alongside this, but organized separately, was a social democratic
workers' group, led by a professional working under the pseudonym
5 "Pan-Oleg". This would indicate a fairly high level of organiz-
£»
at ion, indeed one authority claims that it had 90 members. The 
frequent mention of the Committee being also "a circle of the 
highest type" is clearly meant to reinforce this picture. There 
are, however, reasons for doubting its accuracy.
Of the authorities consulted the words "circle of the
1. It is less clear to what extent it fitted SR pre­ 
conceptions.
2. Jnstitut Marksizma-Leninizma pri TsK KPSS, Istoriya KPSS 
M 1967 (h'enceforth Istoriya KPSS), vol.2, p 21; 
S.- Ivanovo "Kronshtadtskoe podpole", PR, 1924, no.12, 
p 139; Naida, op 0 cit., p 250; Sivkov, op.cito, p 17„
3. Istoriya KPSS, loc.cit; Ivanov, loc.cit.; Sivkov, 
loc.cit. citing Ivanov.
*
4. Naida, loc.cit.
5. Ivanov, loc.cit.,
6. Naida, Ioc 8 cit.
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highest type" are used first by Ivanov. In doing so, he is 
indicating that, with the addition of a few representatives from 
other circles, it was his circle, in the mines battalion, that 
functioned as the co-ordinating comnittee for Kronstadt. The 
words "circle of the highest type" are an ironical reference to 
the circle's position in the Party's constitution. In fact he is 
indicating a low level of organization in Kronstadt, as his 
circle, the biggest, had only 10-12 members including the repres­ 
entatives from other units. Naida's other point that "character­ 
istically it was sailors who always made up the main part of the
2organization" is belied by Ivanov, a soldier, whose soldiers'
circle was the main one and is not supported by any original 
manoirs.
Nonetheless, the organization Ivanov describes, though not 
the grandiose affair claimed by Naida, is convincing enough: he 
names names, describes events and is fairly specific, without 
being over-effusive about the role of the Social Democrats. Yet 
there is reason to doubt his account, too: not the events or 
people or organization that he describes, but his dating. It is, 
at first sight, odd that an account of the Kronstadt social 
democratic organization among the Kronstadt troops (henceforth - 
the Kronstadt S-*D military organization) purporting to begin in
1. Istoriya KPSS, loc.cit. uses words almost identical to 
Ivanov's but cites an archival reference: possibly 
Ivanov's manuscript?
2. Naida, loc.cit.
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19O4 and ending before the 1906 mutiny should make so little 
mention of the biggest event of the period: the October 1905 
mutiny. One's suspicions increase on further examination. It 
would appear from Ivanov's account that he is writing from 
memory and has not checked his material. Pan-Oleg, for 
example, whom Ivanov has as organiser of the Kronstadt workers' 
groups in 1904, was K. Zharnovetskii, who, according to his own 
memoirs, only went out to Kronstadt early in 1906. Similarly, 
Ivanov states that soon after he joined the military organiz­ 
ation, in 1904, the organiser I.N. Shevedrin-Maksimenko, a 
Menshevik, was arrested, and that the work then collapsed until
new organisers, Stepan and Maks were sent from Petersburg to
2replace him at the end of 1904. Sivkov repeats this. In fact,
the exact date of Shevedrin's arrest is known: it was on 17 July 
1905, the same day as I.S. Dubrovinskii and V.A. Antonov-Ovseenko,
after they had been holding a social-democratic meeting in one of
3Kronstadt's parks. Finally, Ivanov claims that a professional
called "Viktor-Ijeonid" was sent out to Kronstadt "after the
4 break with the SRs". In fact, "Leonid" was the pseudonym of
I.F. Dubrovinskii who visited Kronstadt both in 1905 before the
1. Zharnovetskii, op.cit a , p 60.
2. Ivanov, "'Kronshtadtskoe podpol'e", PR, 1924, no.12, p 139; 
• Sivkov, op.cit., p 17.
3. Zharnovetskii, op.cit;, p 52 citing police report. 
Sivkov (!!), op.cit., p 21.
4. Ivanov, "V 'Kronstadte.J', KL, 1923, no.5, p 322. I shall 
discuss the affair, with the SRs in more detail below.
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break with the SRs and in 1906 after this. This is not to say that 
Ivanov's account is dishonest. On the contrary, it has the ring of 
a true story but, like many genuine memories, the chronology is a 
little muddled. It can be used as evidence that a social demo­ 
cratic organization existed in Kronstadt at some time during the 
period, but not that it existed in 19O4. Further evidence of a 
negative kind comes from the official multi-volumed Istoriya KPSS. 
Its appendix listing RSDLP groups and organizations which emerged 
in 1903-O4 makes no mention of a group, let alone an organization 
in Kronstadt.
Another approach to the problem gives very similar results. 
Social-Democratic slogans for 19O5-06 centered around calls for a 
Constituent Assembly, for a Democratic Republic, for troops and 
workers to unit an an armed uprising. None of these are to be 
found in any of the demands of the Kronstadt sailors during 19O5. 
Instead, we find immediate demands for improvements of service 
life: the removal of the ban on sailors walking in parks, more 
freedom during off-duty hours, more humane discipline, the pro­ 
vision of reading rooms, better pay, shorter terms of service, 
the removal of unpopular officers and above all better food:
o
the constant andjnost explosive issue.
1. Istoriya KPSS, vol.1, pp 607-O9. However, vol 0 2 in the 
text does claim that a group arose in 19O4 (p 21). 
Perhaps this had been discovered after vol.1 was 
written?
2. "Kak samoderzhavie 0 .. M , KB, 192O, no.8, p 53; '
Zharnovetskii, op.cit.,pp 52, 54; Naida, op.cit., p 175; 
Sivkov, op.cit., p 21; Vinogradov, op.cit., p 34; 
"Vosstanie. u .", KB, 1920, no.l, pp 37-38.
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This is not to deny that there were Social Democrats in 
Kronstadt in 19O5. There is no reason to doubt the existence 
of Ivanov's organization, at least by the sumner of 1905. 
Nor is there any reason to doubt that organizers from 
St. Petersburg visited Kronstadt: I e F. Dubrovinskii in July
and October, and possibly in between; Shevedrin-Maksimenko in
2 *3 4 July; Antcnov-Ovseenko in July; Krylenko in October; and
possibly others. However, both these professionals and the 
local group had only little influence on the events of 19O5. 
Naida insists that "...the October uprising of the Kronstadt
sailors...(is a],..clear confirmation of the growing influence
£» 
of the Bolsheviks over the masses of soldiers and sailors".
He admits that the mutiny broke out spontaneously, so presumably
1. Zharnovetskii, op.cit. ,pp 52, 54 identifies the
"neizvestnyi Kievskii meshchanin A 0 A. Nikitenko" arrested 
- on 17 July 19O5 as Dubrovinskii; Sivkov, op.cit., p 25-27 
has him in Kronstadt during the uprising, as does 
Zharnovetskii, op.cit., p 54.
2. Zharnovetskii, op.cit., p 52 0
3. Zharnovetskii, op.cit., p 52; Sivkov, op.cit. identifies
the "Austrian citizen S 0 K0 Dal'nitskii" of the police report 
as Antonov-Ovseenko 0
4. Zharnovetskii, op.cito, p 54.
5. All the sources cite others, but by pseudonym only, which 
it has not proved possible to identify, with the possible 
exception of Tat'yana
(Ivanov, "V Kronshtadte 0 .„", EL, 1923, no.5, p 322) who 
could be D.M. Pozner, who worked in the Petersburg military 
organization at the time and used that pseudonym,
6. Naida, op.cit., p 183.
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Bolshevik influence cannot be detected there. "But", he continues, 
"once £the uprising] had begun, the Bolsheviks stood at the head 
of the movement (vosstavshikh) and selflessly led the struggle to 
the end". This seems strange. Is one to assume that the stoning 
of brothels, the burning of houses, the looting of liquor stores, 
the internecine battles between soldiers and sailors were led by 
Bolsheviks, however selfless? It simply is not convincing, for 
Naida himself, after these pompous affirmations presents no 
evidence to back them.
Other authors have been more cautious. Vinogradov, writing 
in the early 1920's, states that the mutiny broke out before
revolutionary cadres from Petersburg had time to organise anything
o
and this made it vulnerable to the hooligan elements. A contemp­ 
orary "bourgeois journalist" visiting Kronstadt immediately after
w
the mutiny reports,
It is generally held that this mtt tf ny was not 
revolutionary in its origin, but arose from 
chronic discontent with the caimand, with the 
food, with discipline (poryadok), with the 
whole existence 0 The best proof of this is 
that the workers, among whom intensive 
propaganda was being carried out, did not 
support the mutiny 3
a point overlooked by many more recent Soviet commentators. Nor is
4
Zharnovetskii's reply that the arrest of revolutionaries shows that 
they were influential, was very convincing. The arrest of
1. ibid.
2. Vinogradov, op.cit., pp 33-34.
3. cited by Zharnovetskii, op.cit., p 57.
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revolutionaries proves nothing, save that they were active. The 
problem is, were they influential? Police reports that they
were influential are, in themselves, no more convincing. As
i 
Richard Cobb has so brilliantly pointed out, policeman like to
find a villain, even when pursuing a revolution. Also, a 
revolutionary troublemaker is far more acceptable to the 
authorities as a cause for unrest than the blunders of their own 
policy. Nor is the enthusiastic reception given to revolutionary 
speakers necessarily an indication. The enthusiasm could indic­ 
ate no more than fellow feeling for the speakers' anger at the 
authorities. Real sympathy would have been shown by the adoption 
of policies - and this was not the case. R>wever, some of the 
points that Zharnovetskii makes are valid and worth repeating. 
The Krons^adt meeting did transcend the bounds of the naval base 
in that the temper of the sailors was influenced by the political 
events in the country generally. One can also argue that the 
attack on the officers had a dual nature: as enforcers of the 
hated discipline and as representatives of the hated regime. 
Nonetheless, more evidence would be required for this to be 
utterly convincing.
All in all the cause of the mutiny would tend to validate
2
Zharnovetskii ! s explicit conclusion,also hinted at by Vinogradov,
1. Richard Cobb, Police and People, 
London, 1970.
2. Zharnovetskii, op.cit., p 59; Vinogradov, loc.cit; so 
does Sivkov, op 0 cit., p 23, but from his own glowing 
accounts of previous work it is hard to see why.
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that the Kronstadt organization at the time, especially among the 
troops, was extremely weak indeed} that what work was done was 
done by professionals coming in from Petrograd, as conditions in 
Kronstadt had made it impossible to establish resident profess­ 
ionals. The very fact that the professionals could only make 
flying visits, combined with the difficulties imposed by military 
discipline and the fact that Kronstadt was an island, meant that 
their influence could be at the best marginal. This analysis is 
reinforced by other sources. The police report on Shevedrin- 
Maksimenko's arrest states that he had arrived in Kronstadt on 
that day together with Antonov-Ovseenko. Ivanov states that 
after Shevedrin-Maksimenko's arrest (in July, after all) "work 
practically ceased. There was no one of sufficient revolutionary
understanding among the soldiers. We simply kept in touch with
2one another". Most convincing of all are the simple words of
Zemlyachka's report on work in Kronstadt, given to the
Petersburg Coranittee on 26 September 1905: "The Petersburg
3Committee Military Organisation is in touch with the Fleet
units and eight regiments. The organization is not yet set up
in its final form, but there are already two propaganda circles
4 and literature is being distributed". This literature was
1. Zharnovetskii, op.cit., p 52.
*
2. Ivanov, "Kronshtadtskoe podpol'e", PR, 1924, no.12, p 139.
3. • stress mind, i.e. this was the origin of work, not 
Kronstadt itself.
4. P.K. (udelli) "Protokoly PK RSDRP za 19O5-O7gg", KL, 
1930, no.4, p 8.
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apparently all from Petersburg, some of it even explicitly, 
addressed "to the workers of St. Petersburg". This is a far cry 
from Naida's organization of 90.
In mid-September 1905, the Petersburg Conmittee of the
RSDLP established an okruzhnoi raion to organise work in the area
2around the City. - This, however, was not established in time to
have much influence on the mutiny of October 1905. After the 
mutiny, as Social Democratic work ceased in Kronstadt, the 
establishment of contacts there was made a task of the okruzhnoi
raion. Zharnovetskii, N. Krylenko and Manuil'skii were assigned
3to this. The fact that Zharnovetskii, the one organiser who had
not been involved in work there, was given the task of specific­ 
ally re-establishing links with Kronstadt rather than Krylenko 
and Manuil'skii who had worked there before, could indicate the 
Petersburg Committee's attitude to the 'quality of the work 
before the uprising. On the other hand this could simply have 
been for conspiratorial reasons, in that he would not be likely 
to be recognised by the police there.
At first work was extremely difficult. All contacts with 
Kronstadt had been lost and the town had been placed under a state
1. Zharnovetskii, op.cit., p 60.
4
2. T.P. Bondarevskaya, Peterburgskii komitet RSDRP v 
revolyutsii 1905-19Q7gg, L 1975, p 127.
3. Zharnovetskii, op.cit., p 51; Naida, op.cit., p 280;
. Sivkov, op.cit., p 30. It has not proved possible to find 
evidence supporting Vinogradov's more optimistic view that 
the Government transferred revolutionary sailors to 
Kronstadt, and that these re-established links with 
Petersburg, op.cit., p 33.
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of siege after the mutiny. Early in 1906, however, the 
okruzhnoi raion got an additional party worker - a student 
named Sergei Tokmachev - who had joined the Party just before 
the uprising in Moscow in December 1905. He was assigned to 
KblpinOo Zharnovetskii soon discovered that Tokmachev actually 
came from Kronstadt and that his mother still lived there. It 
was agreed that Tokmachev should work with Zharnovetskii and that 
his mother's house should become the Party's base on the island.
Toknachev had been in Kronstadt during the October 
mutiny, and had supported the Social Democrats, although he had 
not then been a Party member. After the mutiny, he and some 
Gimnazium pupils, together with two workers' circles, having
lost touch with the Social Democrats had formed a Non-Party
2Conmittee. This turned out to be still in existence.
Zharnovetskii and Tokmachev contacted them, informed them that a 
real Social Democratic organization was now going to be built 
and proposed that the Conmittee dissolve and become a circle for 
the formation of Party agitators. This they agreed to do.
Zharnovetskii then separated the two workers' circles from the
3rest, making them a temporary Kronstadt Committee* This was
fortunate as all the former members of the Non-Party Conmittee
1. ibid., pp 60-61„ It is perhaps indicative of how
completely links with Kronstadt had been severed that 
no one.apparently knew of Tokmachev's background when he 
arrived in Petersburg, although he had been in touch 
with the Kronstadt Social Democrats before the October 
mutiny and had addressed a meeting on their policy.
2. ibid.
3. ibid.
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* ^
were soon arrested, except for the now separate workers' circles.
• \.
During the Spring of 1906 the Kronstadt organisers managed to 
establish eight workers' circles. These attracted some older 
workers who had had contact with Social Democrats before and it 
is through them that contacts with the troops were re-established. 
All work with members of the armed forces was carried out through
workers resident in Kronstadt, as it was too dangerous for the
o 
professional revolutionaries to have direct contact. The
organisation also received help from an autonomous Estonian S-D 
group which had survived the mutiny. Soon contacts were sufficient 
for the Social Democrats to be able to hold occasional meetings
for Kronstadters at convenient places on the mainland. Lisii Nos
3 near Sestroretsk, was a favourite place for these. In May the
Kronstadt organisers were reinforced by Manuil'skii who "was 
particularly successful at the meetings at Lisii Nos. His
!• ibid., Zharnovetskii does not date this accurately, so it 
has not proved possible to establish whether this is what 
Naida is referring to (op,cit,, p 280) when he writes that 
the Kronstadt Social-Democratic leadership was arrested on 
6 January 1906 „ As he says that those arrested included 
Petersburg Committee members, this v/ould seem unlikely. 
However, he is not specific and cites no sources 0
2. Zharnovetskii, op0 cit 0 , p 61.
3. ibid 0 ; Naida, op 0 cit., p 280; both these sources in
their enthusiasm apparently overestimate the size of the 
Kronstadt attendance at these meetings 0 Both claim that 
meetings of "up to 500" were held at Lisii Nos 0 However, 
the Okhrana report apparently referring to the same 
meeting, that of 14 May 1906, states that although 50O 
people were at the meeting only 180 came by boat from 
Kronstadt and the remainder were workers, students, etc. 
from Sestroretsk ("Kronshtadtskoe vosstanie.. 0 ", KA, 1936, 
no«77, p 94).
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particular kind of Little-Russian humour went down extraordinarily
well with the sailors". Flying meetings were also held in the
2barracks "almost every day" according to a police report and
activity had become so brazen that notices were posted up around
3 barracks "in daylight under the noses of the officers".
The success of the work led to two worries: first, that 
the authorities must arrest the organisers before long; secondly, 
that the sailors migfct start an uprising before the Social 
Democrats were ready for it. In order to minimise the effect of
any possible arrests, it had been agreed during April that two
4 Kronstadt Social Democrats should be on the Petersburg Committee.
Kronstadt was removed from the okruzhnoi raion and given raion 
status of its own. Once military contacts had built up, they were 
handed over to the Petersburg Military Organisation, which had 
autonomous status under the Petersburg Committee but, because of
the special conditions of work in Kronstadt, contacts were still
5 maintained through the intermediacy of Kronstadt workers.
With this multiplicity of links, it was hoped that police action
1. Zharnovetskii, op.cit,, p 72.
2. ibid,, p 69.
3. ibid. k
4. ibid., p 72; Naida, op 0 cit,, p 280 for some reason only 
claims one; Bondarevskaya, op.cit., pp 294ff in her 
tables of Petersburg Committee members for 1905-07 lists 
the Kronstadt workers, P.A. Artem'ev and E 0 Kanopul.
5. Zharnovetskii, op 0 cit., p 62.
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\vould not be able to break contact.
The Social Democrats attempted to prevent what they 
considered a premature uprising but playing do\vn the sort of 
issue that had proved so explosive in 1905. However, feeling 
was running high among the troops. The "explanation" of the 
October Manifesto to the armed forces was eagerly awaited after 
the October mutiny, and caused disappointment when it was 
eventually published„ There was resentment at the sentences 
mated out after October, combined with the belief that for all 
the casualties it had been worthwhile as the term of service had 
been reduced to five years. Some officers apparently behaved 
stupidly after the mutiny, increasing resentment rather than 
trying to patch things up. The increased restrictions imposed 
to try to prevent agitators merely made life more irksome and
the early summer of 1906 saw a number of incidents on the pattern
2of 1905, also culminating in attacks on brothels.
The continuing tension alarmed the Social Democrats to 
the extent that they asked the Duma Fraction of the Party to send
sane of their members to Kronstadt to persuade the troops of the
1* i^i-Ao, PP 59 » 69 > Sivkov, op.cit., pp 24-25.
2. Zharnovetskii, op.cit., pp 76, 76-SO; V.Amosov, "V 1905 
godu v Kronshtadte", KL, 1925, no.3, pp 109-10; 
"Posle vosstaniya v Kronshtiidte, 26-27 oktyabrya I905g", 
KL, 1925, no.3, p 103; "Revolyutsionnye vystupleniya v 
BaltJiskom flote za 1906-1003gg. M , KB, 1921, no.6, p 49 0
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dangers of a premature uprising. They also agreed that in the 
event of an unplanned or premature mutiny two members of 
Petersburg Conmittee and one member of the Central Committee
should irnnediately go to Kronstadt to try to take charge of 
events .
An additional reason for fearing a premature uprising 
was the activities and attitudes of the SRs. Modern Soviet 
authorities are predictably coy about the SRs and Mensheviks. 
While not denying the existence of these groups, or even the 
fact that /joint work was carried out. they usually are quick to
ix>int out that this /was done as part of a "bitter struggle with
3the SRs", and that SR proposals for alliances were refused,
except for short-term tactical agreements and then only with the
4 permission of higher Party bodies.
Earlier Soviet accounts tell quite a different story; 
one that is confirmed from Socialist -Revolutionary, and from 
Okhrana sources. According to these sources, the Social 
Democrats managed to establish organizations among the Kronstadt 
workers and among the soldiers of the Mines Company, but had not 
been able to establish any direct contacts with the sailors or
1. P.K(udelli) "Protokoly Petersburgskogo Kbmiteta..„", 
KL, 1930, nOo4, p 20 0
2. Zharnovetskii, op.cit., p 72 e
3. Sivkov, op.cit., p 35.
4. Naida, op.cit,., p 247.
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with the mass of the Kronstadt soldiery. On 23 April, under 
pressure from the rank and file members of both organizations, 
who did not care too much for the finer distinctions of policy, 
a meeting of both parties decided to begin joint work. The 
first step was the establishment of a Provisional Technical 
RireaUo This was i) to prevent disputes and slanging matches 
between SRs and SDs at political meetings; ii) to distribute the 
literature of both parties around the ships and barracks; 
iii) on rest days to set up patrols which would restrain soldiers 
and sailors from pointless rioting, and a joint committee to sit
on these days at a known place, ready to intervene should the
2patrols prove incapable of restraining the soldiers and sailors.
Very soon after this, the Provisional Technical Bureau held a 
further jpint meeting, where the rank and file of both parties 
wanted the parties to merge. One Social Democratic professional 
was in favour of this, but all other SD and SR professionals 
opposed it. In the end, a compromise was reached. Both parties
1. Ivanov, "Kronstadtskoe podpol'e", PR, 1924, no,12, p 139; 
further confirmation of Ivanov's error in dating is 
that henceforward, if one adds one year to his dates, they 
coincide with other sources; Zharnovetskii, "Kronshtadt- 
skoe...",' KL, 1925, no.3, p 61; V 0M 0 Mitrofanov, 
V Pamyat* Zhizni, L 1930, p 17.
2. Yu Zubilevich, Kronshtadt: VQspominaniya revolyutsion- 
erki, vol.1; Kronstadt-n.d 0 , pp 42-44; S.V 0 Ivanov, 
"V Kronshtadte,v Arkhangel'ske, v Libave", KL, 1923, no.5, 
pp 319-20; idem. "Kronshtadtskoe podpol'e, PR, 1924, 
no.12, p 140; Zubilevich (an SR) says that the initiative 
for the joint work came from the SDs. Ivanov (an SD) says 
that the initiative came from the SRs.
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were to remain, but a United Garrison Assembly was to meet a few 
times a month and its decisions were to be binding on both 
parties. Meanwhile, an Executive Conmittee was elected to work 
out a plan to go into immediate effect should an uprising begin 
spontaneously. . v
At seme stage after this the Petersburg Committee of the 
RSDLP ordered the Kronstadt SDs to withdraw from the Assembly. 
(Just when this occurred is unclear, as Ivanov's (SD) account has 
it that the order came immediately after the setting up of the 
Assembly, whereas Zubilevich's (SR) account implies that the 
Assembly functioned for some time.) Two SD professionals were 
sent to Kronstadt where they attempted to enforce this decision 
at a meeting of the Assembly. The Assembly agreed to dissolve 
itself as it was usurping party rights. However, and again this 
proposal came from the rank and file, it decided, despite strong 
opposition from the SD professionals, to create a "Non-Party 
Organization" to co-ordinate the work of preparing the uprising. 
The Petersburg Committee of the RSDLP then withdrew all its
professionals from Kronstadt. The local Social Democrats,
2 
undaunted, decided to carry on without help from the capital.
Zubilevich, op.cito, vol.1, pp 45-46; Ivanov, 
"Kronshtadtskoe podpol'e", PR, 1924, no 0 12, p 140; 
Zharnovet ski i, ' 'Kronsht adt skoe„..", KL, 1925, no „ 3, 
pp 69, 72; Voennye vosstaniya v Balt'ike v 1905-1906gg, 
M 1933, p 59; N. Egorov, "Kronshtadtskoe vozstanie", 
Byloe, 1917, no.4(26), p 90.
Zubilevich, pjxjcrt u , vol.2, pp 24, 95-1O2; Ivanov, 
"Kronshtadtskoe podpol'e", PR, 1924, no u !2, p 141; idem. 
"V Kronshtadte...", KL, 1923, no.5, pp 319-20.
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During this period, co-operation between the parties was 
close. A cannon four point agitational programme was agreed: 
i) to call for a Constituent Assembly; ii) for the eight hour 
day; iii) for the army to be replaced by a militia; iv) for 
the confiscation of land. Members of both parties helped 
smuggle the literature of the other party into Kronstadt and, 
although each party maintained its separate sphere of influence 
(the workers, the Mines Company and the Artillery for the SDs, 
the Fleet and the Infantry for the SRs), each party distributed 
the literature of both parties in its own particular sphere. 
Joint meetings were arranged, mostly at Lisii Nos, the nearest 
point on the mainland, near Sestroretsk but sometimes in 
Kronstadt itself, where the most popular speaker was F.M. Qnipko, 
Trudovik Deputy in the First State Duma. Both SDs and SRs saw as 
their main task the prevention of any premature outbreaks that 
would jeopardise the general uprising that both were preparing 
for. Both the Kronstadt SDs and the Kronstadt SRs earned 
hostility from their respective Petersburg leaderships for the 
alliance, although the Kronstadt SRs were able to persuade their 
leaders to accept it, unlike the SDs 0
The "Non-Party Organization" did break down, however.
»
According -to Ivanov, this was because the SRs broke the agreement
1. Ivanov, loc.cit.; Zubilevich, op 0 cit., vol.1, pp 63, 84; 
Zharnovetskii, op 0 cit., p 69; Mitrofanov, V Pamyat' 
Zhizni, pp 58, 61; A. Piskarev, "Kronshtadtskoe 
vosstanie 20 iyulya 1906 goda", KB, 1920, no.4, p 37; 
L.S. "Krasnyiostrov", ICiS, 1929, no.56, p 34.
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by calling for the socialization of the land at a public meeting, 
thus breaching the agreement on limiting agitation to four 
issues. This may have happened, but in itself is unlikely to 
have broken an alliance that was working well. One can possibly 
accept Zubilevich's view that the local SDs had been badly worried 
by being cut off by their Petersburg Comnittee 0 According to 
Zubilevich,the Social Democratic Petersburg Committee then set out 
to convince its Kronstadt branch that the basic approach of the SRs 
was wrong. The SRs believed that a successful uprising in the 
Fleet would give the revolutionaries military command of the 
Capital, and would also inspire other revolutions all over Russia, 
and this was the prime objective. The SDs, on the other hand, saw 
a general strike as the first objective, with a Fleet uprising 
playing a supporting role. This difference was crucial, as for 
the SRs it meant that the mutiny in tne Fleet must come first, 
whereas the SDs were concerned to contain the Fleet from any out­ 
breaks until a general strike had begun. Eventually the Kronstadt 
SDs were convinced and withdrew from the "Non-Party Organization".
Even so, joint work of a looser kind for the preparation of 
an uprising continued and,according to Zubilevich, the local SDS
1. Ivanov, lOc.cito; Zubilevich, op 0 cit., vol.3, pp 17-25. 
Zubilevich's version also accords more with the Social 
Democratic attitude to work in the armed forces, which I 
shall discuss below0 For a contrasting view of the whole 
affair cf. Naida, Revolyutsionnoe dvizhenie v tsarskom 
flote, pp 247, 282, who has the initiative i'or united 
work firmly coming from the SRs, who moves the "Non-Party 
Committee" back to 23 April, thereby obliterating the 
United Garrison Assembly, but who has the "Bolsheviks" 
(in fact a united Bolshevik-Menshevik Corrmittee at this 
time) reject the whole, thing from the beginning anyway.
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encouraged the SRs to take over what had previously been accepted 
as SD spheres of interest.
The uprising they were preparing for was to take place
simultaneously at the three major bases of the Fleet: Kronstadt,
2Helsingfors and Revel'. In Helsingfors, the Social Democrats
had managed to create a much stronger organization than they had 
in Kronstadt. This was largely because of the difference between 
the two bases. Since Kronstadt was an island, where everything 
centred on the naval base, the sole reason why the island was
populated at all; it was fairly easy to watch people coming and
^ o 
going and to spot those with no obvious business there.
Helsingfors was capital of Finland, which enjoyed semi-autonomous 
status in the Russian Empire. Most importantly at this time 
(i.e. since October 1905), the Finnish Social Democratic Party 
was legal and able to give a good deal of help to their Russian 
comrades. In addition to which, Ifelsingfors was a large town, 
with a good rail connection with Petersburg, with a population on
the whole hostile to Russian rule. It was far more difficult for
4 the police to pursue revolutionaries there.
1. Zubilevich, op.cit., vol.3, pp 26-28; Ivanov, "Kronshtadt- 
skoe podpol'e" , PR, 1924, no.12, p 141; idem; 
'V Kronshtadte... M , KL, 1923, no.5, p 319.
2. the naval base at Helsingfors is situated on the Sveaborg 
archipelago in Helsingfors harbour. This is where the 
mutiny began and thus it is known as.the Sveaborg mutiny 
or uprising.
3. L.S. "Krasnyi ostrov", KiS, 1929, no.56, pp 26-28.
4. I. Egorov, Vo.sstaniya v Daltiiskom flote 19O5-06£g, L 1926, 
p 55; ' N. Chuzhak, "v vocnncm podpol'e bol'shevikov 1905- 
1906gg" in V tsarskoi kazarmc, M 1929, pp 56-57.
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Towards the end of June, the Helsingfors SRs and an 
emissary from the Kronstadt SRs suggested to the Helsingfors 
SDs that they should set up a joint Information Bureau to co­ 
ordinate work for an uprising. The SDs at first refused, as 
they were not sure what their Central Ccnmittee's attitude would 
be to this. However, as they continued to get no direction from 
the Central Ccnrnittee^ they accepted and a plan for a simultan­ 
eous uprising in the three bases was established. A key man in 
this joint venture was an officer, staff-captain S.A 0 Tsion, who
at this very time moved from the RSDIP, where he had been on the
\ 
editorial board of the SD paper Vestnik kazarmy, to the PSR.
2 This apparently did not prevent the SDs from working with him.
In the event the plan miscarried. The mutiny in Sveaborg 
broke out before it was supposed to. M.A. Trilisser, the main 
Social Democratic professional in Helsingfors blamed the Sis for 
this at the Conference of SD Military Organizations held later in
the year. In his memoirs, however, he writes that the mutiny was
3 entirely spontaneous. This meant that the proper signals were
not sent to Kronstadt or Revel 1 . In Kronstadt the uprising was
1. Egorov, op.cit., pp 56, 115; Chuzhak, op.cit., pp 57-58; 
Zubilevich, op.cito, vol.3, p 15; Piskarev, 
"Kronshtadtskoe vosstanie...", KB, 1920, no.4, p 37.
2. Chuzhak, loc.cit.; N. Fedorovskii, "Sveaborgskoe 
vosstanie", Krasriaya Nov'.,1926, no.3, p 159.
3. Chuzhak, loc.cit,; Fedorovskii, op.cit., p 162 agrees. 
At this conference, Trilisser also attacked the Central 
Committee of the RSDLP for not being any help, perhaps 
the attack on the SRs was to balance this.
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hurriedly put into operation by the local SRs, once they read 
of the Sveaborg events in the paper. The SDs somewhat reluctantly 
joined them. In both places, after seme bloodshed, the mutinies 
were quelled, in Kronstadt by the army, in Helsingfors by the 
navy.,
The Revel 1 mutiny did not come off at all. One ship, the 
Paroyat' Azova, mutinied at sea under the influence of a Social 
Democratic student, one A.Kbptyukh , who had got aboard disguised 
as. a sailor. Some officers were killed, some put off in a ship's
boat, some were locked into their cabins. By the time the ship
\ 
reached Revel 1 , the mutiny had been quelled by the petty officers.
Although it coincided with the Kronstadt mutiny, those involved
2were unaware of this, or of the Sveaborg mutiny.
There are a number of interesting parallels between the 
Sveaborg and Kronstadt mutinies that ought to be stressed. In 
both places, the rank and file of the parties and non-party 
people were impatient with the differences between the SDs and 
the SRSo Indeed, in Helsingfors, where the parties were organiz­ 
ationally less close than in Kronstadt, they were nonetheless
1. Zubilevich, op.cit., vol.3, pp 33ff; A. Piskarev, 
"Kronshtafitskoe vosstanie 20 iyula 1906 goda" KB, 
1920, no.4, pp 39-40; P.S. Shuvalov, "Iz bor by za 
khleb i volyu", KL, 1923, no,5, pp 272-73; 
Fedorovskii, op.cito, p 168; Pyatyi (Londonskii) 
s"ezd RSDRP, Protokoly, M 1963, p 773; S. Vinogradov, 
Flot v revolutsionnom dvizhenii, L 1925, pp 37-41.
2. "Vooruzhennoe myatezh na Kreisere 'Pamyat 1 Azova'", 
KB, 1920, no.2, pp 30-35; Piskarev, op.cit., p 38.
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lumped together in the popular mind as the Trudovaya Partiya. 
In fact, the attitude of non-party people and of the party rank 
and file towards the differences between the SRs and the SDs, 
which earned them the disapproval of the higher echelons of the 
Party inside Russia, was similar to the attitude of the higher 
Party Comnittees inside Russia to the emigre disputes we have
*
discussed in Chapters One and Two.
In both places the local SRs and SDs worked together to 
prepare an uprising„ In both places, when the mutinies broke out 
before either party was ready, they both joined in and continued
V
to co-operate until the mutinies were over. In both places, 
joint work with the SRs was accompanied for the SDs by poor 
relations with their own party leaders. This was also apparently 
accompanied by a failure in SD propaganda. In Kronstadt, the SDs
could, and did, claim that things got out of hand because the SRs
2were much more numerous than they were. In Helsingfors, on the
other hand, they claimed to be the stronger party, yet Trilisser 
in his report to the November 1906 Conference, put the blame on 
the SRs' influence here too.
To a great extent this can be attributed to a certain 
ideological confusion inside the newly reunited Social Democratic 
Party. At the Fourth Party Congress, in May 1906, a dispute had
1. Zubilevich, op 0 cit 0 , vol.1, pp 46, 57; Piskarev, op.cit., 
p 38; Egorov, op 0cit., p 79; Mitrofanov, V pamyat' 
. zhizni, p 17.
2. Zharnovetskii, "Kronshtadtskoe...", KL, 1925, no.3; 
p 101; Egorov, ODoCit., pp 139-42.
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broken out over the importance of work among the armed forces. 
Lenin and Krasin argued for barricade fighting where the 
example of the armed workers would inspire the troops to change 
sides once the uprising had begun, rather than beginning the 
revolution once the troops were won over. And this attitude 
is evident in the way in which the Petersburg Conmittee treated 
Kronstadt and Kelsingfors later in the year. Also, signific­ 
antly at the Fourth Congress, Yaroslavskii, the one delegate 
actively involved in work among the troops denounced the kind of
work the Party was conducting there as "not serious...extremely
\ o 
careless...disorganised...". The Military Organization of the
Petersburg Committee sent a message of protest to the Congress 
as it had practically no delegates competent to discuss military 
matters. 3 At the Fifth Congress, held in 1907, after the 
Kronstadt and Sveaborg mutinies, the Military Organization again
complained that work among the troops had never been properly
4discussed at a Party Congress "through lack of time". Iron­ 
ically,' at this Congress too, the question was not discussed 
"through lack of time", although four sessions (i.e. two days) 
were devoted to discussing the agenda 0
1. Chetvertyi (ob"edinitel'nyi) s"ezd RSDRP, Protokoly, 
M -1959, pp 363ff o
2 ' ibid., p 373; he told the (apocryphal?)story of a CC 
member who went out to the Potemkin in a boat merely 
to give the mutineers a slogan post hoc.
3. ibid., p 387.
4. Pyatyi (Londonskii) s"ezd RSDRP, Protokoly, passim.
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Social Democratic propaganda was also hindered by the 
Party's divisions over the State Duma. One eye witness in 
Sveaborg describes the extraordinary effect of the announcement 
of the dispersal of the State Duma by Duma Deputy, MIkhailichenkOo 
He had finished speaking and the meeting was drawing to a close, 
when he suddenly got up again:
s
Comrades, he said, I have just received a 
telegram informing me of the dispersal of 
the State Duma 0 Here it is. It is a new 
appeal to the Russian people and the people 
will not leave it unanswered. Perhaps today, 
perhaps tomorrow, revolution will break out 
in Russiao Today I am leaving you. Each one 
of us must be at his post. I appeal to you, 
Finnish citizens and Russian soldiers, to 
support those who were elected by the people 
in their struggle against the Tsarist 
Government. 1
Other participants confirm that the dissolution of the Duma after
2only two months did much to radicalise feelings. The Bolsheviks,
at least, could not hope to have much impact here, as they were 
boycotting the Duma at the time.
For whatever reasons, the propaganda of the Socialist 
Revolutionaries predominated in both bases. A Government
Commission, established to discover the causes of the Kronstadt
3mutiny, found it was launched with the slogan "Land and Freedom".
Subsequent Bolshevik memoirs, when recounting the last words or
*
prison letters of the executed, record only "Land and Freedom",
1. Fedorovskii, "Sveaborgskoe vosstanie", Krasnaya Nov', 
1926,.no.3, p 161.
2. Piskarev, "Kronshtadtskoe vosstanie", KB, 1920, no.4, 
p 38; Zubilevich, Kronshtadt, vol.3, p 13.
3. Voennyc vosstaniya v Baltiiskom flote, p 63.
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"for sacred freedom, for land, for power to the people" and 
"Down with the tyrants. Long live freedom". None of which have 
Social Democratic overtones.
After the July mutinies and the arrests which followed 
them, very little was left of the Social Democratic organization 
in Kronstadt. In October the Petersburg Committee sent an 
organiser, A, Khrennikov, to the island to see if he could find 
out why the organization had collapsed and if there was any chance
-v
of any new work there. Ife was unable to find out why the organiz­ 
ation had collapsed and concluded that, for the time being, 
Social Democratic work in Kronstadt was "unthinkable". 2
The Socialist Revolutionaries, on the other hand, were 
able to re-establish an organization which developed rapidly. In 
February 1907 they sent three professionals to Kronstadt, who set 
up a secret Party Headquarters, organized meetings, and were even
able to nake contact with some of their comrades inside Kronstadt
3prison. By March the Social Democrats, too, had managed to re­ 
establish contact with some fourteen people: six sailors and
4 eight workers.
1. Egorov, op 0 cit 0 , p 133; Fedorovskii, op.cit 0 , pp 172-73. 
True to form, Naida writes that the Petersburg Committee 
of .the RSDLP prepared and led the July uprising in 
Kronstadt. Naida, Revolyutsionnoe dvizhenie 0 .., p 251 0
*
2. Mo Akhun and V. Petrov, "Voennaya organizatsiya pri PK 
RSDRP v 1906 godu", KL, 1926, no.l, p 138
3. A. Drezen, "Baltiiskii flot v gody reaktsii", KL, 1929, 
no e 4(31), p 59.
4. ibid„, p 58.
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Here again, though, it was the SRs who predominated. 
Their main achievement in the first half of 1907 was to try and 
rectify the chaotic organization that they felt had led to the 
failure of July 1906. They began to build a network of ship­ 
board comnittees, linked to each other by a Naval Assembly of 
delegates from each committee. The Committees were given very 
specific tasks. They were in charge of all aspects of life 
aboard ship, they were to organize strikes,'demonstrations and 
go-slows (obstruktsii) and they were to decide on reactions to 
current political events. Each comnittee was to have its own 
funds made up from a compulsory levy from all its members. 
These members, too, had very specific tasks: to find out the 
political opinions of every man on board, to track down police 
spies, to distribute literature, and to prevent fruitless pre­ 
mature outbreaks. The whole venture was geared towards a new 
mutiny, which the SRs thought would spark off revolution through­ 
out Russia. Even though the tasks of each committee and its 
revenue were very specifically laid down, this new SR organiz­ 
ation had one feature which was important in distinguishing it 
from Social Democratic-dominated organizations. Each committee 
had very great autonomy in deciding how to react to political 
events, and in how to dispose of its income.
In a series of arrests, beginning in May and lasting 
until August 1907, the police wound up this new Fleet Organiz-
1. ibid., pp 64-66.
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ation, and with it the remaining Fleet SRs and the SDs who had 
worked with them. This relationship, too, is worth noting. 
The Fleet Organization was entirely SR in concept. Its aim was 
to launch an armed mutiny that the RSDLP leadership, at least 
did not believe in unless it was in a secondary, support role to 
a workers' strike or revolution. Yet the Fleet SDs co-operated 
with the SRs in building their organization rather than the kind 
of organization more suitable to the aims of their own Party 
leadership. It is perhaps this subordinate role of the Social 
Democrats that leads one modern Soviet historian to speak of this 
period with uncharacteristic evasiveness.
By August 1907, on the eve of the police action against 
it, the Fleet Organisation was well established. Committees had 
been set Up on a good number of ships and some of these had got
as far as getting their finances goinge There had not been time
2to start meetings of the Fleet Assembly.,
Some activity continued until the end of 1907 but, in 
general, the next three years were quiet ones for the Fleet 
revolutionaries: the "Period of Reaction", as Soviet historians 
call it..
By late 1910 or early 1911, however, there was a revival
i
of revolutionary activity.. From the Autumn of 1911, Okhrana 
agents were reporting the establishment of committees very
1. P.Z. Sivkov, Kronshtadt, L 1972,pp 53-54; Drezen, op.cit,, 
p 67
2. Drezen, op.cit., p 67.
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similar to those that had had a brief existence in 1907. On 
19 April 1912 representatives from a number of ships moored off 
Ifelsingfors met secretly and adopted a plan of action for a 
possible general mutiny.
Three days later representatives from some thirty-five 
ships met and decided to start the mutiny on 24 April. This was
t *
the day the Fleet was to put to sea, after spending the winter 
frozen into the ice. It was deemed to be a good day, as the 
Fleet would still be together, before dispersing to various 
duties, and the ships armed. The plan was that the crew of the 
Tsesarevich and Slava were to take over their ships on the night 
after sailing. They should then go to Revel 1 and join with the 
Ryurik. All three ships would then return to Helsingfors, where 
a mutiny was to break out on the fortress. At this poijat the 
destroyers were to go to Kronstadt and take it over. The news
of the successful mutiny would then set off uprisings among the
o
workers and part of the army.
It is unmistakeably an SR plan. The.mutiny in the Fleet 
is the spark that will set alight the whole of Russia. There 
is no question of it being subordinate to any proletarian action. 
On the contrary,^ the proletariat was to move in support of the 
movement begun in the Fleet.
1. K.S. Eremeev, Sbornik vospominanii i rasskazov starogo 
bol'shevika, M 1931, p 42; A, Drezen, "Baltiiskii flot 
v gody pod"ema", KL, 1930, no.3, pp 132ff.
2. Eremeev, op.cit., p 46; Egorov, Baltflot v gody reaktsii. 
M 1928, p 81; "Delo o revolyutsionnoi organizatsii sredi 
matrosov", ZZh, 1912, no.29, pp 1682-83 .
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As for the Social Democrats, their part in all this was 
very similar to that of 1905, 1906 and 1907. From 1910 onwards 
there are signs of Social Democratic contacts being re­ 
established among the port workers in both bases, as well as 
sane of the ships. In December 1910 sailors from the Slava 
then refitting in Toulon, wrote to Lenin in Paris asking for 
organizational help. A certain "comrade Aleksei" was sent to 
Toulon to give them what help they needed. 2 Again, in 1912, a 
"representative" of the Baltic Fleet called on Lenin in Cracow. 3
Once again, the Fleet Bolsheviks were active participants 
in preparing an uprising that was contrary to the beliefs of 
their Party leaders. When the Okhrana swooped on the very 
evening that the mutiny was to have begun, a large number of 
Social Democrats, including some that were to become fairly 
prominent in 1917, were arrested along with the Socialist
Revolutionaries, The battleship Slava was one of the two ships
4 at the very centre of the mutiny. Yet, to the contemporary
"bourgeois" press, to Pravda and to Lenin himself, the affair was
1. A, Drezen, /'Baltiiskii flot v gody pod"ema", KL, 1930,
no.3, p 142; Ereneev, op.cit., p 44; P. Mal'kov, Zapiski 
komendanta Moskovskogo Kremlya, M 1959, p 9.
2. Krupskaya, Raniniscences of Lenin, p 202; M. Stolyarenko, 
"V.Io Lenin i bol'sheviki linker a Slava1 ', VIZh, 1969, 
no.4, p 99.
3. PSS, vol.48, p 84.
4. Ereneev, op.cito, pp 46-47„
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thought of entirely in terms of the Socialist Revolutionaries. 1
It was only in the early Spring of 1915 that revolutionary 
activity began to pick up again in the Fleet. Revolutionary 
cells, containing members of both the SDs and the SRs began to 
form on board the ships. Some kind of liaison was established 
with Petrograd by the Socialist Revolutionary sailor,
, »
S.G. Lysenkov, who managed to contact the Bolshevik, I.G. Dudin, 
at that time working as an electrician in the Petrograd Naval 
Prison. Through Dudin, Lysenkov received both SR and SD liter­ 
ature, which he distributed to the Fleet organizations. 2 On 
4 May, Lysenkov had to run away to Moscow to escape arrest, but 
before leaving, he had time to hand over his contacts to another 
SR, S.G. Pelikhov, who maintained them until he was arrested on 
15 October 1915. 3
Pelikhov f s arrest coincided with the mutiny which broke out 
on the battleship Gangut over bad food after a heavy day's 
coaling. The mutiny which was quite spontaneous and independent 
of party activity, was followed by the arrest of 123 sailors, and
1. Pravda, 18 June 1913; PSS, vo! 0 22, pp 1-2;
"Delo o revoljoitsionnoi organizatsii sredi matrosov", 
ZZh, 1912, no.29, pp 1682-83.
2. I. Solov'ev and T. Fedorova, "K istorii vozniknoveniya 
bol'shevistskikh organizatsii na Baltiiskom flote", 
VIZh, 1966, no.11, pp 12-13; A.L. Sidorov (ed.), 
Revolyutsionnoe dvizhenie v armii i na flote v gody 
pervoi mirovoi voiny Sbornik dokumentov., M 1966, p 314; 
I. Egorov, "Matrosy bol'sheviki nakanune 1917 goda", 
KL, 1926, no.3, p 18.
3. Solov'ev and Fedorova, op.cit,, p 13; Sidorov (ed.), 
opa cit., pp 319, 348-49, 355 U
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this brought home to the Fleet revolutionaries the danger of such 
outbursts to their painfully constructed organizations. The 
solution was seen to be an organization which would encompass
Kronstadt and Helsingfors and which would make contact with the
orevolutionary parties in Petrograd for political guidance,,
Contact between Kronstadt and Helsingfors was established 
when the Imperator Pavel I came to Kronstadt for a refit towards 
the end of November. This initial contact was developed when 
N.V. Brendin, a Kronstadt sailor who had been granted six months 
sick leave, was persuaded to take it in Helsingfors rather than to 
go home.
At about the same time, contact was made with the Vyborg 
District Committee of the Bolshevik Party, who sent one of their 
members, the former Potemkin mutineer, Ivan Egorov, to help the
1. Solov'ev and Fedorova, op.cit,, pp 13ff in their very 
remarkable article effectively demolish previous Soviet 
claims that the Gangut affair was an "uprising" led by 
Bolsheviks: a story which they find was introduced into 
historical literature in the.memoirs of P 0 Dybenko who, as 
they point out, was serving on another ship. At the trial 
that followed the State prosecutor claimed that the mutiny 
was the work of revolutionary parties (and some of the accused 
were members, whether or not they had started the mutiny) in 
order to facilitate a verdict of guilty, cf. also E. Samoilov, 
"Besporyadki na Ganpnte v oktyabre 1915 goda", KB, 1921, no.8, 
pp 31-36; Mo Kuznetsov, "Vosstanie na linkore Gan^at v 1915g',' 
KB, 1921, no.5, pp 47-50; "Volneniya vo flote v 1915 godu", 
KA, 1925, no u 9, pp 94-103.
.2. N.A. Khovrin, Baltiitsy idut na shturm, M 1966, p 13.
3. Khovrin, loc.cit.; "Delo o revolyutsionnoi organizatsii 
sredi matrosov...", KB, 1920, no.5, p 29.
-139-
Fleet organizations. At the end of December, however, the 
Qkhrana moved in. Over the next two months they arrested Egorov, 
his wife, a third member of the Vyborg.District Bolshevik Organiz­ 
ation and seventeen sailors including I.D. Sladkov (Kronstadt) and 
N.A. Khovrin (Imperator Pavel I) who had originally made contact
between the two bases, and N.V. Brendin, who had given up his sick
2 leave to develop it.
One of the main aims of the organization had been to restrain 
the sailors from useless outbursts and at the same time to protect 
its members from the Qkhrana by using all the techniques of con­ 
spiracy developed by both the PSR and the RSDIP. A tribute to the 
success of this venture is the fact that contact was not broken.
A new Main Committee was elected in May 1916, again containing
3members of both parties. Contact was retained with the Vyborg
District Committee of the Bolshevik Party after Egorov's arrest, 
through P.M. Kimen, a worker in the Aivaz works, until his arrest
1. I refer here to the Bolshevik Committee of the Vyborg 
District of Petrograd, not the Finnish town of Vyborg. 
I. Egorov, "Matrosy-bol'sheviki nakanune 1917g", in 
P.F. Kudelli and I.F. Egorov (eds,), Oktyabr'skii 
shkval, L 1927, p 12; Shlyapnikov, Kanun semnadtsatogo 
goda, vol.1, p 245; Solov'ev and Fedorova, op.cit., 
p 17; Sidorov, op.cit., p 347.
2. Egorov, op.cit., p 15; V. Zalezhskii, Bor'ba za 
Baltiiskii flot, M-L 1925, p 9; I. Egorov, Zhizn' 
rabochego revolytsionera, L 1925, pp 3O-31.
3. P.Z. Sivkov, Kronshtadt, p 75; "Delo o revolyutsionnoi 
organizatsii", KB, 1920, no.5, p 29; Egorov, op.cit., 
pp 12, 16.
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in July 1916. -
What was new about the Fleet Organization of 1915 was that
/
the Social Democrats, or rather now, the Bolsheviks, were in the 
ascendant. The literature of both parties was distributed. .Both 
parties worked in the Organization, but where the joint organiz­ 
ations of 1907 and 1912 had seemed overwhelmingly SR, that of 1915 
is overwhelmingly Bolshevik in political orientation. 2 There are 
traces of SR policies, as for example in the Okhrana report, that 
the organization was preparing to make certain demands on the 
Government which would be forced to make concessions because of
o
the Fleet's military importance, but not many.
Of course, this view of the Organization may be the result 
of the selective Soviet publication of documents and memoir 
mater iaj.. Except for the remarkable article of Solov'ev and 
Fedorova, so frequently cited over the last few pages, and the 
collection of documents published by Sidorov, Soviet sources pass 
over the SR presence in silence e One is just supposed, presum-
1. Solov'ev and Fedorova, opoCito , p 18; Sivkov, op.cit. ,
p 74. On p 77 Sivkov claims that contact was maintained by 
B.A. Zhemchuzhin after Kimen's arrest, I have not been 
able to confirm this. In any case, Zhemchuzhin was himself 
arrested in October 1916. Geroi oktyabrya, vol.1, L 1967, 
pp 19-21.
2. So much so that most Soviet sources attempt to portray it 
• as an exclusively Bolshevik organization, e.g. Sivkov, 
op.cit., pp 67ff, etc. But see below, Appendix p 350.
3. Sidorov, Revolyutsionnoe dvizhenie, p 345.
4. I. Solov'ev and T. Fedorova, "K istorii vozniknoveniya
bol'shevistskikh organizatsii na Baltiiskom flote", VIZh, 
1966, nOoll, pp 10-19; A,0. Sidorov (ed.), Revolyutsionnoe 
dvizhenie v armii i na flote v gody pervoi miravoi volny, 
M 1966, passim.
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ably, to believe that they disappeared between their predominance 
in 1912 and their overwhelming majority in the Kronstadt and 
Helsingfors Soviets of March 1917.
Numerically, as the March 1917 Soviet elections would tend 
to indicate, the SEls remained the majority. However, by 1915 the 
Bolsheviks had gained a moral authority based on their Party's 
opposition to the War, unlike much of the PSR. It is perhaps 
significant, in this respect, that a Zinmerwald Manifesto was
r
among the documents seized by the Okhrana in their arrests in
2February 1916, J Also, the Social Democrats' record of opposition
*
to spontaneous outbursts, like that on the Gangut, was probably 
winning respect among sailors who were tired of continuous
arrests.
\
What we are probably justified in concluding is that by 
1915, instead of the Fleet Social Democrats being completely 
swamped by the Fleet Socialist Revolutionaries^they had managed 
to assert themselves as a political force, and that an inter­ 
change of political ideas and methods involving the Fleet SDs, 
the Fleet SRs and the Vyborg District Committee of the Bolshevik 
Party was underway. What this was to lead to will be examined 
in the following chapters.
1. for SR disillusionment with the PSR leaders on this, 
cf. Svyatitskii, "Voina i predfevral'e", KiS, 1931, 
no.2(75), pp 7-50.
2. "Delo o revolyutsionnoi organizatsii...", KB, 1920, 
no.7, pp 53-54; of course, SRs participated in the 
Zinmerwald movement too.
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THE TRADITIONS EMERGE AND; COME INTO CONFLICT DURING 
THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION
CHAPTER FOUR
THE DIVISIONS IN THE BOLSHEVIK PARTY IN PETROGRAD 
IN FEIMJARY AND MARCH 1917
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The Origins of the Differences
The differences inside the Bolshevik Party in Petrograd, 
which became acute during and inmediately after the February 
Revolution, reflected differences of long standing in the Russian 
revolutionary movement concerning the form of Government that 
should succeed Tsarism.
Although the Bolsheviks saw the coming revolution as a 
democratic, Or capitalist one, they feared that a liberal Govern­ 
ment would lack both the inclination and the determination to 
carry through the revolution and implement the fundamental 
liberal reforms. The experience of 1905-06 had made this point 
one of general concern to both sections of the RSDLP and to the
PSRo In both parties some sections revived Marx's theory of the
i ' "Permanent Revolution",,
The original Bolshevik response to the problem was the 
slogan for a "Provisional Revolutionary Covernment" 0 This body 
was to be composed of members of all revolutionary parties, and 
would hold power temporarily while preparing the elections to a 
Constituent Assembly. It would guard against counter-revolution 
and pass provisional laws to implement the Socialist Minimum 
Programme, i.e 0 the eight-hour day, the establishment of minimum 
wage-rates-, the confiscation of large estates, etc. These were 
regarded as democratic or capitalist and not socialist reforms.
1. L.D. Trotsky, "Results and Prospects" in idem..
The Permanent Revolution, London, 1962, pp 161ff;
M. Perrie, "The Socialist Revolutionaries on Permanent
Revolution", SS, 1973, no.3, pp 411-13.
-144-
Similarly, the call for a Provisional Revolutionary Government 
was not a call for a socialist state. It was simply a measure 
to be taken to prevent a Government of capitalists and landlords 
coming to terms with the old regime at the expense of the working 
class and peasantry. The form of the future Russian state would 
be decided not by the Provisional Revolutionary Government, but 
by the Constituent Assembly.
The formation of the St. Petersburg Soviet in October 1905 
gave rise to further differences between the Bolsheviks and 
Mensheviks. The Mensheviks had played a far greater part in the 
formation and leadership of the Soviet than had the Bolsheviks. 
Indeed, the latter's role had been almost negligible, whereas to 
the Mensheviks the Soviet appeared as the culmination of their 
theories on the .political education of the working class in the 
arts of Government, administering funds, etc. When the Soviet 
was disbanded by the Government in December 1905, with very 
little protest from the workers, Lenin was able to use this 
experience to resume his offensive on the Mensheviks. The Soviet, 
he argued, only made sense as part of a struggle for power, per­ 
haps as the nucleus of the Provisional Revolutionary Government.
As merely an organ for workers' self-administration, it was
o
without value, even dangerous.
. Social Democratic and Right Socialist Revolutionary thought 
dealt almost exclusively in terms of a central Soviet. Lenin does
1. Tretii s"ezd RSDRP Protokoly. M 1959, pp 198-202.
2. PSS, vol.12, pp 62-70, 375-76.
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on one occasion in 1906 examine the implications of a plethora 
of local Soviets as well as a Central Soviet. However, he is 
concerned here with them solely as secondary rudimentary bodies , 
easily dispersed and dependent for their very existence on a 
strong Central Soviet. Even this view was formulated during 
the extreme left phase of Bolshevik politics imnediately after 
1905. In the years that followed, until the dispute with 
Rikharin in 1915, Lenin and the Bolshevik Party generally in its 
official pronouncements virtually ignored the Soviets.
The Mensheviks and Right Socialist Revolutionaries con­ 
tinued to think in terms of a Central Soviet as a body expressing 
working class opinion, educating the workers politically and 
exerting pressure on a central Government. This was what they
had in mind when they set up the Petrograd Soviet on 27 February
21917, and this is how it functioned initially. Like the
Bolsheviks, they thought in terms of a centralised state, and had 
no clear policy about the role of local Soviets. Indeed, one 
modern historian considered this to be their major weakness in 
1917. 3
On the other hand, the Socialist Revolutionary Maximalists, 
who were opposed to any form of centralised state, placed all
1. "PSS, vol.12, pp 229-30.
2. E.N. Burdzhalov, Vtoraya msskaya revolyutsiya,
M 1967, pp 211-12; N.N. Sukhanov, Zapiski orcvolyutsii, 
vol.1, Pbg, 1919, pp 66ff.
3. O. Anweiler, The Soviets: The Russian Workers', Peasants' 
and Soldiers' Councils 19O5-21, NY 1974, p 125.
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their emphasis on the local Soviet as the basic unit in the 
future Republic of Communes. To them, the overthrow of the 
Tsarist state must not be followed by a centralised capitalist 
state. This would be much stronger and more destructive of 
local initiative than the relatively inefficient Tsarist state. 
It vrould^thus be a retrograde step, hindering rather than
»
accelerating the Republic of Communes. In the event of the 
overthrow of Tsarism, the role of the local Soviets would be to 
undermine central authority to prevent the growth of a new 
central state. If this were established, an uninterrupted civil 
war must be unleashed against it, including the killing of those 
in authority. In this, they were very close to anarchist thought.
The Maximalists disappeared as an organised party in 1906 
but their' ideas .remained important among the Party's rank and 
file, resurfacing on the eve of the First World War in a wave of 
resentment against the moderate leaders of the PSR. Defensian
during the War itself made the division between leaders and led
o
even wider. The radical, or Maximalist wing of the Party was
not predominantly intellectual, but made up of proletarian and 
peasant elements, and over 70 per cent of SR terrorists were
1. B. Gorev, "Maksimalisty" in L 0 Martov, P. Maslov and
A. Potresov (eds.), Qbshchestvennoe dvizhenie v Rossii 
. v nachale XX veka, vol 0j>, St. Pbg, 1910, pp 511-23.
2. M. Hildermaier, "Neopopulism and Modernisation: The 
Debate on Theory and Tactics in the PSR, 19O5-14", 
RR, 1975, no.4, pp 453-75.
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workers, peasants, soldiers or sailors. It is the more 
radical or Maximalist brand of Socialist Revolutionism that 
worker Bolsheviks on the Vyborg Side, or in the Baltic Fleet, 
would be more likely to encounter.
The Positions Adopted by the Different Factions in Petrograd
k
The various policies were associated with different party 
organizations, and so it is convenient to describe them by the 
name of the organization concerned. It must be stressed, however, 
that the policies represented a majority opinion in the organiz­ 
ation, and that they all contained dissenting minorities for at 
least part of this period.
The four organizations concerned are: the Vyborg District 
Conmittee of the Bolshevik Party, the Petersburg Committee, the 
Russian Bureau of the Central Committee and what, in this
thesis will be called the Pravda group. This is somewhat of a 
misnomer as the group gained only very temporary control of 
Pravda, but it has been chosen because the episode is both well 
known and caused considerable disturbance at the time.
1. O.H. Radkey, The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism, NY, 1958, 
p 69.
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The Vyborg District Committee1
The question of the role of the Soviets was re introduced 
into discussions inside the Bolshevik Party by a member of the 
Vyborg District Committee in September 1915. This was, of
4
course, the period at which the Vyborg District Committee was 
working with both Socialist Revolutionary and Social Democratic
• o
organizations in the Baltic Fleet. It was also the period in
which the Party had to decide what to do about the War Industries 
Committees, which had just been established or, more specific­ 
ally, what the Party should do in the election of workers' 
representatives to these Committees,. The problem gave rise to 
considerable differences of view inside the Petrograd Party, 
and for a long time no decision could be reached. Eventually two 
policies emerged, neither of which could obtain an absolute 
majority. The more radical one proposed using the electoral 
campaign to put forward Bolshevik policy, but to boycott all 
elections. The other proposed to go one step further in the 
electoral process, by participating in the election of electors, 
so that Bolshevik policies could be put forward at the All-City 
Conference of Electors, where the actual representatives to the
1. The Vyborg District (or Vyborg Side) of Petrograd is a
working class area of the city, to the north east of the 
fork of the Greater Nevka and the Neva, joined to the 
centre of the city by the Liteinyi bridge. It was in 
this area that the Bolsheviks had the -greatest support up 
to and including 1917, and its committee was the best 
organised of all the Petrograd district parties.
2. see above pp 137ff.
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/ i 
War Industries Conmittees were to be chosen. Presumably the
advocates of the first policy felt that participation in the 
Conference of Electors would associate the Bolsheviks too
closely with the War Industries Corrrnittees, while Party policy
i 
was, in fact, to oppose the election of Worker Representatives.
The deadlock was broken by an amendment proposed byi
V.N. Zalezhskii, a moderate Conciliator, but also a member of 
the Vyborg District Committee. He proposed that the second 
course be adopted on condition that, should the electoral campaign 
arouse the working class sufficiently, the Bolshevik electors
should use their position to delay the final vote and declare the
oConference a Soviet of Workers r Deputies.
There are a number of things to note about this incident. 
The proposal was made by a moderate. It concerned one central 
Soviet. It was something between the 1905 Bolshevik concept of 
the Soviet as the embryo of a Provisional Revolutionary Government 
and the Menshevik concept of the Soviet as an organ of workers' 
self-expression. In all these ways it is a moderate, rightist
proposal and on one level it was attacked as such by Lenin in a
3set of "theses" and in an accompanying letter to Shlyapnikov.
1. The electoral process was indirect, like that used to 
elect deputies to the State Duma.
2 t A. Kondrat'ev, "Vospominaniya o podpol'noi rabote...", 
KL, 1923, no.7, p 37; for Zalezhskii's position as a 
moderate, see pp 174-75.
3. PSS, vol.27, pp 48-51; vol.49, p 160.
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On the other hand, we should remember that this amendment 
was a compromise which broke a deadlock that had lasted for 
several days of discussion 0 We do not know what policies had
been previously discussed and found unacceptable. Presumably
• 
they would include more moderate and more radical proposals.
Also, we cannot dismiss entirely the fact that the discussion on
\ •
the role of Soviets, after some nine years dormancy, was re- 
introduced by a member of the Vyborg District Conmittee at a 
time when that Conmittee was in close contact with the Fleet 
revolutionary organizations, and hence with Maximalist ideas, to 
which the Soviets were central.
This is not to say that 'one would expect the Vyborg 
Bolsheviks to accept Maximalist ideas wholesale, but that the 
discussions one would imagine them to have with the Maximalists 
would dispose them to think again about their Party's attitude, 
or lack of it, towards the Soviets. Those of a more radical 
disposition might be inclined towards adapt ing Maximalist ideas 
to fit Bolshevik conceptions, the moderates might incline towards 
a more Menshevik view. Furthermore, Lenin's attack on the pro­ 
posal for contemplating forming Soviets outside the context of 
an uprising, would further encourage the radicals to pursue 
their train of thought in the contacts with' the Fleet that 
followed this incident. These, as we have seen, lasted until 
December 1915.
Indeed, there are hints both in Lenin's "Theses" and in his 
letter to Shlyapnikov of the existence of a more radical position
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on the Soviets, In the "Theses", for example, he writes about
•
Soviets, in the plural, rather than the Soviet proposed by 
Zalezhskii 0 This could be dismissed as mere looseness of 
expression, were it not (for the fact that in his letter to 
Shlyapnikov he says that the "Theses" are partly in answer to 
questions raised by the dispute with Bukharin, 2 who, of 
course, was far from being a moderate .
Nonetheless, the evidence thus far probably does not allow 
us to do more than note the fact that the question of the role 
of Soviets was raised in the Party in Russia by a member of the 
Vyborg District Committee at a _time when this Committee was 
engaged in work with the Baltic Fleet Revolutionary Organisations,
The- trial of the Baltic sailors arrested as members of the 
Glavnyi Kbllektiv, and their contacts in the Vyborg District 
Comnitee took place in October 1916, The Petrograd Bolsheviks, 
and probably other parties too, organised a strike to coincide 
with the trial. This was very successful, and about 130,000 
workers participated, some factories being out for a week. 
Rightly or wrongly, the Bolsheviks believed that the size of the 
strike impressed the Court into awarding relatively short
1. PSS, vol.27, p 49,
2. ibid,, vol.49, p 160.
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I 
sentences of hard labour, rather than the death penalty. At
the same time, the hostility of the radicals in the Party 
towards the Workers' Representatives on the War Industries
Committees increased when the latter condemned the strike.
• 
On the other hand, if the plight of the Baltic sailors
had evoked a response in the Petrograd working class, Party issues
*
left it unmoved. Demonstrations organized for 9 January 1917 to 
commemorate Bloody Sunday were very poorly attended, as were the 
Bolshevik demonstration on the anniversary of the trial of their 
Duma Fraction and the Menshevik demonstration to protest against
the arrest of the Workers' Representatives on the War Industries
2Committees.
It was probably these recent disappointments that led the 
Vyborg District Committee to react cautiously to the proposed 
strike to mark International Women's Day, on 23 February 1917. 
Here was an issue much more remote than Bloody Sunday, the 
Bolshevik Deputies, or the arrest of the Workers' Representatives 
to the War Industries Conmittees, and the Vyborg District 
Committee instructed its members not to join the strike, and to 
dissuade others. It would fail, and lead only to reprisals. 
Energy should be conserved for a big strike on a real issue. 
This cautious reply led to a revolt in the Bolshevik rank and
1. A. Shlyapnikov, "Fevral'skie dni v Peterburge", 
PR, 1923, no.1(13), pp 71-72.
2. ibid,, p 79; Kbndrat'ev, op.cit., pp 237-38.
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file who, together with the local Menshevik and SR rank and file, 
decided to ignore Party instructions and go ahead with the 
strike,, The success of the strike astonished the Vyborg District
Committee, which immediately changed its policy to support it.
•
It was, of course, the first day of the February Revolution. 1 
Initially,^ no one suspected that this was more than a 
strike against the high cost of living, and the bread shortage. 
On the third day of the strike, however, things began to take a 
more radical turn. That morning, demonstrators leaving the 
Vyborg side had carried banners with the same slogans that had 
been carried on many demonstrations since the war began: 
"Down with the Autocracy!" and "Down with the War!"2 During the 
day, Bolshevik demonstrators from the Vyborg Side heard two 
slogans from non-Bolshevik agitators that were to win support 
from the crowds. The first, presumably from a Menshevik or
o
Right SR source, called for the crowds to support the Duma. The
second was a call for the election of local workers' Soviets
4 which was to incorporate representatives of the soldiers. This
has all the marks of emanating from the radical or Maximalist
1. V. -Kayurov, "Shesf dnei fevral' skoi revolyutsii", PR, 
1923, no.1(13), p 158.
•
2. ibid., p 162.
3. ibid.
4. I. Gordienko, Iz boevogo proshlogo, M 1957, p 58.
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wing of the SRs. In the evening of that same day, the Vyborg 
District Comnittee noted that the"factories wished to begin 
electing deputies to a soviet. Once again, this did not orig­ 
inate with the Bolsheviks, although the Vyborg District
•
Comnittee decided to try to take control of it. 2
The Vyborg^District Committee felt the tide running away 
from under them, and over the next two days badgered 
Shlyapnikov to allow them to have access to a Party cache of 
arms, so that they could transform the movement into an armed up­ 
rising. Not surprisingly, Shlyapnikov rejected this request, 
itself also oddly Maximalist in flavour, pointing out that the 
Bolsheviks' few revolvers would not make much impact on the
1. To Hasegawa, "The Bolsheviks and the Formation of the 
Petrograd Soviet in the February Revolution", SS, 1977, 
no e l, pp 89-90, believes this to be possibly Menshevilc in 
origin, as "it is known that the Mensheviks adopted the 
slogan to establish district Soviets". This he presumably 
infers from the meeting of 25 February of Menshevik 
activists who decided to set up a central soviet as a kind 
of information bureau to co-ordinate the strike. 1 cannot 
accept this. First he has quite unjustifiably rendered 
the Russian "raiony" as "local Soviets" thus inserting 
what he sought to prove (Hasegawa, loc a cit.; Burdzhalov, 
Vtoraya Russkaya Revolyutsiya, vol.1, p 2O9). Secondly 
the words Gordienko heard clearly refer to a means of 
uniting the striking workers with the mutinous soldiery, 
not merely an information bureau for co-ordinating the 
strike. Further in the article, without fully explaining 
why, Hasegawa rejects the argument of the Japanese 
historian Wada Haruki that the manifesto of the Vyborg 
District Committee of 27 February was written by SR 
Maximalists (Hasegawa, op 0 cit», p 99 )„ However, like 
most historians in the West and in the- Soviet Union, 
Hasegawa ignores the SRs altogether (except for this 
peremptory rejection of Wada) u I can only regret that 
Wada's article is in Japanese and thus not available to me.
2. N. Sveshnikov, "Otryvki iz vospominanii", PP, no.57, 
14 March 1923.
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Petrograd garrison„ In fact, were agitators in the crowd to 
shoot at the soldiers, this could' cause the soldiers to turn 
against the crowd and any chance of a revolution would be over.
The way to obtain arms, Shlyapnikov argued, was to win over the
1 soldiers.
The problem was that Shlyapnikov could give no clear 
directive as to how this could be done. One obvious solution was 
through the creation of local Soviets, and one can imagine that 
the Vyborgers pressed for this as an alternative to the distri­ 
bution of arms. However, Shlyapnikov's last experience of Party
policy on the Soviets was Lenin's attack on Bukharin's programme
o
in 1915-16 as "semi-anarchistic". As a member of the Central
Committee, Shlyapnikov presumably felt it his duty to keep as 
close to 'Lenin's line as he could. His rejection of the pro­ 
posal to create Soviets, on the grounds that the uprising must
be guided by Bolshevik cadres rather than non-party organiz-
3ations, was impeccably in the Leninist tradition. Unfortunately
it was a position that Lenin himself was abandoning. V/hat is 
more, by failing to solve the problems of the Vyborg District 
Comnittee, it further alienated them, driving them towards the 
Left, away from the Central Committee, and towards the 
Maximalist- policies, whither they were in any case being pulled
1. A. Shlyapnikov, Semnadtsatyi god, vol.l, (2nd edition),
M n 0 d 0 , pp 86, 100, 103-O4; idem. 'Tevral's kie dni..." 
PR,.. 1923, no.1(13), p 81.
2. see abovt Chapter Two, and below Chapter Eight.
3. Shlyapnikov, Semnadtsaty god, vol.1, p 97.
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by their own rank and file.
On 26 February, Shlyapnikov learned that the Petersburg 
Committee of the Party had been arrested,, It must have been
with some misgivings that he had, perforce, to charge the largest
i
and best organized of the Petrograd District Committees to take 
over the leadership of the entire City. The new leadership was, 
of course, the Vyborg District Committee.
Very early on the morning of 27 February, before seven 
o'clock and much to his landlady's indignation, Shlyapnikov was 
woken up by I.D 0 Chugurin, a member of the Vyborg District 
Committee, demanding a leaflet to be issued all over the city, to 
help win over the soldiers. They drew one up together, then and 
there. It was entirely consistent with Central Committee policy 
and ended with the following slogans:
Down with the Tsarist monarchy! 
Long live the People's republic! 
All landlords' land to the people! 
An eight-hour day to the workers 
Long live the RSDLP!
Long live the Provisional Revolutionary Government!
2 Down with the slaughter
It contained no mention of any kind of soviet.
On the same day, a leaflet was issued on the Vyborg Side 
which was quite different in tone. This one read:
1. Shlyapnikov, "Fevral'skie dni...", PR, 1923, no.1(13), 
p 96.
2. Shlyapnikov, Semnadtsatyi god, vol.1, pp 107-O8.
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Comrades! The hour we have longed for has 
come. The people are taking power into 
their own hands. The revolution has begun. 
Do not waste a moment, create a Provisional 
Revolutionary Government today!
Only organization can strengthen our force.
First of all elect deputies; let them make 
contact with each pther.
Let a Soviet of deputies be created under 
the protection of the troops. You will bind 
the remaining soldiers to you with a firm 
bond. Go to the barracks. Call out the 
remainder .
Let the Finland Station be the centre for 
the revolutionary headquarters to assemble.
Seize all buildings which could aid your
struggle.t
Comrade soldiers and workers! Elect 
deputies. Get in touch with each other.
Organize a Soviet of Workers' Deputies.
The leaflet is unsigned and its authorship has given rise to some 
controversy. Hasegawa states that "Soviet historians unanimously
agree that £it] was issued by the Vyborg District Comnittee" , and
2he accepts this verdict. Ifowever, there are grounds to believe
that this is not the whole story. Soviet historians are intent 
on demonstrating that the call for a Soviet in February 1917 
originated with the Bolsheviks. Theirs is a somewhat flimsy 
case, contradicted as far as the Russian Bureau of the Central 
Connittee is concerned, by Shlyapnikov himself. As it is axio­ 
matic to modern Soviet scholarship that the Bolshevik Party was
1. KPSS v bor'be za pobedu sotsialisticheskoi revolyutsii 
v period dvoevlastii Sbornik dokumentov, M 1957, p 171.
2. Hasegawa, op.cit., pp 98-99.
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united, evidence from any sector of the Party, ex post facto 
corrmits the whole Party.
On the other hand, the Japanese.historian Wada Haruki
believes that the leaflet was the work of some Bolsheviks
»
acting independently, or the Mezhraiontsy. or the SR Maximalists.
2Hasegawa dismisses this. But the argument deserves more
attention.
We know already that the rank and file Bolsheviks on the 
Vyborg Side disregarded the advice of their Committee on 
23 February, when they joined SRs and Mensheviks on strike. We 
know that there was pressure from some sections of the Vyborg
Corrmittee (but not from the whole Committee) to distribute arms
3to the workers to turn the strike into an armed uprising. We
know also that Bolshevik -memoirists speak of the call for Soviets 
coming from outside the Party., This is confirmed by a Socialist 
Revolutionary worker from the Vyborg Side, who was told by a more 
senior member of his Party that on Sunday, 26 February, Mwe on
the Vyborg Side had a meeting. A Soviet of Workers' Deputies was
4 formed. There were some representatives from the soldiers there.."
1. there are honourable exceptions to this rule, Burdzhalov 
among them.
2. Hasegawa, loc„cit.
3. Shlyapnikov, Semnadtsatyi god, vol.1, pp 103-O4, makes it 
clear that Chugurin was the main advocate of this view, 
which had some, but not unanimous support.
4. I. Markov, "Kak proizoshla revolyutsiya", VR, 1927, 
no.5/6, p 70.
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In addition, there is something odd about the most commonly 
cited secondary source. This reads:
In the morning of 27 February, an initiative 
group for the elections to a Soviet of 
Workers' Deputies was formed at a meeting of 
the Vyborg District Committee. This group 
issued an appeal organizing the Soviet of 
Workers 1 Deputies", 1
\ 
The question arises, why an initiative group? Why should
the appeal for a soviet not simply be made in the name of the 
Vyborg District Committee? One answer could be that the entire 
Committee was not in favour of the move. This could also 
explain why the leaflet was not signed,,
There are further indications that the Committee was 
divided. On the evening of 26 February it had held a meeting in 
the open air on the outskirts of Petrograd to discuss what to do 
next: call off the strike, or proceed to a revolution? It was 
very cold, and the comrades were tired out, and the meeting
dispersed before caning to any conclusion, promising to meet
2 next morning to continue the discussion. Chugurin, a known
extremist, hence presumably in favour of pursuing the revolution, 
turned up at Shlyapnikov' s lodgings the next morning clamouring
for a leaflet to help win over the troops. Shlyapnikov found
3 his views much moderated.
1. • E.N. Burdzhalov, op.cit., p 210; Hasegawa, op..cit., p 99.
2. Kayurov, op 0 cit., p 166.
3. Shlyapnikov, Semnadtsatyi god, vol.1, p 107.
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Some time later that morning other Vyborgers called on 
Shlyapnikov to tell him that it had been decided to pursue the 
revolution. They were followed by Chugurin who rushed in*
once more demanding arms, having abandoned his moderate position
2 '
of a few hours before. /
Would it be too much to assume that Chugurin had come \
round early, got Shlyapnikov out of bed, and obtained a leaflet, 
and with it the implied blessing of the Central Committee to
continue the revolution, in order to influence the Vyborg District
3Committee meeting, which was to meet at eight o'clock? Once the
decision to continue was assured, he could safely revert to his 
original position, to try in turn to press the Central Committee • 
into more radical action.
There is a further oddity about the leaflet: the design­ 
ation of the Finland Station as the venue for the Soviet. 
Burdzhalov explains this in terms of the Vyborg District 
Committee being overtaken by events; the decision to hold the 
Soviet in the Finland Station, on the Vyborg Side, making sense
to the Committee in charge of the city's Bolshevik organization,
4 but abandoned once the movement to the Duma began. There is much
1. i^ido, pp 1O8-09. Shlyapnikov who apparently knew nothing 
of the Vyborg vacillations thought they were speaking of 
factory conmittees.
2. ibid.
3. Kayurov, loc.cit.
4. Burdzhalov, op.cit. , p 211.
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sense in this explanation, and it receives negative confirmation 
from Kayurov's statement that he heard of the existence of the 
Petrograd Soviet in the Tauride Palace for the first time late
t
in the night of 27-28 February, He had been looking for•
Shlyapnikov, who was attending the Soviet, but had not thought 
of looking in the Tauride.
On the other hand, Kayurov admits that he was out of touch 
with the Vyborg and Petersburg Committees for long periods
during the revolution, at one stage (24 and 25 February) for two
2whole days. How typical is he? Can one really believe that no
one on the Vyborg Side knew of the Soviet in the Tauride? What 
happened at the Finland Station? Either one must believe the 
call to have been completely ineffectual, or were there scores 
of delegates sitting there wondering why no one else came?
Furthermore, elections of Soviet deputies in the Vyborg
3Side factories had begun as early as 24 February.
By 27 February the movement was well underway. Why were 
none of these delegates either aware of, or seeking the Soviet 
in the Tauride Palace? Were they all waiting at the Finland 
Station? Or if they knew of the meeting in the Tauride, why did 
the authors of the leaflet, supposedly the best organized
i
1. Kayurov, op 0 cit., p 169; Shlyapnikov, op.cit., p 130.
2. Kayurov, op.cit«, p 162.
3. A.M. Andrecv, Sovety rabochikh i soldatskikh deputatov 
nakanune oktyabrya, M 1967, p 39.
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Conmittee in the Petrograd Bolshevik Party, not know of it? 
In any case, Shlyapnikov writes in his memoirs that he first 
learnt of the meeting of the Soviet in the Tauride Palace by a 
telephone call from the Vyborg District! When he got there, 
however, there were no workers or Bolsheviks present„ One can
assume, then, that their absence was intentional.\
Many of these puzzles appear to be solved if we suppose 
i) that the leaflet did not refer to a Central Soviet somewhere 
in. the heart of the city, but to a local soviet there, on the 
spot on the Vyborg Side. A local soviet, after all, would be 
more useful in winning over the troops actually stationed on the 
Vyborg Side (and this was the explicit aim, according to the 
leaflet) than would a more remote Central Soviet, necessarily 
concerned with wider issues; ii) that the election of delegates 
in the factories from 24 February onwards was to the local soviet 
rather than to the Petrograd Soviet; iii) that the prime movers
4
in this were Socialist Revolutionary Maximalists and possibly 
Menshev'iks, rather than the Bolsheviks; iv) that part of the rank 
and file and possibly part of the Vyborg District Committee 
leadership wished to join this movement, as neither the District 
Committee nor the Central Conmittee could offer any viable alter­ 
native policy to continue the revolution; v) that on 27 February 
this radical section formed an initiative group and issued the
1. Shlyapnikov, 'Tevral'skie dni...", PR, 1923, no.1(13) 
pp 106, 108.
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leaflet, which although it has a Bolshevik flavour is also by 
its call for a local soviet (or indeed a soviet at all) out of 
line with Vyborg Committee or Central Committee pronouncements
immediately before or immediately after it; and vii) that all
\
three of Wada Haruki's surmises^probably contain some truth.
The events of 27 February certainly had Vyborg Committeek
men like Kayurov rattled. A half dozen or so of them spent the 
evening looking everywhere for Shlyapnikov, except the Tauride 
Palace. At midnight, after the first session of the Petrograd 
Soviet had ended, he returned home, and they presented him with
a leaflet which they wanted issued in the name of the Central
2Committee "to prevent other parties taking over the masses".
Shlyapnikov agreed to do so, giving it to Molotov to polish up 
stylistically. It was issued on 28 March, and published in the 
Izvestiya of the Petrograd Soviet. It calls for a Provisional 
Revolutionary Government, but makes no mention of Soviets, local 
or central.
From 28 February onwards, the Vyborg District Committee
1. This would not have been an isolated occurrence.
Burdzhalov, op.cit., p 210, gives the text of another 
leaflet, issued on 27 February, calling for a soviet 
which he says was not issued by any official comnittee 
of the RSDRP, although recognisably Bolshevik.
*
2. Kayurov, op.cit., p 167.
3. Shlyapnikov, op^cit., p 130; N 0 Avdeev, Revolyutsiya 
1917 goda Khronika sobytii, vol u l, M 1923, pp 185-86; 
Izvestiya Potrop,Tadskogo Sovcta Rabochikh Doputatov, 
Pribavlenie k no.l, 28 February 1917.
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swung further to the left. Bolshevik memoirists, with some 
justification, attribute this to the extremely militant mood of 
the working class at the time, which wanted to press on and seize
full powero Another element was that, now that the Party was
t 
legal, the rank and file had a chance to impose their views on
the leadership. On 28 February, the first full Assembly of Vyborg
v
Side Bolsheviks was held. According to one estimate some two to 
three thousand members were present. Even if this is an over- 
estimation, it indicates something considerably larger than the 
half dozen or so Committee members who determined policy when the 
Party was illegal. The Assembly adopted a policy document, which 
contained the following words: •
3. The existing Soviet of Workers' and 
.Soldiers' Deputies, which is constantly 
attracting new revolutionary cadres from 
the revolutionary people and army, must 
proclaim itself the Provisional Revolut­ 
ionary Government and must urgently carry 
out the following measures: make the 
Provisional Conmittee, composed of twelve 
members of the State Duma, subordinate to 
the Provisional Revolutionary Government,
4. Remove from the State Duma the power 
to represent the people, as it was 
elected on the basis of a law which served 
to support the former Tsarist regime. 3
1. F.N 0 Dingel'stedt, "Vesna proletarskoi revolyutsii", 
^ KL, '1925, no,1(12), p 192; V.N. Zalezhskii, "Pervyi 
legal'nyi pe-ka", PR, 1923, no.1(13), pp 142ff.
•
2. Zalezhskii, loc.cit.
3. KPSS v Bor'be za pobodu Sotsialisticheskoi revolyutsii 
y period dvoevlastii, pp 172-73 0 This dates it 
1 March, but the difference either way is of no 
significance.
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This is the first time since 19O5-06 that this policy can be 
clearly attributed to any official Bolshevik organization. Its 
adoption placed the Vyborg District Committee in a special
place on the left of the Party. It should be rioted, however,
»
that this was still not a call £or Socialism, but remained
within the framework of traditional Social Democratic thought ont
the Bourgeois, or Democratic Revolution.
At about the same time, a leaflet aimed at the Petrograd 
soldiers,was issued jointly by the Mezhraiontsy and a group of 
Socialist Revolutionaries led by P. Aleksandrovich 
(P.A. Dmitrievskii). Although written in far more picturesque 
language than the Vyborg District policy statement, its central 
message was the same:
Soldiers! The fox's tail frightens us more 
than the wolf's tooth,, Your real friend 
and brother can only be the worker and 
peasant. Unit^closely with them! Send 
your Representative Delegates to the Soviet 
of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, which 
in Petersburg alone is supported by 
250,000 workers. Your Representatives and 
the Workers' Deputies must become the 
Provisional Revolutionary Government of the 
people, from which you will receive land and 
freedom. 1
Aimed as it is at the soldiers, where the SRs would expect 
to have more support than the SDs, it complements the SD appeal 
to the workers. There is good reason to believe that this \vas 
not just a coincidence. Aleksandrovich had corresponded with
1. Shlyapnikov, Semnadtsatyi god, vol.1, p 262.
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I^nin in emigration, proposing a unification of the Left SRs and 
Bolsheviks, a unification consistent with Lenin's statement that 
the real divide was now one's attitude to the War 0 Lenin's
reply, indeed, encouraged informal co-operation between Left SRs»
2 and Bolsheviks, »<
During 1915 and 1916 Aleksandrovich was in Scandinavia,
where he was in touch with Kollontai and Shlyapnikov, and prob-
3 ably with Bukharin and Pyatakov as well. Shlyapnikov organized
the transport of Aleksandrovich's SR anti-war literature into
Russia, and in late 1916 Aleksandrovich himself returned to
4 Russia using Shlyapnikov's contacts., Once back in Petrograd,
Aleksandrovich devoted most of his time to reactivating the SR 
Petersburg Conmittee, and reviving work in the factories 0 He 
inmediately fell out with the leading SI intellectuals, but main­ 
tained his contacts with the Bolsheviks, and presumably with the
5 Mezhraiontsy n Here then was another source for interaction of
political ideas between the Petrograd SDs and SRs, As 
Aleksandrovich worked almost exclusively with worker SRs after
1. V.Io Lenin: Biograficheskaya Khronika, vol.3, p 383 0
2. PSS X vol.49, pp 150-52 0
3. ibid.; Shlyapnikov, Kanun..., vol.1, pp 206-O9 0
4. Shlyapnikov, Ioc 0 cit.; one should note that this was
about the time that Shlyapnikov also returned to Russia.
5. Svyatitskii, "Voina i predfevral'e", KiS, 1931, no.2(75), 
pp 40ff; Shlyapnikov, op.cit., pp 294-95.
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his row with the Party's intellectuals, it would be natural to 
expect any such interplay to be most manifest on the Vyborg 
Side.
After their new policy document had been passed, Vyborg
»
District agitators, together wijth their SR and Menshevik equiv­ 
alents, addressed numerous meetings, calling for the Soviet to 
be made the Provisional Revolutionary Government. On 3 March 
the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee ordered the Vyborg 
District Committee to withdraw a leaflet that it was circulating
as- it did not correspond to Central Committee Policy or to "the
2needs of the time". This leaflet had contained a major innov­ 
ation in policy. It called for power to be in the hands of the
Soviets, in the plural, who should be responsible for calling
3the Constituent Assembly.
Rebuffed by the Central Committee, for breaking Party 
discipline, the Vyborg District Committee began to try to change 
Party policy. On 5 March, a Vyborg representative, O.G. Lifshits, 
presented a resolution to the Petersburg Committee. This stated:
1.^ Zalezhskii, op.cit., p 142; Dingel'stedt, op.cit.,
pp 193, 195; E e N 0 Burdzhalov, "0 taktike bol'shevikov 
v marte-aprele 1917 goda", VI, 1956, no.4, p 41.
2. Shlyapnikov, "Fevral'skie dni...", PR, 1923, no.1(13), 
p 129.
3. Burdzhalov, loc.cit.
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1. The task of the moment is the creation of a 
Provisional Revolutionary Government from the 
unification of local Soviets of workers', 
peasants 1 and soldiers 1 deputies from the 
whole of Russia.
2. In order to prepare for the seizure of full 
central power, it is necessary:
a) to strengthen the power of the Soviets of 
workers' and soldiers' deputies;
b) to proceed in the local areas to partial 
seizures of power, by means of the over­ 
throw of the organs of the old power and 
their replacement by Soviets of workers 1 , 
peasants' and soldiers' deputies, whose 
task would be: to arm the people, to 
democratise the army, to confiscate the 
land and to implement all the other 
demands of the Minimum Programme without 
preliminary permission.
3. The power of the Provisional Government formed 
by the Provisional Committee of the Fourth 
State Duma, will be recognised and supported 
only until the formation of the Provisional 
- Revolutionary Government from the Soviets of 
workers', peasants' and soldiers' deputies, 
and only insofar as its activities correspond 
to the interests of the proletariat and the 
broad popular masses.
All counter-revolutionary moves of the Provisional 
Government must be ruthlessly exposed. 1
The emphasis had now shifted entirely to the local Soviets 
and the taking of local power. It was not, of course, identical 
to the Maximalist vision of the Republic of Communes, but came 
very close to it. It was, in fact, a fusion of Maximalist and 
Bdlshevik ideas. Not surprisingly the Petersburg Committee
1. P.F. Kudelli (ed.), Pervyi legal f nyi Peterburp;skii komitet 
bol'shevikov v 1917g. Sbornik materialov i protokolov 
zasedanii..., M-L 1927, p 19.
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rejected the resolution. It received only one vote, that of 
K. Shutko from the Vyborg District; Lifshits herself could not 
vote, having only a consultative voice. However, the Vyborg
District Conrnittee continued to fight to get its policies
i 
adopted both in Petrograd and, as we shall see, in the Baltic
Fleet.
The Petersburg Committee
This was the leadership of the Bolshevik Petrograd party 
organization made up of representatives from all the Petrograd 
District Committees. It opposed the war and had refused to 
change- its name in 1914 to the -Petrograd Conrnittee, as a protest
against chauvinism. It had been heavily infiltrated by police
2agents. Three of its members were Okhrana agents in 1914.
In March 1917, after the revolution, the reconstituted Petersburg
X
Committee still contained one Okhrana agent, Yan Martynovich
3Ozol', who was unmasked only in June of that year. As a conse­ 
quence, it was ravaged by police raids throughout the war. In 
late 1915 almost all its members were arrested. In January 1916 
the rest were picked up. At the time, V.N. Zalezhskii, the last
1. Kudelli (ed.),loc.cit.
2.^ L. Haimson, "The Problem of Social Stability in Urban 
Russia, 1905-1917,- SR, 1964, no.4, p 637.
3. P.P. Kudelli (ed.), op 0 cit., P 8.
4. Zalezhsky, op.cit., p 135.
-170-
to be arrested, was seriously worried lest the entire Petrograd 
organization should collapse. The Conmittee was reconstructed 
with new people, however, but on 26 February 1917, in the middle
of the revolution, almost all of this new committee 'was again
t r)
arrested by the police.
At its first meeting after the revolution, there was some 
wrangling as to who should be on the new Committee. The old 
members had been released from prison and there was some doubt 
about the representativeness of a number of the new delegates 
from the city areas. A compromise solution was agreed that, 
during the period whilst the Party was regathering its forces, 
the Committee should consist of both all people who had been
elected to it before February 1917 and new members delegated from
3the District Committees, This meant that the majority of the
Petersburg Committee was made up of people, none of whom had 
actually participated in the victory of the revolution and a good 
number of whom had also been cut off from the labour movement for 
over a year. This latter group were in the very odd position of
having gone into prison at a very low moment in the Party's
4 fortunes, having had virtually no contact with the outside world,
1. ibid., p 136.
\
2. .Shlyapnikov, "Fevral'skie dni...", PR, 1923, no.1(13), p 95,
3. Kudelli, op.cit., p 28.
4. Zalezhsky, op.cit., p 136.
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and having come out to find the revolution over. As one of them 
admitted, he was not "psychologically prepared" for it. In 
addition, the "old" members were overwhelmingly those Conciliator 
prafctiki of 1912-14, longing for a reunion with the Mensheviks. 
The experience of the Petersburg Committee's members was 
reflected in its policy. On 25 February the Petersburg Committee 
decided to create "a committee for determining the question of 
the best and most expedient form of organization to control the
already excited but not yet sufficiently organized masses of
2striking workers." It also decided:
,.eto form immediately in the factories, a 
series of factory committees, the members of 
which must elect their own representatives 
from their composition to the "Information 
Bureau", which will serve as a connecting 
- link between the organizations and the 
factory committees, and will guide the 
latter, giving them directives of the 
Petersburg Committee.
This "Information Bureau"...will eventually 
be transformed into the "Soviet of Workers' 
Deputies" in (sic) the type which functioned 
in 1905. 3
This resolution has in common with those of the Vyborg 
District Committee the proposal to create a Soviet. However, in
1. ibid.
\
2. Burdzhalov, Vtoraya russkaya revolyutsiya, vol.1, p 153.
3. Hasegawa, opoCit 0 , p 92. Hasegawa inserts ^Party} before 
the word "organizations" in the first sentence. I do not 
know with what justification.
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all other respects it is quite different. It contains no 
reference to a Provisional Revolutionary Government. The Soviet's 
role is to be the co-ordination of striking workers, not the
vehicle for bringing these together with the mutinous soldiery.
•
Indeed, the soldiers are not mentioned.
In fact, the Petersburg's Committee's resolution is very 
much in the Menshevik tradition of thought about the role of the 
Soviet. Furthermore, on the same day, 25 February, a group of 
"representatives of workers' organizations" met and decided to 
form a Soviet of Workers' Deputies,, News of those elected was 
to be transmitted through the Social Insurance Boards and \forkers 1 
Co-operatives. The all-city centre, which would amass information 
from all areas was to be the Council of the Petrograd Workers'
Co-operatives. Hasegawa has decided, it is not clear on what
2evidence, that this was a Menshevik meet ing „ The Mensheviks may
have dominated it intellectually, but it is much more likely to 
have been a joint Bolshevik-Menshevik-Right SR venture. All three 
were active in the co-operatives and in the Social Insurance
Boards, and the Rightists from all three parties had been in
3 constant touch throughout the February Days, Indeed, Sukhanov
specifically says that the decision to form a Soviet was taken at 
one of these inter-party meetings on or before 24 February
*
1. Burdzhalov, Vtoraya russkaya revolyutsiya, vol.1, p 209.
2. Hasegawa, op.cit., pp 89-90.
3. V.M. Zenzinov, "Fevral'skie dni", NZh, 1953, no.34, 
pp 194-95, 207; N. Sukhanov, Zapiski o revolyutsii, 
vol.1, p 27.
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"at the suggestion of the old liquidator and defensist,
i 
F.A. Cherevanin". In the event none of these early meetings
came to anything as most of the Petersburg Committee and of "the
representatives of workers' organizations" were arrested on 25
>
2 and 26 February. However, the eventual founding of the Soviet
on 27 February was carried out by a group of Right Bolsheviks,
Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries, mainly ex-members of
3the War Industries Committees.
After the revolution, the Petersburg Committee continued 
to'be the centre of Right Conciliationist Bolshevism. On 3 March 
it voted that it would
...not oppose the power of the Provisional 
Government insofar as its activities corres­ 
pond to the interests of the proletariat and . 
. of the broad democratic masses of the people...
Except for the subtle insertion of "not oppose" for "support" this 
was identical to the Menshevik and Right SR position adopted in 
the Petrograd Soviet.
On 5 March, as well as rejecting the Lifshits resolution, 
it rejected one from V.M. Molotov that would have aligned it with
1. Sukhanov, Ioc 0 cit a
2. Burdzhalov, Ioc 0 cit.; Shlyapnikov, ' Tevral'skie dni...'', 
PR,'1923, no.l(13), p 95 0
3. Shlyapnikov, Semnadtsatyi god, vol.1, pp 119ff;
Sukhanov, Zapiski 00 ., vol.1, pp 66ff 0 " N 0 D 0 Sokolov had 
been considered a Bolshevik up to this time, although 
he immediately joined the Mensheviks.
4. Kudelli (ed.), orxcit., pp 9-1CX
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the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee. In his memoirs, 
V.N. Zalezhskii recalls that the Petersburg Committee's main 
objection to the Russian Bureau's position was that it was too
"academic" and did not take into account the realities of thet
day, like the actual, existing Soviet, which did not figure in
o
the Bureau's resolution. Their objection was similar to that
of the Vyborg District Committee; their standpoint was quite 
different.
The vote on this issue is not without interest. The two 
main sources for this name nine of the people voting, six for
the Petersburg Committee policy, three against it (the other
3voters'are not named). All three of those named as voting
against the Petersburg Committee came from the Vyborg District 
(K.I. Shutko, M.I. Kalinin, N.G. Tolmachev), whereas three of 
the six members voting for the Conmittee policy had been in prison
for at least a year before the February revolution (M.I. Antipov,
4 V.V. Shmidt and V.N. Zalezhskii). Two of the remaining three
named as supporting the Petersburg Conmittee line (G.F. Fedorov 
and L.M. Mikhailov) were "old" members. Thus, although it has 
not been possible so far to produce any evidence as to whether
1. ibid., p 19.
2. Zalezhskii, "Pervyi legal'nyi Fte-ka", PR, 1923, no.1(13), 
pp 146-47.
3. Kudelli, op.cit., p 11: A. Shlyapnikov, Semnadtsatyi god, 
vol.1, M n.d., p 209.
4. Zalezhsky, op.cit., p 135; Shlyapnikov, "Fevral'skie dni 
dni...", PR, 1923, no.1(13), p 95.
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they were arrested or not during the February revolution, there 
is a strong possibility that they were. Only the last person 
(P.I. Stuchka) was not an "old" member of the Petersburg
Cormittee.
\ 
These "old" members continued to dominate the Petersburg
Committee throughout March and April. So long as they remained 
dominant the Committee maintained its position, even moving from 
the policy of no opposition to the Provisional Government "insofar 
as", to one of conditional support for it on 18 March. One of 
the main preoccupations of the Petersburg Committee during March 
was the convocation of an Ail-Russian Conference of Party workers. 
On 4 March the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee approved 
the proposal and Zalezhskii, as Petersburg Commitee represent­ 
ative, was appointed to set up an organizing committee to call
2the Conference and work out an agenda, The Conference was called
to coincide with the Ail-Russian Assembly of Soviets at the end of 
the month, so that delegates could attend both. It represented 
the high point of Conciliationism since 3912, as it was to reunite 
Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. It was interrupted by the return of 
Lenin, and the April Theses.
On 8 April, the Petersburg Committee rejected the April 
theses by 13 votes to two. By mid April, the composition of the
V.
Committee had changed considerably and its policy changed to
1. Eudelli (ed.), opoCit., pp 49-52.
2. Zalezhskii, "Pervyi legal'nyi Pe-ka", PR, 1923, no.1(13), 
p 145.
-176-
support for Lenin's posit ion. When the new Executive Conmittee 
of the Petersburg Conmittee was elected in early May, the only
"old" members that it contained had all opposed its majority 
policy during March.
oThe Russian Bureau of the Central Conmittee
This was composed initially of three men: A 0 Shlyapnikov, 
V.M. Molotov and P. Zalutskii. The main body of the Central 
Committee elected at the Prague Conference in 1912 was in exile, 
either abroad or in Siberia. The Russian Bureau represented the 
• exiled Conmittee on the spot, and had been set up by Shlyapnikov 
on his- trips into Russia.
All three of its members had escaped arrest during the 
war. All three were active during the February Revolution. Their 
Manifesto, "To All Citizens of Russia", published on the front page 
of a special supplement to the first issue of the Izvestiya of the 
Petrograd Soviet, stated that a Provisional Government, composed 
of the representatives of the big bourgeoisie and landowners 
could not be supported and that the Party must call for a Provis­ 
ional Revolutionary Government. This was to be composed of 
members of the parties represented in the Executive Conmittee of
I/ They were: P.A. Zalutsky, M.I. Kalinin, V.M. Molotov, 
. all elected from the Vyborg District and N0 I 0 Podvoisky 
from the Military Conmission (Voenka) of the Petersburg 
Conmittee o The other five members of the Executive 
Conmittee were newly elected (Kudelli, op 0 cito , pp 99-100, 
103.
2. Hereafter referred to as Russian Bureau.
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the Petrograd Soviet and was to implement, provisionally, the 
Minimum Socialist Programme and prepare for the Constituent 
Assembly. This policy was confirmed at the meeting of the
Russian Bureau of 1 March, but soon came to grief as the
\
members of the Russian Bureau realized that the leaders of the 
other parties in the Executive Corrmittee of the Soviet were not 
interested in forming a Revolutionary Provisional Government 
but in checking the activities of the existing government. The 
Russian Bureau was then confronted with the dilemma that, 
although they could not support the Provisional Government, they
could not oppose it either "as it was not possible to undertake
o
the responsibility of government our selves."
It will have already become clear that Shlyapnikov was 
not the greatest of revolutionary leaders. Ifowever, we should 
not underestimate the difficulties of his position. On the one
*
hand, the Petersburg Corrmittee was continuing the Cone iliat ion ist 
trend towards reunion with the Mensheviks, whereas Lenin had 
stressed over and over again in his letters to Shlyapnikov, the 
split with the Mensheviks was the main question confronting the 
Party. 3 On the other hand, the Vyborg District Committee was
. Shlyapnikov, "Fevral 1 skie dni...", PR, 1923, no.1(13), 
p 129.
2. "Protokoly i Rezolyutsii Byuro TsK RSDRP(b) (Mart 1917g) M 
VIKPSS, 1962, no.3, p 141.
3. see Chapter Two, p 78.
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putting forward views that were similar to those of Bukharin, 
Pyatakov, Radek and Pannekoek and the Left SRs. He could 
hardly forget the vehemence of Lenin's attack on Bukharin and
co. Also, although Lenin might have been prepared to allow
\
informal co-operation with the Left SRs, he could hardly be 
expected to condone the acceptance of their programme.
In the first half of March the Russian Bureau co-opted a 
number of new members. By 12 March, when this process was com­ 
pleted, the balance of power inside the Bureau still lay just 
in favour of those strongly opposed to the Provisional Govern­ 
ment. Of the fifteen full members, only two (V.N. Zalezhskii 
and M.K. Muranov) are known to have been in favour of support 
for the Provisional Government, six (A.G. Shlyapnikov,
V.M. Molotov, P. Zalutskii} M.I. Kalinin, K 0 I. Shutko and
3K.M. Shvedchikov ) are known to have been opposed to it. The
*
position of the other seven is more difficult to define. Three, 
M.S. Ol'minskii, A.I. Elizarova-Ul'yanovaand K.S. Eremeev, may
be presumed to be Conciliators. We have already come across
4 M.S. Ol'minskii on the editorial board of the pre-war Pravda.
K.S. Eremeev was also on Pravda in its extremely conciliationist
1. See above in text. 
^. See above p 174.
3. He was in contact with the Kronstadt organization which 
took a "Vyborg" line.
4. See p 27.
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phase, and A 0 I 0 Elizarova-Ul'yanova, Lenin's sister, was attacked 
by I^nin for being a conciliator in 1915. l M.I. Khakharev, as a 
member of the Vyborg District Committee^ and G.I. Bokii, a Left
o
Commnist in 1918, may be presumed to be against the Provisional
>
Government. The position of the other two, Elena Stasova and 
M.I. Ul'yanova is uncertain.
There was one more member of the Central Comnittee - 
J.V. Stalin. On 12 March he had been admitted to membership, but 
because of certain "personal characteristics" was given a voice 
in discussions but no vote (s soveshchatel'nym golosom). The 
existence of such a large number of Bureau members whose precise 
position is unknown means that "Shlyapnikov' s group may have been 
confronted with a sizeable minority in opposition. What can be 
definitely ascertained from the policies of the Russian Bureau, 
though, is that this opposition remained a minority.
On 22 March the Russian Bureau adopted a resolution on the 
Provisional Government which was to be presented to the March 
Conference of Bolshevik Party Workers. The language of this 
resolution is somewhat more mild than that of the resolutions 
passed at the beginning of the month. This has misled some
1. PSS, vol.49, p 193.
2. Kayurov, op.cit., p 167.
3. Sed'maya (aprel'skaya) vserossiiskaya konferentsiva RSDRP, 
"C^Protokoly, M 1958, p 375.
4. "Protokoly i rezolyutsii Byuro TsK...", p 143.
-180-
scholars into believing that it is a milder resolution. Close 
examination of the content reveals that it is not milder, but 
more revolutionary. It says: i) that the Provisional Government 
cannot solve the tasks of the revolution; ii) that the Soviets 
are the embryos of the new power, which at a given moment in the 
development of the revolution will implement the demands of the 
people in revolt; iii) in the meantime the Petrograd Soviet 
should keep a careful check of the government's actions; and iv)
consolidate the Soviets and deepen the revolution by arming the
o
whole people and creating a red guard 0 It makes no mention at
all of the Constituent Assembly.
•In fact, the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee had 
taken into account the sharp criticism of the Petersburg 
Committee that its programme was "academic". In working out the 
practical implications of its first reactions to the Provisional 
Government, it actually devised a programme that was far closer 
to the one Lenin was to propose early in April than was the 
apparently more radical platform of the Vyborg District Committee. 
The Vyborg District Committee wished to strengthen the Soviets 
to make them into a Provisional Revolutionary Government, which 
would give way to the Constituent Assembly. By the end of March 
the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee was already proposing 
the Soviets themselves, not as a temporary holding arrangement
1. emphasis added
2. "Protokoly i rezolyutsii Byuro TsK...", pp 152-53.
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but as the new power.
One thing that may have misled scholars is the fact that 
Stalin presented the resolution to the.conference on 29 March.
His'speech is certainly ambiguous in its attitude towards the\
Provisional Government, and Trotsky, later, did not omit to point 
this out. However, Stalin's speech was not the resolution, and 
he admitted at the end of it that he preferred the resolution of 
the Krasnoyarsk Soviet, which contained the "insofar as" formula,
o
to the one which he was proposing. This need not surprise us. 
It" was not unknown in the Bolshevik Party for a member of a diss­ 
enting minority on a party committee, or even a member of the 
majority thought to have doubts, to be entrusted with presenting 
the official resolution at a general party meeting. This was 
both good for discipline and a way of trying to convince the 
minority of the correctness of the majority's view. It may not 
be too much to assume that this is what was happening at the 
March conference.
This Chapter does not seek to prove that the Russian 
Bureau of the Central Committee anticipated Lenin's full programme 
but merely that they were moving towards a similar position before 
he returned. They were confronted with opposition in the Party 
in, particular from the middle-range Party leaders of the kind who
1. Trotsky, Stalin, pp 190-92.
2. "Protokoly Vserossiiskogo (frairtovskogo) soveshchaniya 
parciinykh rabotnikov", VIKPSS, 1962, no.5, pp 111-12.
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dominated the Petersburg Conmittee and who were represented at 
the March Conference. Shlyapnikov, Molotov and the others had 
taken the criticisms of the Petersburg. Conmittee that were valid
into account, and whatever the weaknesses of the Bureau's policy
>
at the end of March it did present an immediate concrete 
programme for action. Where they still failed was that none of 
the Bureau majority had the authority to curtail the mischief1 
of the Pravda Group, and neither were they able to stem the move­ 
ment for unification with the Mensheviks which came from the 
Pravda Group, and from the Petersburg Conmittee.
The Pravda Group
The origin of this was not in Pravda at all, but with a 
small group on the Petersburg Committee. These voted with the 
majority in opposition to the Vyborg District members or to the 
Russian Bureau, but in their speeches urged a more wholehearted 
support for the Provisional Government. Their argument was that 
the revolution was a bourgeois capitalist one, power therefore 
belonged to the capitalists, not to the proletariat and, as
B.V. Avilov put it, the Provisional Government therefore should
2
be obeyed "not from fear, but from conscience". These words
came from the passage in the Constitution of the Russian Bnpire
1. I use this word advisedly. It included flagrant breaches 
of party discipline. See below.
2. Raskol'nikov, Na boevykh postakh, M 1910, p 2, para 4.
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which laid down the way in which the Tsar's subjects should obey 
him, and consequently implied rather more than conditional 
support.
The Pravda Group received powerful allies with the return
*
of Muranov, Stalin and Kamenev from exile on 12 March. Muranov 
and Kamenev were politically in agreement with this group. 
Stalin does not appear to have been, as his speech at the March 
conference would seem to place him more with the "insofar as" 
majority of the Petersburg Conmittee. However, there is evidence 
that Stalin worked with them during the second half of March, as 
will be shown below. One can perhaps assume, with reference to 
Stalin's future behaviour, that he was less concerned with 
policy than with power in the Party. He had been denied a full 
place on the Central CommJttee on 12 March, he sensed the partic­ 
ular disruptive nature of the Muranov-Kamenev alliance and 
decided to join them, perhaps to benefit from the attendant chaos.
If Stalin was denied a full place on the Russian Bureau,
2Kamenev was rejected by them completely. He had disgraced him­ 
self by his behaviour at the trial of the Bolshevik Duma 
Deputies in 1915, when he had testified whereas the other Bolsheviks 
had refused to do so. He had also tried to ingratiate himself with 
the court, -for which he had been openly attacked by Lenin in the
1. Svod Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii, Kniga 1, M 1910, p 2, 
para 4.
2. "Protokoly i rezolyutsii Byuro TsK...", p 143.
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emigre press. Kamenev had also been the subject of complaints
from Bolsheviks in both Siberia and Russia. The Russian Bureau
i
did, however, decide to allow him to work for Pravda, but ruled
2that his name should not appear in the paper.>
The strength and influence that the group wielded, 
however, came from Muranov. Whereas both Stalin and Kamenev 
were suspect, Muranov had a spotless record. One of the two 
really hard Leninists in the Duma Fraction, Muranov had made a 
very brave showing at his trial. In his writings during the war,
Lenin had used his name to indicate the best kind of Bolshevik
3work: work of the Muranov type. His prestige was probably
higher than that of any other Bolshevik in Russia at the time. 
As long as he was in it the Pravda Group could not be squashed, 
at least until someone with higher prestige than Muranov returned 
to Petrogradc At the time that could mean only Lenin.
Shlyapnikov, in his history of 1917, alleges that Stalin, 
Kamenev and Muranov introduced "into the leading bodies of the
party disagreements and deep organizational frictions" and that,
4 in particular, they launched an attack on Pravda and its editors.
Some echoes of this can be caught in the rather reticent text of 
the Protocols of the Russian Bureau. On 12 March, at the meeting
\ 
1 - PSS, vol.26, p 168 S
2. "Protokoly i rezolyutsii Byuro TsK...", p 143.
3. See p 54.
4. Shlyapnikov, Semnadtsatyi god, vol.2, M-L 1925, pp 179-80.
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when the membership of Stalin, Muranov and Kamenev was considered 
some members of the Petersburg Committee were somewhat critical 
of Pravda. Between then and the afternoon of the next day some-
?
thing happened to one of Pravda's editors, V.M. Molotov, for the 
afternoon session of the Russian Bureau begins with an unexpected 
announcement from him that he was resigning as "he did not con­ 
sider himself sufficiently experienced". Later in the same 
session Pravda was again severely criticized, although the 
Protocols do not state by whom, and the editorial board was
,•
changed and enlarged. Molotov's resignation was accepted, and
3Stalin became a member of the board.
4 The next morning's edition of Pravda carried an article by
Muranov declaring that "as in the past" the paper was to be pub­ 
lished by the Party's Duma Fraction. The article explained that 
this was because the Duma Deputies were well known to the people 
as "they were exiled because, at the very beginning of the war,
when nobody raised their voice against Tsarism, they called for a
5 revolutionary struggle to overthrow the old order 90 ." This was
a bid by Muranov to take over the paper, as he was the only 
member of the former Duma Fraction in Petrograd at the time. The
1. "Protokoly i rezolyutsii Byuro TsK...", p 144.
\
2. ibid., p 146.
3. ibid.
4. Pravda, no.8, 14 March 1917.
5. Shlyapnikov, Semnadtsatyi god, vol.2, p 180.
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argument that this was merely restoring past practice was 
specious. The illegal status of the party under Tsarism had 
made necessary the fiction that Pravda was not the organ of the
f
Party's Central Committee, but the publication of a group of Duma 
Deputies, The need for this fiction ended when the Party became 
legal after the February revolution Muranov's reasons indicated 
the direction of his thought, for he completely omitted to point 
out that the main prosecution evidence against the Bolshevik 
Deputies was that they opposed the war. This omission did not 
escape the anti-war members of the Russian Bureau and of the 
Petersburg Comnittee 0 Pravda no .8 also carried an article by 
Kamenev calling for conditional support for the Provisional 
Government. This was the policy of no Petrograd organization at 
the time. Even the Petersburg Coirmittee's policy merely stated 
that it would refrain from opposing the Government "insofar as".
On the afternoon of the same day, 14 March, the Russian 
Bureau held a preparatory meeting for that evening's Soviet 
session. It agreed to oppose the official resolution of the 
Executive Corrmittee of the Petrograd Soviet, "To all the Peoples 
of the World", as it found this to be defensist. It also rejected 
a resolution that Stalin wanted to propose in opposition to the 
official Executive Committee on that evening, as it found this
1. ibid,
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defensist also. At the Soviet session that evening Muranov 
disregarded the decisions of the afternoon's meeting. He spoke 
before any other Bolshevik, welcomed the official Executive
f
Ccranittee resolution and called on everyone to vote for it. 
According to Shlyapnikov, the other Bolsheviks scrapped their
speeches and kept quiet as they did not want to drag inner party
Pdifferences into the open. The motion was passed unopposed.
This extraordinary breach of discipline was followed the 
next morning, 15 March, by a leader in Pravda, signed by Kamenev, 
advocating support for the war. This in fact constituted two 
further breaches in discipline, as the article was directly in 
opposition to official Party policy and Kamenev's name had been 
specifically banned from the paper.
Once again the Protocols give us slight echoes of the uproar 
on the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee that evening. 
V.P. Nogin, who was over from Moscow, wanted to know why Kamenev's 
name had appeared in the paper at all, and was presumably somewhat
surprised to learn that this was against the instructions of the
o
Russian Bureau. Ol'minskii, who opposed Kamenev, then resigned
4 from the editorial board "because of his heaJ-th". At the end of
1. There is no protocol for a meeting of the Russian Bureau 
\ on 14 March in the collection published in VIKPSS, 1962, 
no.3, pp 134-57. The information here is taken from 
Shlyapnikov, Semnadtsatyi god, vol.2, M-L 1925, p 180.
2. Shlyapnikov, opoCit., pp 181-82.
3. "Protokoly i rezolyutsii Byuro TsK0 ..", p 148.
4 e ibid.
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a somewhat stormy debate, during which Kamenev's article of that 
morning was voted to be totally unacceptable, yet another 
editorial board was elected. This time it was composed of
?
Molotov, whose rapid return gives a clue to the reasons for his\
resignation, Kamenev and Eremeev. Stalin was to be on it tempor­ 
arily as Eremeev was out of town. Pravda then returned to its 
former line, more or less. Kamenev now officially had a voice 
in its policy but could be outvoted by the other two editors.* 
This was apparently not the end of the matter, for two days later
o
the Russian Bureau passed a resolution proposed by Ol'minskii, 
protesting at the method of Kamenev's inclusion on the editorial 
board and referring the matter to the next Party Conference. 
Kamenev then changed his tack 0 His article on the war had 
caused discontent in the Party outside the Russian Bureau too, 
It had upset the Petersburg Conmittee as, whatever the disagree­ 
ments the latter had with the Russian Bureau, they were both
5 opposed to the War. Rank and file Bolsheviks in the factories
• s*
were demanding the expulsion of Pravda's editors from the Party.
1. ibido
2. Shlyapnikov, Semnadtsatyi god., vol.2, p 185 0
3. Very decisively: eight for, one abstention.
4. "Protokoly i rezolyutsii Byuro TsK000 ", p 150 0 This is 
somewhat mysterious, as he had been apparently quite 
properly elected by the Russian Bureau"two days before 
(ibid., p 148). I can offer no explanation for this.
5. Shlyapnikov, op.cit., p 187.
6. ibid., p 185.
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18 March Kamenev proposed to the Petersburg Committee that it 
change its policy towards the Provisional Government, from its 
present refusal to oppose the Government "insofar as", to actual
support. With some opposition, notably from Zalezhskii, the
>
__ 2 Committee adopted Kamenev rs proposal. This was a major victory
for the Pravda Group, but it did not mean that they had any wide 
support in the Petrograd party. As has been shown above, the 
Petersburg Conmittee at this time was dominated by its "old" 
members, who had not been elected by the present party membership 
and whose removal during April was to show just how much out of 
step they were. It did allow the group to continue its opposition. 
Thwarted in their attempt to take over the Russian Bureau and 
Pravda, they could still block policies they did not like, with the 
support of the Petersburg Committee. Thus, although Shlyapnikov 
claims that Pravda returned to its former line, it did not publish 
Lenin's Letters from Afar in full, although these generally 
supported the Russian Bureau's position. Indeed, only the first
of the five letters was published, and that with about one-fifth
3of it cut out. The Pravda Group also continued activity of
another sort, as Shlyapnikov sadly records:
1. . Kiidelli, op.cit., p 49.
2. ibido, p 52.
3. Pravda, no 0 14, 21 March 1917; no 0 15, 22 March 1917,
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Disorder continued inside the Party. 
Breaches of Bolshevik policy were 
comnitted in many areas and the example 
for all this was given by comrades whom 
we had grown accustomed to regard as 
leaders in Tsarist timesc 1
1. Shlyapnikov, Semnadtsatyi god, vol«2, p 187
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION IN
THE BALTIC FLEET AT HELSINGFORS:
Vosstanie or Bunt?
-192-
Although the February Revolution of 1917 was generally 
free of bloodshed, in Helsingfors, the main base of the Baltic 
Fleet, it was a very bloody affair in which a significant number
of officers and petty officers lost their lives. 1 The standard\
Soviet explanation for the violence in February and March is 
simple. Although the revolution reached its climax in Petrograd 
with the mutiny of the garrison and the formation of the Soviet 
on 27 February, they argue that news of these events and of the 
abdication of the Tsar was withheld from the Fleet by its 
commander, Admiral A.I. Nepenin. The motives attributed to him 
vary from an attempt to maintain discipline in the Fleet by
isolating it from civil turmoil, to a manoeuvre to keep the
o 
fleet available for a possible counter-revolution. A few
Soviet historians offer different versions, but still accuse
1. The further one gets from the events, the smaller are the 
casualties admitted by Soviet sources. On 15 March 1917, 
Admiral A 0 S 0 Maksimov reported that 120 had been killed 
and wounded in Helsingfors (cited in V 0 V. Petrash, 
Moryalvi Baltiiskogo Flota v bor'be za pobedu Qktyabrya, 
M 1966, p 52); an account published in the early 1920's 
estimates 9O officers killed (S. Lokashevich, "Materialy 
po istorii russkogo flota: kratkaia khronologiia revol- 
,yutsionnogo dvizheniya v russkom voennom flote", MS, 
1920, nos.6/7, p 40); Petrash himself gives 45 officers 
killed and eleven missing (Petrash, op 0 cit 0 , p 52); 
an even more recent source gives the total killed as nine 
(LI. Mints, Istoriya velikogo Oktyabrya, vol.1, M 1967, 
p 692),
2. M. Klio Kiuru, Boevoi rezerv revolyutsionnogo Petrograda, 
p 7; R.No Mordvinov (ed 0 ), Baltiiskie moryaki M .., p 322; 
S.S. Khesin, Oktyabr ? skaya revolyutslya i riot, pp 4O-41; 
N.A. Khovrin, Baltiitsy idut na shturm, p 68; S,F 0 Naida, 
Revolyutsionnoe dvizhenie v tsarskorr. flote, p 5800
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Nepenin of manoeuvring. E.N. Burdzhalov is alone in stating 
rather more cautiously, that the bloodshed occurred because the 
sailors had decided their comnanders were concealing the news of
f
the abdication from them in order to lead them in defence of
tsar ism, but Burdzhalov himself refrains from speculating about
o
Nepenin's motives,,
The version accepted by most Soviet historians was given 
currency during 1917 by Admiral D 0N. Verderevskii, one of 
Nepenin's successors as Fleet Comrander and subsequently Minister
for'the Navy in A.F. Kerenskii's cabinet. IMs may account for
4 its persistence. However, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa's revealing account
of M.V. 'Rodzyanko's manipulation of information to the High 
Cormand, as part of his bid for the premiership, forces one to
c
look again at events in Helsingfors 0 A careful re-reading of
£»
the Stavka documents produces a very different picture.
On 26 February 1917 (OS) Rodzyanko, as President of the
1. Mints, opoCito, vo! 0 l, p 692; Petrash, op 0 cito, pp 48-53.
2. E.N. Burdzhalov, Vtoraya russkaya revolyutsiya, vol.2. 
M 1971, p 122.
3. R.P. Browder and A.F 0 Kerensky, The Russian Provisional 
Government, 1917, vol.3, Stanford, 1961, p 1631.
4. See for example D 0 A. Longley, "Officers and Men: A Study 
of the Development of Political Attitudes among the 
Sailors of the Baltic Fleet in 1917", SS, 1973, no.l, p 30.
5. T. Hasegawa, "Rodzyanko and the Grand Dukes' Manifesto of 
1 March 1917", CSP, 1976, no.2, pp 154-67.
6. "Fevral'skaya revolyutsiya 1917 goda", KA, 1927, no.2(21), 
pp 3-78; and 1927, no.3(22), pp 3-70.
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State Duma, sent a telegram to the various front commanders. 
In it, among other things, he asked for their support for a 
"Government of Confidence", The Naval Cormiand had, of course,
f
been receiving information of the rioting in the capital since
o
it began on 23 February. Nepenin and his staff were familiar
with the call for a "Government of Confidence", which had been 
one of the main planks of the liberal platform throughout the
War. Indeed, a group of Nepenin's staff was very much in
3sympathy with this demand.
There is no reason to believe that Nepenin was surprised 
or suspicious when, during the evening of 27 February, he 
received a further telegram from Rodzyanko telling him 
(untruthfully) that a "Provisional Government" had been formed 
under Rodzyanko and asking him to urge the Tsar to recognise it. 
After some discussion with Captain Prince M0 B. Cherkasskii, one 
of his liberal staff officers, Nepenin decided to comply. Con­ 
sequently, on the morning of 28 February, he issued an order to 
the Fleet stating that disorders, caused by food shortages and
1. "Fevral'skaya revolyutsiya",KA, 1927, no.2(21), pp 5-8. 
This collection does not include a telegram to Nepenin. 
Since Generals M 0 V 0 Alekseev, N0 V. Ruzskii, A 0 E 0 Evert 
and A 0 A 0 Brusilov reported receiving Rodzyanko's tele­ 
gram, it is reasonable to assume that it was sent to all 
front conmanders, and that Nepenin received it, as he 
did all subsequent ones (see below).
2. "Fevral'skaya revolyutsiya v Baltiiskom flote (iz dnev- 
nika 1.1. Rengartena)", KA, 1929, no.1(32), p 98 
(hereafter cited as "Dnevnik Rengartena").
3. ibid., p 119.
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suspicions of treason, had broken out in the capital, and that 
this had led to a change in the composition of the Government. 
The order called for greater vigilance against the enemy, who
f
might attempt to use the disorders to his advantage,, The Fleet 
was put on battle alert and shore leave was curtailed. All 
ships' commanders were ordered to inform their crews, and 
Nepenin himself toured the major ships to explain events in 
Petrograd in this vein 0
By this time, in Petrograd, a preliminary meeting of the 
Workers and Soldiers Soviet had taken place and elections to the 
Soviet were going ahead in the factories and military units. 
Nepenin', however, did not know this. His belief that Rodzyanko 
had formed a government was shared by a number of observers in
Petrograd; General M.V0 Alekseev, the chief of staff had tele-
2graphed all fronts to this effect. Isolated in Helsingfors,
with the Hughes telegraph as his sole source of official news 
since railway links with the capital had been cut off on 27
o
February, Nepenin had no way of verifying the news he received. 
In fact, Rodzyanko himself was responsible for the misconception, 
Up to 27 February, he had considered his own premiership as
1. ibid., p 99; Mordvinov (ed.), op.cit., p 17.
2. "Fevral'skaya revolyutsiya", KA, 1927, no.1(21),pp 30-33; 
1927, no.3(22), pp~4-5; David R. Jones (ed.), "Documents 
on British Relations with Russia, 1917-18",CASS, no.3, 
p 357.
3. Mints, op.cit.., vol.1, p 536.
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inevitable. The news that the Tsar had instructed General 
N.I. Ivanov to march on Petrograd, however, made Rodzyanko fear 
that he might be imprisoned as a rebel. In addition, he was
f
being edged out of the leadership of the Duma Cbnmittee by a 
group led by P.N. Milyukov, who was pushing the candidacy of 
Prince G.E. L'vov. On the evening of 27 February, Rodzyanko 
began to send false information to the military commanders to 
persuade then that he was firmly in charge of a government which 
alone could deal with the disorders. Thereby, he hoped to get 
Alekseev to call off the Ivanov expedition, as likely to cause 
further civil strife, and at the same time persuade the Duma 
liberals that as he alone could control the armed forces, he must 
be made premier.
On 28 February, events as seen from Nepenin's flagship, 
the Krechet, became progressively more confused. On the one hand, 
no instructions were received from Stavka or from the new Govern­ 
ment. On the other hand, information from Naval Intelligence 
spoke only of a "Comnittee for the Restoration of Order and for 
Contacts with Persons and Institutions" and not of a government. 
Fearing that he might have stuck his neck out, Nepenin watered 
down the order issued that morning, using the traditional term 
"Council of Ministers" instead of "Government". He summoned a
1. Hasegawa, "Rodzyanko and the Grand Dukeso..", CSP, 1976, 
no.2, pp 161-62; G 0 Katkov, Russia 1917: The February 
Revolution, L 1967, pp 301-O5.
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meeting of his staff officers and told them that, in the absence 
of any direction from the Minister or from Stavka, he would act 
as necessary. As there was the risk that he might miscalculate,
f
he relieved them of all responsibility by ordering them formally 
to obey him without discussion. He stated that his policy was 
one of non-intervention in the revolution, and ordered all ships' 
commanders to be on the alert for trouble, to keep all agitators 
from the shore away from the lower deck, to report any "misunder­ 
standings" between officers and men immediately, and to maintain
1 contact with other officers and ships.
The picture of Nepenin which emerges from these early 
events is thus one of an officer who was scrupulous in keeping 
his subordinates informed and in shielding his officers from 
possible reprisals; energetic in taking all measures to keep the
Fleet on a war footing; and anxious not to intervene against the
o
uprising. That the information he was conveying to his officers
and men was wrong, was not Nepenin*s fault, but the product of 
Rodzyanko's actions, All in all, this picture is very much more 
consistent with Nepenin's previous record as a successful, 
energetic, popular officer (a record to which he owed his early
1. "Fevral'skaya revolyutsiya", KA, 1927, no.2(21), p 14; 
"Dnevnlk Rengartena", KA, 1929, no.1(32), pp 99-100; 
Mordvinov, op~cit., pp 17-18.
•
2. On 27 February he ordered the captain of the Aurora, which 
was being refitted in Petrograd, not to use arms against 
the crowds invading his ship, if he could possibly avoid 
doing so. Captain M.I. Nikol'skii obeyed this order and 
forfeited his life as a consequence. Mordvinov (ed.), 
op.cit. , P 16.
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promotion to Fleet Commander) than with the subsequent Soviet 
portrayal. Captain I.I. Rengarten, Nepenin's staff officer 
whose diary is a very valuable source for these events, notes
r
that most fleet officers received the news of the "formation" 
of the new "Rodzyanko Government" with favour; which again con­ 
trasts with the normal picture of dyed-in-the-wool reactionaries. 
During the night of 28 February/1 March, all news reaching 
the Krechet appeared to confirm that Rodzyanko had taken power 
and was taking steps to restore order. Nepenin learned that a 
mutiny had begun among the army units in Kronstadt, that naval
units were so far not affected, and that the Duma Committee had
2 - 
intervened to restore order. This was followed by news of the
murder of the captain of the Aurora, with information that here
too, order was being re-established by "the commission presided
3 over by Rodzyanko". Further telegrams from the Naval Staff in
Petrograd confirmed that the effective government was the Duma 
Presidium under Rodzyanko, and that Admiral I.K. Grigorovich, the
Tsar's Minister for the Navy, was either still in office or
4 co-operating with Rodzyanko.
At 4 a.m. on 1 March, conraunication by Hughes telegraph
1. "Dnevnik Rengartena", KA, 1929, no.1(32), p 100.
2. Mordinov, op.cit., p 18.
3. ibid., p 19.
4. ibid.; "Dnevnik Rengartena", KA, 1929, no.1(32), 
p 101.
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with the capital was cut on Duma instructions. Since the rail­ 
way line to Petrograd was also still cut, this meant that 
Nepenin's sole official means of cornnuniation was by Morse code
t
over the ship's radio receiver. During the night, Rodzyanko 
sent Nepenin two telegrams telling him that the Duma had taken 
power, and urging him to recognize the new Government v After a 
discussion with his liberal staff officers, Nepenin decided to 
do so, for the reasons that Rodzyanko had gambled on: that recog­ 
nition of a competent government, enjoying popular support, would 
bring political turmoil to an end, thus enabling the maintenance 
of discipline in the armed forces. Nepenin acted most correctly, 
informing Rodzyanko (whom he believed to be the Prime Minister),
Stavka, the corrmanders of neighbouring units, and the Tsar of his
2 decision, and of the reasons for it. The Hughes connection was
imnediately restored.
During the morning, the officers and men were informed. 
Insofar as the officers are concerned, Nepenin's briefing was 
straight-forward. He read them Rodzyanko's telegrams, told them
of his decision and that he had informed the Tsar, and dismissed
3them without allowing any discussion. It is not clear whether
his order to the men merely stated that there was a new government,
1. "Mordvinov, p 22; "Dnevnik Rengartena", KA, 1929, no.1(32),
P lOlo
2. 'Tevral'skaya revolyutsiya", KA, 1927, no.2(21), pp 45-46; 
"Dnevnik Rengartena", KA, 1929, no.1(32), p 1O2.
3. "Dnevnik Rengartena", KA, 1929, no.l(32), p 102,,
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or whether it included the information that Nepenin had recognised 
it. Nor is it clear whether the officers who attended the 
morning briefing were instructed to inform their crews, or indeed
t
did so. Available sources for this matter are simply inadequate.\
The most comprehensive collection of naval documents, published 
in the Soviet Union, for example, does not contain any ships' logs
for the critical days of 1 and 2 March, although it does have them
2for 28 February, 3, 4 and 5 March.
It was not until the early afternoon of 1 March that
Nepenin learned the full extent of the mutiny in Kronstadt. He
3immediately contacted Rodzyanko to ask for help.
late that night, Nicholas II decided to accept a "Government 
of Confidence" under Rodzyanko, General Ne V. Ruzskii was 
instructed to contact Rodzyanko by Hughes and inform him of the 
Tsar's decision. To Ruzskii's surprise, however, Rodzyanko tempor­ 
ised. In fact, events in Petrograd had progressed very rapidly and 
Rodzyanko had virtually been eased out of the new Government,, His 
order to the troops to obey their officers, instead of calming
l e ibid., pp 101 and 121,
2. Mordvinov, op.cit., pp 17-18, 3O-32, 36-37, 38-39, 43-44.
3. ibido, p 22; "Dnevnik Rengartena", KA, 1929, no.1(32), 
p 103. Later in the day as well as subsequently, 
Nepenin's support for Rodzyanko is evident in telegrams 
between various front commanders and is usually 
explained as his reaction to the Kronstadt mutiny. It 
is clear, however, that when he recognised Rodzyanko, 
Nepenin was not yet aware of the extent of the Kronstadt 
mutiny.. See "Fevral'skaya revolyutsiya", KA, 1927, 
no.2(23), pp 40, 51, 61.
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them down, had given rise to the suspicions that led to Order 
Nb.l of the Petrograd Soviet. His manoeuvrings with the 
generals had led some of his IXima colleagues to believe that he
«
was part of a reactionary jplot involving Nicholas II and General 
Ivanov 0 Milyukov, now in conference with the representatives of 
the Soviet, was urging that the new government be independent of 
the Duma, which had discredited itself by accepting prorogation. 
Moreover, most Constitutional Democrats now believed that the 
monarchy itself "factually did not exist". Milyukov, however, 
had just managed to persuade them and the Soviet representatives 
that acceptance of Aleksei Nikolaevich as constitutional monarch, 
with Mikhail Aleksandrovich as regent, would be a useful way of 
legitimising the Government and of making a right-wing coup, like 
that of General Ivanov, more difficult. In any event, Nicholas II 
was now unacceptable to everyone c
Thus,when Ruzskii's message canie through, Rodzyanko was 
caught out by his own plan. To accept the Tsar's proposal meant 
certain hostility from the Duma Committee and from the Soviet, and 
possible civil war between the Duma and the generals. To refuse 
and to demand abdication was to risk running afoul of the High 
Command himself. Yet he did refuse, telling Ruzskii that the Duma 
could only "hope to contain the disorders if Nicholas were to abdic­ 
ate in favour of his son. But he still gave the impression that 
he was in charge,'in the hope that Milyukov and the others might 
yet be forced to accept his candidacy for the premiership, if this 
were the price both the Tsar and the generals demanded for
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abdication.
In fact, Rodzyanko's standing with Stavka remained so high 
that, as soon as he had received a summary of the conversation 
with Ruzskii, Alekseev incorporated its main points into a 
message to all front commanders, pointing out that abdication in 
favour of Aleksei Nikolaevich, with Mikhail Aleksandrovich as 
regent, now seemed the only hope for Russia. Three commanders - 
General A 0 E 0 Evert, General A. A. Brusilov, and Grand Duke Nikolai 
Nikolaevich - responded immediately. By two-thirty that after­ 
noon, Alekseev had combined these three replies into a telegram
o
to Nicholas II urging abdication. Admiral Nepenin, who had
been the first member of the High Conmandto recognise the Prov­ 
isional Government, was not one of those now pressing for abdic­ 
ation.
Just as General Ruzskii, in Pskov and General Alekseev at 
Stavka in Mogilev were unaware of the state of affairs in
1. For most of this argument, I am indebted to Hasegawa, 
- "Rodzyanko and the Grand Dukes r oe . M , CSP, 1976, no. 2, 
pp 165-67, with some additional points from W0 Rosenberg, 
Liberals in the Russian Revolution, Princeton, 1974, 
pp 52ff„ Although Hasegawa's argument is generally 
impressive, he does not present a really satisfying reason 
for Rodzyanko to press for abdication, only reasons to 
explain why he ceased pressing for a "Government of 
Confidence" and no longer opposed abdication Kasegawa is 
not concerned with events after the Ruzskyi-Rcdzyanko 
conversation by Hughes telegraph on the morning of 2 March. 
.This may account for his not realising that Rodzyanko did 
not opt out at this point, but actively continued his 
campaign on a different tack for another thirty-six hours. 
My interpretation of his motives is admittedly speculative; 
I am concerned primarily with the fact that he continued 
to misinform the armed forces, not his reasons for so doing,
2. "Fevral ! skaya revolyutsiya", KA, 1927, no.2(21), pp 67-73.
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Petrograd, so also Admiral Nepenin was unaware both of affairs 
in the capital and, for most of the morning of 2 March, of those 
in Pskov and Mogilev. The day began with a request from the
f
naval Commander in Revel'for permission to make some kind of 
political statement, in light of the deteriorating situation. 
Nepenin instructed him to announce that he, Nepenin, was working 
in full agreement with the Duma Committee; should it prove 
necessary, he could also announce that the Commander of the Baltic 
Fleet and the Comnander of Revel'had recognised the Provisional 
Government. At the same time he cabled Rodzyanko, asking him to 
send Duma Deputies to Revel'to confirm this announcement.
Nepenin's briefing of his staff officers and ships' 
commanders followed much the same pattern as that of the day 
before, except that he was able to tell them of the full extent of 
the mutiny in Kronstadt, of the beginnings of trouble in Revel', 
and of the role of the Duma Conmittee in both places. He re­ 
asserted his support for the Duma, and stated that he would 
announce this publicly if necessary„ As before, he forbade public 
discussion of this by his officers, but invited anyone to come to 
his cabin for a private conversation. The Soviet historian 
V.V. Petrash interprets this as indicating some kind of monarchist
1. This request implies that, although the Fleet had been 
. informed of events in the capital, no explicit announce­ 
ment about the political allegiance of the naval conmand 
had been made. Mordvinov, p 24; "Dnevnik Rengartena", 
KA, 1929, no.1(32), pp 103,122,fn.23; "Fevral'skaya 
revolyutsiya", KA, 1927, no 0 3(22), p 13.
plot. This seems unlikely. If officers were opposed to the Duma 
and favoured maintaining the monarchy, why should they need to 
discuss it privately with Nepenin? Such sentiments would have
t
been consistent with their oath of loyalty, and could have been 
properly expressed in public. Nepenin is more likely to have been 
shielding them against the possibility of their being arraigned 
for breaking their oath to Nicholas II, should he have miscalcul­ 
ated. Furthermore, Petrash's account is based exclusively (and at
first sight rather oddly) on the emigre memoirs of an ex-naval
o 
officer, G. Graf, who was not at the briefing. Rengarten was at
the briefing, and his diary shows that news had not yet come in
3 about the proposal that Nicholas should abdicate. As far as
Nepenin and his staff knew, the question was whether to recognise 
a government that was apparently behaving patriotically and was 
capable of restoring order, in the hope that by so doing, they 
might persuade Nicholas to accept it also. The briefing ended 
with the reading of telegrams from Rodzyanko and A.I. Guchkov, 
and of the day's order to the lower deck of the Fleet,informing 
them of recent events. It was only after the meeting had
dispersed that Alekseev's telegram calling for abdication came
4 through, and caused consternation among Nepenin f s staff.
1. Petrash, op.cit., pp 48-49.
2. Graf, Na Novike (Baltyiskyi flot v voinu i revolyutsiyu), 
M 1922, p 356.
3. "Dnevnik Rengartena", KA, 1929, no.1(32), p 104.
4. ibid.
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It was not until evening when it had become clear that
the announcement of support for Rodzyanko's Government had not
i 
calmed things down in Revel, that Nepenin sent a telegram to
f
Stavka supporting the proposal that Nicholas II should 
abdicate. It was delivered to the Tsar in Pskov at 10 p;m., 
that is, at about the same time that Guchkov and V.V. Shul'gin 
arrived there from Petrograd. Later that night, the Krechet 
learned of Nicholas 1 abdication and of Prince G.E, L'vov's 
appointment as Prime Minister. The first orders the new Govern­ 
ment issued to Nepenin were that he arrest F.A.A. Zein, the 
Governor of Finland, and Borovitnikov, the vice-President of the
Finnish- Senate. They were duly interned on board the battleship
2Slava.
The staff officers were assembled very early next morning 
(at 7.20 a.m.) and informed of the abdication. They cheered the
new Tsar. The news was then sent out to all bases, starting with
t 
Revel,which was considered to be the most critical. At the same
1. Mordvinov, opoCito, p 27„ Graf's account, op 0 cit,, p 257 
suggests that Rodzyanko may have sent Nepenin a further 
message urging him to take this step. Graf is very indig­ 
nant that Rodzyanko tricked Nepenin into supporting 
abdication, by telling him falsely that other commanders 
and Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich had agreed„ In fact, 
they had agreed, and had done so on Alekseev's prompting 
that morning ("Fevral 1 skaya revolyutsiya", KA, 1927, 
no.2(21), pp 67-71). Rodzyanko was practising deception, 
but not this particular one.
2. "Dnevnik Rengartena", KA, 1929, no.1(32), pp 104-05;
Mordvinov, op.cit., p 31, Kiuru, p.8 claims that this 
was only done on 4 March, thus giving the impression that 
Nepenin had refused to arrest "reactionaries",, However, 
the evidence from the other two sources is conclusive„
-206-
time, the staff began tidying and filing the telegrams of the 
past four days. All of them believed the revolution to be over, 
now that the new Government had been installed and recognised. 1
r
Hardly had this begun when another telegram was received from
Rodzyanko at 7.30 ordering that the announcement of the abdic-
2at ion be withheld. It was too late to prevent the announcement
going to Revel', but Nepenin promised to try to prevent it in 
Helsingfors, Abo and Moondsund. Even so, he was too late to stop 
the abdication manifesto being read to some of the Helsingfors 
units.
.This was Rodzyanko ! s gravest disservice to the Fleet. He 
had been frightened by the reaction of the Petrograd garrison to 
his order of 28 February, and again by their reaction to Milyukov's
premature public announcement of the constitutional monarchy during
3the afternoon of 2 March. His fears were increased when Guchkov
and Shul'gin returned from Pskov to announce that Nicholas had
1. Similar scenes were taking place at the front. 'Tevral'skaya 
revolyutsiya", KA, 1927, no 0 3(22), p 31; "Dnevnik 
Rengartena", KA, 1929, no.1(32), p 105.
2. "Dnevnik Rengartena", KA, 1929, no.1(32), pp 105, 122
fn.SO; "Fevral'skaya revolyutsiya", KA, 1927, no.3(22), 
pp 3O-31; Graf, p 258, Here too, Rodzyanko appears to have 
contacted Nepenin directly, as well as through Stavka, in 
his desperation to have the abdication manifesto withheld. 
Nepenin, clearly beginning to lose patience, concurred but 
warned that "any delay will be disastrous (gubitel'no)." 
Petrash, op 0 cit., p 49, fn.23.
3. P.N. Milyukov, Political Memoirs, 1905-17, 'Ann Arbor, 1967, 
pp 406-O7; Katkov, op.cit., pp 398-400.
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abdicated, not in favour of his son, Aleksei, who might just have been 
acceptable^but in favour of his brother, Mikhail. In addition to his 
concern lest the announcement of MjJkhail's accession provoke another 
popular uprising, Rodzyanko now had a personal score to settle with
? _
Milyukovo The abdication manifesto had nominated L'vov, not Rodzyanko, 
as Prime Minister 0 Far from bargaining, the Tsar and the generals had 
been ready for abdication. Ironically, this was largely because of 
Rodzyanko J s conversation with Ruzskii the day before,, Rodzyanko felt 
that Milyukov had deprived him of the office that was his by rights. 
Milyukov was the main, almost the only, advocate of a constitutional 
monarchyo Rodzyanko now swung from the idea of a "Government of 
Confidence" under Nicholas II to opposition to any monarchy at all. 
He was determined that Nicholas 1 abdication should not be announced 
until Mikhail f s could be joined to it. To make sure that the 
generals were not tempted to go ahead with the announcement, he once 
again misinformed Stavka, telling them that new riots had broken out 
in Petrograd and that soldiers were killing their officers.
The delay was fatal for the Baltic Fleet. Rumours swept 
Helsingfors that Nepenin was concealing something of importance from 
the lower deck, that the Fleet was about to steam to Petrograd to
put down the revolution, that Zein and Borovitnikov had been moved on
2 
board the Slava to form a reactionary headquarters, and so on.
A moment's thought would have shown how baseless these rumours were. 
It is not possible to prepare a battleship for sea without the
*
1. "Fevral'skaya revolyutsiya", KA, 1927, no 0 3(22), pp 27ff.
2. Khovrin, "V 1917g vo flote", KL, 1926, no.5, p 56; 
Mordvinov (ed.), opoCit., p 31.
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knowledge of its crew. It was equally impossible to steam to 
Petrograd because of the ice (as Nepenin had pointed out to a general 
who had proposed this to him two days before). 1 Such was the 
atmosphere of tension and excitement, that rational considerations
r
did not apply.
To make matters worse for Nepenin, Naval Intelligence reported 
during the morning that the problem in Petrograd was not so much the 
abdication, as sane kind of party struggle inside the new Government. 
This appeared to have been cleared up, however, as a radio message was 
received from the Government, addressed to all citizens, announcing
its formation, Nepenin's staff inmediately set to work to print this
2for distribution to the ships. Before this could take place, a mutiny
broke out in the minelaying division. Nepenin rushed over and, together
with the division's corrmander, Admiral A.S. Maksimov, managed to
3persuade the mutineers to disperse.
On his return to the Krechet, Nepenin sent a further message
to Rodzyanko, informing him of the mutiny, and asking him to send
4 Kerenskii to Revel', as things there had not settled down.
He also decided to take matters into his own hands. He had his
1. "Dnevnik Rengartena", KA, 1929, no.1(32), p 121, fn.21.
2. ibid., p 105.
3. ibid., p 106; "Fevral'skaya revolyutsiya", KA, 1927, no 0 3 
(22), p 35„ Some Soviet writers state that this mutiny 
took place on 2 March (Kiuru, op.cit., p 8; Velikaya 
.oktyabr'skaya sotsialisticheskaya revolyutsiya: Khronlka 
'sobytyi, vol.1, M 1957, p 39). This conclusion, however, 
is based on secondary sources whereas the evidence cited 
above is conclusive.
4. "Fevral'skaya revolyutsiya", KA, 1927, no 0 3(22), p 35.
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staf f officers draw up an order informing the Fleet of events, 
and surrmoned all ships 1 connanders to the Krechet. They were not 
to disobey Rodzyanko's order, merely to circumvent it. All
t
telegrams and orders were to be read to the men, except the 
abdication order which the captains were to explain in their own 
words. They were to stress that Admiral Nepenin supported the 
new Government, and that the government demanded that discipline 
be maintained. The men were informed accordingly at around 
6 p.m. on 3 March. Eye-witnesses report that they took the news
quietly and orderly and that, in fact, they appeared to know
o
about the abdication already.
^
Less than an hour later, the mutiny began. Just after 
seven o'clock, the sailors of the battleship Imperator Pavel I 
began to kill their officers. The Pavel hoisted a red flag and 
turned its guns on the battleship lying alongside it, the Andrei 
Pervozvannyi, which hastily raised its own red flag. The movement 
spread rapidly. One after the other, the ships hoisted red flags 
and, after nightfall, lit red riding lights. 3
Nepenin was dining when the news was brought to him. 
"Khorosho", he said, and then added somewhat imprudently, in front
1. Mordvinov, op,cit., pp 29-30; "Dnevnik Rengartena", KA, 
1929, no.1(32), p 106.
2. Graf, opoC-it,, p 258; D.A., "Den 1 4-go marta na kreisere", 
Voennaya byl' (le passe militaire), no.32, September 1958, 
p 5.
3. Graf, op.cit., p 283; Khovrin, KL, 1926, no.5(20), p 56; 
Mordvinov, op.cit., pp 3O-31.
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of the wardroom stewards, "which of the dreadnoughts is in a 
position to fire on the Pavel?" He lapsed into silence for a 
while, then said, "No, I shall not shed blood. That would be 
pointless."1
At about this time, a message came in from Alekseev. His 
suspicions had been aroused the day before, and certain aspects 
of Rodzyanko's conversation calling for abdication had also 
seemed odd. Naval Intelligence had checked some of his state­ 
ments, and found that there had been no massacre of officers in 
Petrograd on 2 March. Rodzyanko was, therefore, lying. Alekseev 
then telegraphed all fronts that there was disunity within the
Duma, that the workers' parties were exerting much influence, and
othat Rodzyanko was unreliable and not to be trusted.
^
Alekseev moved cautiously, perhaps because he at last 
realised the danger in acting on inadequate information, or per­ 
haps because despite all that he had learned, he still trusted 
Rodzyanko, an ex-guards officer, more than he did the other 
politicians. Despite growing pressure from front conrnanders, he 
refused to countermand Rodzyanko's order forbidding the announce­ 
ment of the abdication. Throughout the afternoon, he was unable 
to contact Rodzyanko. It was only at 6 p.m., when he managed to 
get through to the new Minister of War Guchkov, that he learned
1. "Dnevnik Rengartena", KA, 1929, no 0 l(3.2), p 123, fn 0 34. 
Petrash, op.cito, p 5O, omits the last remarks, thus 
giving quite a different impression.
2. "Fevral'skaya revolyutsiya", KA, 1927, no.3(22), pp 22-24, 
32.
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of Mikhail's abdication. Even at this late stage, the misinform­ 
ation reaching the armed forces did not end. When Alekseev 
tried to contact Guchkov again, ten minutes later, the Hughes
?
machine in Petrograd was answered by Colonel Bk A. Engel'gart, a 
Rodzyanko appointee, who told him that Guchkov had resigned. 
It was 10 p 0m. before Alekseev finally contacted Rodzyanko and 
received permission to announce the abdications to the troops. 
This news was relayed to the various fronts at 1.30 a.m. on 
4 March.
The message from Alekseev that Rodzyanko was unreliable 
was the last straw for Nepenin. All day, he had withheld the 
official announcement of the abdication, against his better judge­ 
ment. The mutiny that he had warned against, and had done so much 
to prevent, had now broken out. The laconism of his report to 
Rodzyanko and Alekseev was an implicit reproach for the policy of 
delay of which he was now the victim. It contained no appeals 
for help from the Duma (and is notable as the"first message that 
he sent not to do this). It was a simple report, consisting of 
two telegrams:
19.30. Urgent. Mutiny on Andrei, Pavel 
and Slava. Admiral Nebul'sin killed. The 
Baltic Fleet no longer exists as a fighting 
force. I shall do what I can. Nepenin.
1. ibid., pp 33-39. When pressed by Alekseev„ Engel'gart 
changed his mind about Guchkov's resignation.
2. ibid., pp 40ff.
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Fiirther to Nb.286/op. Mutiny on nearly 
all ships. Nepenin. 1
The report was received at Stavka with alarm. Rodzyanko did not 
' 9
find the time even to read it.
Now that the mutiny had begun, Nepenin acted with his 
customary energy. A message was sent to all ships, inviting 
them to send delegates to the Krechet to present their demands. 
During the night, the ships' representatives assembled, and 
were addressed by Nepenin who, pale and exhausted, restrained 
hiniself with diff iculty 0 Only towards the end of his speech did 
he lose control, when he described those who had killed officers 
as scum (svolochi) and cowards, adding that he despised cowardice 
and feared nothing„ Nonetheless, the ships' delegates then pre­ 
sented him with a list of demands, which seemed both interminable 
and ludicrously petty compared to the violence unleashed in their 
name. Officers should address other ranks as vy and generally
show more respect toward other ranks; sailors should have more
4 freedom, and be allowed to smoke in the street, and so forth.
1. ibid., p 36; Mordvinov, op 0 cit 0 , p 29; "Dnevnik 
Rengartena", KA, 1929, no.1(32), p 107 0
2. "Fevral'skaya revolyutsiya", KA, 1927, no.3(22), pp 40ff.
3. "Dnevnik Rengartena", KA, 1929, no,l(32), p 123, fn.34; 
Mordvinov, op.cit., p 31„
4. ' ""Dnevnik Rengartena", KA, 1929, no 0 l(32), p 107. The
importance of minor irritants in major upheavals should 
not be underestimated. See for example Shklovskii's 
insistence on the importance of the ban on riding in 
trams in causing the mutiny of the Petrograd garrison„ 
V. Shklovsky, A Sentimental Journey: Memoirs, 1917-22, 
Ithaca, 197O, p 7.
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Agreenent seemed eventually to have been reached. 
Nepenin, worn out, withdrew and the delegates stood at attention 
and said goodbye to him in a friendly fashion. No sooner had he
t
left the room, than one delegate said, "He won't do anything he 
promised", and debate began all over again. Finally, however, 
they did reach agreement, helped somewhat by a conversation with 
Kerenskii over the Highes telegraph. Kerenskii conf irmed that 
Nepenin had recognised the Provisional Government, and urged the
men to obey their officers. It was during this conversation
•« 
that Nepenin and the ships' delegates learned for the first time
of the abdication of Mikhail Aleksandrovich. When the delegates 
dispersed in the early hours of the morning, after Nepenin had 
promised to allow ship-board meetings later that day to be 
followed by an assembly of ships' representatives on shore, the
Fleet Commander felt confident enough to send a reasonably
2optimistic telegram to Stavka.
On the morning of 4 March, the delegates returned to the 
Krechet to arrange the details of the promised assembly. Nepenin 
confirmed his support and ordered refreshments to be provided. A 
little after 9 a.m. some infantry regiments marched down to the 
port to discover what was going on 0 Nepenin met their officers, 
and arranged for ships' delegates to help them elect delegates
1. "Dnevnik Rengartena", KA, 1929, no.1(32), p 108;
"Fevral'skaya revolyutsiya", KA, 1927, no 0 3(22), p 47.
2. "Dnevnik Rengartena", KA, 1929, no.1(32), p 108;
Mordvinov, op.cit., p 32; "Fevral'skaya revolyutsiya", 
KA, 1927, no.3(22), p 48.
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to the meeting. On some of the ships, officers who had been 
arrested were set free. At 11 a.m. Nepenin issued an order 
announcing the impending arrival of Duma Deputies,F.I. Rodichev
f
and M.E. Skobelev, who were to address the assembly of ships' 
representatives. He recommended that officers should join 
their men in the welcome demonstrations. A significant number
of officers did indeed go ashore, bearing both red and
2St. Andrew's flags.
Despite this apparent accord, however, the sucpicions of 
at least part of the lower deck had not been appeased. When the 
representatives returned to their ships after the meeting with 
Nepenin'during the night, some of them had been unable to per­ 
suade their messmates to accept his bona fides or to release 
their officers. Indeed, some of the representatives must have 
been disturbed when Nepenin told them to pass on to all who had 
taken part in the killings that although he refused to spill any 
blood himself, he could not allow mutineers to remain in the
crews where the crimes had been cornnitted and would hand them
3over to the new Government for just ice.
1. "Dnevnik Rengartena", KA, 1929, no,l(32), p 108; 
Mordvinov, op 0 cit 0 , p 36.
2. Mordvinov, op0 cito, p 36.
3. ibid c , p 32; Burdzhalov, op.cit a , vol.2, p 123 cites a 
letter from the Provisional Government's Assistant Naval 
Minister, BU P, Dudorov (to whom he quaintly refers as "an 
officer") to Admiral A 0 V 0 KolchaK, stating that Nepenin 
had "lost his temper and was unable to refrain from 
smiling bitterly and speaking sarcastically",, He con­ 
cludes that this had caused the representatives to feel
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For these sailors, Nepenin's continued exercise of power 
as Fleet Commander was a threat which had only been increased by 
Kerenskii's supposedly soothing words over the Hughes telegraph.
r
Kerenskii had confirmed that Nepenin had recognised the new 
government and that this recognition was known and accepted in 
Petrograd, thereby removing the mutineers' last defence against 
reprisals. He had inadvertently made it clear that the Govern­ 
ment would not accept the mutiny as an uprising against defenders 
of the old regime, but would see it as murder. From the time 
they stepped out of that meeting, it would be very important to 
some of those delegates to have Nepenin ! s authority destroyed. 
*The first attempt to break the agreement reached on the 
Krechet came at 5.30 in the morning on 4 March. A radio message 
went out from the Slava:
Comrade sailors! Do not believe the tyrant. 
Remember the order on saluting. No, we shall 
not get liberty from the vampires of the old 
regimeo We were waiting for a deputation, 
but when delegates from the crowd were sent 
to him, the Krechet suddenly started to send 
out signals "send a disciplined regiment". 
No, death to the tyrant, and no confidence.
United Fleet Democratic Organisation
(contd 1 from (3) overleaf)
that they were being treated with contempt. Possibly so. 
Nepenin was certainly tired and strained by the time this 
meeting took place„ Dudorov was not at the meeting, how­ 
ever, and there is no other evidence that Nepenin had 
contempt for the men under his corrmand. The Provisional 
Government, moreover, would have been anxious to place the 
blame for the mutiny firmly in Helsingfors rather than in 
Petrograd. In any case, there is no need to assume 
hauteur in Nepenin's manner in order to explain the desire 
by part of the lower deck to destroy his authority.
1. Mordvinov, op.cit., p 33.
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Although this message caused sane surprise and distress on board 
the Krechet, it did not interrupt arrangements for the meeting to 
be held later that morning. A few hours later, a second attempt
f
was made, this time in a message from the Pavel, addressed 
directly to Nepenin:
The entire lower deck has lost faith in you, 
and demands that you temporarily cease to 
issue orders, which only duplicate and make 
matters worse. The lower deck is organising 
a provisional committee, which will be in 
charge until order has been fully restored... 
(indecipherable)...ships' delegates. 2
This did not stop Nepenin either; not long after the receipt of 
this message, he issued his order to officers to participate in 
the demonstrations for the Duma Deputies.
Half an hour later, news reached the Krechet that Admiral 
Maksimov had been elected Commander of the Fleet. Ten minutes
later, Maksimov arrived decorated with red ribbons, and riding in
3a car flying a red flag. Even at this point, Nepenin did not
lose his composure. He informed Maksimov that he was unable to 
hand over his command without authority from the Government and 
from the Supreme Commander. Until these bodies had pronounced, 
however, he would agree to have all his orders countersigned by 
Maksimov. The latter was forced to accept this, and left, his
w
car now sporting the Fleet Commander's ensign as well as the red 
flag.
1. "Dnevnik Rengartena", KA, 1929, no.1(32), p 108„
2. Mordvinov, op 0 cito, p 34.
3. "Dnevnik Rengartena", KA, 1929, no„ 1(32), pp 108-09; 
Graf, opoCito, p 265.
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On. board the Krechet, the work of restoring order con­ 
tinued. Nepenin's statements and Kerenskii's message over the 
Hughes telegraph were printed and sent out for distribution. At
r
12.15 Nepenin's persistence seemed to have borne fruit. A body 
calling itself the Central Committee of Ships' Delegates on 
board the Pavel issued a statement recognising Nepenin's actions 
as correct and accepting his comnand.
Less than an hour later, a group of armed sailors arrived, 
ostensibly to escort Nepenin to the Station Square, where crowds 
of sailors and officers were awaiting the arrival of the Duma 
Deputies. On the way there, he was shot in the back and killed 
by an unidentified sailor. Ironically at about the same time,
the Provisional Government appointed Nepenin Assistant Minister
2for the Navy.
The Mutiny of 3 March 1917 in Helsingfors cannot be seen 
as a vosstanie - an uprising against defenders of the old regime.
9
It occurred only after all ships had been informed of the end of 
the old order and of the Fleet Conrander's acceptance of the new 
government. It was much more of a bunt - an elemental blood­ 
letting, a settling of scores, the boiling over of hatreds and 
resentments brought to a head by the revolution in the capital.
It would follow from this that the vilification of Nepenin 
by Soviet historians must be rejected. There was a delay in
1. "Dnevnik Rengartena", KA, 1929, no e l(32), p 1O9; 
Mordvinov, opoCit., p 34.
2. Pravda, 4 June 1917, p 3; Mordvinov, op.cit., pp 35-37; 
Graf, op.cit., p 266.
-218-
announcing accurate news about events in Petrograd. But this was 
not because Nepenin was ambiguous about his allegiance to the new 
regime. Indeed, at one point he specifically told his staff
r
officers that he would disregard any order from Nicholas II to 
take action against the revolution. He behaved honourably 
toward his men, his officers and his Tsar, There was nothing 
underhanded about his change of allegiance. He kept the Tsar, the 
Duma and his officers informed of his actions and of the reasons 
for these actions. He kept the men informed of events without, as 
far as one can make out, telling them of his own political alleg­ 
iance. It should be noted that to announce a new government with­ 
out comment is tantamount to accepting it; and that personal state­ 
ments of political creed were not in the tradition of the Russian 
Imperial Navy. Here too, it would be a mistake to see duplicity. 
Nor can Nepenin be accused of being bloodthirsty: even at the 
height of the mutiny, he ordered his commanders to refrain from
•
spilling blood and refused to do so himself.
" What then accounts for the extraordinary violence? Soviet
historians are fond of stressing the harsh and often petty
o
discipline of the tsarist navy. This theory finds some support
in the demands of the ships 1 delegates to Nepenin while the mutiny 
was going on. Discipline, however, was presumably hard in Revel', 
where-there was little bloodshed, and in the Black Sea Fleet, where
1. "Dnevnik Rengartena", KA, 1929, no.1(32), p 102.
2. Petrash, op.cito, p 53; Burdzhalov, op.cit., vol.2, p 107.
-219-
there was none. Also, the harshness and pettiness of discipline 
in the Royal Navy of that time was not significantly different 
from that in the Russian Navy. Discipline may have been a
t
factor, but it cannot have been the only one.
The men on board the big ships in Helsingfors were demoral­ 
ised by the War. Russian naval strategy did not allow the 
battleships and cruisers to be much used, so frightened were the 
strategists of the consequences of losing them. The winter of 
1916-17 had been very hard, and the ships had remained frozen 
into the harbour for months on end with nothing for the sailors 
to do except polish brass and salute officers. The war had 
reduced'the number of times the big ships put to sea, the winter 
reduced it to nothing. The small ships - destroyers, minelayers 
and submarines - which were mostly based at Revel',were active 
throughout the war and thus had higher morale. This would
certainly explain the differences between the revolutions in
2Revel'and Ifelsingfors.
Yet even if one accepts demoralisation as a factor, or even 
as the main factor, doubts remain. Was there not a persistence in 
the course of the mutiny that needs explaining, particularly in 
the hunting down of Nepenin? Does this indicate some political 
leadership at work?
1. Henry Baynham, Men from the Dreadnoughts,London. 1976, passim.
2. Longley, op.cit., Soviet Studies, 1973, no.l, pp 34-35; 
Graf, op-cit.,, pp 248-49, 253, 290, 366.
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Many Soviet historians claim that the uprising was led by 
Bolsheviks. This claim is supported by Graf and George Katkov, 
both emigres and both anxious to blame the Bolsheviks for the
r
2massacre. Graf s claim is based on an unsubstantiated accus­ 
ation made by a Bolshevik at a public meeting in 1917, and 
cannot be taken as conclusive by itself. Katkov attempts to show 
that the massacre was consistent with Bolshevik theory, citing a 
speech made by Lenin in Zurich in February 1917. In it, Lenin 
states that the 19O5 mutineers made the mistake of
...^liberating the officers whom they had 
arrested; they allowed themselves to be taken 
in by promises and arguments from their super­ 
iors; this is how the commanding officers 
gained valuable time, obtained reinforcements, 
broke up the forces of the mutineers and 
followed this up with the most cruel suppress­ 
ions and executions of the ringleaders. 3
This would be convincing only if the riiitiny had broken out before 
the Naval Command had recognised the Provisional Government, as in 
Kronstadt. But in Helsingfors, the mutiny broke out after the
1. fcLuru, opocite, p 8, claims that the Bolsheviks led the
uprising, but later (pp 23-24) explains Bolshevik weakness 
in the Soviet by the fact that most fleet Bolsheviks had 
been arrested during the war. See also Khovrin, Baltiitsy 
idut na shturm, M 1966, p 69; Naida, op.cito, p 580; 
S.S. Khesin, "Russkyi flot i sverzhenie samoderzhaviya", 
in Sverzhenie samoderzhaviya: Sbornik statei, M 1970, 
p 187.
2. Graf, op 0 cit., p 289; G 0 Katkov, "The Russian Navy and 
the Revolution", in M.G. Saunders (ed.), The Soviet Navy, 
London, 1958, p 86.
3. Katkov, in Saunders (ed.), The Soviet Navy, pp 85-86, 
citing V.I. Lenin, PSS, vol.30, p 318.
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recognition of the Provisional Government. Not to kill the 
officers would not have been to invite reprisals, for there was 
nothing to suppress, the rank and file .of the Fleet having played
r
no part in the revolution.
Further factors make one doubt any significant Bolshevik 
presence. None of the memoirs published in the 1920's claim 
Bolshevik leadership. Secondly, had this major mutiny been led 
by the Bolsheviks, one would expect to find this reflected in the 
composition of the Helsingfors Soviet elected immediately after
•
the mutiny, either in numbers or in powerful Bolshevik personal­ 
ities. Neither is to be found.
One Soviet historian, V.V. Petrash, while rejecting Graf's 
claim (and thereby implicitly rejecting that of most of his own 
colleagues) that the Bolsheviks led the mutiny, does state that 
it was led by a "centre", the composition of which "it has not 
been possible to establish". Interestingly enough, the only vague
•
point about this claim is the political composition of the centre
since Petrash cites membership figures, names ships and supports
2his data with otherwise inaccessible archival sources.
The existence of such a centre is given some support by 
published sources. Eye-witness accounts insist that groups of
1. See especially Khovrin, KL, 1926, no.5(20), p 59.
Forty years later, Khovrin changed his mind about Bolshevik 
leadership during the mutiny; see his Baltiitsy idut, p 69.
2. Petrash, op.cit., pp 49-50 and 50, fn.24. The archive 
cited is the Leningrad Party Archive.
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sailors went from ship to ship organising the mutiny, and that 
political agitators from the shore were also active. One impor­ 
tant Bolshevik source, published in the 1920 ! s, speaks of the
r
mutiny being prepared by unspecified "active groups", weakly
o
linked to organisations in Petrograd. The log of the First
Battle Squadron for 3 March records that "on board the Gangut
3 alone officers have not been arrested," At first sight this
seems odd: the Gangut was a big ship, with a revolutionary past. 
Why was it the exception? Not much more than a year before the 
Gangut had had a mutiny after which all political suspects on 
board had been rounded up, Thus the Gangut was likely to be the 
one battleship without a revolutionary nucleus.
It should also be noted that the first radio message to 
Nepenin on the morning of 4 March is signed by "The United Fleet 
Democratic Organisation". This title suggests a group of 
activists from diverse revolutionary parties. This would accord
•
well with the revolutionary traditions of the Baltic Fleet. Also, 
after February 1917, the Socialist Revolutionaries held the 
majority of seats in the three fleet Soviets at Kronstadt,
1. Mordvinov, op.cito, p 31; Graf, opoCit., pp 256, 260, 266, 
267, 274, 276, 280, 284, 287 (rejection of Graf's identif­ 
ication of these groups as Bolsheviks does not imply 
rejection of the existence of the groups themselves.) 
D.A. Voennaya byl', no.32, September 1958, pp 4, 7.
2. P. Dybenko, Myatezhniki, M 1923, p 14.
3. Mordvinov, op.cit., p 32.
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Helsingfors and Revel'. Thus, in March 1917, a revolutionary 
body comprising Socialist Revolutionaries, Bolsheviks and anar­ 
chists, with the SRs dominant, accords with both tradition and
r
the imnediate post-revolutionary balance of power in the Soviets.
Moreover, the kind of bunt that erupted on 3 March: a 
mutiny after the recognition of the Provisional Government, which 
was nonsense in terms of Social Democratic theory, makes very good 
sense in terms of radical SR theory as an attempt to prevent the 
establishment of the much-feared capitalist state.
To a certain extent, and largely because of Nepenin's 
courage and determination, the mutiny failed in the short run. The 
United Fleet Democratic Organisation got their massacre, but the 
fact that the officers had recognised the Provisional Government 
and had not used violence against the lower deck, made part of the 
men opposed to the mutiny. This becomes apparent if one examines 
the two anti-Nepenin messages issued on 4 March. The first one,
*
from the Slava, signed by the United Fleet Democratic Organisation, 
is couched in the language of anarchism and the extreme left of the 
Socialist Revolutionary Party. There are no Social Democratic 
overtones in the references to "vampires of the old regime", or 
in t.he call for "death to the tyrant". The second message, from 
the Pavel and signed simply by " 00 .ships representatives", despite 
the threat that it contains, is in much more moderate language.
1. Shestoi s"ezd RSDRP(b): Stenograficheskyi otchet, M 1958, 
p 75; E. Yarchuk, Kronshtadt v russkoi rovolyutsyi, 
NY 1923, p 6; Petrash, op 0 cit., p 106; Mordvinov, 
op.cit 0 , p 333, fn.16.
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Indeed, it can be interpreted in two ways: in the same vein as 
the first message, or as an appeal to Nepenin to keep out of ' 
things until support for him and his officers could be organised
r
on the lower deck. This second message speaks of a comnittee 
being organised. Perhaps we can assume that it is this comnittee 
which issued the third, and pro-Nepenin message once the moderate
\/
movement being organised on the Pavel was underway.
Writing of the mutiny in the Petrograd garrison, 
V.B. Stankevich stressed the importance of the fatal "five minutes"
If what \jthe soldiersl had achieved was a 
great deed, and if the officers now recog­ 
nised this, why had they not led the soldiers 
into the street?...Now after victory was an 
established fact, they had joined the great 
deed. But how genuinely, and for how long?... 
Admittedly, all of the officers had joined the 
revolution by the next day...Admittedly, some 
of the officers had. run to join in five minutes 
after the soldiers went out. Nevertheless, 
here the soldiers had led the officers and not 
vice versa, and these five minutes constituted 
an uncrossable abyss... 1
In the Petrograd garrison there had been relatively little blood­ 
shed, but there had been those five minutes which undermined the 
authority of the officers. In Helsingfors (and Revel 1 ), despite 
the bloodshed, there had not been those five minutes. The 
officers had recognised the new government before the men, and 
even in the wildest moments of the bunt a significant sector of 
the lower deck were favourably impressed by this. Once the blood­ 
shed was over, the fever purged, this element of the lower deck,
1. V.B. Stankevich, Vospominaniya 1914-18gg, Berlin, 1970, 
p 72.
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now in the ascendant, accorded respect to their officers, symbol­ 
ised in the fact that when they returned to their ships, some 
crews asked forgiveness of their officers. 1 Officers were limed-
<
iately elected to the Soviet and its executive conrnittee con­ 
tained one of Nepenin's staff captains.
This moderate element in both Helsingfors and Revel' was to 
make the politics of these bases significantly different from the 
politics of Kronstadt, where the officers had not recognised the 
Provisional Government. Throughout 1917, the moderate and buntar' 
trends can be traced among the Helsingfors sailors. As late as 
July, for example, the moderate tendency was still able, briefly, 
to associate three battleships - the Respublika (formerly 
Imperator Pavel I), the Slava and the Petropavlosk - with a 
resolution supporting the Provisional Government and demanding that
those responsible for the July demonstrations be handed over to the
2authorities. Of course, the buntar' tendency was eventually to
•
predominate. It is perhaps worth noting that here too, the trad­ 
itions established in 1905 and reasserted so dramatically on 
3 March 1917, continued up to the October Revolution. Neither the 
"Kronstadt Republic" in May nor the Petrograd demonstrations in 
July were initiated by Bolsheviks, but rather by the left wing of 
the Socialist Revolutionaries and by the anarchists 0 The new
•
1. 'Tevral'skaya revolyutsiya", KA, 1927, no.3(22), p 56.
2. I.M. Ludri, "Sudovye komitety", in P.F. Kudelli and 
I.V. Egorov (eds. ), Oktyabr'skyi shkval: moryaki 
Baltiiskogo flota v 1917g, L 1927, p 80.
-226-
factor after February was that these rank and file SR actions, 
which dragged the local Bolsheviks along with them and were aimed 
against the national SR leadership that had betrayed the populist
i
tradition (hence the fury of the sailors against Victor Chernov 
in July), received national support from the Bolshevik Central 
Committee. Thus, to the rank and file Socialist Revolutionaries 
and anarchists in the Fleet, the Bolshevik national leadership 
became identified with the disruption of capitalism, the smashing 
of the central state and the establishment of the populist 
Republic of Coirmunes. Bolshevik strategy and populism coincided 
in the slogan "All power to the Soviets" in October; when the 
sailors'fought for it, they were fighting for the Republic of 
Coranunes and not for a centralised Bolshevik state. In this 
sense, we could perhaps say that the mutiny in Helsingfors was not 
so much the last bloody act of the February Revolution, but the 
first blow leading to October.
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THE FACTION FIGHT AND ITS RESOLUTION BY 
THE APRIL THESES
CHAPTER SIX
THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS
A LEFT FACTION: KRONSTADT
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THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION IN KRONSTADT
The course of the February Revolution in Kronstadt can be 
explained in terms of the SD-SR interchange of ideas and co-
<
operation that had been established by the Glavnyi Kbllektiv.
On one level, the Kronstadt uprising can be seen as a near 
perfect "classical" Social Democratic uprising: a mutiny in the 
armed forces, following and supporting a prior uprising by 
workers, thus protecting this latter from any counter-revolutionary 
attempt by the Tsarist Government, and this is how it is portrayed 
by all Soviet memoirists and historians. This version runs as 
follows':
On 23 February news reached Kronstadt that all was not 
quiet in Petrograd, and leaflets, presumably from Petrograd, 
appeared. This coincided with the exams in the various training 
establishments in Kronstadt. Sailors taking these were then due to 
be sent forward to the active Fleet, and it was thus with some 
relief that all work stopped on the arrival of the disturbing news 
from the capital. On 26 February, news reached Kronstadt that the 
disturbances had become a revolution in Petrograd. This caused 
much excitement and about half the sailors failed to turn up for 
afternoon duties. On 27 February, V.M. Zaitsev, the leader of the
1 V V Petrash, Morvaki baJtiiskogo flota v bor'be za pobedu oktvabrva, M-L 1966, pp 46ff; P.Z. Sivkoy, Kronshtadt L 1972 pi? 83ff; A,V 0 Bogdanov, Morvaki-baltntsy v l^-1-7^ M 1955, pp 18ff, etc. These accounts are apparently based on I N' Kolbin's memoirs: "Kronshtadt ob fevralya do Kbrnilovskikh dnei", KL, 1927, no.2(23), pp 134-38; and "Kronshtadt organizuetsya, gotovitsya K boyu", in p Nu Kudelli and I.V. Egorov (eds.), Oktyabr'skii shkval, 
L°1927, pp 26-27.
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Bolshevik Military Organisation, went to Petrograd to consult 
with members of the Vyborg District Committee of the Bolshevik 
Party. During that day tension in Kronstadt rose, as the sound
«
of cannon fire was heard from the direction of Oranienbaum. That 
evening the Bolshevik Military Organisation met and decided to 
begin agitation for an uprising the following day,
On 28 February news of the mutiny in the Petrograd 
Garrison reached Kronstadt. Under Bolshevik leadership, workers 
in the Naval Dockyard went on strike and demanded that Admiral 
R.N. Viren, the Military Governor of Kronstadt come and discuss 
their demands. He did go to the Dockyard, received their demands,
but declined to discuss them until the next day, at a meeting on
2Anchor Square. At sane time during the day, the Kronstadt
Bolsheviks received the Manifesto issued by the Russian Bureau of 
the Central Committee of their Party, calling for the formation 
of a Provisional Revolutionary Government. Another meeting of 
local leaders confirmed the plans for the uprising that night.
1. Kblbin, "Kronshtadt ot fevralya00 .", KL, 1927, no.2(23), 
p 134, idem. "Kronshtadt organizuetsya...", p 26; Sivkov,
op.cit., p 24 has Zaitsev go to Petrograd on 23 February. 
This seems too early for any decision to be made for an 
uprising, as this was not yet on the cards in Petrograd. 
On the other hand, if a revolution was already foreseen in 
Petrograd, why delay the supporting Kronstadt mutiny until 
28 February? I have decided that the visit took place on 
27 as all memoirists recall a meeting on 27<, Kblbin, 
loc^cit.: M. Yu "Fevral'-v Kronshtadte", LP, 12 March 1927 
(he also records 27 as the day news arrived of the course of 
events on the Vyborg Side)
2. Kblbin,loc.cit 0 ; Bogdanov, op.cit., pp 19-20;
M.A. Stolyarenko, Syny partii-baltiitsy, L 1969, p 168.
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It was to begin at seme time after 9 o'clock and the signal for 
a simultaneous mutiny all over Kronstadt was to be a burst of
machine gun fire from the barracks of the Kronstadt Fortress
« i 
Infantry Regiment.
All was to go very much as planned. Some semblance of 
order was maintained until the evening. Then some units refused 
to sing "God save the Tsar" at evening prayers, 2 which more or 
less coincided with the time the mutiny was due to begin. The 
signal was given, and armed troops all over the island poured out 
into the streets, with their regimental bands playing the Marseillaise. 
Wherever officers tried to organise resistance to the mutiny, they 
were killed. In addition, officers who had earned especial hatred 
because of exceptional cruelty were hunted down, culminating in
o
the killing of Admiral R.N. Viren on Anchor Souare.
1. Kolbin, "Kronshtadt ot fevralya 0 ..", KL, 1927, no,2(23), 
p 135, idem. "Kronshtadt organizuetsya.,„", p 27; 
R.N, Mordvinov (ed.), Baltiiskie moryaki v podgotovke i 
provedenie velikoi oktyabr'skoi sotsialisticheskoi 
revolyutsii, M-L 1957, p 20; N. Tochenyi, "Kronshtadttsy 
i vremennoe pravitel ! stvo , in S.F. Naida (ed.), Voennye 
moryaki v bor'be za pobedu oktyabr'skoi revolyutsii, 
M 1958, p 313, writes that the signal was to come from 
the training ship Okean, but he is alone in this.
2. This is written of as one incident, but attributed to
various people by different writers, so that I can only 
conclude that it occurred in more than one unit, or that 
the story was apocryphal: Kolbin, loc.cit.,, Vinogradov, 
Flot v revolyutsionnom dvizhenie, L 1925, p 59; 
Geroi oktyabrya vol.2, L 1967, pp 92, 287.
3. Kolbin, "Kronshtadt ot Fevralya,. 0 ", pp 135ff, _idem.;
"Kronshtadt organizuetsya. „.", pp 28ff. The death of Viren 
is described vividly, but quite differently by different 
authors, whose versions include his being shot in the back 
on the way to Anchor Square, his being shot in Anchor
(continued on next 
page)
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This account may be quite reasonable as far as it goes. 
However, a number of questions arise. Modern Soviet historians 
agree that the Kronstadt uprising began with the strike of workers 
at the Kronstadt Dockyard. But this in itself must cast doubt 
on its Bolshevik leadership. The first Kronstadt Conmittee of
the Bolshevik Party, formed on 4 March 1917, contained not a
o 
single worker. This is somewhat singular, as the Social
Democratic Party would strive above all to have workers on its 
conmittees. An absence of workers could mean either that "there 
were no workers of sufficient calibre to be members of the 
Bolshevik Conmittee, or that these workers were not Bolsheviks. 
F. Dingel'stedt, a Bolshevik agitator from the Vyborg District of 
Petrograd who was in Kronstadt in March 1917, opts for the first 
alternative, and refers to the "backwardness" of the Kronstadb 
working class at the time. Indeed, in his account, the February
Revolution in Kronstadt originated with the sailors and artillery-
3men and was only subsequently joined by the workers.
( contd 1 from overleaf - 3)
3. Square, his being stabbed to death in Anchor Square, his body 
being soaked in petrol and burned in Anchor Square. 
Kblbin, loCoCito: E. Yarchuk, Kronshtadt v russkoi 
revolyutsii, NY 1923, p 5; N 0 Tochenyi, op 0 cit 0> pp 316-17; 
Rjshekhov, "Noch 1 pod 1-e marta 1917g v Kronshtadte", KB, 
1920, no.l, p 34; D a Fedotov, "The Russian Navy and the
.Revolution", USNIP, 1922, no.48, p 908; A.P. Lukin, Flot,
"Paris, n.d., pp 188-89.
1. See above p 229.
2. See Tables, pp 353-55. .
3. F.N. Dingel'stedt, "Vesna proletarskoi revolyutsii", KL, 
1925, no.1(12), pp 196, 198-99.
-232-
This is odd, given the unanimity of other authors on the 
strike in the Dockyard and as the beginning of the uprising. In 
Bolshevik terms, can workers who begin a revolution be backward?
«
These same modern Soviet historians normally list a number of 
Bolsheviks who led the Kronstadt workers in the February 
Revolution. One name is common to all lists: M 0M. Martynov. 
One Soviet historian, P.Z. Sivkqv, tells us that Martynov was
already an active Social Democrat in 1910, when he organised a
o
factory group in Kronstadt. On the other hand, a modern bio­ 
grapher of Martynov writes that he joined the Bolshevik Party in
3 March 1917. This apparently conflicting evidence makes sense
only if we assume that in 1910, and until after the February 
Revolution, Martynov and his factory group were Menshevik, and 
thus "backward" in the eyes of the Vyborgtf Dingel'stedt, and un­ 
acceptable as members of the Kronstadt Bolshevik Committee in 
March 1917.
It is, of course, almost compulsory for Soviet authors to 
describe any "revolutionary" action as being "led by the Bolsheviks" 
and so it is for the Kronstadt uprising, even leaving aside the
1. Bogdanov, op 0 cit 0 , pp 19-20; Stolyarenko, op 0 cit., p 168; 
Sivkov, op.cit 0 , p 85; Petrash, op 0 cit., p 46.
2. Sivkov, op.cit., p 33.
V.
3. Geroi oktyabrya, vol.2, p 96.
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activities of the Dockyard workers. 1 No-one mentions the Socialist 
Revolutionaries, except A.V. Bogdanov, who claims that they 
attempted to "hold the masses back from the uprising"2 : an extra-
<
ordinary statement, given the accepted Soviet views of the past 
record of the SRs in the Fleet. Although we may probably dis­ 
regard this statement of Bogdanov's, there are other clues, even 
in Soviet writings, to the presence of SRs in the leadership of 
the February Revolution in Kronstadt.
Kblbin, the most corrmonly cited source for the authorised 
Bolshevik version, for example, writes at some length of a "comrade" 
with whom he worked in early February. This "comrade" went to 
Petrograd to fetch "leaflets and our Party literature". This in 
itself is odd. "Why are the leaflets, distinguished from our Party 
literature? Could it be because the "comrade" was acting very much 
in the traditions of 1915 and collecting material from more than 
one party? The "comrade" was arrested just before the February 
Revolution. Kbl/bin describes his arrest in some detail, as the 
"comrade" had the bunk next to his in barracks. Yet he at no 
stage tells us his full name. Why not? All Bolsheviks that he 
meets, however glancingly, are given full' names. It cannot be 
because he has forgotten it, as at one stage he refers to the
1. "Bogdanov, op 0 cit 0 , p 18; Stolyarenko, op,cit 0 , p 168; 
Sivkov, op 0 cit 0 , p 85; Petrash, opoCito, p 46; 
D 0 Kondakov, "V revolyutsionnom Kronshtadte" in S 3 F 0 Naida 
(edo), Voennye moryaki..., p 289 0
2. Bogdanov, loc.cit.
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"comrade" as 'Tedya",, 1 If we assume Fedya to be an SR, on the 
other hand, Kblbin f s reticence becomes quite comprehensible.
The authorised version refers to two meetings to prepare
4
the uprising: one on the evening of 27 February, which was 
followed by intensive Bolshevik agitation, and one on the 
evening of 28 February, which actually drew up the plans for the 
uprising. The terms in which memoirists refer to this second 
meeting are interesting,, Kblbin refers to it as a "group of 
activists", Tochenyi as a "Revolutionary Committee" and Pronin as 
"Soveshchanie partiinoi gruppy, rukovodyashchei vosstaniem", 
all of which are ambiguous as to whether the meeting was attended 
by one party, or more than one.
It may not be unreasonable to assume, then, that the first 
meeting was in fact a Bolshevik meeting (just as other parties 
may have been holding similar meetings on the same day), but the 
second meeting was of representatives of all parties involved in 
preparing the uprising. This view is consistent with the 
decision taken at the second meeting to begin the uprising with 
a burst of machine gun fire from the Fortress Infantry Regiment: 
a unit that no memoirist and no Soviet historian mentions as 
being pro-Bolshevik. An all-Bolshevik meeting would be unlikely 
to entrust something as important as the signal to begin the 
uprising to a non Bolshevik unit.
1. Kblbin, "Kronshtadt organizuetsya...", pp 23-24.
2. Kblbin, op.cit., p 27; Tochenyi, "Kronshtadty...", p 315; 
Mordvinov (ed.), op.cit., p 20.
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The violence of the mutiny in Kronstadt is more difficult 
to interpret. First of all, it is by no means clear quite how 
many officers were killed. Most memoirists stress the violence,
«
as did contemporary report. However, a week after the mutiny, 
Naval General Staff in Petrograd informed the Fleet Conmander' s staff 
in Helsingfors that casualties had been fewer than originally 
thoughto One memoirist, who was a naval cadet at the time,
records that they were unaware of the mutiny, and indeed slept
o
through the whole affair. Also, estimates of the numbers killed
vary between the modern Soviet figure of twenty-four and an 
anarchist claim to one hundred and eighty, with the most conmon
o
figure being thirty-nine.
The most corrmon explanation and justification, for the 
violence, whatever it was, is in terms of the special harshness of 
the pre-revolutionary regime in Kronstadt, and the hunting down 
of the most hated officers for vengeance. There is good reason to 
believe that officer-men relations were worse in Kronstadt than in 
the rest of the Imperial Navy. Apart from being a dumping-ground
1. Mordvinov, op.cit,, p 48„
•
2. Bakhmetev, "Oktyabr 1 v fevrale", KB, 1920, no.6, p 37.
3. Petrash, op 0 cit,, p 24; I 0 ". Flerovskii, "Kronshtadtskaya 
respublika", PR, 1926, no.11(58), p 38; Tochenyi, op.cit., 
p 318; Izvestiya gel'singforsskogo soveta, 9 April 1917; 
•Mordvinov, op0 cit 0 , p 21; Graf, The Russian Navy,... p 143; 
Lukashevich, "Materialy po istorii russkogo flota", MS, 
1920, nos.6/7, p 40; Yarchuk, op 0 cit., p 5.
4. Yarchuk, Ioc.,cit 0 ; Birzheviya vedomosti, no„ 16250, 26 May 
1917 (morning edition); Novaya zhizn', no 0 30, 24 May 1917.
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for all men considered undesirable for whatever reason, it was 
also short of officers, and especially short of officers of good 
calibre, most of whom were naturally to be found in the active 
Fleet,2
But even if vengeance played some part in the Kronstadt 
killings, it cannot explain everything,, Admiral A 0P 0 Kurosh, 
for example ; who was specially disliked for his role in the 
"pacification" of Sveaborg after 1906, 3 was not killed, although
he was arrested and humiliated,,
A 
On the other hand, unlike their colleagues in Helsingfors,
the Kronstadt officers did not support the Provisional Government. 
On 27 February, Colonel B0 A. Engel'gart, the Duma Deputy whom 
MoV. Rodzyanko had entrusted with winning the armed forces to the 
Duma cause, phoned Admiral A 0P 0 Kurosh, Commander of Kronstadt
Fortress. Engel'gart's attempts to sound Kurosh out, and to get
5 him to come to Petrograd for discussions, got nowhere. On 28
1. This is something that Admiral R 0 N0 Viren had found alarming 
in September 1916 0 Sivkov, op0 cito, pp 81-82 0
2. Graf, Na "Novike", Munich, 1922, pp 291-92; Admiral Kblchak 
hinted at the unsatisfactory officer-men relations in the 
Baltic Fleet at the time, although this is somewhat unsatis­ 
factory evidence, as he was attempting to show how good these 
were in the Fleet under his command (Browder and Kerensky, 
The Russian Provisional Government, vo! 0 2, p 871).
3 0 Graf, The Russian Navy, pp 143-44; "Dnevnik Rengartena", 
KA, 1929, no 0 l(32), p 122 0
4. See next chapter
5. Graf, The Russian Navy, p 137; Lukin, Flot, p 182.
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February, Admiral Viren summoned a meeting of the senior officers 
under his command, to see whether Kronstadt forces could be used 
to put down the revolution in Petrograd. He was dissuaded, not
\
because his officers were sympathetic to the Duma .(or if they 
were, no record of this survives), but because they, realistic­ 
ally, argued that there was no unit in Kronstadt that could be 
relied on to do the job.
During the course of the mutiny itself, some officers
2supported the mutineers. This, too, was different from
Helsingfors, where, except for Admiral A.S 0 .Maksimov who saw the 
bunt as a way of furthering his career, the officers could have
n° conmon ground with the mutineers. In Kronstadt, however, 
where a substantial section of the officer corps still remained 
loyal to the Tsar, or at least declined to switch their allegiance 
to the Duma, officers of liberal political sentiments could find 
conmon cause with the mutiny.
Unlike Helsingfors, where the violence is not explicable 
in terms of Social Democratic theory, in Kronstadt it is. The 
mutiny was in support of a larger proletarian and liberal up­ 
rising in the capital, and against an officer corps who were at 
least thinking in terms of using military force in support of the 
old regime. This is not to deny the presence of SR buntar 1
1. Kblbin, "Kronshtadt ot fevralya...", p 135; idem.
"Kronshtadt organizuetsya...", pp 26-27; Lukin, Flot 
pp 181-82.
2. Kblbin.loc.cit.
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elements in the uprising. On the contrary, they were most 
certainly present. However, here in Kronstadt, they found comnon 
cause with the Social Democratic and even liberal revolutionaries.
Here again, and in distinction to Helsingfors, the pre­ 
cedent established in 1915 in Kronstadt with the Glavnyi Kbllektiv 
reasserted itself: an SR-SD alliance with the SDs achieving some 
sort of ideological ascendancy.
THE PRECARIOUS ASCENDANCY OF THE MODERATE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS
The relationship between the parties during the mutiny is 
best seen in the body formed immediately it was over. This was 
not a soviet, but a seven-man body called the Conmittee of the 
Social Movement. It was elected, or more probably acclaimed, on 
Anchor Square on the morning of 1 March, and it is probably 
reasonable to assume that its composition was similar, and 
possibly the same as the "Group of Activists" or "Revolutionary 
Committee "that had met the day before to plan the uprising. Its
composition is interesting: it contained three Bolsheviks, three
2Socialist Revolutionaries, and one officer of unknown politics.
The very fact that it was not a Soviet would argue for 
strong Bolshevik influence inside the Committee. Its first 
measures were also very much in the Right Bolshevik - Right SR 
traditions. It took steps to restore public order, banning the
1. Poshelpv, op.cit., pp 33-34.
2. See p 351.,
-239-
sale of spirits, ordering shops to resume trading, ordering the 
arrest of certain officers but forbidding arrests without its 
authority, and establishing a guard rota.
That evening, in Petrograd, P0 N. Milyukov phoned a fellow 
Kadet Duma Deputy V 0 N. Pepelyaev and asked him to go to 
Kronstadt to find out what was going on. Accordingly, Pepelyaev 
left early next morning, taking another Deputy, Taskin, with him. 
On their arrival, they were questioned by an armed patrol, but 
when it was learned that they were Duma Deputies, they were 
invited to go everywhere, see what they could, and speak to whom 
they wishedo They addressed a number of meetings in various units 
and were everywhere well received. That evening, they returned to
Petrograd accompanied by two members of the Committee of the
2Social Movement.
The four of them went straight to the Tauride Palace for 
talks with the new Minister of War, A.I. Guchkov. The two members 
of the Cormiittee of the Social Movement asked Guchkov to appoint 
a new caimander of Kronstadt, now that Admiral R.N. Viren was 
dead. This request was confirmed by a telegram from the remainder
of the Corrmittee in Kronstadt,which also confirmed their recog-
3nit ion of the New Government. The delegates to Guchkov explained
1. Velikaya oktyabr'skaya sotsialisticheskaya revolyutsiya 
khronika sobytii, vol.1, M 1957, p 26.
2. A.K. Drezen (ed.), Burzhiiaziya i pomeshchiki v 1917 godu, 
M-L 1932, p 74.
3. In fact not yet formed.
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that a'new corrrnander would have more chance of being accepted in 
Kronstadt if he were clearly appointed by the Duma, that a 
military man would not be acceptable, and that a Duma Deputy 
would be the best choice. Guchkov asked Pepelyaev if he would 
do it, and after consulting with Milyukov, Pepelyaev agreed. 1 
Oi the next day, Pepelyaev was appointed "Commissar of the 
Provisional (Government and Conmander of Kronstadt Port", a nomin­ 
ation that left him free to negotiate the appointment of a 
military commander of the Garrison when he could.
The Cormittee of the Social Movement, however, was not the 
only body set up in Kronstadt after the mutiny. Army units, 
naval barracks and ships' companies all set about electing unit 
ccranittees, as well as a new officer corps. On 2 March, the 
Committee of the Social Movement tried to take this under its 
wing by calling an Assembly of Representatives of Units of the 
Garrison, to which each unit was to send one delegate. This met 
on 3 March, and a new body, called the Council of Ten, elected
from the Assembly and from the Committee, was created as an
o
Executive Committee to the Assembly.
Pepelyaev returned to Kronstadt on 3 March, accompanied, by 
a certain Vikker, representing the Executive Committee of the
1. Drezen (ed.)> op 0 cit 0 , p 75; A 0 Blinov, "Pervye revolyut- 
-sionnye organy vlasti v Kronshtadte v 1917 godu", in 
S.F. Naida (ed. ), Voennye moryaki v bor'be za pobedu 
okt yabr'skoi revolyut si i, M 1958, p 135.
2. Blinov, op.cit., pp 136-38.
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Petrograd Soviet. They went straight to the Comnittee of the 
Social Movement, where Pepelyaev asked for confidence in the 
Provisional Covernment which had been set up that day. He then 
took the chair at a meeting of the Council of Ten. It was here 
that he received his first setback, for Vikker, to Pepelyaev's 
horror, proposed that commanders in Kronstadt should all be 
elected and that "relations between commanders and the Commissar 
of the Provisional Government should be based on agreement".
This was, of , course, very much in the spirit of Order No.l 
of the Petrograd Soviet, if a little more extreme, and Vikker had 
presumably come to Kronstadt to prevent the Provisional Government 
from being able to use the Kronstadt Garrison to disperse the 
Petrograd Soviet. Not unnaturally, though, Pepelyaev objected to 
this formulation, as it meant that he could not act without the 
agreement of the Kronstadt elected commanders and that conversely 
they need only carry out those Government instructions that they 
happened to agree with. After some discussion, a compromise 
formula was found that the Kronstadt commanders would be guided
by the orders of the Commissar, and Pepelyaev had to be content
2with that.
In fact, the Committee of the Social Movement was quite 
unrepresentative of feeling in Kronstadt as a whole. One of the 
reasons for this was the strong Bolshevik representation on it.
1. Drezen (ed.), op.cit., p 75.
2. ibid.; Blinov, op.cito, p 138.
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This was most probably the result of the ideological ascendancy 
that the Bolsheviks had managed to establish in 1915 in the 
Glavnyi Kbllektiv and in the course of the February mutiny itself. 
Their capacity for organisation, for producing literature, and in 
the actual mechanics of the mutiny had given them an importance 
far greater than their numbers warranted. The overwhelming mass 
of the Kronstadt sailors were Socialist Revolutionary in sentiment 
(as was to be revealed when the Kronstadt Soviet was eventually 
elected and the Bolsheviks had only eleven delegates as opposed 
to one hundred and eight SRs, seventy-two Mensheviks and seventy- 
seven non-Party). Once the parties became legal, the Bolshevik 
capacity for illegal organisation was no longer an advantage 
(although it was to reassert itself before too long) compared to 
sheer weight of numbers. The cautious Social Democratic 
policies of recognition of the revolution as bourgeois, the 
ignoring of the Soviets, were not satisfactory to the mass Socialist 
Revolutionary following who thought in terms of the devolution of 
power into the Republic of Comnunes 0 A conflict of authority
began between the Committee of the Social Movement and the
2Assembly of Representatives of the Garrison.
1. Petrash, op 0 cit., p 73.
2. Drezen (ed.), op 0 cit., p 77 0 It is somewhat ironic that
modern Soviet historians treat the Comnittee of the Social 
'Movement as "in the hands of the SRs" (Blinov, op.cit., 
p 135) or that the "Mensheviks and SRs had a significant 
numerical preponderance" on it (Sivkov, oixcit.. p 88), 
It is not clear whether there were any Mensheviks on it 
at all. It was the SRs who objected to the Committee as 
"undemocratic" ( Delo naroda, no 0 2, 16 March 1917), as 
well they might given the Bolshevik presence out of all 
proportion to the size of the Party in Kronstadt.
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•Qn the other hand, the policies of the Cormrittee were not 
satisfactory to the largely Menshevik-Kronstadt working class 
(presumably their's were the 72 Menshevik Deputies subsequently 
elected to the Kronstadt Soviet), who also wanted a soviet of a 
different kind. In fact, the workers acted first, and on 2 March 
before Pepelyaev's appointment even, they began electing dele­ 
gates to a Workers' Soviet. This met for the first time on 
5 Marcho Despite modern Soviet claims to the contrary, there is 
no evidence of any Bolshevik influence at work here. No Soviet 
authority can document any Bolshevik office holder in this soviet,
whose first chairman, Serov, is of unknown Partiinost' (and there-
o
fore certainly not a Bolshevik). Its second chairman, elected
on 13 March, was A.N. Lamanov, a member of the "Non-Party Party",
o
which was the Kronstadt name for the Maximalist SRs. This is very 
much as one should expect, given that the Kronstadt Bolshevik 
leadership, as expressed in the Committee of the Social Movement, 
was at best indifferent to the Soviets.
The Workers' Soviet's first steps were to regulate con­ 
ditions of work: on its first day, it raised wages, made foremen 
elective and introduced the eight-hour working day. It also
1. Blinov, op.cit., pp 136-37.
2. ibid., p 137.
3. Sivkov, op 0 cit., p 93; the Kronstadt report to the Bolshevik 
Party's Sixth Congress in August 1917 contains no mention 
at all of the Kronstadt working class. 
Shestoi s"ezd RSDRP(B) 0 Protokoly, M 1958, pp 76-78.
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announced that it was "waiting for the formation of a Soviet of 
Military Deputies for comradely joint work". 1 Within a few days 
it declared itself responsible for all questions relating to 
working conditions in the city, and that its decrees were 
binding to all workers„
Pepelyaev and the Committee of the Social Movement 
evidently appreciated the threat to their authority that a 
Workers' and Soldiers' Soviet would represent„ Consequently, on 
6 March, they announced a project for a three-fold Soviet: a
Workers' Soviet, a Military Soviet and a "City Group", under a
2united Executive Conmittee.
The "City Group" was presumably to include the middle class, 
who were now excluded from the Workers' and Military Soviets, 
thereby ensuring that at least one third of the Executive Conmittee 
would support the Provisional Government's Conmissar. Elections 
to the City Group were called for 9 March. However, as these 
were by the indirect, complex system of curiae, used in the 
elections to the pre-r evolutionary Duma, the City Group could not
wield the authority of the two Soviets, and encountered much
3hostility from them.
Elections to the Military Soviet were held on 7 March and 
this met four days later. One Bolshevik memoirist describes it
_ ____________________*________________________________________________________________________________ __ __ _ _ —— _ - -- —— ,--- ._!. 1_ . ——
1. Sivkov, opoCito, p 93; Blinov, op a cit., p 137.
2. Drezen (ed.), op.cit., p 77.
3. ibid., p 79; Sivkov, op.cit,, p 96
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as being "in the hands of zealous defensists and covert Black-
1Rindreds",, In fact, its chairman was a young Socialist- 
Revolutionary officer, called Krasovskii, and its vice chairman 
was the non-party Lieutenant Glasko, both of whom had been 
members of the Committee of the Social Movement. Its secretary 
was an artilleryman called Zhivotovskii, who was a Menshevik. 2 
There were probably about eleven Bolsheviks in over two hundred 
delegates,,
However, and again as further evidence that the Bolsheviks 
had won respect, if not a large membership,on 8 March, two 
Bolsheviks, neither of whom were Soviet deputies, were appointed 
to important Soviet posts. The Bolshevik soldier A 0M 0 Lyubovich 
was made chairman of the Executive Conmittee of the Military 
Soviet, and the Bolshevik sailor I.D. Sladkov, just released from
1. F.Ne Dingel'stedt, "Vesna proletarskoi revolyutsii", 
KL, 1925, no 0 l(12), p 203 0
2. ibid., p 207; Mordvinov, op.cit., p 389; Drezen (ed a ), 
op.cit., p 297 has Krasovskii as a Menshevik and 
Zhivotovskii as an SR; Dingel'stedt, op 0 cit., p 207 has 
them both as Mensheviks 0
3. The memoirs of sailor A.G. Pronin (Mordvinov (ed.),
op 0 cit 0 , p 21) list eleven deputies who were elected to 
the "Revolutionary Committee of the Movement" B This is 
corrected by the editor (ibid., p 331) to "the soviet". 
Petrash considers this figure to be at least represent­ 
ative (op.cit., p 73). All the names listed by Pronin 
are from military units, further confirming Bolshevik 
lack of support among the Kronstadt workers. There 
were 280 delegates in the joint workers' and military soviet, 
(ibid., p 72). I have not been able to establish the 
size of the military soviet by itself. This is not 
important, as the Bolsheviks apparently had no delegates 
in the Workers' Soviet.
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prison where he was serving sentence for his part in the Glavyni 
Kbllektiv, was made chairman of the Comnittee to investigate the 
officers who had been arrested during the mutiny.
The Committee of the Social Movement and the Assembly of
o
Representatives of the Garrison were dissolved on 9 and 10 March.
On 10 March, the new Joint Soviet Executive Committee assumed its
functions. The new Joint Soviet Executive Committee met on
3
11 March„ This first meeting marked a definite swing away from
the Right Bolshevik - Right SR policies of the Committee of the 
Social Movement and towards Left Populism. It declared that 
Kronstadt was prepared to come to the aid of the Petrograd Soviet 
instantly, "on receiving information of any divergence between the
Provisional Government and the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers'
4 Deputies"o
1. Sivkov, op.cit., pp 94-95 o Lyubovich's case is not clear. 
Soviet sources always refer to him as a Bolshevik in this 
context o His biography in Geroi oktyabrya (vo! 0 2, pp 64- 
66) states that he joined the RSDLP in 1907 . However, the 
index to the minutes of the April Conference gives the 
date of his joining the Bolshevik Party as March 1917 
(Sed'maya (aprel'skaya) konferentsiya RSDRP (b), M 1958, 
p 387). Presumably he was a Menshevik from 1907 until 
March 1917. He may well, then, have been made chairman 
of the Soviet EC as a Menshevik, not a Bolshevik. This 
would explain why he was not made a member of the Kronstadt 
Committee until April, despite his prominence (Mordvinov, 
, p 391 ) 0 Be that as it may, Sladkov was a
Bolshevik, and was apparently co-opted, as his name does not 
.appear on Pronin's list (ibid., p 21 )„ It was quite common 
for Soviets to co-opt people who had not been elected. 
(J.L.Keep, The Russian Revolution, London, 1976, p 121)
2. Blinov, op.cit., p 139.
3. Drezen (ed.), op.cit., p 297.
4. Peitrash, op.cit., p 118.
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On 12 March, the Kronstadt Military Soviet refused to 
allow Kronstadt units to take the oath of allegiance to the new 
Governmento Its statement has an unmistakable Maximalist ring:
A free people does not need an oath. 
It is not the people who should swear 
allegiance to the Provisional Government, 
but the Provisional Government to the 
people„ 1
On the same day, Pepelyaev was asked to acknowledge in writing
the receipt of a letter informing him that henceforward the
oKronstadt Soviet was the "ruling body" in the town c
A mere twelve days after its election by acclaim for its 
leadership of the mutiny, the Committee of the Social Movement 
was disbanded and its policies reversed. Support for the 
Provisional Government and acceptance of its Commissar as 
chairman had been replaced by a complete rejection of the Govern­ 
ment and a recognition only of Soviet power. Moderate Bolshevik/ 
Right SR policies had been replaced by Maximalist Populism, and 
Bolshevik influence was at a very low ebb.
THE VYBORG INTERVENTION
The accepted Soviet version of the relations between the 
Petrograd and Kronstadt Bolsheviks runs like this: on 3 March, 
the Petersburg Committee decided to send some organisers to 
Kronstadto These arrived there the next day and established the
1. Kolbin, "Kronshtadt ot fevralya...", KL, 1927, no 0 2(23), 
p 139; Blinov, op.cit., p 143.
2. Petrash, op.cit., p 118; I.P. Flerovskii, "Kronshtadt- 
skaya respublika", PR, 1926, no.12(59), p 120.
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Kronstadt Conmittee, with one of the Petersburg Committee-men, 
Semen Roshal 1 , as its first chairman. This Corrmittee then 
carried out a Leninist policy, despite the opposition of the 
Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries. 1
A slight variant to this version has appeared in three 
recently published Soviet histories 0 2 Two of these note that the 
first group of organisers was sent to Kronstadt by the Vyborg 
District Corrmittee 0 However, this is passed over as a point of 
little significance, and the Vyborg District Bolsheviks are not 
credited with anv major role in creating the legal Kronstadt 
Organisation. Burdzhalov, who otherwise follows the traditional 
approach, also notes the presence of emissaries from the Vyborg 
District, but makes this a non-party affair, referring to it as
»
"help from the workers of Petrograd". Sivkov also dates the 
formation of the Kronstadt Conmittee differently, making it four 
days later, on 8 March. None of these changes, however, are 
seen as altering the basic story. It is a most polished account, 
and, at first sight, there seems no reason to doubt it. Neither, 
as the books are all solidly footnoted, does there seem reason 
to doubt the research that produced it. Yet it was this very 
perfection, the smoothness of the process described that led the
1. • Shlyapnikov, Semnadtsatyi god, vo! 0 l, p 145; I.I. Mints, 
Istoriya velikogo oktyabrya, vol e 2, M 1968, p 19; 
Mordvinov (ed.), op.cit 0 , p 334 etc.
2. Burdzhalov, Vtoraya russkaya revolyutsiya, vo! 0 2, p 116; 
S.S. Khesin, Oktyabr'skaya revolyutsiya i flot, pp 57-59, 
76; Sivkov, op,cit., pp 10OO3.
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present writer to look at it again.
Two main sources are used to back this version. The first 
is the report of V0 V. Shmidt to the Seventh Party Conference in 
April 1917. Shmidt states that "in the very first days of the 
revolution" the Petersburg Committee paid "especially great 
attention to Kronstadt". This is somewhat vague, but would 
certainly seem to be corroborative evidence. However, in the 
very next breath, Shmidt says "similar attention was paid to 
Helsingfors". Now this is simply not true, as we shall see in the 
next chapter. Here we may merely counterpose Shmidt's statement 
with that of a fellow member of the Petersburg Conmittee, 
V.N. Zalezhskii, who wrote that the Petersburg Conmittee did not
give the work in Finland any serious consideration during March
2and, even forgot about it. If we look more closely at the con­ 
text of Shmidt f s remarks, they seem far less convincing. He was 
giving the report on behalf of the Petersburg Committee, in reply 
to the attacks made on it for its Conciliationist policies during 
March. He was pleading a case: that the Conmittee did some good 
work in spite of its mistaken policies. As his comment on 
Helsingfors demonstrates, he was carried away by his own argument. 
His testimony, therefore, tells us nothing about Kronstadt unless 
supported by other evidence.
1. Sed'maya (aprel'skaya) vserossiiskaya konferentsiya 
RSPRP(b)", Protokoly, p 203.
2. V.N. Zalezhskii, Bor'ba za Baltiiskii flot, M-L 1925, 
p 11.
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The other, and major source is the collection of Minutes 
of the Petersburg Committee for 1917, edited by P0F 0 Kudelli. 1 
S.S. Khesin, for example, writes that the Petersburg Coimittee 
discussed Kronstadt on five occasions during March: on 3, 7, 
15, 18 and 20 March. In support of this he cites pages 26-28, 
43-47, 52-53, 57 and 58 of Kudelli's book. 2 This looks con­ 
vincing: five dates and five references. We are further re­ 
assured to find that Mordvinov also cites page 27 of Kiidelli's 
book to support his claim that the Petersburg Comnittee sent 
organisers to Kronstadt on 3 March. 3
From these two references, we should conclude that pages 
26-28 refer to the Petersburg Committee Session of 3 March. In 
fact, they refer to the session of 7 March, when Kronstadt was 
indeed discussed. The Minutes for 3 March appear on pages 9-10, 
which are not cited by any historian in connection with this 
affair: not surprisingly, as they contain no reference to 
Kronstadt. Oddly enough, the source for the story that the 
Petersburg Comnittee discussed Kronstadt on 3 March and decided 
to send organisers, comes much later in the book, on page 57. 
Here, it occurs not in the text, but in Kudelli's notes to the 
session of 18 March„ At this session, the Petersburg Coirmittee
1. P.F. Kudelli (ed.), Pervyi legal'nyi Peterburgskii 
komitet bol'shevikov v 1917 godu, L 1927
2. Khesin, Oktyabr'skaya revolyutsiya i flot, p 58;
idem. "Russkii flot i sverzhenie samoderzhaviya" in 
Sverzhenie samoderzhaviya 0 Sbornik statei, M 1970, p 192.
3. Mordvinov, op.cit B , p 333.
-251-
did decide to send organisers to Kronstadt. Kudelli notes that 
a similar decision had been made on 3 March. She vaguely gives 
her source as the writings of Zalezhskii, but gives no specific 
reference. Nor does she explain why neither discussion nor 
decision appear in the Minutes for 3 March. She does, however, 
list the organisers sent out on 3 March: Roshal', Qrlov,
Raskol'nikov and Zhemchuz-hin, All of these are contradicted else-
2 where. She contradicts herself about Raskol'nikov on another
page in her own book, where she notes that he was sent out on
Q8 March in response to a Petersburg Comnittee decision of 7 March. 
That this is also false need not detain us here. All that we need 
to note is that the evidence for the early intervention of the 
Petersburg Conmittee seems less conclusive than it did.
Our suspicions are raised further if we consider the history 
of the book itself. It was published in 1927, at the height of the 
struggle against the Left Opposition. At the time, Trotsky 
attacked it as having been edited to suit the Party line. He 
accused Kudelli of omitting one whole session, that of 1 November 
1917, because it contained material embarrassing to the Party 
majority in 1927. His article, complete with photographs of the 
galley proofs and containing the text of the missing minutes, is 
convincing.
1. See above p249 where Zalezhskii says the opposite.
2. Dingel' stedt, op.cit., pp 200, 202; Geroi oktyabrya, 
vol.1, p 149.
3. Kudelli (ed.), op.cit.. p 28.
4. L.D. Trotsky, "The Lost Document", passim.
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This does not mean that the book should be rejected com­ 
pletely. There is much valuable material in the text of the 
minutes, whatever has been cut out. It does mean, however, that 
the footnotes should be treated with caution, as they are 
directly subject to Party editorial policy.
One book we have cited does not use either source. This 
is Shlyapnikov's, which antedates Kudelli by some five years. 
It is probably much more honest than Kudelli's, but is subject 
to many of the same provisos. It was written at the time when 
Shlyapnikov was leader of the Workers' Opposition, just after the 
Tenth Party Congress. What is remarkable about the book, consid­ 
ering the fact that Shlyapnikov was one of the major participants 
in the faction fight in March 1917, is how uninformative it is. 
There are a few hints, a few complaints about particularly 
loathed opponents, but no systematic study. It is an altogether 
coy book by the leader of a faction written at the time when 
factions had just been banned.
A closer look at the evidence suggests quite a different 
story.
On 1 March, two sailors who had been imprisoned in 
Petrograd for their part on the Glavnyi Kollektiv, returned to 
Kronstadt. One, T.I. Ul'yantsev, was a Bolshevik; the other, 
S.G.Pelikhov, a Socialist Revolutionary, but they had worked 
together during the War and had been in prison together. Not 
liking what they saw in Kronstadt, they returned to Petrograd on
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2 March to look for help. 1
In Petrograd, they went first of all to the Executive Comnittee 
of the Petrograd Soviet, which suggests that their dissatisfaction 
had been about the lack of a soviet in Kronstadt. Ifowever, they got 
no satisfaction there (at least, they thought so, but Vikker's trip
oto Kronstadt on 3 March may have been provoked by their visit). 
They then went round to the offices of the Vyborg District Ccmrittee 
where they were warmly received. -That evening, they were taken to a 
meeting of the Vyborg District Soviet, where a delegation of some five
qor six people was chosen to go over to Kronstadt. The only available 
memoirs of this delegation are both written by Bolsheviks, who both 
speak of it as a Bolshevik Party delegation. This seems unlikely. 
Pelikhov, after all, one of the two sailors from Kronstadt was not a 
Bolshevik, but an SR, although shortly to join the Bolshevik Party. 
He would, surely, have been on the look-out for suitable SRs. Also, 
if it were a Party delegation, why the need to go to the Soviet? 
Could it not have been chosen at the offices of the Party Committee? 
Finally, both Dingel'stedt and Gordienko agree that there were five 
or six people in the delegation, but only name four, only three of 
whom are clearly Bolsheviks. Possibly then, this was a mixed 
Bolshevik-SR delegation, and this may be what Burdzhalov is hinting 
at when, unlike all other Soviet historians, he refers to it not as
1. I.M. Gordienko, "Pis'mo v redaktsiyu", KL, 1926, no.6(21), 
p 188.
2. See above p 240; Dingel'stedt, op 0 cit 0 , p 195.
3. Dingel'stedt, op.cit., p 195; Gordienko, "V Kronshtadte v 
1917 godu", KL, 1926, no.l(16), pp 44-46.
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a Bolshevik group but as "help from the workers of Petrograd" 0
On arrival in Kronstadt, on 3 March, the delegation was 
taken to one of the Naval Shore Establishments (Flotskii 
poluekipazh) where they were received somewhat coldly. One of 
the delegation interpreted this as resentment by the Kronstadt
sailors of the criticism of the way they were conducting their
o
affairs implied in the arrival of the delegation.
The Vyborgers began to explain their view of the revolution. 
Not surprisingly, in a place where there was a long tradition of 
Maximalist politics, they immediately found a response among 
members of the unit. Some, however, were alarmed and rushed off
to inform Pepelyaev (at three o'clock in the morning, as he
3recalled!)
The next day the Vyborgers spent some seven hours in dis­ 
cussion with Pepelyaev. Gordienko and Dingel'stedt had been quite 
happy to do this, but had some difficulty in persuading some of the 
anonymous members of their group who refused to go unless armed
with revolvers (a touch which would further tend to indicate a
4 Maximalist presence). As might have been expected, the
1. See above p 248.
2. Gordienko, "Pis'mo v redaktsiyu", KL, 1926, no.6(21), 
p 188.
3. Dingel'stedt, op.cit., p 197; Gordienko, "V Kronshtadte 
v 1917 godu", KL, 1926, no.1(16), p 47; Drezen (ed.), 
op.cit., pp 75-76o
4. Dingel'stedt, op.cit 0 , pp 197-98; Gordienko, op.cit., 
pp 5O-51; Drezen (ed.), op 0 cit., p 76.
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discussions were satisfactory to neither party. The Vyborg Group 
eventually left Pepelyaev, saying that they could spend their time 
more fruitfully elsewhere, and continued to agitate around 
Kronstadt. Pepelyaev sent a member of the Council of Ten over to 
the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, where he 
reported:
...that the situation \jLn KronstadQ was very 
serious, because of clashes between naval and 
land forceso The arrival of representatives 
of the Soviet of Deputies of the Vyborg Side, 
criticising the Provisional Government and 
the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies 
• had made matters much worse. It was decided 
to send over a number of Soviet members. 1
That same evening, 4 March, the Kronstadt Bolsheviks, with 
the help of the Bolsheviks in the Vyborg Delegation, elected a
new Conmittee. This was immediately recognised as legitimate by
2the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee. Without access to
archives, it is not possible to be certain about the composition 
of the Kronstadt Committees in these early days. Soviet sources 
are somewhat vague, making great use of that save-all term "and 
others" ("i drugie"). As far as one can make out, however, a pre­ 
liminary committee had been set up on 1 March. This had included, 
Sladkov, Pelikhov and Ul'yantsev, all members of the Glavnyi 
Kbllektiv, and Zinchenko, also recently released from prison. It
1. Minutes of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, 
in Shlyapnikov, Semnadtsatyi god, vol 0 2, p 297. The clashes 
had possibly been between the crowds demanding the Vyborgers 1 
blood and those who defended them 0 Dingel'stedt, op 0 cit., 
p 197; Gordienko, "V Kronshtadte v 1917 godu", KL, 1926, 
no.l, p 47.
2. Mordvinov (ed.), op.cit., p 334.
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was chaired by V.I 0 Zaitsev, of the Conmittee of the Social Move­ 
ment, and it might be reasonable to believe that "the other 
younger comrades" were the other two members of the Committee of 
the Social Movement, S.S. Gredyushko and F.V. Gromov. The 
Conmittee was not elected, but apparently nominated by Zaitsev. 
The lists of those appointed on 4 March are also incomplete, but
strikingly the most reliable of them, although it maintains
o
Gredyushko,omits the names of Zaitsev and Gromov.
A
The next two days were eventful ones for the Vyborg dele­ 
gation. Their views were warmly received in some places, but in
others met with such hostility that one of their number lost his
3wits. On 5 March, they attended a meeting of the Assembly of
Representatives of Units of the Garrison. Here, Dingel'stedt's 
speech insisting on the building of Soviets, and contrasting 
Rodzyanko's abortive order that the troops obey their officers 
with Order No.l of the Petrograd Soviet, mot with great favour, 
despite an initially cold reception. While they were in there, 
however, the Assembly had to put them into protective custody, to
1. Sivkov, op.cit., p 100.
2 e These names are on lists given by many Soviet historians, 
but these also list Roshal', who did not go to Kronstadt 
until 7 March 0 I have therefore discounted them for 
reasons that should become obvious 0 Mordvinov, Ioc.cit 0 , 
omits their names. By subtly phrasing he manages to 
convey the impression that Roshal' was there, but on 
closer examination it can be seen that he does not 
actually say so* I have consequently accepted his list.
3. Gordienko, "Pis'mo v redaktsiyu", KL, 1926, no„6(21), 
p 188.
-257-
save them from a hostile crowd outside. Crowds also gathered 
outside the Poluekipazh barracks demanding that the Vyborgers 
be handed over, apparently for a lynching.
That afternoon, Glaskov, the chairman of the Assembly, 
organised a mass meeting so that "misunderstandings" about the 
Vyborgers could be cleared up 0 With the Assembly behind them, 
the Vyborgers were overwhelmingly well received;
The crowd listened to us, recalled 
Dingel'stedt, with approval, showing dis­ 
approval only when Rodzyanko or Milyukov 
were mentioned, and interrupted us with 
shouts of agreement when we spoke of the 
need for active support for the Soviet, 
not merely expressions of faith in it. 2
By way of contrast, the two delegates sent over by the Petrograd 
Soviet, M.I. Broido and F. Yudin, both Mensheviks, addressed 
another meeting together with Commissar Pepelyaev. As Pepelyaev 
told the Duma Committee:
...with intelligence and great goodwill 
towards the Provisional Government, they 
explained the agreement which existed 
between the Duma Comnittee and the Soviet 
of Workers' and Soldiers'- Deputies. They 
appealed to their audience not to listen to 
provocatory rumours and appeals.
The meeting ended with the three of them symbolically embracing on 
the platform. "Suspicions towards the Provisional Government",
1. Gordienko, "V Kronshtadte v 1917 godu", KL, 1926, no.1(16), 
pp 53-54; Dingel'stedt, op.cit., pp 199-200; Drezen (ed u ), 
op.cit,, p 77.
2. Dingel'stedt, op.cit., p 199.
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Pepelyaev subsequently said rather sadly, were allayed, "but not
for long".
THE FACTIONS FIGHT TO CONTROL KRONSTADT
After their good reception at the meeting organised by the 
Assembly, the Vyborg Group felt that they had achieved what they 
wanted. Most of them returned to Petrograd that evening, leaving 
Pelikhov and Ul'yantsev in Kronstadt to maintain contact. 
Dingel'stedt left on the morning of the next day, 6 March, accom­ 
panied by Vladimir Zaitsev, one of the Bolshevik members of the
Committee of the Social Movement, who had just been appointed as
o
Kronstadt's representative to the Petrograd Soviet. On the
evening of the next day, 7 March, Zaitsev addressed the Petersburg
Ccrnrnittee, asking it to nominate one of its members to be an
3adviser (rukovoditel') to the Kronstadt Conmittee. This is the
first time that there is any mention of Kronstadt in the minutes 
of the Petersburg Conmittee.
A number of questions arise here. Zaitsev left Kronstadt 
on the morning of 6 March. The journey to Petrograd would have 
taken around two hours, so he .would have been in the capital by 
the early afternoon at the latest. Yet some thirty hours elapsed
1. Drezen (ed.), op.cit., p 77; Dingel'stedt, op.cit., p 200.
2. Dingel'stedt, loc.cit.
3. Kadelli (ed.), op.cit., p 71.
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before he turned up at the Petersburg Conmittee, although this 
latter was in session during the evening of the day on which he
^
arrivedc This delay might be explained if we assume that, 
despite some personal reservations, Zaitsev had accepted the 
policies of the Vyborg District as representative of thought in 
the capital„ On his arrival in Petrograd, he realised for the 
first time the extent of the divisions between the different 
groups there. It was in talking to him^that individual menbers 
of the Petersburg Comnittee realised also for the first time 
that Vyborg District Bolsheviks were organising support for their 
policies outside their own territorial limits. At the very least, 
the Petersburg Conmittee should insist that its views were heard 
in Kronstadt, and Zaitsev, who had personally lost influence 
there since the Vyborg intervention, was asked to make a formal 
request to the Petersburg Conmittee for help e Two members of the
Petersburg Commitee were ordered to go to Kronstadt so that "its
2opinions might be clearly expressed there". They were Semen
Roshal', who was to be the Kronstadt Comnittee's "leader" and
Kirill Orlov, who was to liaise between Kronstadt and the
3Petersburg Committee.
The two men were well chosen. Orlov knew Kronstadt well, 
and had just emerged from prison where he had been serving sentence
1. ibid., pp 2O-23.
2. ibid., p 26.
3. Sivkov, op.cit., pp 102-O3; Dingel'stedt, op.cit., p 200.
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for his liaison work with the Glavnyi Kbllektiv, Unlike his 
fellow prisoners Ul'yantsev and Pelikhov, however, his views did
•»
not incline towards Maximalist Populism. In fact, he was on the 
extreme right of the Petersburg Cormiittee, holding views very 
close to those of Kamenev. It was possibly for this reason that 
PelUkhov and Ul'yantsev had avoided him, their natural contact, 
when they came over to Petrograd on 2 March, Roshal 1 was quite 
different. He was just 21, Jewish and middle class, a student in 
neuro-physiology, not, at first sight, the ideal choice for organ­ 
ising sailors. However, in his three years in the Bolshevik 
Party, this ex-Menshevik had gained very varied experience of 
political work in the Putilov Works Social Insurance Board, where 
he had won the grudging respect of some worker Bolsheviks, and 
among the troops at the front and in Petrograd, for which he had
been imprisoned in Kresty from December 1915 until the February
2Revolutiono His political views were those of the majority of
3the Petersburg Committee.
The two men left for Kronstadt that night. On the next day, 
8 March, the Kronstadt Bolsheviks held their first general assembly,
1. A.F. Il'in-Zhenevskii, "Gel'singfors vesnoyu 1917 goda", 
KL, 1925, no.2(13), p 223.
, *
2. G.G. Roshal 1 , "Iz zhizni 'Doktora™, KL, 1923, no,5, 
pp 313-16; "Podpol'naya rabota v Petrograde v gody 
- imperialisticheskoi voiny (1914-1917gg) Rasskazy 
rabochikh", KL, 1922, nos.2/3, p 124; E.V. Gorbetskii, 
Kronshtadtskii tribun Roshal', L 1927, pp lOff.
3. S.GU Roshal', "Nashi tseli", Golos pravdy, no.10, 
26 March 1917.
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TMs was the first opportunity they had had, as a body, to dis­ 
cuss their attitude to the Provisional Government. We may assume 
that Qrlov and Roshal' expressed the views of the Petersburg 
Conmittee forcefully and convinced the Kronstadters that their 
acceptance of the Vyborg line had been somewhat hasty, for they 
re-elected the Corrmittee, with Roshal 1 and Qrlov as members. 
Vladimir Zaitsev, who had been dropped on 4 March, presumably for 
his moderate views, was brought back onto the Conmittee.
The Kronstadt Committee now contained spokesmen for the 
policies of both the Vyborg District Conmittee and of the Peters­ 
burg Comnittee. The formation of this compromise Committee had 
not been a smooth process, but had taken some eight days of 
chopping and changing to complete, a long period for the election 
of ten men. It is from 8 March that the Kronstadt delegate to 
the April Conference dated the formation of the Kronstadt
Conmittee, not 4 March, the date of its recognition by the Central
2Committee.
Meanwhile, Pepelyaev, already worried by the impact of 
Vyborg-type agitation, was further alarmed by the arrival of the 
two Bolshevik organisers on 7 March. Wrongly believing these to 
be reinforcements to the Vyborg delegation, he sent a panicky 
cable "to Petrograd asking for permission to use force against the 
poluekipazh, which the Vyborgers had used as their base, as it was
1. See Tables 2-4, in Appendix pp 353-55.
2. Sed'maya (aprel t sl<aya)vserossiiskaya konferentsiya 
RSPRP(b). Protokoly, p 125.
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"conpletely under the influence of anti-state revolutionaries". 1 
This was refused him despite his trip to Petrograd the next day
>
where he reported to the Provisional Government and to the 
Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, of
...the beating of officers, their arrest 
in large numbers, the complete absence of 
officers in positions of corrmand, ships' 
commanders elected from among the sailors 
themselves. The Fleet has ceased to exist 
as a fighting force. 2
Quite a different interpretation of the significance of the 
sending of Petersburg Commitee members to Kronstadt, was made on 
the Vyborg Side. On 10 March, Dingel'stedt returned to Kronstadt,
o
bringing with him Boris Zhemchuzhin. Zhemchuzhin was a member 
of the Petersburg Committee, but there is reason to believe that 
he was part of its radical minority. It has not been possible to 
establish exactly what his vievvs were in early March and he is 
described as being rather quiet at Party meet ings „ However, later 
in the month, he went to Helsingfors where he is reported to have
been thrown overboard the battleship Petropavlovsk for the radical
5 ness of his views. Also, the fact that Dingel'stedt brought him
to Kronstadt is in itself suggestive.
1. Drezen (ed.), op 0 cit., p 77; Mordvinov (ed), op.cit., p 48.
2. Khesin, Oktyabr * skaya revolyiitsiya i flot, p 70;
Mordvinov (ed.), loc.cit.; Drezen (ed 0 ), op.cito, pp 77-78.
*
3. Dingel'stedt, op.cit., p 202.
4. F.F. Raskol'nikov, Na boevykh postakh, M 1964, p 27.
5. Zalezhskii, Bor'ba za Baltiiskii flot, p 13.
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His arrival was timely. On 7 March, the Kronstadt 
Bolsheviks, presumably worried at the rapid loss of their Party's
•^
influence since 1 March, decided that they needed a printed news­ 
paper. Initially, they thought in terms of reprinting Pravda in 
Kronstadt, and adding an extra page for local news. 1 On the same
day, the Petersburg Ccranittee agreed to send them regular ship-
2ments of Pravda. Zhenchuzhin, an intellectual, would be of great
value in writing this extra page, and on 1O March, the day of his 
arrival, the Bolsheviks proposed to the Soviet that the printing
works of the local Naval gazette, Kronshtadtskii vestnik, be
3requisitioned for them.
Here,they ran into some trouble as, although the Soviet at 
first approved the plan, later on in the same day, perturbed at 
the thought of a one-party monopoly of the press, it decided to 
use the printing works for its own Izvestiya, in which all parties 
would get a hearing. One of the chief spokesmen for using the 
printing works for the Izvestiya was A.M. Lyubovich, at that time 
either still a Menshevik or newly recruited to the right wing of
the Kronstadt Bolshevik Party,, He was, in fact, to become the
4 first editor of the Izvestiya of the Kronstadt Soviet.
The prospect of a local edition of Pravda alarmed Pepelyaev
1. Blinov, op 0 cit 0 , p 140. .
2. Kudelli (ed.), op.cit., p 27.
3. Geroi oktyabrya, vol.1, p 419; Sivkov, op.cit., pp 108-O9.
4. Sivkov, loc.cit.
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even more than he was before. On 11 March he went to Petrograd, 
and again addressed the Executive Committee of the Petrograd 
Soviet. This latter decided to send its most powerful delegation 
yet: M.I. Skobelev, the Menshevik Deputy to the Fourth State
Duma, and his entourage of Right SR sailors and soldiers, whose
o
recent mission to Helsingfors had been so successful. On 12
March, the delegation was made yet stronger when the Bolshevik Duma 
Deputy, M.K. Muranov, probably the most influential Bolshevik
inside Russia at the time, returned to Petrograd from his Siberian
3 exile and agreed to accompany Skobelev to Kronstadto On 13 March
the delegation left for Kronstadt, where it stayed for three days.
The Skobelev-Muranov mission to Kronstadt was not a great 
success. They addressed meetings, stressing the need to strengthen 
relations between the Petrograd Soviet and the Provisional Govern­ 
ment. They read the Petrograd Soviet's Manifesto "To the Peoples 
of the Whole World". They were everywhere backed by Pepelyaev. 
In their report back to Petrograd they tried to smooth things over 
by explaining the political excitement in Kronstadt in terms of 
its being "badly informed" about relations between the Petrograd
1« Shlyapnikov, Semnadtsatyi god, vol.2, p 309.
2. See pp 273ff.
3. Dingel'stedt, op.cito, p 206; IPS, no 0 17, 17 March 
1917. Modern Soviet sources are remarkably reticent, about 
this delegation., Khesin, Oktyabr'skaya revolyutsiya i 
flot, p 49, for example, omits it from his long list of 
what he contemptuously calls "strolling players" 
(gastroli).
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Soviet and the Provisional Government. The "excesses" in
February were put down to the "bad organisation" of the revolution-
1 ary movement in Kronstadt.
On the other hand, the implications of Muranov's presence 
in the delegation, combined as it was.with Kamenev and Stalin's
re-emergence on Pravda, were not lost on the Party leaders in
o
Petrograd. The Central Committee acted first. On 10 March, as
we have seen, the Kronstadt Bolsheviks were speaking of issuing a 
local reprint of Pravda. On 14 March, the day after the Muranov-
Skobelev mission arrived in Kronstadt, the Central Ccranittee sent
3 P.I. Snirnov there. On 15 March, while the mission was still
there, the Kronstadt Bolsheviks bought out the first issue of 
their paper. It was not just a reprint of Pravda, but a completely 
new and separate paper Golos pravdy, written and published in 
Kronstadt, although it did contain some material from Pravda.
This decision cannot be seen as a normal part of events. 
The Party was short of money and of people with the literacy skills 
necessary to publish newspapers. Only ten days earlier, the
Petersburg Ccranittee had had to put up with having a represent-
4 ative on Pravda's editorial board rather than publish its own paper.
1. IPS, no 0 17, 17 March 1917.
2. Shlyapnikov, Semnadtsatyi god, vo! 0 2, pp 187-88.
3. I.N 0 Kblbin, "Kronshtadt ot fevralya...", KL, 1927, no.2 
(23), p 138.
4. "Protokoly i rezolyutsii Byuro TsK000 ", VIKPSS, 1962, no.3, 
p 136 0 The inclusion of the Petersburg Committee's name on 
Pravda's masthead upset some members of the Russian Bureau who 
were worried about being associated with "Liquidators". 
ibid., p 138.
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On the other hand, Muranov's presence on the right of the Party 
was making itself felt in all manner of ways. He did not spend 
the whole three days, 13-15-March, in Kronstadt, but travelled 
back and forth, attending Central Commi.ttee and Soviet meetings. 
On 14 March he had broken Party discipline in the Petrograd Soviet 
by welcoming the official resolution of the Executive Committee, 
despite a Central Committee decision to oppose it. Pravda of 
15 March contained Kamenev's article supporting the War. This 
must have been written at least by 14 March, and if its contents 
were then known to Shlyapnikov, could by itself have led him to 
act. In fact, Nb.l of Golos pravdy contained an article attacking 
the War. The Central Comnittee had temporarily allied with the 
Vyborg District Committee and with Kronstadt. Golos pravdy was 
aptly named. It was the voice that Pravda was in danger of losing.
The Muranov-Kamenev group's reaction was to send their own 
man, F.F. Raskol'nikov, to take over Golos pravdy. He arrived in 
Kronstadt on 17 March.
1. Raskol'nikov himself claims that he went at Molotov's
request in response to urgent pleas from Kronstadt itself 
(F.F. Raskol'nikov, Kronshtadt i Piter v 1917 godu, L 1925, 
p.20) 0 However, by his own account, he reported to 
Kamenev weekly (ibid., p 48). Also, on 3 April the 
Bolsheviks went to meet Lenin in Beloostrov in two groups, 
One led by Shlyapnikov, one led by Kamenev. Raskol'nikov 
was in Kamenev's group (idem. "Priezd tov.Lenina v Rossiyu" 
PR, 1923, no.l, p 220). He also praises Kamenev in this 
f same article (p 226). I have concluded from this that, 
* despite his subsequent record as a Party Left, Raskol'nikov 
was a rightist at this time. Also, he was secretary of 
Pravda in 1912 when it was at its most conciliatory.
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Qn the next day, the disputes inside the Bolshevik Party 
took a new turn, breaking into the non-party press„ The 
Izvestiya of the Petrograd Soviet was edited by a Right Bolshevik, 
V.D. Bonch-Bruevicho Encouraged perhaps by Muranov, who must have 
been outraged by the appearance of Golos pravdy while he was in 
Kronstadt, and especially by the fact that its first issue called 
for opposition to the War and to the new oath of allegiance, 
Bohch-Bruevich published an attack on Golos pravdy in the Izvestiya. 
It .was a report, supposedly from the Kronstadt Soviet, saying that 
it had found the publication of Golos pravdy to be harmful, that 
it received no support from either section of the armed forces in 
Kronstadt, and that it had requisitioned for Party ends the
editorial offices and print works intended for the Kronstadt
31 Soviet's own Izvestiya. It was a shrewd attack: given the
Bolshevik reputation for placing the Party before all else, the 
average reader of Izvestiya would be likely to believe it, and 
nothing would be more likely to drive a wedge between the Left 
Bolsheviks and their Maximalist allies than the belief that the 
former were diverting Soviet property to Party ends.
That evening, Kirill Or lav, also sympathetic to Kamenev, 
attacked from a different angle. He complained to the Petersburg 
Committee that an article of Dingel'stedt's published a week prev-
1. It called the new oath of • allegiance a-"criminal attack by 
the Provisional Government on the rights of the people, and 
on the freedom won by the revolution". Golos pravdy, no 0 l, 
15 March 1917-
2. IPS, no.18, 18 March 1917.
-268-
iously in Pravda had distorted the facts about the situation
there. Ol'rainskii who now had reasons of his own to dislike the
o
Kamenev-Muranov-Stalin group, for all his conciliationism,
summoned Dingel'stedt, accepted his assurances that he had written 
the truth, and told him to write a reply to the article in the 
Petrograd Izvestiya, Bonch-Bruevich published this in the next 
issue, but with it a further "statement from the Kronstadt Soviet", 
This one accused "Pravda representatives of holding up Soviet pro­ 
ceedings with demagogic speeches", and of "deceiving the editors
of Pravda itself with reports that distorted the facts". Ibis
3drew a further indignant letter from Dingel'stedt„
Four days later, on 27 March, Kronstadt Soviet deputy 
Kuranin reported on a strange incident that had occurred during a 
trip to Petrograd on Soviet business. He had called on General 
Potapov, only to discover there a rival delegation from Kronstadt' 
headed by Zhivotovskii, the former secretary to the Kronstadt 
Soviet. Zhivotovskii had denounced Kiiranin as an imposter, but 
fortunately Potapov cabled Kronstadt, and Kuranin f s bona fides 
was established. It transpired that the authors of the reports 
to the Petrograd Izvestiya and the leaders of the fictitious 
delegation were the same people: Zhivotovskii and Krasovskii,
1. Kudelli (ed.), op.cito, p 52 0
2. See p 187.
3. Dingel'stedt, op.cit., pp 206-07; IPS, no.20, 
21 March 1917„
4. IKS, no.9, 29 March 1917.
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who were disgruntled at having been so speedily removed from 
their Soviet offices„ The matter was now fairly easily and 
swiftly cleared up by a further letter from Dingel f stedt to the 
Petrograd Izvestiva, It is nonetheless indicative of the sharp­ 
ness of the divisions in the Party at the time that a Bolshevik 
editor should publish so fraudulent an attack on another section 
of his own Party, either without checking it first, or else 
knowing it to be false.
Meanwhile, as the factions battled for control over Golos 
pravdy, the procession of litterateurs from the Capital to 
Kronstadt continued. On 18 March, Qrlov had asked for help from
the Petersburg Committee. The Petersburg Commttee responded by
2sending two more men: Ivar Snilga and Viktor Deshevoi.
In one respect, the Party's rights won this battle. 
Although it did not adopt, quite, the policies advocated by the 
Pravda Group in Petrograd, Polos pravdy became much milder in its 
attitude towards the Provisional Government, and censored Lenin's
"Letters from Afar" in the same way as did Pravda, although
3Raskol'nikov had read the original of No.l in ful! 0
On the other hand, those Bolsheviks who were sent to 
Kronstadt were becoming infected with the Maximalist Populism that
1. IPS, no.30, 1 April 1917.
2. Kudelli (ed.), op.cit., p 57.
3. Raskol'nikov, Kronshtadt i Piter v 1917 godu, p 43;
Golos pravdy, no.11, 28 March 1917;" no.12, 29 March 1917.
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predominated there. It became clear to them fairly quickly that 
the Kronstadt Soviet had already assumed de facto power on the 
island, that this was immensely popular, and that no policy that 
omitted support for local Soviet power stood a chance of being 
accepted. Similarly the only acceptable policy on war was one 
that opposed it utterly.
On the latter issue the Kronstadt Bolsheviks had never 
wavered. Golos pravdy may have adopted a mild policy towards the 
Government, but it was firmly opposed to the War throughout this 
period. It is no accident that the first resolution that the
Kronstadt Bolsheviks were able to get passed by the Kronstadt
2Soviet was one against the War, This occurred on 14 March, at
the time of the Skobelev-Muranov mission.
On 23 March, demonstrations and meetings were held in
3Kronstadt to mark the burial of the "Victims of the Revolution".
Some fifty to sixty thousand people are reported to have turned 
out in Kronstadt, and this was followed by further demonstrations 
and meetings on 24, 25 and 26 March. Carried away by the atmos­ 
phere and by the other orators, and intoxicated by the response 
they got, even the more right-wing Bolsheviks like Roshal' and 
Raskol'nikov began adopting the Vyborg line. Likewise,
1. . Sed* maya (aprel'skaya) vserossii skaya konferent siya. 
RSDRP(b), Protokoly, p 135
2. Khesin, Oktyabr'skaya revolyutsiya i flot,p 75.
3. Not the Kronstadt officers, of course, but the people
killed in Petrograd by the half-hearted attempts to put 
down the Revolution.
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Golos pravdy denounced the war, associating Milyukov and Guchkov 
with the expansionist policy of the former Tsarist Government, 
and asserting the Petrograd Soviet's right to take power.
The excitement of those four days of meetings brought 
home to the Kronstadt Bolsheviks that only if they adopted the 
policies of the Vyborg District Committee could they hope to 
regain the influence they had lost since the disbanding of the 
Comnittee of the Social Movement. From this time on the Kronstadt 
Coninittee could be counted on as a firm ally of the Vyborg District 
Committee. Together, they were to take the campaign for their 
policies further: this tiine to Helsingfors 0
1. Dingel'stedt, opoCit., pp 208-O9; Golos pravdy, no 0 9, 
25 March 1917; ibid., no.11, 28 March 1917.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE SECOND STEP TOWARDS
A LEFT FACTION: HELSINGFORS
-273-
THE TEMPORARY SUBMERGENCE OF MAXIMALIST POPULISM
Admiral Nepenin was not the last victim of the mutiny. 
For some hours after his death, the Petropavlovsk continued to 
send signals to other ships, demanding the arrest or execution 
of certain officers, and could still inspire enough fear or 
allegiance to have those orders obeyed„ Also, apparently spontan­ 
eous killings of officers occurred over the next few days 8 
Ifowever, these were merely the sporadic twitchings of the tail-end 
of Maximalist predominance. Moderate policies were reasserting 
themselves, either because the sailors were revolted by the murders, 
especially the murder of officers who had welcomed the new Govern­ 
ment, or simply because the main body of them had never really 
been as extrene as the leaders of the mutiny, and now felt able to 
assert themselves.
Two hours after Nepenin's death, the Duma Mission, headed 
by the Kadet Deputy F.I. Rodichev, who had just been appointed 
Minister for Finland, and the Menshevik Deputy M.I. Skobelev, 
arrived in Helsingfors 0 The huge crowd which had been awaiting 
their arrival on Station Square since morning frequently interr­ 
upted their speeches with cheering, and then carried them shoulder-
o
high to their cars. They addressed the newly elected members to
1. "Dnevnik Rengartena", KA, 1929, no.l(32), pp 11O-13;
• Graf, Na "Novike", p 287; D.A., "Den' 4 marta na kreisere", 
VB, 1959, no.34, p 6.
2. IPS, no.9, 8 March 1917; Mordvinov (ed.), op 0 cit., pp 39-40.
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the local Soviet who had assembled on board the flag-ship 
Krechet, before going ashore to the Morskoe Sobranie for the 
Soviet's inaugural meeting. Accompanied by Admiral A.S. 
Maksimov, they visited all ships, urging the men to be recon­ 
ciled with their officers. Everywhere, they were overwhelmingly 
well met.
In the short ipun, the assassination of Admiral Nepenin 
was convenient for the Provisional Government, as it enabled it 
to side-step the problems raised by Maksimov's election by the 
sailors to be Commander of the Baltic Fleet. With Nepenin dead,
there was no obstacle to a Government Order appointing Maksimov
2as his successor. This was duly issued. In the short run, too,
this measure, which apparently confirmed the men's right to 
elect their conmanders, enhanced the authority of the Provisional 
Government, and of its representatives, Skobelev and Rodichev.
Maksimov himself, and the new Soviet, did what they could 
to re-establish discipline and moderation. The Soviet cancelled 
all shore leave, ordered that signals from individual ships be 
disregarded, that only orders issued by the Executive Committee 
of the Soviet should be obeyed, and that anyone disregarding 
these should be arrested. Maksimov, meanwhile, lifted the state 
of siege, banned the carrying of weapons in the streets, ordered
1. Mordvinov (ed 0 ), op.cit., pp 37, 39-40; "Dnevnik 
Rengartena", KA, 1929, no.1(32), pp 110-11.
2. Mordvinov (ed.), op.cit.., p 34.
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that the officers be released and normal duties resumed, and 
announced that a Committee of Enquiry would be established to 
investigate both the officers and the reasons for their arrest. 
A statement signed by the Soviet leaders, and by Rodichev and 
Skobelev, promised that a list of reforms would soon be pres­ 
ented to the Petrograd Soviet and that, in the meantime, all 
demands for reforms to the economy or to the conditions of 
service life should cease. The statement also announced that 
the only Naval authorities in Helsingfors were the Executive 
Committee of the Soviet, and the Fleet Commander. 1
At midnight on 4 March, all ships extinguished their red 
lights, and in the morning, battle ensigns were not raised. The 
Andrei Pervozvannyi alone refused to comply until its demands be 
met. HDwever, this threat and an attempt to revive the sentiments 
of the previous day's mutiny with a leaflet, supposedly issued by 
the Tsar and calling for an uprising to restore his throne, were 
dealt with without too much difficulty. As 5 March was a Sunday, 
religious services were held on board all ships as normal. Armed
patrols, commanded by officers, maintained order ashore over the
2next few days.
i; IGS, no.l, 9 March 1917; no.2, 11 March 1917; IPS, no.9, 
8 March 1917; Mordvinov (ed 0 ), op.cit 0 , pp 37, 41-42, 44.
2. Mordvinov (ed.), op,cit,, pp 40, 43; IPS, no 0 9, 8 March 
1917; Graf, op 0 cit., pp 278ff; "Dnevnik Rengartena", KA, 
1929, no. 1(32), pp 111-13. Is it too much to see the hands 
of the Maximalists behind this leaflet, with its echoes of 
the famous Populist appeal in 1877 to the peasants of 
Chininin Uezd, Kiev Guberniya, that the Tsar wanted them 
to seize the Gentry's lands? (Datfid Field, Hotels in the 
Name of the Tsar, Boston, 1976, pp 172-74)
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On. 5 March, the Executive Corrmittee of the Soviet was 
able to thank all units for restoring order. On 6 March, the 
Soviet plenary session declared that it was
...necessary to allow officers back to 
their units immediately, to reach agreement 
with them and to establish new relations with 
them based on mutual confidence and rights. 1
That same day, four officers, one of whom was Captain Rengarten, 
a former member of Admiral Nepenin's staff, were elected to the 
Executive Committee of the Soviet, and the regulations governing 
soviet elections were drawn up specifically to provide for officer 
representation. On 8 March, Rodichev reprimanded the Executive 
Conrnittee of the Soviet for its treatment of officers, and on 9 
March, the EC decided to ask Maksimov to propose that officers be 
returned their weapons. Three days later, the Comnission to 
investigate officers and their arrest began work. Initially, 
at least, the Executive Conmittee of the Soviet was chaired by an 
officer, mostly by Captain Rengarten, and from 23 March, the Soviet 
Plenary sessions were chaired by a Social Democratic officer, 
Sergei Garin. On one occasion, at least, it was chaired by a 
general.
The Soviet was also moderate in its statements of general 
policy. One of its first acts was to send a telegram to Rodzyanko
1. IGS, no.l, 9 March 1917.
2. IGS, no.l, 9 March 1917; no,2, 11 March 1917; no.3,
12 March 1917; no.4, 14 March 1917; no.6, 17 March 1917; 
no.10, 23 March 1917; "Dnevnik Rengartena", KA, 1929, 
no.1(32), p 114.
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and Price G.E. L'vov, expressing full support for the "new 
Popular Government". Four days later, Admiral Maksdmov and .the 
Soviet's chairman, N. Khil'yani, asked the-Soviet to 
support the Provisional Government and help win the War, senti­ 
ments that were greeted with great enthusiasm by the Soviet 
deputies. This was followed by a telegram addressed "to the 
workers of Petrograd", urging then to work harder to win the War, 
At the request of Maksimov, a Soviet delegation was sent to 
Kronstadt, to see how the war effort was proceeding there. Even 
the Andrei Pervozvannyi, the last ship to lower its battle ensign 
after the mutiny, issued an appeal of this nature.
The Helsingfors Soviet supported the Petrograd Soviet's 
statement "To the Peoples of the Whole World", the very statement 
that Muranov had read to a mass meeting in Kronstadt, and which 
coined the concept of "Revolutionary Defensism". After some hes­ 
itation, it authorised a collection of funds to build a new 
destroyer, to be called the Svoboda. Its Izvestiya warned against
"German provocation", taking up a common theme of speeches made
o
in the Soviet itself.
The moderation of the Helsingfors Soviet, its willingness 
to support both the Provisional Government and the War, was the
1. IGS, no.l, 9 March 1917; no.4, 14 March 1917; no.5,
16 March 1917; no.10, 23 March 1917; no,13, 28 March 1917,
r-
2. IGS, no 0 3, 12 March 1917; no 0 5, 16 March 1917; 
no.13, 28 March 1917; Volikaya oktyabr'skaya 
sotsialisticheskaya revolyutsiyac, Khronika sobytii, vol. 1, 
p 238.
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result of two things: revulsion at the violence of the mutiny, 
and uncertainty of the limits of Central Government and local 
soviet power. As long as the Helsingfors .Soviet and the Provis­ 
ional Government did not clash on questions of prerogative, the 
blood shed on 4 March seemed to have been a pointless act of 
butchery. As soon as the Helsingfors Soviet and the Provisional 
Government did begin to dispute each other's powers, then the 
slogans of the mutineers would begin to regain meaning and 
popularity. In addition, the more time elapsed since the mutiny, 
the easier it was to forget the horror of the killings.
The limits of Soviet and Central Government power had been 
obscured by the appointment of Maksimov as Commander of the Baltic 
Fleet in the afternoon of 4 March. This act had seemed politically 
opportune, but was in fact a mistake. Maksimov was not highly 
regarded either by his fellow officers or by his men, which was 
one reason why, although the senior of the two, he had been passed 
over in 1916 in favour of Nepenin. He would in any case have had 
to be replaced before Iong 0 In the shock that followed the assass­ 
ination of Nepenin, when the moderates in the Fleet were reassert­ 
ing themselves, and when Government reprisals for the mutiny 
seemed a possibility, it might have been possible to assert
1. A. Bubnov, V tsarskom stavke, NY, 1955, p 334; Graf, Na
"Novike", p 265; D 0 Fedotoff-White, Survival: through War 
and "Revolution in Russia, Philadelphia, 1939, p 102; 
S.N. Timirev, Vospominaniya morskogo ofitsera, NY, 1961, 
p 28; I.N. Kolbin, "Kronshtadt ot fevralya...", ML, 1926, 
no.5(20), pp 59-60.
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governmental prerogative and appoint an admiral of known compet­ 
ence. By appointing Maksimov, the Government appeared to be 
recognising the right of -the lower deck to elect its officers, 
up to and including the Conmander of the Fleet. This misunder­ 
standing was to cost the Provisional Government dear.
The ambiguities in the Helsingfors Soviet's allegiance to 
the Government were there from the beginning. All decisions of 
the Executive Committee of the Soviet had to be countersigned by 
the Fleet and Army Commanders before they could be transmitted to 
the men. On the other hand, whatever the views of the Government, 
the Soviet saw both the Fleet and the Army Conmanders as their own 
appointees, who could presumably be replaced if they gave trouble.
The issue did not arise in the first few days after the 
mutiny, as Maksimov's actions were very much in line with the 
Soviet's desires. On 5 March, he anticipated the Provisional 
Covernnsnt's decree by one day in introducing measures "democratis­ 
ing Fleet life". Ife abolished saluting off duty- He set up a 
Ccmnittee to work out new ways of organising life on board ship. 
His decisions were apparently ratified by the Central Government 
when it agreed that ships' committees should determine off-duty 
conditions on board ship. He also implicitly recognised the
Soviet's right to appoint officers, when he asked it not to appoint
2specialists in short supply away from their specialist jobs.
1. IGS, no.l, 9 March 1917.
2. IGS, no e l, 9 March 1917; no.5, 16 March 1917; no.15, 
3O~March 1917; Khesin, "Russkii flot i sverzhenie 
samoderzhavie", p 191.
-28O-
Indeed, the Helsingfors Soviet found itself assuming powers that 
went far beyond local administration, or lower deck welfare. 
It pronounced on policies x>f War, Peace and Government. It 
arrested some people, and set others free. It appointed, 
promoted and demoted officers and men, dealt with disputes 
between officers and men and between the officers themselves. 
It decided what was or was not politically acceptable behaviour 
by all ranks.
The first issue to bring out the different assumptions 
held by the Provisional Government and the Helsingfors Soviet 
about the limits of their power, was the swearing of the new 
Oath of Allegiance. The Helsingfors Soviet's refusal was differ­ 
ent in style from the Kronstadt Soviet's defiant message, but was 
in the long run just as absolute. The new Oath was seen as an 
infringement of the Soviet's prerogatives, and was held in abey­ 
ance while more information was sought from the Petrograd Soviet. 
The issue was raised a number of times over the month of March,
but remained unsolved, and the Oath as unsworn as it was in the
2more flamboyant Kronstadt.
i
The dispute was dangerous for the Provisional Government as 
it affected every sailor and soldier directly, and made him attempt
1. IGS, no.16, 31 March 1917; no 0 18, 6 April 1917; 
no.19, 7 April 1917; no,21, 9 April 1917.
2. IGS. no.6, 17 March 1917; no.11, 24 March 1917;
no.15, 30 March 1917. It was perhaps not entirely coin­ 
cidental that Captain Rengarten resigned as chairman of 
the Executive Committee on the day that the Soviet first 
discussed the Oath. IGS, no 0 8, 21 March 1917.
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to clarify his attitude towards Central Government,, This 
enabled the Maximalists, who had lost ground since the mutiny, 
to regain influence: the' issues on which they had led the 
mutiny were again becoming the subject of discussion.
V
On 21 March, the crew of the Imperator Pavel I, the ship 
which had started the bloodshed on 3 March, formally asked their 
Captain and the Helsingfors Soviet for permission to change the 
ship's name to Respublika. On that same day, the Sailors 1 Section 
of the Soviet demanded new elections, as neither the Soviet nor 
its Executive Committee enjoyed the full confidence of the lower 
deck. Two days later, the Soviet Plenary Session decided to 
organise new elections, on a more democratic basis.
At the same time, pressure was coming from the other 
direction. On 22 March, a group of officers decided to form a 
"Union of Republican Officers". Although its declared aim was to
demonstrate the officers' support for the Revolution, its
2immediate effect was to cause disquiet on the lower deck.
On 23 March the Soviet Plenary Session declared itself
...the sole and highest leadership of the 
political organisations of the Helsingfors 
District, and of Finland
and that
i
all ship-board, company, battalion, regi­ 
mental and other committees are its local 
organs. 3
1. IGS, no.13, 28 March 1917; no.14, 29 March 1917; no.15, 
30-March 1917. These took place only one month later.
2. IGS, no.16, 3O March 1917.
3. IGS, "no.14, 29 March 1917.
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The next day, the Soviet Executive Conmittee were told 
by their delegate to Petrograd that a campaign against the 
Petrograd Soviet was underway in the Capital. The EC inmediately
drafted a telegram, promising the Petrograd Soviet that "your
1enemies will only reach you over our dead bodies". As if in
answer to this, and seemingly announcing that the campaign had 
reached Helsingfors, the Union of Republican Officers, on 25 March, 
announced its conditional support for the Fetrograd Soviet and 
complete support for the Provisional Government and for the War. 
One day later, with a representative of the Petrograd Soviet in 
attendance, the Soviet expressed -its complete faith and support in 
the Petrograd Soviet. It revised its former unconditional support 
for the Provisional Government to conditional support insofar as
it carried out its obligations and acted in agreement with the
2Petrograd Soviet.
In fact, the formation of the Union of Republican Officers 
could not have come at a more inopportune time. Its resolutions, 
however well-intentioned, had the effect of hastening the 
Helsingfors Soviet's shift towards Maximalist policies, in that 
they seened to be aimed at undermining the Soviet's authority. 
Indeed, the very fact that the officers were issuing separate 
resolutions at all at the time that the Soviet was being forced 
by Central Government to define the limits of its prerogatives,
1. IGS, no.16, 31 March 1917.
2. IGS, no.16, 31 March 1917; no.21, 9 April 1917
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sharpened issues that were probably better left vague, and 
increased the suspicion that Government and Soviet, Officers and 
Men, were increasingly getting out of step 0 This impression was 
further strengthened, when it was discovered that officers on 
Admiral Maksimov's staff were circulating a political manifesto 
issued by Duma Deputy V.M. Purishkevich, notorious for his support 
for the Black-hundredso
The Helsingfors Soviet had not adopted a particularly 
radical position by the end of March. Nonetheless, the important 
thing to note is that the basis of the Moderate Ascendancy, the 
union of officers and men and of 'Provisional Government and Soviet 
was being .rapidly undermined. Its policies were in a state of 
flux, but moving towards Maximalism. Symbolic, perhaps, of the 
balance of forces in the Helsingfors Soviet at this time was the 
difference in character between the two delegates elected to 
represent it at the All Russian Conference of Soviets. One was 
Sergei Garin, a Bolshevik Conciliator, a spokesman of moderation 
and conditional support for the Provisional Government. The other 
was Pavel Shishko, future leader of the Left SR Party. The same 
session that mandated them to "inform the Petrograd Soviet that 
the Fleet is in full fighting order", also gave a delegate from
a Petrograd factory permission to take machine guns and revolvers
2to arm the workers' militia.
1. IGS, no.18, 6 April 1917.
2. IGS, no.14, 29 March 1917; no 0 16, 31 March 1917.
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THE ASCENDANCY OF THE RIGHT BOLSHEVIK CONCILIATORS
For two weeks after the mutiny, there was no formal 
RSDIP organisation in Helsingfors. There was a Finnish Social 
Democratic Party which had been legal even before the Revolution, 
thanks to Finland's semi-autonomous status, and which had held 
the majority of seats in the Finnish Sejm since 1916. The Party 
contained Social Democrats of various hues, and was officially at 
this stage reformist. However, it had close links with the 
Bolsheviks, whom it had helped with the illegal transport of 
materials in and out of Russia. After the February Revolution,
its Left Wing gained strength and the Finnish Social Democratic Party 
left the Second International in May 1917. Russian workers in 
Finland could and did belong to it. Russian servicemen did not.
It was the Petersburg Committee that first made contact with 
the Finnish Social Democratic Party. As a legal party with a 
majority in the Sejm, this latter's finances must have been in a 
much better state than those of the Bolshevik Party,, The Peters­ 
burg Committee was first to realise the possibilities in this and 
sent one of its members, a Finn, I.A. Rakh'ya, to Helsingfors on
/
3 March. Rakh'ya was successful, returning a week later with
1. M.Kh. Kiuru, Boevoi rezerv revolyutsionnogo Petrograda, 
p 16; Shlyapnikov, Semnadtsatyi god, vol.1, p 50; 
A.M. Kollontai,''Avtob'iograf icheskii ocherk'', PR, 1921, 
no.3, p 296; M.S 0 Sverchikov, Revolyutsiya i 
grazhdanskaya voina v Finlyandii, M 1923, pp 8-9.
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10,000 rubleso
Somehow or other, the Central Conmittee got to hear of 
this and took possession of the entire.sum. The next meeting of 
the Central Conmittee on 12 March was the one which discussed 
Muranov, Stalin and Kamenev's return from Siberia. It was also 
the scene of a wrangle over the differences between the Peters­ 
burg Committee and the Central Conmittee. For once the Peters­ 
burg Conmittee spokesman, unnamed, was being relatively polite 
about the Central Conmittee, and minimising the differences 
between them. The reason for this was the 1O,000 rubles, half of 
which the Petersburg Committee demanded, pointing out, with some 
justification that they had got hold of the money. The Central 
Corrmittee replied that:
The Bureau of the Central Conmittee is 
constantly in close touch with Finland, 
and consequently the claims of the Peters­ 
burg Conmittee are irrelevant 0 It was 
decided to give material aid to the Peters­ 
burg Conmittee and proposed that a current 
account for 1,000 rubles be opened, 
(passed unanimously)
2
and with that the Petersburg Conmittee had to be satisfied.
The Central Conmittee, however, was taking no chances. 
With the factional struggle in the Party reaching the point where
1. P.F. Kudelli (ed 0 ), Itervyi legal'nyi Pe-Ka 0 .„ , pp 9, 37. 
This source, in a footnote, gives the sum as 7,000 rubles. 
However, the Central Conmittee minutes of the Debate 
discussed below speak of 10,000 rubles.
2. Protokoly i rezolyutsii Byuro TsKu .. n , VIKPSS, 1962, no.3, 
pp 143-44.
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1 a split seemed possible, control over sums of money of the size
of the Finnish Social Democrats were handing out would be 
crucial. Rakh'ya had reported that the Finnish Party were going 
to organise a special collection in aid of the RSDIP. 2 It was 
important that it should go to the right"place. Accordingly, 
M.I. Ul'yanova, Lenin's sister and a member of the Central
o
Committee, was sent to Helsingfors, presumably to ensure that 
constant and close touch be maintained.
Ul'yanova's trip partially rebounded on the Central 
Comnittee. It was followed by a visitation to the Central 
Comnittee of the Bolshevik Party-of Finnish Social Democrats who, 
after lauding the work of the RSDLP, and regretting that Pravda 
was not able to devote more space to Finnish affairs, pointed out 
that 3,000 of the 10,000 rubles given to Rakh'ya had been 
destined for the Mensheviks! However, they did promise to carry
M
out the special collection to help the RSDLP. This time, the 
Russian Bureau simply took administrative measures to prevent the 
Petersburg Committee getting at the Finnish money. On 20 March, 
once the Finns had left, it ordered the Petersburg Committee to
/
1. Shylapnikov, op.cit.. vo!2, p 188.
2. Kudelli (ed.), op.cit., p 37.
3. V.V. Anikeev (ed.), Deyatel T nost TsK RSDRP(b) v 1917 godu. 
Khronika sobytii, M 1969, p 32.
4. "Protokoly i Rezolyutsii Byuro TsK", VIKPSS, 1962, no.3, 
p 155.
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confine its activities to Petrograd and its inmediate 
surroundings.
Rakh'ya had also brought back a request from the Finnish 
Social Democrats to send speakers and organisers to Finland to 
help organise the Russian workers there. 2 No more was heard of 
this after the Petersburg Comnittee decided to refer the matter 
to the Executive Corrmittee. In fact, the Petersburg Committee's 
attitude to Finland at the time is best sunmed up in the words 
of one of its members, V.N0 Zalezhskii:
...we somehow completely forgot about 
Helsingfors. I remember that at one 
Petersburg Comnittee meeting, comrade 
Okulov raised the question of the need 
to do work in Finland and asked it to 
send him there. The Petersburg Committee 
did not attach any particular significance 
to this. Somehow, in one way or another, 
it was agreed to send comrade Okulov. 
He left, I believe, for Vyborg, and the 
Petersburg Comnittee forgot about it. 3
One of the reasons for the forgetfulness of the Petersburg 
Corrmittee was that Social Democrats of whom they approved, were oper­ 
ating there, and apparently were coping very well. Again, accord­ 
ing to Zalezhskii, the good news of pro-Bolshevik feelings and 
revolutionary discipline that they were receiving from Helsingfors, 
contrasted strangely with the turmoil in Kronstadt.
1. I.I. Mints, Istoriya velikogo oktyabrya, vol.2, p 20 0
2. 'Kudelli.(edo), loc.cit.
3. V.N. Zalezhskii, Bor'ba za Baltiiskii flot, M-L 1925, p 11.
4. Zalezhskii, op.cit., p 12.
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With or without the help of^the Finnish aixTRussian 
Parties, a number of Helsingfors Social Democrats had attained 
prominent positions in the local Soviet. On 7 March, a Social 
Democratic worker, N0 Khil'yani, was elected chairman of the 
Soviet, and a Social Democratic sailor, N. Khovrin, was made 
chairman of the Committee to investigate officers and their 
arrest. On 12 March, another Social Democrat, S.A. Garin, was 
made editor of the Soviet Izvestiya. When Khil'yani resigned as 
Soviet chairman on 23 March, Garin was appointed to be his 
successor too.
In some ways, the set-up in Ifelsingfors in early March 1917 
was not unlike that in immediately post-revolutionary Kronstadt: 
a weak or non-existent Social Democratic organisation containing 
a few Social Democrats of talent or character who had managed to 
attain influential positions. Unlike the Kronstadt Bolsheviks, 
however, the Helsingfors Social Democrats were not exposed to the 
agitation of the Vyborg District Conmittee early in their legal 
existence, and so their development was, initially, a more 
leisurely affair,
1. IGS. no.3, 12 March 1917; no.15, 30 March 1917;
Dingel'stedt, TrVesna proletarskoi revolyutsii", KL, 
1925, no.1(12), p 211. A.F, Il f in-Zhenevskii, 
"Neskol'ko popravok", KL, 1925, no.1(12), p 215, 
"corrects" Dingel'stedt on Khil'yani's appointment, 
and this "correction" is accepted by some modern 
Soviet sources (e.g. Velikaya oktyabr'skaya sotsial- 
isticheskaya revolyutsiya Klironika sohytii, vol.1, 
p 119). However, IGS confirms Dingel'stexit's account, 
which is the one followed here.
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21 March, about 100 people attended a meeting "for
•
all citizens accepting even minimally the programme of the 
Social Democratic Party1 '.' The meeting elected a conmittee of 
thirteen Russian sailors, soldiers, workers and intellectuals, 
and the Helsingfors Section of the RSDLp'was formedo 1 The new 
conmittee was a "United" one, comprising both Bolsheviks and 
Mensheviks. Of its thirteen members, at least four 
(S.A. Garin, V. anirnov, A0 Sidorov, and P.E 0 Dybenko) were 
Bolsheviks, or Bolshevik sympathisers.
Even the Bolsheviks on the Conmittee were very much under 
the influence of their chairman, Sergei Garin. Garin, a tempor­ 
ary wartime naval officer, and a playwright in civilian life, 
had been a Bolshevik: since 1903. Not only did he write well, and 
was well known for his successful play "Sailors", but "he was,
perhaps, the only one of us who could speak well, with tears in
2his voice". Garin was politically on the right of the Party,
with views that coincided with those of the Stalin-Kamenev- 
Muranov Pravda Group. On the day that he became its editor, the 
Izvestiya of the Helsingfors Soviet carried an article by him, 
asking his "dear brother citizens" to believe him as "a Russian 
writer, who has suffered for these freedoms in prison and exile, 
and with blood and tears", and calling for a united front of all 
Russian citizens against their "two enemies: the Germans and the
1. IGS, no.10, 23 March 1917; Dingel'stedt, op.cit., p 212; 
for the composition of the Conmittee, see p 358.
2. N.A.^Khovrin, Baltiitsy idut na shturm, p 77.
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Old Regime'1 1
There were three members of the Helsingfors section of the 
RSDIP whose experience of' the February Revolution had been 
different frcm that of their comrades,, V.M. Marusev and 
A.N. Khovrin were shipmates from the battleship frnperator Pavel I. 
Both had been members of the Glavnyi Kbllektiv in 1915 and, 
although both had been acquitted at the trial in 1916, through 
lack of evidence, both had been sent to a penal battalion at the 
Front. On the way there, Khovrin had escaped and made his way 
back, first to Kronstadt, then to Petrograd 0 In February 1917
he was working in a factory on the Vyborg Side, and it was here
2that he participated in the February Revolution.
The third was P.E. Dybenko, a naval storekeeper on the 
troopship Schcha. A Bolshevik since 1912, Dybenko had just 
happened to be in Petrograd in February 1917, in the course of 
his naval duties, and participated in the February Revolution on
«3
the Vyborg Side. Thus, none of them had witnessed the bloodbath 
in Helsingfors, all of them had had contact with Kronstadt or the 
Vyborg Side, where two of them had participated in the February 
Revolution.
1. IGS, no.3, 12 March 1917.
2. Geroi oktyabrya. vol.2, pp 100-O2; A.L, Sidorov (ed.), 
Revolyutsionnoe dvizhenie.,., p 398; A.N. Khovrin, 
Ealtiitsy idut na shturm. pp 54ff.
3. P.E. Dybenko, Myat'ezhniki, M 1923, pp 19-22.
-291-
Although these three felt that their view of the 
Revolution was not the same as Garin's they found that "it was
difficult to deal with him", both because of his 
forcefulness and of their inexperience. Help was not forthcoming 
from outside Helsingfors, as Dybenko, bewildered by the diversity 
of the new democracy, recalls:
Newspapers would arrive from Petrograd. 
Each one told a different story, and in 
some way or other would attack the others. 
All this reading made the ordinary Party 
member so muddled that the poor fellow 
found it hard to sort things out. No 
Bolshevik papers arrived at all. 2
He does not add, as he might have done, that had Fravda arrived, 
it would only have muddled the poor fellow even more, especially 
after 12 March. Gar in, on the other hand, if he read Pravda, must 
have felt himself to be very much in the mainstream of Bolshevik 
policy.
The three discontents recruited a fourth, G.A. Svetlichnyi,
another shipmate of Marusev and Khovrin's, and between them they
3decided to contact the Central Committee for help. Nevertheless,
however strong his reservations, Dybenko still agreed to be a 
member of the Committee of the Helsingfors section of the RSDLP,
1. N.A. Khovrin, op c cit., pp 77-78 0
2. Dybenko, op 0 cit., p 31.
3» P.E. Dybenko, "Vospominaniya", in Or fevralya k oktyabryu, 
M 1957, p 153. Dybenko also states here that they issued 
leaflets on "Bolshevik" policy, published on a duplicator 
on board the Imperator Pavel I. This is not in his earlier 
memoirs, nor is it mentioned by anyone else.
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elected one week after the meetings when he, Khovrin, Marusev 
and Svetlichnyi had decided to seek help from the Central 
Conmittee.
On 21 March, the day that the Helsingfors Section of the RSDLP 
was formed, the Central Committee informed it of the impending 
Conference of Party Workers to be held to coincide with the Ail- 
Russian Conference of Soviets0 2 On 22 March, the Helsingfors 
Soviet elected Garin as one of their representatives to the All- 
Russian Conference of Soviets. On 23 March, he was made chairman 
of the Soviet. On 24 March, the Conmittee of the Helsingfors 
Section of the RSDLP passed the following resolution:
To support the Provisional Government, in 
so far as it fulfils its obligations as 
proclaimed to the whole nation, and as long 
as the Provisional Government is prepared 
to follow the path of the revolutionary 
conquests for the benefit of Free Russia. 
While so doing, we Social Democrats must use 
all means to eliminate among the people
1. Dybenko, "Vospominaniya", Ioc,cit 0
2. Anikeev (ed»), Deyatel 'nost' TsK0 .., p 43 0 There is some­ 
thing odd about this telegram from the Central Committee. 
Anikeev, op.cito, p 42 lists the organisations sent invit­ 
ations, but does not include Helsingfors. tfowever, he 
records (p 43) that on the same date a telegram was sent 
to Helsingfors, the text of which has not been found. The 
Helsingfors section of the RSDLP causes some embarrassment 
to Soviet historians because of its policies,, Some insist 
that it was not recognised by the Central Committee 
(Kiuru, opoCit., p 24; Khesin, Oktyabr'skaya revolyutsiya 
i flot, p 60). However, Garin attended and even spoke at 
the March Conference of Party Workers, so we must assume at 
least de facto recognition of the Helsingfors section. It 
is possible that the telegram sent on 21 March contained 
both recognition of the Helsingfors section, and an invit­ 
ation to send a representative to the Conference.
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those trivial demands which, prior to the 
convocation of the Constituent Assembly, 
might form a barrier between the people 
and the Provisional Government, 1
On 26 March, Garin left Helsingfors for Petrograd, where he 
was to attend both the Soviet and the Bolshevik Party Conferences. 2 
He was at the height of his influence: holding high office in the 
local Soviet, chairman of the local Social Democratic Organisation, 
which had just adopted his policy statement, and very much in the 
main stream of the Conciliationist thought which predominated at 
the March Conference. His hopes at this latter affair for a 
national reunion with the Mensheviks were shattered by Lenin's 
return from abroad and the presentation of the April Theses. When 
he returned to Helsingfors, it was to discover that his influence 
had been challenged there too by a diabolus ex machina.
THE KRONSTADT DELEGATION
t
Dingel'stedt records that on 24 March, the second day of 
mass meetings and demonstrations in Kronstadt, Pelikhov suggested 
that they should move on, as Kronstadt was now theirs. 
Pelikhov's character, Dingel'stedt writes, "was such that he 
could no longer bear to stay in Kronstadt, now that it had been
1. - IGS, no 0 13, 28 March 1917; no 0 14, 29 March 1917; 
no.15, 30 March 1917.
2. "The March 1917 Party Conference", in L 0 D. Trotsky,
The SLalin School of Falsification, NY 1937, pp 232, 246-47,
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reduced to order". He proposed that they should "go to Finland 
where he had heard that things were not going too well". 1
The next morning, Pelikhov and Dingel'stedt left for 
Petrograd, accompanied by E.F. Zinchenko and B.A. Zhemchuzhin. 
The group was well chosen: a successful agitator (Dingel'stedt), 
an experienced journalist (Zhemchuzhin), a sailor who had just 
left the SRs to become a Bolshevik (PeliMiov), and a soldier 
(Zinchenko). In fact, the group appears too well balanced and 
too well suited to its purpose, to introduce the Vyborg District/ 
Kronstadt Committee policies into Helsingfors, and to establish 
a newspaper propagating these policies, to merit the apparent 
casualness of its formation that Dingel'stedt would have us 
believe.
The group spent two days in Petrograd trying to get per­ 
mission from the Central Committee for its venture„ Here, too, 
Dingel'stedt's account is misleading, perhaps deliberately so,
in view of the political pressures on him at the time he was
o
writing his memoirs. He tells us that the group "had to comply
with certain formalities and obtain mandates from the Petersburg 
Committee. This was done with some difficulty, as the Petersburg 
Committee viewed us Kronstadt Bolsheviks with some disquiet,
1. Dingel'stedt, op.citr.,, p 21CX
2. * He was a leading Trotskyist who in 1936 was "to follow... 
[the round of camps and prisons, finally to disappear]... 
without giving in". Victor Serge, Memoirs of a 
Revolutionary, London 1963, p 208.
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because of our extremism". Indeed so, and by contrast, it 
viewed the Helsingfors Section with favour. However, the 
sentiments of the Petersburg Comnittee were neither here nor 
there, as five days previously the Central Comnittee had
removed Helsingfors (and possibly Kronstadt too) from its sphere
2of competence. One of its reasons for doing so may well have
been to prevent any kind of ideological link-up between the 
moderates on the Petersburg Comnittee and the Helsingfors 
Conciliators,,
Possibly Dingel'stedt included this reference to the 
Petersburg Committee merely to remind his readers in the 1920's 
what that body's policies had been before Lenin's return. In any 
case, his account does not go on to make any specific mention of 
any meeting with the Petersburg Comnittee. Instead, he describes
a meeting with "the most 'Maximalist' (note the word - D.L.) of
3the Petersburg Comnittee members"^ N.I. Podvoiskii, who was
also chairman of the Bolshevik Military Comnission, a body whose 
policies were also inclining towards Maximalism. Podvoiskii "did 
not entirely approve of our new enterprise, and in any case asked 
us to be cautious". Nonetheless, he did not prevent A.F. II'in- 
Zhenevskii, a young member of the Military Comnission, from
1. Dingel'stedt, op.cit;, p 211.
2. "See pp 286-87.
3. Dingel'stedt, loc.cit.
4. ibid.
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deserting his regiment to join the Kronstadt Party0 
Zhenevskii himself tells us that Podvoiskii was doubtful about 
the venture because he felt that the group was not experienced 
enough, and would have preferred a member of the Central 
Conmittee to go.
Kis objection was pertinent, for the Kronstadters were 
proposing to go to an area that already had a section of the 
RSDLP, without an official invitation from that section's 
Committee, in order to advocate policies to which that Conmittee 
would be opposed. However, for the Central Conmittee to be seen 
to be involved in such a venture would be dangerous at a time 
when it was facing strong opposition in Petrograd, even within 
its own ranks. Zhemchuzhin's reply to Podvoiskii, on the other 
hand, expresses well the impatience the Party's young Maximalists 
felt at what they saw as Shlyapnikov's dilly-dallying:
Well, we shall be one up on our Party 
generals, if we are able to found an 
organisation in Helsingfors and launch 
a newspaper. 2
The group, now including Zhenevskii, took the night train to 
Ifelsingfors on 26 March. If no one had actually stopped them 
from going, no one had officially backed them either, a fact that 
expressed itself somewhat forcibly by their having to pay their 
own fares.
1. A.F. Il'in-Zhenevskii, "Gel'singfors vesnoyu 1917 goda", 
KL, 1925, no.2(13), pp 209-10.
2. ibid.
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Despite the ostentatious lack of official backing from 
the Central Corrmittee, one can detect a series of attendant 
events that might have been coincidences, or might indicate 
covert support in high places. On 26 March, the Central 
Committee did pay the fare to Helsingfors "on Party business" 
to F.M. Etaitriev, sailor, from the battleship Imperator Pavel l} 
This, of course, was the ship that Marusev, Khovrin and 
Svetlichnyi served on, and Emitriev himself was to become a
prominent supporter of the Kronstadt delegation, and a member of
p
the (Bolshevik) Helsingfors Conmittee 0 Could his presence in
Petrograd at this time "on Party business" really have been a 
coincidence? Could he not have been the emissary sent by Marusev 
and co., to ask for help from the Central Conmittee?
Or again, the Kronstadt Group left Petrograd for 
Helsingfcrs at about the same time as Sergei Gar in, the influential 
Conciliator, who was so hard to deal with, was leaving Eelsingfors 
for Petrograd. The Kronstadt Group could thus be sure of some 
eight to ten days agitation before Garin returned from his 
conferences. If this was a coincidence, it was indeed a fortunate 
one. Finally on 27 March, their first day of activity in 
Helsingfors, the Kronstadters found their ideas receiving strong
support from Aleksandra Kollontai, whom Dingel'stedt describes
3 
casually as passing through on her way back to Russia.
1. Anikeev (ed.), Deyatel'nost TsK..., p 47,
2. Mordvinov (ed.), op 0 cit., p 385.
3. Dingel'stedt, op,cit.., p 213; IGS, no. 15, 30 March 1917.
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•
A number of points arise here. First, Kbllontai had returned 
to Russia a week earlier, on 19 March, when she delivered 
Lenin's first "Letter from Afar" to the Central Committee in 
Petrograd. Secondly, Ilelsingfors is not "on the way" back to 
Petrograd coming from abroad. One has to make a special trip, 
changing trains at Riihimaki. Thirdly, Kbllontai, at that time 
on the extreme left of the Party, although not on the Central 
Ccrrmittee herself, was closely connected with one of its members: 
Shlyapnikov. Her presence in Helsingfors on 27 March could have 
been a coincidence. She did, after all, have extensive Finnish 
connections. If it was a coincidence, once again, it was a 
fortunate one.
On their arrival in Helsingfors, in the morning of 27
March, the Kronstadt Group inmediately contacted Marusev, with
o
whom they drew up a plan of campaign. This in itself suggests
that there was more to the Group than meets the eye. It 
certainly belies Zhenevskii's statement that the Group had "no
contacts, no knowledge of Helsingfors, no money", except on the
3 last point. Pelikhov had had contacts on the Glavnyi Kbllektiv
in 1915, but these were all with its Kronstadt members, and there 
is no suggestion anywhere in the available evidence that he even
1. -Anikeev (ed 0 ), opoCit., pp 19-2O; Kbllontai, "Avtobiograf- 
icheskii ocherk", PR, 1921, no.3, p 295.
2. Dingel'stedt, op.cit., p 212k
3. Zhenevskii, op.cit., p 210.
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knew about Marusev. Ife was in prison with Ul'yantsev, who did 
have contacts with Helsingfors. But Ul'yantsev's special 
friends on the Glavnyi Kbllektiv were Varyukhin, Khrulev, Peshkov
n
and Brendin, not Marusev. As Ul'yantsev was now in Kronstadt, 
one should expect the Group to have gone to any one of his 
four friends before going to see the unknown Marusev. Unless, 
of course, there had been some contact in Petrograd between them 
and F.M. Ehiitriev, who was a shipmate of Marusev and whose fare, 
as we know, was paid by the Central Comnittee.
After their meeting with Marusev, the Group went round to 
the Soviet offices to introduce themselves to the members of the 
Presidium of its Executive Conmittee. Here, they aroused some 
suspicion. Only one member of the Group was able to produce any 
kind of credentials at all, and even those did not show him to
be "the representative of the Executive Conmittee of the Kronstadt
3 Soviet" that all five of them claimed to be! Undeterred by so
unpromising a start, the Kronstadt Group declared that they were
i
so shocked at the state of affairs in Helsingfors that they 
intended to act in quite a different way to the Executive Conmittee 
of the Helsingfors Soviet. Despite all this, the EC offered them 
premises so that they had somewhere to sleep and somewhere whence
1. Sidorov (ed 0 ), Revolyutsionnoe dvizhenie..., pp 319, 320, 
349, 355, 435-36.
»
2. "Delo o revolyutsionnor organizatsii sredi matrosov...", 
KB, 1920, no.7, pp 57-58.
3. IGS, no.19, 7 April 1917.
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to conduct their agitation. They were invited to attend the 
next full meeting of the Executive Conmittee to explain them­ 
selves.
Two days later, Dingel'stedt had to confess to a 
plenary meeting of the Executive Committee of the Soviet that 
they were not in fact delegated by the Kronstadt Soviet, but 
were in Helsingfors to found a Party newspaper. He must have 
been somewhat surprised at the response. The Kronstadt Group
were welcomed as "ideological workers" (ideinye rabotniki) and
o
invited to carry on with their work.
One of the striking features of the visit of the Kronstadt 
Group to Helsingfors is how generously they were received by the 
local Social Democrats, which is indicative of the state of inter- 
party relations at the time. They came to change the policies and 
methods of the local Soviet and of the local Social Democratic 
Organisation, and to publish a newspaper in the name of Social 
Democracy, advocating policies that the local Social Democrats 
would not support. Yet the Presidium of the Executive Committee 
of the Soviet, five of whose nine members were Social Democrats,
1. ibid.; Zhenevskii, op 0 cit., p 211 writes that they were 
initially well received, but that friendliness turned to 
hostility once their views were known, thereby making it 
appear that opposition to them was politically motivated. 
This is not borne out by the EC Minutes as published in 
IGS, loCoCit. Similarly, Dingel'stedt, op.cit.., p 213 
writes that they got their premises illegally the next 
day.
2. IGS, no.19, 7 April 1917.
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offered them premises from which to conduct their agitation. 
Khil'yani, who was temporarily in charge of the Helsingfors 
Social Democrats while Garin was away, and whose views were, if 
anything, further to the right than Garin's, invited them to 
speak at a public meeting, together with Kbllontai. On 29 March 
it was Brilliantov, another member of the Committee of the 
Ifelsingfors Section, who welcomed them as "ideological workers". 
Their generosity may have been helped or prompted by Kbllontai, 
with a valid mandate from the Central Committee, putting in a 
good word for the Kronstadters. Indeed, this may be what lay 
behind the coincidence of her visit. But generosity it was, for 
all that.
Needless to say, they received little thanks for this in 
the memoirs of the members of the Kronstadt Group. Writing in 
the less tolerant days of the 1920s, they were doubtless anxious 
to prove that they had won a great victory for Bolshevism in the 
face of determined Menshevik and SR hostility. If such hostility 
existed, it is not echoed in contemporary sources. Quite the 
contrary.
On 28 March, Marusev brought a group of dissident Social 
Democratic sailors round to the premises occupied by the Kronstadt 
Group. After some discussion, it was decided that those present 
should call themselves the Sveabprg Sailors' Collective of the
1. IGS, no.15, 30 March 1917; no.16, 31 March 1917; no.19, 
7 April 1917; Zhenevskii, op.cit., p 214; 
Dingel'stedt, op.cit., p 213.
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RSDLP, and that the new paper should be issued in their name. 
This would enable it to appear as the organ of a local Social 
Democratic Organisation without immediately confronting the 
existing Ifelsingfors Section.
1. It has proved difficult to date the formation of the 
Sveaborg Collective with any certainty. Zhenevskii, 
op.cit., p 212 gives 28 March, but then adds "the day 
after the meeting on the Imperator Pavell". However, 
the meeting on the Pavel took place on 28 or 29 March 
(see below). Zhenevskii's chronology is unreliable 
throughout. For example, he places the Kbllontai 
meeting on 29 March (ibid., p 214), whereas it is clearly 
documented in IGS, no.15, 30 March 1917, as having taken 
place on 27 March. Soviet sources give a variety of 
dates. Mordvinov (ed.), op.cit., in a note on p 363 gives 
27 March, but cites no source, as does Khesin, Oktyabr f - 
skaya revolyutsiya i flot, p 61. This seems early in the 
Kronstadters 1 visit. Kiuru, op 0 cit., p 26 gives 25 March 
but then lists Zhemchuzhin and co 8 , who were still in 
Petrograd at that time, as members. A table in Sed'maya 
(aprel*skaya) Konferentsiya RSDRP(b), Protokoly,' p 279, 
also gives 25 March. However, this table is not really a 
conference document, but was compiled in 1934, supposedly
from information in the speeches on pages 125-27, 
where no dates are given. Cfcie may suppose that some ttoviet 
historians are anxious to push the date of the formation of 
the Sveaborg Sailors' Collective forward, so that Dybenko 
rather than Dingel'stedt may take the credit for it. The 
reasons for this would be (i) that Dingel'stedt became a 
prominent Trotskyist who still has not been rehabilitated. 
His name, for example, does not appear once in Mordvinov 
(ed.), op.cit.: an editorial tour de force; (ii) to en­ 
hance the view that 'everywhere the masses were striving for 
a true Leninist position and were only held back by the 
Mensheviks and SRs. If we follow Zhenenskii, we can either 
accept his date, or his statement that it was the day after 
the meeting on the Pavel. This would mean 28, 29 or 30
.March. 30 March is too late, as the paper was issued then, 
in the name of the Collective. That leaves 28 or 29 March. 
It does not seem to matter which one picks, until further 
evidence comes to light. The only important factors are 
(i) it happened after the arrival of the Kronstadt Group, 
and (ii) it happened before the publication of Volna. For 
the membership of the Collective, see p 358..
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The name would also, with its echoes of the Glavnyi 
Kbllektiv show the non-Social Democrat sailors the tradition it 
intended to continue. The new Collective then offered the 
Kronstadt Group board and lodging on the Shcha, an offer that 
must have been welcome, given their impoverished state.
That afternoon the Collective held a meeting on board the 
Imperator Pavel I, Their speeches aroused much enthusiasm and 
the meeting decided to allocate 1,000 rubles from mess funds to 
launch the new paper.
All that was now needed was a press to print the new paper 
on. Here, it was the local Socialist Revolutionaries who came to
their help, offering the Sveaborg Collective the use of their
2
press. It is not clear whether this was a new agreanent reached,
possibly, through the good offices of Pelikhov, or indeed any of 
them as their ideas would have been welcome to at least the 
Maximalists among the local SRs, or whether they were merely
continuing an agreanent that had been operating before the arrival
3
of the KronstadterSo Dybenko claims the latter, stating that the
paper he had published earlier in the month had been printed on
1. Dingel'stedt, op 0 cito, p 213; Khovrin, "V 1917g vo flote", 
KL, 1926, no 0 5(20), p 6O; Zalezhskii, Bor'ba za 
Baltiiskii flot, p 24; IGS, no 0 22, 11 April 1917 gives 
/the date as 29 March, but this was probably the date the 
"Ship's Committee ratified the decision. Volna, no 0 l, 
30 March 1917 gives the date as 28 March.
2. Zhenevskii, op.cit., p 211; Dybenko, Myatezhniki, p 32.
3. loc.cit.
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the SR press. Shitov confirms this, 1 It is possible, and very 
much in the tradition of Left Bolshevik - Left SR co-operation 
that we know existed in^the Fleet. Khovrin, on the other hand, 
in the version of his memoirs published in the 1920s2 writes 
quite categorically:
Of course, without the help of the 
comrades...(from Kronstadt] we should 
not have been able even to consider a 
luxury like publishing our own Party 
paper. There was very little literary 
talent...•>
which seems plausible enough. Alsc, it is hard to rid oneself of 
the suspicion of arriere pensee in an event that no one seems to 
have noticed at the time cropping up at a politically opportune 
moment in memoirs written some twenty years later. Why do neither 
of them mention the name of this paper? In any case, the first 
issue of Volna was published by the Gorshkov Printing WDrks, the 
imprint that appears on Helsingfors SR papers,, It appeared on 
30 March, on the third day after the arrival of the Kronstadt 
Group in Helsingfors. Despite a certain aridity of subject
matter, due to the fact that it had mostly been written on the
3 train before their arrival, it was a remarkable performance„
1. M. Shitov, ''Bol'shevistskaya Volna''. in S 0 F. Naida (ed 0 ), 
Voennye moryaki v bor'be za pobedu oktyabrya, p 348.
2. Khovrin, "V 1917g vo flote", KL, 1926, no.5(20), p 61; 
idem.; Baltiitsy idut na shturm, M 1966, p 79 does not 
mention the affair, unless this is what, is intended with 
the words: "Volna...quickly became popular with its 
readers. But the SR paper Niva soon ceased publication. 
Incidentally, almost all of its print workers came over 
to work for Volna".
3. Zhenevskii, op.cit., p 213 is very critical of the first, 
issue.
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Zhenchuzhin inmediately sent a copy back to Petrograd, laughing 
at how "the eyes of our Petrograd generals will bulge when they 
see that we have produced a paper in three days, as we promised. 1
More help was on its way. Two members of the Finnish 
Social Democracy, one of whom, A. Sidorov, was also on the 
Ccmhittee of the Helsingfors Section of the RSDLP, came round to 
the premises of the Sveaborg Sailors' Collective holding a copy 
of Volna, no 0 l. They had read it, and liked it, and proposed 
that in future it be printed on the press of the Finnish Senate,
which was more modern than Gorshkov's and, anyway, controlled by
2 Social Democrats. A further advantage was that it would give
the Sveaborg Collective premises for editorial work. At present, 
the only place where Zhenevskii could get peace was in the 
lavatory of the premises given them by the Soviet, and this is
!„ ibid., p 214.
2. On this issue too, Zhenevskii's memoirs show the political 
pressures of the time he was writ ing. Dingel'stedt 
(op. cit o, p 213) writes that the Bolsheviks approached the 
Finnish Social Democratic Senator Tokoi, who immediately 
gave his permission„ Zhenevskii in his "corrections" to 
Dingel'stedt's article (idem 0 "Neskol'ko popravok", KL, 
1925, no 0 l(12), p 215) says that the use of the Finnish 
Senatorial Press was only obtained "with great difficulty" 
and that, in the interim, Volna had to be published at a 
third printers, the Rybakov Works 0 Presumably it was not 
politically wise to mention help to the Bolsheviks from 
the Finnish Senate after the Finnish Civil War, and 
Finland's independence from Soviet Russia. However, the 
evidence is on Volna itself. No e l was 'printed at 
Gorshkov's. No 0 2, which appeared the next day, at the 
Finnish Senatorial Press,, cf. also Zhenevskii, "Gel'sing- 
"Gel'singfors vesnoyu 1917 goda", KL, 1925, no u 2(13), p 215,
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where he had edited the first issue"1
Not all went smoothly, however. Although agitation went 
well on some ships, there was marked hostility on others. 
Sailors selling Volna were chased off some ships and even beaten
up. Zhemchuzhin was thrown overboard by an unsympathetic group
o 
of sailors on the Petropavlovsk, In some cases, too, collectives
formed on board ships in the first flush of enthusiasm after a 
fiery meeting, dwindled and dissolved after a short existence. 3 
The Moderate Ascendancy in Helsingfors might have been on the 
wane, but it was still strong and could call on considerable 
support. The Sveaborg Sailors 1 Collective had to take this 
into account in its agitation. Volna is notably milder in tone 
than Golos pravdy, despite the overlap in editorial staff. The 
first few issues (which alone concern us here) do not contain 
appeals for Soviet power, but calls for "a democratic republic", 
the confiscation of land, the eight-hour day".
1 0 Zhenevskii, "Gel'singfors vesnoyu 1917 goda", KL, 1925, 
nOo2(13), p 217 0
2. Zalezhskii, Bor'ba za Baltiiskii flot. DP 13. 28;
idem.,; "Gel'sinefors vesnoi i letom 1917 soda", PR, 1923, 
no.5(17), p 118; Zhenevskii, op 0 cit., p 224.
3. I base this on the statement by Dingel'stedt that
collectives were formed on the Gangut and the Andrei 
Peruozvannyi. He is not mistaken about the second ship, 
as he goes on to say that they had not expected any 
success there, as Captain Lodyzhevskii still had great 
influence over his men (Dingel'stedt, opoCit., p 214 )„ 
Lodyzhevskii was captain of the ship, and chairman of the 
ship's committee (Mordvinov (ed 0 ), op.cit 0 , p 390)„ 
The Andrei Pervozvannyi is not in the list of ships with 
Bolshevik organisations drawn up in April 1917 by the 
Helsingfors Cornnittee of the RSDLP(b) (ibid., pp 64-65).
4. Volna, no.3, 1 April 1917.
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They also had to take into account the dislike of the 
average rank and file Party member, and Party sympathiser for 
inner-Party or even inter-Party disputes. Volna, consequently, 
did not call for a split with the Mensheviks, .but for "all 
Social Democrats, who do not merely recognise the Party's 
programme on paper", to unite.
Even so, the activities of the Sveaborg Sailors' Collective 
had caused enough concern among the Helsingfors moderates for 
Petrograd to be alerted, and Kirill Qrlov was sent to Helsingfors 
to sort things out. He arrived there on 2 March to find himself 
confronted with a very delicate situation: two rival Social
Democratic CormrLttees, both enjoying Central Conmittee recog-
o
nit ion, were competing against each other for members.
He was limited in what he could do by the speed with 
which the Kronstadt Group had moved before his arrival. However,
1. ibid c , stress mine.
2. Zalezhskii, Bor'ba za Baltiiskii flot, p 24 is exaggerating 
when he writes of "two Bolshevik Centres", Only one was 
Bolshevik, the other was United Bolshevik-Menshevik 0 But 
it was not Menshevik, and neither was Gar in a Menshevik, 
as some modern Soviet historians would have us believe 
(Mordvinov (ed c ), op 0 cit 0> p 335; A 0 V 0 Bogdanov, 
Moryaki-baltiitsy v 1917g, M 1955, p 33; Petrash,
pp 58-59 ) 0 Central Conmittee recognition of the Helsingfors 
Section can be assumed from Garin's presence at the March 
Party Conference (see p293) 0 Central Committee recognition 
'of the Sveaborg Sailors' Collective can be assumed from the 
fact that they were asked to send a delegation to Toreo, 
on the Finno-Swedish border to meet Lenin (see p335). For 
the date of Orlov's arrival, cf 0 Sivkov, op.cit 0 , p 107; 
Zalezhskii, Ioc 0 cit 0 ; Zhenevskii, "Gel ' singi'ors vesnoyu 
1917 goda", KL, 1925, no .2(13), p 216, predictably has a 
different date: 31 March.
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be had one very strong card: his personal popularity in the 
Fleet as a former Potemkin mutineer and as liaison man for the 
Glavnyi Kbllektiv. He used this to good advantage, touring the 
ships. On board the Andrei Pervozvannyi. whose crew not long 
before had thrown Zhemchuzhin into the sea, he was carried on 
the men's shoulders round the deck. He was thus able to force 
a compromise on the Sveaborg Sailors 1 Comnittee. He and 
Zhenevskii met Garin and Trofimov on the day of Garin's return 
from Petrograd. On 6 April, a meeting of all Helsingfors Social 
Democrats was held, both former organisations were dissolved and 
a new conmittee elected. Although the Presidium of the new 
Committee was mostly made up of members o± the Sveaborg Sailors' 
Collective, it did contain one member of the former Helsingfors 
Section. That this was not just a token representation is indic­ 
ated by the fact that the meeting then passed a resolution of
conditional support for the Provisional Government. Qrlov had
2 done much to rally the Party Right.
This balance was not to be maintained for long. On 4 April, 
Lenin presented his April Theses in Petrograd. The Helsingfors 
Comnittee elected three delegates to the April Conference:
1. Zalezhskii, Bor'ba za Ealtiiskii flot, p 24.
2. Volna. no.8, 8 April 1917; Zhenevskii, op.cit., pp 220-24; 
Zalezhskii, op.cit,, p 24; both these latter sources try 
to make out that the Helsingfors section was routed. The 
resolution on the Provisional Government shows otherwise. 
For composition of presidium, see p359. Unfortunately, 
it has not proved possible to establish the membership of 
the Conmittee itself.
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N.K. Antipov and N0 A. Khovrin, representing those who welcomed 
the April Theses,and Kirill Qrlov, representing those who 
opposed them. By then, however, Qrlov and those he represented
were becoming seriously out of step with the Party leadership.
o
Shortly after the April Conference, he was recalled to Petrograd.
1. . Zhenevskii, op.cit., p 223; Khovrin, "V 1917g vo flote", 
KL, 1926, no 0 5(20), p 62.
2. Khovrin, loc.cit.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
THE RETURN OF LENIN:
THE TRIUMPH OF THE LEFT
Lenin, chto tarn ni boltai? 
Soglasna s nim lish' Kollontai.
(rhyme circulating in the 
Bolshevik Party, April 1917)
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LENIN CHANGES HIS MIND
In the Simmer of 1916, the main emphasis of the dispute 
between Lenin and Eukharin shifted from the issue of the Self- 
Determination of Nations, to that of the socialist attitude to 
the State. In August 1916, Lenin found Bukharin's article 
"Towards a Theory of the Imperialist State" to be incomplete, 
unthought out, good for nothing. His reply, for internal 
Party circulation only, traced the roots of Bukharin's "errors" 
back to the Theses he had presented to the Berne Conference of 
Bolsheviks in the Spring of 1915, when he had argued that, in
the epoch of imperialism, democratic demands were inappropriate
2and the working class must concentrate on purely socialist ones.
In Lenin's eyes, Bukharin's error stemmed from his 
inability to understand the part played by the struggle for 
partial reforms and for democracy in the struggle against 
Imperialismo This same error lay behind the inappropriate demand 
for the immediate expropriation of the banks put forward by 
Pannekoekand the Dutch Left, and the refusal of Radek and the
/
Rozlamowcy to admit any validity in the claims of small nations 
to national independence. All three, Bukharin, the Dutch and the 
Poles advanced extreme demands because they believed that the
1. PSS, vol.49, p 287 o
2. PSS, vol.30, p 59; cf. above pp 55ff; for the distinction 
between democratic and socialist demands cf. pp 143ff; 
Bukharin's theses are in D, Baevskii, "Bor'ba Leninu 
protiv bukharinykh 'shatanii mysli'", PR, 1930, hod, 
p 44; and Gankin and Fisher (eds u ), op»cit., pp 187-89*
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advent of Imperialism had made partial, or democratic demands 
obsolete. Their rigidity in this laid them open to attack.by 
Kautsky and, with them, the validity of the entire stand of the 
Zimnerwald Left. But Kautsky, after all, was. the real enemy, 
not Rikharin, Pannekoek, or Radek. Thus, in order to defend 
his stand against the War and against the Second International, 
Lenin had to bring about the extirpation of this error from 
within. On the other hand, Lenin wished to keep the matter 
within the Zimmerwald Left as low-key as possible, in case hurt, 
pride and personal injury should split the alliance even if 
theoretical purity were attained. This is why he had refused to 
publish Bukharin's article in August 1916, even though he had 
cormissioned it, and why his reply to it had itself not been 
published. This is why he was so furious when Bukharin ignored 
his advice to "let his ideas mature" and went ahead and published 
the article in three different journals.
Lenin then felt obliged to give Bukharin an immediate 
public answer, which was published in Sbornik Sotsial-demokrata 
in December 1916. Here, Lenin takes up Bukharin's statement that
it is absolutely wrong to seek the difference 
between socialists and anarchists in the fact 
that the former are in favour of the State 
while the latter are against it.
No, Lenin, replies,
1. PSS, vol.30, pp 45ff, 60; vol.33, p 173.
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Socialists are in favour of using the 
present state and its institutions in 
the struggle for the emancipation of the 
working class, maintaining also that the 
state should be used for a specific form 
of transition from capitalism to 
socialism. This transitional form is the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, which is 
also a stated
The anarchists want to "abolish" the state, 
to "blow it up" (sprengen) as ^Bukharin] 
expresses it in one place, erroneously 
ascribing this view to the socialists. 1
Ife makes a similar point in a letter to Inessa Armand, 
written at about the same time:
It is inaccurate to write, as you do, that 
the "Economists" "renounced" the political 
struggle. They defined it wrongly. The 
"Imperialist Economists" do the same.
You write, "Would even the complete rejection 
of democratic demands mean the rejection of 
the political struggle? Is the direct 
struggle for the conquest of power not a 
political struggle?"
The whole point is that this is just the sort 
of thing that you get from Bukharin (and 
partly from Radek as well), and it is wrong. 
"The direct struggle for the conquest of 
power "while completely rejecting democratic 
demands" is something unclear, unthought out 
and confused. This is precisely what Bukharin 
is confused about...
-..One should know how to combine the struggle 
for democracy and the struggle for the 
socialist revolution, subordinating the first 
to the second. In this lies the whole 
difficulty; in this is the whole essence.
1. PSS, vol.30, pp 227-28,
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The Tolstoyans and anarchists throw out 
the firsto Bukharin and Radek are con­ 
fused, not knowing how to combine the 
first with the second. 1
Rikharin, Radek and Pannekoek's view tended to lump Lenin 
and Kautsky's attitude towards the State together. In his reply 
Lenin was trying to establish that there was a difference between 
the "opportunist, reformist, bourgeois attitude to the State" 
adopted by Kautsky, and the "revolutionary Social-Democratic 
attitude towards the State and towards utilising it against the
bourgeoisie"o Conscious of having done so inadequately, he hoped
2"to return to this very important subject in a separate article".
In January 1917, with Bokharin in America and Shlyapnikov 
in Russia, completely cut off from the Party in Russia and more
isolated in the emigration than he had ever been before, Lenin
3 began reading for this article.
In the course of this reading, Lenin was to change his 
ideas quite markedly., The precise nature of this change has given
rise to considerable controversy. Some authors find his views
4 afterwards "different - indeed opposite" to his previous position,
1. PSS, vol.49, pp 346-47.
2. PSS, vol.30, p 228.
3. N.K0 Krupskaya, "Iz emigratsii v Piter", JJi F. Flatten 
'(edo), Lenin iz cmigratsii v Rossiyu M 1925, p 111; 
Lenin wrote 56 letters between 1 January and 15 March 
1917 (the date he learnt of the February Revolution), 
26 of these were to Inessa Armand, PSS, vol.49, pp 351-99, 
478-79
4. R. Conquest, Lenin, London, 1974, p 83,
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"a repudiation, not only of the previous Bolshevik position 
but, it appeared, of Marxism itself", 1 On the other hand, 
another finds that there was "little, if anything" in Lenin's 
views in April 1917, "which differed fundamentally from 
Ixsnin's policy for years-past". It had merely "never before 
been stated so baldly". This author defines the main issue as 
"the demand for an inmediate socialist revolution,.. O in the form 
of the passing of all power to the Soviets", which had been 
implicit in Lenin's thought since 1905. 2
Those who do find a difference assert, variously, that it
olies in his attitude towards the Provisional Government, his 
"tacit acceptance of the Permanent Revolution," his character­ 
isation of the Russian Revolution as the prelude to world revol-
5 ution, or in his suggestion "that the Soviet, as opposed to the
g armed proletariat should seize power.
Confronted by this diversity of scholarly opinion it would 
seem worth examining the change, if any, in detail. Fortunately
1. A.B. Ulam, Lenin and the Bolsheviks, London 1969, p 432.
2. L.B. Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 
London 1970, p 165.
3. D, Shub, Lenin, London 1966, pp 216-17.
4. P. Broue, Le parti bolchevique, Paris 1963, p 83; 
A. Rabinowitch, Prelude to Revolution, Bloomington 
1968, pp 37-38.
5. R.R. Abramovitch, The Soviet Revolution, London 1962, p 30.
6. L.B. Schapiro, The Origin of the Conmmist Autocracy, 
London 1955, pp"31-33; R.KU McNeal, Pride of the 
Revolution, London 1973, p 171.
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for the historian, Lenin's notes taken during the course of this 
reading in February and March 1917, are all in one notebook, 
vMch has been published. The format of these notes is long 
chunks, copied from the particular book Lenin was reading, 
interspersed with his own conments and marginal notes. It is 
therefore possible to follow, stage by stage, any transformations 
of thought, as they occur. Before doing so, however, anticip­ 
ating the conclusion that the difference will be concerned with 
Lenin's attitude to the Soviets, we should examine his previously 
expressed views on them and on the Paris Comnune of 1871, often 
regarded as the first soviet.
For Lenin, as for all Marxists, the Comnune was one of 
the great landmarks of history: the first real bid for power by 
the proletariat. Yet, although he had always regarded it as a 
heroic event, admiration was always subordinate to an awareness 
of its shortcomings. Before March 1917, the lessons of the 
Commune, for Lenin, lay in its mistaken desire to maintain a 
clear conscience and thus allow Thiers to take the initiative in
the Civil War, and in the weakness resulting from its Central
2
Committee's decision to give up power too soon.
Unlike some Bolsheviks, Lenin had welcomed the Soviets in 
1905. Ke considered them to be of great value, in the context
1. PSS, vol.33, pp 123-307. .
2. PSS, vol.9, p 330; vol.11, PP 70, 132; vol.14, pp 376-78; 
vol. 16, pp 451-54; vol.20, pp 217-22.
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of an armed uprising, as bodies that would broaden the movement 
against tsarism, constantly drawing new layers of the popul­ 
ation into the struggle. In the Soviets, the Social Democrats 
would have the opportunity of propagandising people whom they 
otherwise could not hope"to reach. As the movement towards 
revolution accelerated, the Soviets would form the embryo of the 
Provisional Revolutionary Government.
HDwever, although he was in favour of the creation of 
Soviets in the course of a revolutionary upsurge, he was very 
much opposed to what he called "soviet fetishism". This was the 
belief that the creation of Soviets was in itself desirable at 
all times, a tendency which led to Aksel'rod's belief that the
Soviets should replace the Party as the main focus of Social
2Democratic activity.
Whatever else was new in Lenin's thought in March-April 
1917, it was not the concept of the Soviets as the bodies that 
should seize power, or as the embryos of the Provisional Revol­ 
utionary Government. Both are present in his writings in 1905-O7 
and, indeed, at the time, Lenin was attacked by Plekhanov as 
having a Socialist Revolutionary attitude towards the Soviets and
1. PSS, vol.12, pp 61, 127, 231, 317.
2. PSS, vol.13, pp 32O-24; Pyatyi (Londonskii) s"ezd RSDRP 
Protokoly, M 1963, pp 723-24. I am, of course, concerned 
only with Lenin's understanding of Akesel'rod's views 
here. For an examination of these from a different per­ 
spective cf. A. Ascher, Pavel Akselrod and the Development 
of Menshevism, Cambridge, Mass, 1972, pp 235fi' a
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taking power.
After 1907, Lenin rarely referred to the Soviets, and
when he did it was to stress that they made sense only in the
o context of an armed uprising." With the onset of the First
World War, references to the Paris Commune began to occur in his 
writings very frequently. This time, however, he was concerned 
with it simply as the originator of the slogan of the transform­ 
ation of the war between nations into a civil war. He is still
odealing with it in these terms as late as January 1917.
Lenin's first entries in his notebook of February-March
4 1917 are very much in keeping with his previous thought. Quite
early in his reading, however, a new note is introduced:
N.B. theoretically especially the combin­ 
ation of the dictatorship of the proletariat 
and complete local self-government.
The Bourgeoisie adopted the ' "bureaucratic- 
military" state machine of the feudal and 
absolute monarchies and developed it. The 
opportunists (especially 1914-17) have put 
down roots in it 0 (Imperialism, as an 
epoch in the advanced countries has greatly 
strengthened it.) The task of the prolet-
1. Chetvertyi (obfledinitel f nyi) s"ezd RSDRP. Protokoly, 
M 1959, pp 58-60, 141-42.
2. PSS, vol.16, p 454; vol.17, pp 374-76; vol.19, p 214; 
vol.27, p 49; vol.49, p 160.
3. PSS, vol.26, pp 22-23, 163, 185, 204, 218, 287, 319-20, 
325; vol.27, pp 2, 102, 117; vol.30, pp 136-37, 155, 
279-80, 319-20.
4. PSS, vol.33, p 131.
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arin revolution: to smash, to destroy 
this machine and put in its place complete 
self-government from below, in the regions, 
and the direct power of the armed proletariat, 
its dictatorship, from above. 1
The idea of smashing the existing state was, of course, 
one of those that he had 'previously attacked in Bukharin's 
writings, but was now to adopt. Indeed, not long afterwards,
I^nin notes: "in essence, Bukharin is closer to the truth than
2Kautsky is". There is another new idea here which, however,
does not come from Bukharin. This is the idea of "complete self- 
government from below". As he reads on, Lenin begins to formul­ 
ate more clearly the implications of this for Russia:
The Russian Revolution fof 1905] approached 
this position jjpf the new form of state] . 
On the one hand it was weaker (i 0 e. -more 
timid) than the Paris Cornnune. On the 
other hand, it was more widespread: "Soviets 
of workers' deputies", "railwaymen's 
deputies", "soldiers' and sailors' deputies", 
"peasants' deputies". 0 .Eave there been changes 
since 1871? All of them, their general 
character, add up to this fact, that every­ 
where bureaucratism has grown wildly...that 
is the first thing 0 Secondly, the "socialist 1 " 
workers' parties have mostly grown into that 
very bureaucratism. The split between social- 
patriots and internationalists, between 
reformists and revolutionaries, consequently, 
has an even deeper significance: the reformists 
and the social-patriots "perfect" the bureau- 
cat ic state machine...and the revolutionaries 
must smash it, this bureaucratic-military 
machine, smash it and replace it with a 
"comnune", a new "semi-state".
1. ibid., p 155,
2. ibid., p 173,
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Qne could concisely and accurately 
express the entire matter thus: the 
substitution of Soviets of workers 1 
deputies and their trusted agents for 
the old (ready made) state machine and 
Parliaments. 1 ——
Thus, Lenin had moved from seeing the aim of a revolution 
as being the capture of the state, albeit in a "revolutionary" 
as opposed to an "opportunist" way, to seeing the aim of the 
revolution as the destruction of the state,, As a corollary to 
this he had also moved from seeing the Soviets as merely revolut­ 
ionary organisations, the embryos of a Provisional Revolutionary 
Government, to seeing them as something much more important: the 
embryos of the new state that would replace the smashed bourgeois 
state. Both these differences emerge clearly if we juxtapose a 
statement of Lenin's on the role of the Soviets, written in 1907, 
with one written in April 1917, immediately after his return to 
Russia;
In 1907, he wrote:
The Soviets of workers' deputies000 were 
in fact organs of the insurrection 0 Only 
when the revolution developed, was their 
emergence not a farce, but a major achieve­ 
ment of the proletariat. In the event of 
a new upturn in the struggle...of course, 
such institutions would be inevitable and 
desirable. But their historical develop­ 
ment must consist, not in a schematic 
development of local Soviets of workers' 
deputies up to an All-Russian Labour 
Congress, but in the conversion of the 
embryonic organs of revolutionary power,
1. PSS, vol.33, pp 229-30o
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(and this is what the Soviets of workers 1 
deputies were), into central organs of 
victorious revolutionary power, into a 
Provisional Revolutionary Government. 
Soviets of workers' deputies are essential 
for the victory of the insurrection. A vic­ 
torious insurrection will inevitably create 
other kinds of organs. 1
The Soviets here are clearly envisaged to be temporary bodies, at 
best co-terminate with the Provisional Revolutionary Government. 
In April 1917, however, he wrote:
The Soviets of workers', soldiers', peasants' 
and other deputies...constitute a new form, 
or rather a new type of state.
The most perfect, the most advanced type of 
bourgeois state is the parliamentary, 
democratic republic: power is vested in 
parliament; the state machine, the apparatus 
and organ of administration, is of the usual 
kind: a standing army, a police force, and a 
bureaucracy, which is, in practice irremov­ 
able and privileged, standing above the people.
Since the end of the nineteenth century, 
however, revolutionary epochs have advanced a 
higher type of state, a state which, as Engels 
put it, in certain ways ceases to be a state 
in the strict sense of the word. This is a 
state of the type of the Paris Commune, one in 
which the standing army and police, normally 
separated from the people are replaced by the 
direct arming of the people themselves. It is 
this feature that constitutes the very essence 
of the Commune, which has been so misrepres­ 
ented by bourgeois writers, and to which has 
been erroneously ascribed, among other things, 
the intention of immediately introducing 
socialism.
This is the type of state that the Russian 
revolution began to create in 1905 and in 1917, 
A Republic of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers',
1. PSS, vol.15, p 187.
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Peasants 1 and Other Deputies, united in an 
Ail-Russian Constituent Assembly of 
people's representatives, or in a Council 
of Soviets, is what is already being 
realised now, in our country, at this 
juncture... 1
The Soviets here have a more important, permanent role as 
the basis of the new state. Three further points are worth 
noting: i) Lenin now looks at the Paris Cornnune with new eyes; 
its lessons lie not so much in what it failed to do, as in the 
fact that it first of all advanced this new form of state; 
ii) already in April, Lenin sees the Constituent Assembly merging 
into the Central Council of Soviets: a fact that makes his 
subsequent actions towards the Constituent Assembly appear 
slightly less cynical; iii) he quite explicitly asserts that the 
creation of a soviet state does not mean the immediate intro­ 
duction of socialism.
-The implications of this shift in views ,for Bolshevik 
policy were far-reaching. It enabled Lenin to redefine his 
position vis-a-vis- Kautsky, Chkheidze, Kerensky and Milyukov. 
What united all these, despite incidental differences, and what 
separated them from Lenin, was their attitude to the state. They 
all believed in maintaining the existing state, Lenin now believed 
in smashing it. This meant that in the event of a revolutionary
i
upsurge, any and every centrifugal, anti-authoritarian act and 
movement should be encouraged, as part of the effort to smash the
1. PSS, vol.31, p 162.
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state machine. It meant that the creation of Soviets, as the 
new state to replace the bourgeois state, should be encouraged, 
irrespective of whether or not the Bolsheviks had a majority in 
them. All these can be inferred from the shifts in Lenin's 
thought, brought about as a result of his dispute with Bukharin 
and Radek, without having to resort to any external factors like 
financial encouragement from the German General staff. 1
It must be stressed, however, that Lenin had not fully 
developed these views, but was still in the process of forming 
them when he heard the news of the February Revolution on 15 March 
1917« Some indication of this can be derived from his notebook. 
Lenin's entries are not dated, but one can make at least a rough 
dating by using certain clues„ The first page of the notebook 
contains the following quotation from Marx's Civil War in France:
One thing especially was proved by the 
Carmine, viz, that "the working class 
cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made 
state machine and wield it for its own 
purposes"o 2
This is the only note on the Civil War in France at this point.
The rest of the book is heavily annotated about a third of the
3 way through the notebook. This quotation, however, appears in
1. For a recent, somewhat extreme version of this view, cf. 
M. Pearson, The Sealed Train, London 1975, pp 291-92, who 
asserts "Lenin met Germans in Berlin during the Sealed 
.Train journey, learned the scale of the finance available 
to him and because of this changed his mind on revolution­ 
ary tactics". Ke arrives at this conclusion because "no 
one has adequately explained Lenin's change of mind".
2. PSS, vol.33, p 129.
3. ibid., pp 210-30.
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Engel's 1872 Preface to the Comnunist Manifesto. 1 which was the 
first thing Lenin read and noted. On 12 February (NS) Lenin 
ordered the Civil War in France from the Zurich Public Library. 2 
It would not seem unreasonable to assume that, struck by this 
quotation from the Civil 'War in France, which he would not have 
found to his taste as apparently confirming Bukharin's position, 
Lenin then ordered the book from the library, so that he could 
check its context. This would place the beginning of the note­ 
book at on or before 12 February (3O January OS) 1917.
About a quarter of the way through the notebook, Lenin
comments: "In point of fact, Bukharin is closer to the truth
3 than Kautsky is" 0 This phrase occurs in two letters written
within two days of each other, one on 17 February to Kbllontai,
4 the second on 19 February to Inessa Armando We may perhaps
assume that these letters and the ccnment in the notebook were 
written at the same time 0
If we were to assume a constant rate of reading and 
constant ratio of notes to reading we should infer that Lenin 
began work on about 10 February and ended round about 10 March. 
But we cannot assume this, as the first quarter of the notebook
1. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works, vol.1, 
M 1958, p 22 8
2. .V.I. Lenin: Biograficheskaya khronika, vol.3, p 602 8
3. ' PSS, vol.33, p 173.
4. PSS, vol.49, pp 388, 390.
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actually corresponds to far less than a quarter of the reading. 
Not only do the notes get shorter, but the books get longer. 
The first quarter of the notes refer to only one long work, 
Marx's 18 Brumalre of Louis Bonaparte, for the rest there are 
just letters, prefaces arid the Critique of the Gotha Programne. 
The last three quarters of. the notes refer to a number of quite 
long and complex books, including Anti-Dohring. The Fbverty of 
Philosophy, The Origin of the Family, two books by Kautsky, one 
of which Lenin read in two German editions, comparing them to the 
Russian translation, the Kautsky-Pannekoek debate of 1912, and
Revolution and Counter-revolution in Germany (to which Lenin
o
accords one note which closes the notebook). Thus it would
appear very likely that Lenin was working on this material right 
up to his return to Russia, and even, probably, on the journey
back, where he has been described as "working, reading and
3 writing in note books all the way".
Further evidence that Lenin was still in the process of 
changing his ideas in March 1917 can be found in his other 
writings. The first two Letters from Afar written on 20 and 22 
March, do not show much evidence of his new ideas. The third, 
written on 24 March, shows more, and the fourth, of 25 March,
1. PSS, vol.. 33, pp 134-72.
2. PSS, vol,33, pp 172ff.
3. K. Radek, "V plombirovannom vagone" in F. Platten (ed,), 
Lenin iz cmigratsii v Rossiyu, p 127.
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more still. The fifth, which was to deal with "the Tasks of 
Constructing the Revolutionary Proletarian State" was not 
attempted until 8 April, and remained unfinished. So did the 
section "V/hat is the workers' and peasants' government doing and 
what ought it to do?" in "another article written on 25 March,, 1 
One of the reasons why Lenin's thinking on the Soviets 
during March 1917 remained in this transitional, incomplete form, 
quite apart from the fact that he had not completed his course 
of reading, is that it remained abstract, unrelated to the real 
course of events inside Russia. This was simply because Lenin 
did not know what was going on inside Russia, as his only source 
of information at the time was the Western European Press: 
The Times, the Neue Ziircher Zeitung, the Frankfurter Zeiting, and 
so on. As a result, some of his comments are extraordinarily 
inappropriate. At one stage for example, he supposes the Tsar
to be "putting up resistance, organising a party, or perhaps even
2 
troops, in an attempt to restore the monarchy".
•
In addition, we should note that even in its transitional, 
tentative, incomplete form, the change in Lenin's thought was not 
known to Party members inside Russia. The last information 
before the revolution would have come with Shlyapnikov, in the 
autumn of 1916, a point when, as Shlyapnikov knew better than 
anyone, Lenin and Bukharin were on very bad terms0 After that,
1. PSS, vol.31, pp 11-57, 71.
2. PSS, vol.31, p 1.
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all contact was lost until after the revolution. But even 
after the February Revolution, not much could have been known 
about Lenin's views. The only writings of his definitely known 
to have reached the Party in Russia were: a telegram of 
instructions to Kollontai and others about to leave for Russia, 
The "Draft Theses" of 17 March, the first, and possibly the 
second of the "Letters from Afar", an article about Chernomazov ! s 
relations with Pravda, and a letter to Kanecki. 1
Of. these, only the letter to Hanecki contains any signs of 
Lenin T s new ideas, and even this could be read as being quite in 
line with his previous policy. The main emphasis of the letter 
being: no compromise with Chkheidze, something which the 
Conciliators had heard, and ignored before. What is more, the 
letter refers to the "Draft Theses" of 1915 as "saying precisely 
how we should act in a revolution in Russia", this in itself
1. PSS, vole31, pp 7, 5O3-04; Shlyapnikov, Semnadtsatyi god, 
voloS, p 254„ It is not easy to gauge how many of the 
"Letters from Afar" were delivered. Soch, vo! 0 20, p 632 
says only the first one was 0 PSS, vo! 0 31, pp 5O3-O4 is a 
fine example of elusive Soviet writing: "9(22) March, the 
first and second "Letters from Afar" were sent to 
A.Mo Kollontai so that they could be taken to Petrograd; 
17(30) March, Lenin asked Ya 0 S 0 Ganetskii if the first 
four letters to Pravda had reached Petrograd, promising to 
send copies if they had been Iost 0 A.M. Kollontai took 
(the?) letters to Petrograd and handed them over to the 
editors of Pravda on 19 March (1 April)". The absence of 
definite and indefinite articles in the Russian language 
makes this even more ambiguous in Russian than in English. 
The implication is that all four letters were delivered. 
On the other hand, when Soviet editors do not say something 
outright, there is usually a reason for it. In any case, 
only the first was published, much cut, in Pravda.
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would counteract any suspicion that there might be something new 
lurking obscurely in the letter.
In summary, Lenin was in the process of changing his 
ideas about the state and the Soviets when he left Switzerland for 
Russia in April 1917. These changes were incomplete, and unknown 
even in their incomplete form to the Bolsheviks inside Russia, as 
none of Lenin's writings containing them liad reached Russia before 
his return.
THE DECISION TO RETURN
"When news of the February Revolution reached Lenin in Zurich
2on 15 March 1917, his immediate instinct was to return home.
However, there were great difficulties to be overcome. The most 
attractive route home lay through France and Britain, thence to 
Scandinavia and into Russia„ Lenin immediately began to make 
enquiries as to whether he could return this way. The difficulty
here was the danger that the British or French Governments might
3 arrest him for his known anti-war views.
The problem was not peculiar to Lenin. There were anti-war 
members of all Russian revolutionary parties in Switzerland, 
equally eager to return, and equally worried about going through 
France and Britain. The only other feasible route lay through 
Germany. The problem here was that, even were the Germans to
1. PSS, vol.49, pp 418-23.
2. PSS, vol.49, pp 399, 403-04.
3. ibid., pp 4O3-O4.
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grant passage, and this seemed unlikely enough, there was the 
danger that passage through an enemy country in wartime would 
mean arrest or disgrace-, or both, back in Russia. Nevertheless, 
the Menshevik leader, Martov, proposed to a meeting of the 
International Socialist Corrmittee (i.e. the Comnittee of the 
Zimmerwald Movement) that the possibility of using this route, 
in exchange for German prisoners of war, should be investigated. 
Robert Griim, of the Swiss Socialist Party, undertook to nego­ 
tiate the affair with the Germans.
I^nin kept both options open, although both seemed equally
2
unlikely, and settled down to do what he could to get his
political directives back into Russia. The only route for this 
immediately open to him, was via Aleksandra Kbllontai, who was in 
Norway preparing to return to Petrograd. He sent her a telegram 
which made clear both his policy and, with its references to the 
Petrograd City Duma, how out of touch with Russian affairs he was. 
It read:
Our policy: complete non-confidence in 
and no support for the new government. 
Particularly suspect Kerensky. Arming 
of the proletariat the only guarantee. 
Immediate elections to the Petrograd Duma. 
No rapprochement with other parties. 3
1. Fo Platten, "K istorii vozvrashcheniya v Rossiyu v 1917 
godu russkikh emigrantov 0 ..", in idem. (ed 0 ), Lenin iz 
'emigratsii v Rossiyu, M 1925, p 34 0
2. PSS, vol u 49, pp 409, 414, 417-18, 419.
3. PSS,. vol.31, p 7; this was read out to the Russian 
Bureau of the Central Committee on 13(26) March by 
E. Bosh, ibid., p 503.
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Then, disregarding her ironic comments about the value 
of any instructions he could send from Switzerland, when there 
were good men on the spot in Petrograd, he sent her more 
material: his "Draft Theses" of 17 March, and the first two 
"Letters from Afar". The main message in all this was: no 
support for the-Provisional Government, no rapprochement with 
Chkheidze.
On 23 March, he read an incomplete, and incorrect text, 
in the Frankfurter Zeitung, of the Manifesto of the Russian 
Bureau of the Central Committee. He found this most reassuring, 
especially as the account he read led him to believe, wrongly, 
that the Russian Bureau had called on the masses to organise 
around the Soviet. He cabled his approval to Hanecki in Stockholm, 
Thus, although impatient to return, Lenin had no reason,to believe 
that there was any urgency, necessitating taking serious political 
risks, as the Party was doing well enough in his absence. The 
news that Kamenev and the Duma Deputies were on their way back to 
Petrograd from Siberia added to his feelings that things were not
going badly. He settled down to a long wait in Switzerland,
2possibly until the end of the war.
On 30 March, all this changed, oddly enough because of 
events in the Baltic Fleet. Lenin had welcomed the murder of
1. PSS, vol.31, pp 1-6, 11-33; vol.49, pp 401-03.
2. PSS, vol.49, pp 402, 409-14; E.N. Burdzhalov, Vtoraya 
russkaya revolyutsiya, vol.1, p 270.
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1 'Admiral Nepenin, that supporter of Guchkov and Milyukov" as 
the shooting of officers and the disorganisation of the armed 
forces accorded well with the views he was developing on the need 
to smash the bourgeois state. In this same context, he con­ 
demned Skobelev's "pacifying" mission to Helsingfors as "the 
worst kind of Louis Blanc politics", and harmful to the revol­ 
ution . For similar reasons, he supported the election of 
officers,
Qi 30 March, he was shocked to read a report that Muranov 
had accompanied Skobelev on a similar mission to Kronstadto He 
iirmediately wrote to Hanecki:
If it is true that Muranov went there on 
behalf of the Provisional Government of the 
Guchkovs and Milyukovs, I beg you to trans­ 
mit and have printed that I absolutely 
condemn this, and that any rapprochement with 
Chkheidze and co a , v;ho from their profoundly 
mistaken and profoundly harmful social- 
pacifist Kautskyite position are flirting 
with social-patriotism, would be, I am deeply 
convinced, harmful to the working class, 
dangerous and inadmissible. 4
The most worrying feature of the affair was that the man 
involved was Muranov: the hardest of hard Bolsheviks, one of the 
two Duma Deputies who from the very beginning had been in favour
1. PSS, vol.31, pp 40, 75 0 I note with some satisfaction that 
Lenin took my view of Nepenin's position in the February 
•Revolution, and not that of subsequent Soviet writers 0
%
2. ' ibid., p 75.
3. ibid., p 4.
4. PSS, vol.31, p 42O.
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of the split in the Duma Inaction, the man who had confronted 
the court so bravely at his trial in 1915, the man whom Lenin 
had used as an example of the best type of Bolshevik, as opposed 
to Menshevik work: work of the Muranov-type.
From that moment on, his attitude to returning to Russia 
changed. He was determined to return as soon as possible, in 
order to save his Party. For if a man as strong as Muranov was 
co-operating with the Provisional Government, what might not 
lesser men be doing? The depth, of his concern, and his determin­ 
ation to intervene can also be read in that same letter to 
Hanecki:
CXir party would disgrace itself for ever, 
commit political suicide, if it tolerated 
such a deception \_i.e. revolutionary 
def ensismX „.
... I personally sh?.ll not hesitate for an 
instant to declare, and to declare in print, 
that I should prefer an immediate split with 
anyone in our Party, whoever it might be, 
rather than make concessions to the social- 
patriotism of Kerenskii and co., or the 
social-pacifism of Chkheidze and co. 2
On that same day, he received an urgent telegram from
Shlyapnikov begging him to return immediately, as every moment's
3delay put everything at risk. • Shlyapnikov had written it in
despair. He did not have the political standing in the Party to
1. See above pp 16, 54."
2.1 PSS, vol.31, pp 419-2CX
3 o V.I. Lenin: Biografichcskaya khronika, vol-4, p 29
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override Muranov, Kamenev and Stalin and was calling on the one 
man who could and, whom he felt sure, would not approve of
•
their conciliationist policies. Lenin immediately sent 
Hanecki details of the proposed route through Germany, and this 
was taken into Russia by'special courier e Shlyapnikov cabled 
back: "Ul T yanov must come at once" 0 Then, worried at exposing 
the Party leader to arrest or disgrace, changed his mind and 
cabled: "Do not force matters over Vladimir's return„ Avoid
riskso
3 In fact, Lenin received neither telegram, but was making
his own preparations anyway. On 28 March, he had turned down one
plan through Germany as unacceptable, unless certain terms were
4 met. On 31 March, the day after he had read of Muranov's trip
>
to Kronstadt, and had received Shlyapnikov f s telegram, he cabled 
Grimn:
Our Party has decided to accept without 
reservations the proposal that Russian 
emigres should travel through Germany 
and to organise this journey at once 0 .„
1. Shlyapnikov, Semnadtsatyi god, vol»2, p 182.
2. ibido, vol 0 3, pp 251-52; Ya0 S. Ganetskii, "Priezd tov 0 
Lenina iz Shveitsarii v Rossiyu", PR, 1924, no 0 l(24) 
pp 103-04 „
3. .1 infer this from his telegram to Hanecki of 5 April 
where he says " Shlyapnikov 's opinion desirable", 
implying that he has not got it (PSS, vo! 0 49, p 429). 
Also from the fact that the Provisional Government was 
seizing Bolshevik mail going abroad. See below p 337.
4. PSS, vol 0 49, p 417.
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...We absolutely decline to accept 
responsibility for any further delay, 
resolutely protest against it, and are 
. going alone. We earnestly request you 
to make arrangements at once and, if 
possible, let us know the decision 
tomorrow. 1
• V
Lenin then by-passed Grimm, whom he suspected of deliber­ 
ately delaying negotiations with the Germans and appointed Fritz 
Flatten, whom, as a member of the Zimmerwald Left, he felt was 
more sympathetic to his need to return. 2 He also cabled Hanecki, 
complaining of "incredible delays" and asking Hanecki to send some­ 
one to Petrograd to get Chkheidze to sanction the trip, so that
the Mensheviks could feel free to come too, thus speeding the
3 time of departure, and lessening the risk.
No reply was forthcoming from Chkheidze, On the other hand,
•\
Le Petit Parisien published a report that Milyukov had threatened 
to have any one travelling back through Germany arrested and tried 
for high treason. The Mensheviks decided, in the circumstances, 
not to go. Lenin was so anxious to return that he decided to risk 
even arrest and trial in the hope of being able to prevent the 
Bolshevik Party destroying itself. His group of thirty people 
signed a statement that they were fully aware of the risks they
1. PSS, vol.49, p 424,
2. F. Platten, "K istorii vozvrashcheniya,..", pp 36, 82ff
3. PSS, vol.49, pp 428-29.
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were running and left Berne on 9 April. 1 Four days later they 
were in Stockholm. They crossed the Swedish-Finnish frontier at 
Haparanda-Torneo on 2(15) April. To their surprise and relief 
they were not arrested, but they still feared that this might 
occur at Beloostrov, on the Russo-Finnish border, or even on 
their arrival in Petrograd.itself 0 2
A group of Helsingfors sailors were at Torneo to welcome 
the party. At Riihdmaki, where the Helsingfors line branches off 
from the Torneo-Petrograd line, -there was another, larger party 
of sailors. At Beloostrov, the platforms were crowded with 
workers from Sestroretsk, and members of the Russian Bureau of 
the Central Conmittee boarded the train to travel with Lenin the 
whole time he was on Russian soil. Shlyapnikov had managed to 
persuade Chkheidze and Skobelev to be at the Finland Station in 
Petrograd, and the Petersburg Committee had mustered as many 
workers, soldiers and sailors as they could, and were themselves
1.v PSS, vol 0 49, pp 428-29; F 0 Platten, "K istorii vozvrash- 
cheniya 00 o", in iden. (ed), Lenin iz emigratsii v Rossiyu, 
pp 30, 45, 93o It seemed to" be Radek's fate to participate 
anonymously in major events,, After the affair of the five 
MXtM s (see above pp 9-10) and the similar incident at the 
Ziranerwald Conference (see above pp 65-66). he did not sign 
the statement on 9 April 1917 for fear of arrest by the 
Germans as an Austrian citizen.
•
2. . Platten, op 0 cit., p 51; G a Zinoviev, "Priezd V.I. Lenina 
v Rossiyu" in Platten (ed 0 ), op 0 cit-o, p 121; 
O. Ravich, "Fevral'skie dni v Shveitsarii", KiS, 1927, 
no.l, p 186; D.S. Shuliashvili, "Vstrechi s V.I. Leninym 
v emigratsii" in Lenin v oktyabre. M 1957, pp 40-41, 43.
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there in force.
These measures had been taken, not so much because of
»
'the great love of the working people for their leader" as 
modern Soviet historians would have it2 as for hard-headed, 
practical reasons. "The "working people" at the time, for the 
most part, including even those who supported the Bolsheviks, 
would have known very little about Lenin. Shlyapnikov, on the
t,
other hand, was very much aware of the fact that, by urgently
o
recalling Lenin from Switzerland, he was placing him in danger 
of arrest and imprisonment. Ife therefore ensured that there 
should be a sympathetic, and armed crowd present at all places 
vdiere an arrest might take place, in the hope of thereby dissuad­ 
ing the Government from acting.
\
Lenin was not arrested. At ten minutes past eleven p.m. 
on the 3 April, his train drew in to the Finland Station. That 
night, he addressed a meeting attended by members of the Central 
and Petersburg Committees, and other leading Bolshevik activists.
1. I 0 Demushkin, "Leninskii prizyv vdokhnovil moryakov",
in S 0F 0 Naida (ed 0 ), Voennye moryaki v bor'be za pobedu 
oktyabr'skoi revolyutsii, p 344; F 0 DmVtriev, 
"Volnuyushchie vstrechi", in Naida (ed 0 ), op 0 cit.. 
p 344; Mordvinov (ed.), opcCit., p 51; Shlyapnikov, 
Semnadtsatyi god, vol.3, pp 257-58; E.F. Usievich, 
"V Petrograd!'!, in Lenin v oktyabre, p 47.
2. This is taken from I.I. Mints, Istoriya velikogo oktyabrya, 
vol.2, p 73; its equivalent can be found in almost any 
Soviet book dealing with Lenin's return.
*
3. Shlyapnikov could not have known at the time to what
extent the decision was Lenin's own, and to what extent 
influenced by his cable.
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LENIN INTERVENES IN THE FACTION FIGHT: THE APRIL THESES
When the members of the Russian Bureau boarded Lenin's 
train at Beloostrov, according to one account,
No sooner had they entered the compartment 
and sat down, than Lenin turned on Kamenev, 
"What have you been writing in Pravda? We 
have seen a few issues and swore at you 
heartily...» 1
This incident has caught the imagination of historians, who have
included it in their books, apparently unaware of how strange an
2occurrence it was. For the question is: how had Lenin read a
few issues of Pravda?
Immediately after the February Revolution, the Russian 
Bureau of the Central Committee tried to renew contact with Lenin 
and the other emigre leaders, contact which had been broken since
\
the previous autumn. At first, they attributed the lack of any 
reply to delays in the post, but after a while became convinced 
that the Provisional Government was intercepting and seizing any­ 
thing addressed to known Bolsheviks abroad, or any Bolshevik
1. FoFo Raskol'nikov, "Priezd tov 0 Lenina v Rossiyu", PR, 
1923, no 0 l, p 221.
2. e.g. L0D 0 Trotsky,' The History of the Russian Revolution, 
void, Ann Arbor I960, p 295; A 0 B 0 Ulam, Lenin and the 
Bolsheviks, London 1969, p 428; M 0 Ferro, La revolution 
de 1917, vol.1, Paris 1967, p 307. We have here inciden­ 
tally"^ good example of the "coyness" of Shlyapnikov's 
•writing, which we mentioned above on page 252 „ 
Shlyapnikov recalls, "The members of the Bureau of the 
Central Committee were supposed to-go to Beloostrov, 
I cannot remember quite who precisely went to meet the 
emigre's, except for Mariya Il'ichna,.." Oddly enough, his 
memory is much clearer on events at the Finland Station. 
Shlyapnikov, op.cit., vol.,3, pp 257-58.
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material going to any address abroad. Shlyapnikov raised the 
matter with the Petrograd Soviet, which.referred it to the
•
Contact Commission with the Government. Believing, correctly, 
that there it would be quietly buried, Shlyapnikov organised a 
special courier. M.I. Stetskevich, who had been chosen for her 
knowledge of foreign languages and her skill in conspiratorial 
technique, left Petrograd for Stockholm on 10 or 11 March with 
newspapers and letters for Lenin, with verbal messages to 
request his speedy return and with instructions to discover 
where the break in coimunications was taking place.
At the very most, Stetskevich would have been able to take 
five or six issues of Pravda with her. In any case, all of them 
would antedate Muranov, Stalin and Kamenev's return and take-over
\
of the paper. In fact, it is doubtful if Lenin received even 
these early copies. None of his letters or other writing pro­ 
duced before he returned to Russia mention that he has seen Pravda.
There are three complaints, on 12(26) and 13(27) March that he has
2not. None of his writings before he returned to Russia is based
on any Russian paper at all, but always on the Times, the Neue,>
Zurcher Zeitung, the Frankfurter Zeitung and so on, a fact which, 
as we have seen, led him to make some fairly major errors about 
events in Russia.
1. Shlyapnikov, Semnadtsatyl god, vol.3, pp 249-51.
•
2. PSS, vol.31, p 71; vol.49, pp 407, 415. These would be 
too early for him to have received anything Stetskevich 
brought out with her.
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Stetskevich returned to Petrograd on 20 March, bringing 
the proposal for the trip through Germany. In her absence,
•
Stalin, Muranov and Kamenev had returned and brought the Party 
to the verge of a split, and Shlyapnikov was very anxious to 
have Lenin back. As he had serious doubts about his telegrams 
ever being delivered, he sent Stetskevich to Stockholm again. 
Ihis time, however, she was not so lucky and all her newspapers 
and other written material was taken off her at Torneo, although 
she herself was able to proceed and deliver her verbal messages, 
and the money to pay for Lenin's trip.
On 22 March(4 April), Hanecki managed to get two parcels 
and a few letters into Russia via the Russian diplomatic bag.
Shlyapnikov, however, was not able to use this route to get
2 material out of Russia. In addition, Zinoviev recalls that when
the party reached Stockholm from Berne, the situation inside the 
Russian Party was still unclear. Lenin himself, at the Petrograd 
All-City Bolshevik Conference later in April said that when 
abroad, he had not been able to get hold of any paper to the Left 
of Rech*, and had only been able to form an accurate opinion after
•H (
3his return to Russia.
1. Shlyapnikov, opcCito, pp 252-53,
2. ibido, pp 253-54.
»
3. G O Zinov'ev, "Priezd V.I. Lenina v Rossiyu", in F 0 Flatten, 
(ed.), op.cit., p 120; Sed'maya (aprel'skaya) 
konferentsiya RSDRP(b) a Protokoly, p 9 0
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It would seem, then, that Lenin read "a few issues" of 
Pravda at Torneo or after. But how did -he get hold of them?
•
Zinoviev writes that Lenin bought a few issues of Pravda on 
Torneo Station, and learnt thereby that Malinovskii was a police 
spy and that Pravda "was "not clearly internationalist"* This
oddly understated way of referring to a call to "meet the enemy
obullet for bullet and shell for shell" can be explained by the
alliance between Zinoviev, Kamenev and Stalin to defeat Trotsky 
at the time this memoir was written. But even discounting this, 
how probable is the whole statement? Dybenko records that in 
late March Pravda was not even reaching Ifelsingfors, a major city
of about 150,000 inhabitants, capital of Finland and only some
3 12 hours by train from Petrograd; a city, moreover, that had
>
two Russian Social Democratic organisations and one Finnish one. 
HDW probable is it that Lenin should have been able to find 
casually several issues of Pravda at Torneo, a small frontier 
village of some 1,500 people, thirty-six hours by train from 
Petrograd, with no Social Democratic organisation, and very
likely without even a station bookstall?>
On the other hand,- he could have got them from the group
1. Zinov'ev, op 0 cito, pp 120-21„
2. .Pravda, no 0 9, 15 March 1917 0
3. Dybenko, Myatezhniki, p 31; Ke Baedeker, Russia in 1914, 
pp 2(M, 218, 223.
4. Baedeker, op.cit., pp 240, 246.
-341-
of Helsingfors sailors, who had been sent to Torneo to ensure 
him a safe passage across the frontier. It would be fairly 
safe to assume that the Kronstadt group would have taken seme 
issues of Pravda with them when they went to Helsingfors, indeed, 
Volna contained articles'copied from Pravdao 1 Kbllontai, who 
recalls going "several times" to Helsingfors at this period to 
agitate in the Fleet, would have kept their supplies up, as 
would Ul'yantsev who had just been made roving Party agitator 
for the Baltic Sea area, or any of the Bolshevik agitators who
began to flow towards Helsingfors, once the Kronstadt group had
oestablished a foothold there.
Lenin's return was not, after all, accidental. Ife had 
decided to go back to Russia, and Shlyapnikov had urgently 
recalled him, at great political risk, as the only man in the 
Party capable of dealing with Muranov, Kamenev and Stalin. 
Shlyapnikov must have been very anxious for Lenin to hear his 
side of the dispute, before he heard Muranov's. This could not 
be done at Beloostrov, as the entire Central Conmittee was to
meet Lenin there, and this arrangement had to stand in case
> 
there was any attanpt to have Lenin arrested there. On the other
hand, whatever his disagreements with the Vyborg-Kronstadt group,
1. Zhenevskii, "Gel'singfors vesnoyu 1917 goda", KL, 1925, 
no.2(13), p 217.
2. Kbllontai, "Avtobiograficheskii ocherk", PR, 1921, no 0 3, 
pp 296, 298; Anikeev (ed 8 ), Deyatel ! nost' TsK RSDRP(b) 
v 1917 godu. Khronika sobytii, p 54.
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he could be sure of their support against Muranov, Kamenev and 
Stalin. At the very least,when he contacted them to send groups
•
to Torneo and Riihimaki, we may assume that he would have asked 
them to take the important issues of Pravda (like no.9, with 
Kamenev's pro-war article in it) and show them to Lenin. Hs 
knew, too, that -he could rely on the Helsingfors groups to tell 
I^nin of the faction fight in terms that would do Muranov, 
Kamenev and Stalin no good at all. After all, the Vyborg- 
Kronstadt and now Helsingfors Bolsheviks were involved in the 
faction fight on their own account and would be keen to enlist 
Lenin's support for their policy of building soviet power from 
below.
In fact, the Helsingfors group at Torneo would most prob-
\
ably have travelled on Lenin's train with him as far as Riihimaki, 
both for the lift home, and as an armed bodyguard ready to resist 
any attempt to arrest him. The journey from Torneo to Riikimaki 
lasted sane twenty-four hours, which gave them plenty of time 
to tell him of the faction fight inside the Party and discuss 
Pravda with him. Perhaps these were the "soldiers" that eye-
N
witnesses recall discussing with Lenin as the train came through 
Finland. At Riihimaki, Boris Zhemchuzhin, who was in charge of
1. Although there are a number of sources for the existence of 
the Torneo group, see above p 336 , none of them name any 
of its members. Eye witnesses write only of "soldiers". 
(Zinov'ev, op.cit.., p 121; Flatten, op.cit.,, p 49; 
Krupskaya, "iz emigratsii v Piter",* p 115). This may be 
because of a lapse of memory; or because the group was led 
by someone about whom it is not politic to write (like 
Dingel'stedt); or because of a reluctance to give details 
of any factional activity.
-343-
the group of sailors there, 1 could have supplied any further 
details Lenin might wish to know.
•
The Right of the Party had also organised to have their 
side of things put to Lenin, even though they could not call on 
the help of the Helsingfors sailors, since Garin, who might have 
been able to organise this,, was in Petrograd at the crucial time. 
Their intervention was planned for Beloostrov, and accordingly, 
Kamenev took Teodorovich and Raskol'nikov with him, neither of 
whom, strictly should have been there, but both of whom supported 
him politically. Raskol'nikov's presence in Kamenev T s group 
cannot be explained in any other terms. He was not a member of
the Central Committee, nor was he a friend of Lenin's, whom,
o
indeed, he had never met. He would have been especially import-
\
ant to Kamenev however, as someone able to give an alternative 
view of the Vyborg-Kronstadt activities. In the event, 
Kamenev's preparations were in vain. Lenin's first act was to 
turn on him with his questions about Pravda. Raskol'nikov did 
not even get a-chance to speak to Lenin, and Shlyapnikov was able
to note, a little smugly, that it was clear that Lenin had>
3
grasped the situation in the country very well.
Lenin's speech that night made an extraordinary impression
1. Dmitriev, bp.cit., pp 344-45.
2. Raskol'nikov, "Priezd tov Lenina v Rossiyu", PR, 1923, 
no.l, p 220.
3. ibid.; Shlyapnikov, Semnadtsatyi god, vol.3, p 257 e
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on all present. "A Rubicon", writes Raskol'nikov, "an eye- 
opener even to experienced Party workers".1 F. Drabkina con-
•
firms this:
No one expected it. On the contrary, 
they were waiting for Vladimir Il'ich to 
come and call to order the Russian Bureau, 
and especially comrade Molotov, who had 
adopted a particularly uncompromising 
position towards the Provisional Government. 
It turned out, however, that it was Molotov 
who was closer than anyone, to Il'ich. 2
The next day he made, if anything, a bigger impression on 
the Bolshevik delegates to the Soviet Conference and to a joint 
Menshevik-Bolshevik meeting. As Shlyapnikov recalls:
Those Mensheviks and Right Bolsheviks who 
had placed special faith in that comrade 
Lenin would "give the imprudent Left 
Bolsheviks what for" had miscalculated. 
Vladimir Il'ich's position was further left , 
than our left. 3
The impact that it made cannot be explained entirely in 
terms of the newness of Lenin's ideas. The Right of the Party 
had expected Lenin to support them on his return, because they 
attributed Lenin's views in exile to his lack of knowledge about 
Russian affairs. Lenin's speech of 3 April and the April Theses
s
which he wrote on 4 April, in their assuredness of tone, their 
grasp of the realities of the situation inside Russia are
1. Raskol'nikov, op.cit 0 , p 225.
2. F. Drabkina, "Priezd tov. Lenina i martovskoe soveshchanie 
'predstavitelei bol'shevistskikh organizatsiei", PR, 1927, 
no.4(63), p 157.
3. Shlyapnikov, op.cit., vol.3, p 260.
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markedly different from his published and unpublished writings 
from immediately before his return. No one expected this 
familiarity with Russian politics and this certainty of judge­ 
ment from a man who had just stepped off the train, and whose 
only previously known, recent, statements on the revolution had 
included the supposition that the Tsar was organising a counter- 
re, volution, and that the main counter-weight to the Provisional 
Government could be the Petrograd City' Duma.
They were justifiably surprised. But the April Theses 
were not merely the product of Lenin's reading in exile in order 
to answer Bukharin 0 Lenin had returned deliberately to inter­ 
vene in the faction fight in the Party and to destroy the 
influence of the Conciliator Bolsheviks. He was, after all, 
above all the creator of a Party of a special type, a Party that 
he feared was being destroyed 0 Once past Torneo, he would have 
been very receptive to the views of the Helsingfors group, and 
this made the genesis of the April Theses a two-way process, 
with the Eelsingfors group contributing the details of Russian
^
1. In this respect, I disagree with M 0 Sawer's statement, in 
• an otherwise excellent article, that Lenin's "theoretical 
Ieap 0 o .was in no way connected with the emergence of the 
Soviet movement in Russia''. M. Sawer, "The Genesis of 
State and Revolution", Socialist Register, 1977, p 219. 
But then she, like other writers who deal with Lenin's 
thought, even those who have understood the importance 
of the debate with Bukharin, fail to relate his shifts in 
thought to the practical problems of Party building„ 
cf. RoV. Daniels, 'The State arid Revolution: a Case Study 
in the Genesis and Transformation of Comminist Ideology", 
SR, 1953, no.l, pp 22-43; J. Frankel, "Lenin's Doctrinal 
Revolution of April 1917", JCH, 1969, no e 2, pp 117-42.
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politics, and of the fight inside the Party, hitherto only 
obscurely guessed at by Lenin. Perhaps even more importantly 
they contributed the knowledge of the overwhelming popularity 
of the local Soviets among the masses, knowledge that enabled 
him to clarify and make specific the views he had been 
formulating a little abstractly in exile.
Initially, though, the April Theses pleased no one. 
Shlyapnikov, who had wanted Lenin back to defeat Muranov, was 
shocked by the Bukharinist content, which he had seen Lenin 
attack so vigorously the year before. The Party Right merely 
saw it as evidence that Lenin was either mad, or out of touch, 
or both. The advocates of the Vyborg line had difficulty in 
understanding the concept of the Soviets as the new state, not 
just until the Constituent Assembly, but thereafter too.
The policy won support so quickly, however, because it 
contained just the elements needed to resolve the faction fight. 
To Shlyapnikov and his supporters it gave clear assurance that 
there would be .no more support for the Provisional Government 
or the War. It also confirmed that they had been right in their
N
tentative moves towards the Soviets, if not forceful enough. 
To the Vyborg-Kronstadt Helsingfors Bolsheviks it gave support, 
from the top of the Party for a policy of building and
1. Pravda, no.27, 8 April 1917; Abramovitch, op.cit., 
pp 30-31; Sed'maya (aprel'skaya) vserossiiskaya 
konferentsiya RSDRP(b). Protokoly, pp 16, 18.
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encouraging local Soviets. To the old members of the Petersburg 
Committee, and to the Pravda Group it brought discomfiture, but 
also, unlike the previous policy of the Russian Bureau, it 
offered instead a viable Bolshevik alternative to their own 
policies. Wien the Right Bolsheviks had criticised the Russian 
Bureau for being too "academic" and abstract, or the Vyborg 
District Bolsheviks for being disguised Maximalists, there had 
been much truth in their criticism. Lenin's policy, although it 
incorporated elements of Left Bolshevism and Left Populist 
Bolshevism was quite distinct from either of these. While it 
advocated the centrifugal building of regional Soviets, the 
election of officers, and the destruction of the bourgeois state, 
it also advocated the building of a new central soviet state. 
By so doing, it gave the lower echelon Bolsheviks a policy which 
enabled them to meet the Left SRs on their own terms, support 
for local Soviets, but with their own Bolshevik perspective. 
This, neither the Mensheviks, nor the PSR, who had no policy 
towards the local Soviets, were able to do 0 .The April Theses
I | ' •, , II 1 I -HI. I I - II • •'
gave the Bolshevik Party the only national leadership able to
> 
v channel the enthusiasm created around the local Soviets. This
in turn, gave them the mass support in October.
They also marked the end of one period of Party develop­ 
ment. -For the first time, since the creation of the Bolshevik 
Party in 1912, the Central Coranittee was on the spot, in 
Russiao \Vhatever their differences with the Central Commttee, 
the middle and lower echelon Bolsheviks had to reckon with it
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knowing as much about Russian politics as they did, and with it 
being able to check on their day to day .activities. Relations
•
between the Party leadership and rank and file were thereby 
greatly changed, and new ways of influencing and altering 
policy were to emerge,,
CONCLUSION
II
From the Prague Conference of January 1912 until Lenin's 
return to Russia in April 1917, the existence of Bolshevism 
as a separate party was constantly in jeopardy. The leaders 
of the Second International and a large section of the leaders 
of the Bolshevik Party itself inside Russia regarded the split 
inside the RSDLP at most as a temporary aberration, owing more 
to the clash of personalities than to any real political 
differences. Only the onset of War'in 1914 prevented the 
development of an overwhelming movement towards reunification, 
(and hence the political isolation and even downfall of Lenin), 
both in the International and in Russia. The War gave Lenin 
a second chance to win support internationally in the 
Zimraerwald Movement, which grew up in opposition to the 
leadership of the Second International's support for the War. 
Even so, ty the end of 1916, Lenin was again isolated internat­ 
ionally and cut off from the Party inside Russia. By the end 
of March 1917, the stage was set for the disappearance of 
Bolshevism, which was to reunite with Menshevism at a joint 
Party Conference. It was onto that stage that Lenin stepped 
with his April Theses: his final, and finally successful attempt 
to prevent reunion, and to assert Bolshevism's right to a 
separate existence. From April 1917 on, the "difference" of 
Bolshevism from any other tendency in the Russian and Internat­ 
ional Social-Democracy was assured.
The ease with which Lenin accomplished this political 
victory owed much to a phenomenon of which he had been unaware 
until the last moment. Part of the Party's rank and file 
had developed its own tradition, which had grown out of joint 
work with the rank and file of the Socialist Revolutionary
Ill
Party. This tradition had grown up in opposition to the 
Right Conciliator leadership of the Bolshevik Party inside 
Russia, and owed much to the latter's inability to provide 
clear political leadership. Up to the First World War, the 
Socialist Revolutionaries were the dominant political force 
numerically and ideologically in this quite different, 
and radical, union. After the onset of war, the ideological 
balance shifted in favour of the Bolsheviks, because of 
their international stand against the War. This tradition 
was greatly strengthened in February 1917 by the creation of 
local Soviets in which the two parties worked without creating 
different fractions. However, once again, the Socialist 
Revolutionaries became the more powerful partner in the 
alliance because of their numerical superiority, their 
wholehearted support for the local Soviets, and because of 
the ideological disarray in the Russian leadership of the
«
Bolshevik Party. On the eve of Lenin's return to Russia, 
the left Populist Bolsheviks were organising wider support 
inside their own Party, in an attempt to regain some of
f
their former prestige.
The April Theses mark a turning point in this tradition 
too. Left Populist Bolshevism made Lenin's victory over Right 
Conciliationist Bolshevism easy. Its very existence, and the 
coincidence of many of its ideas with those he had been 
developing in emigration, enabled Lenin to clarify these 
rapidly and to make his dramatic intervention on 3 April both
i
clear and well informed. It also gave him the numerical 
support inside the Party that he needed to dish the Right. 
It is notable that when the Petersburg Committee was reelected 
barely a fortnight after Lenin's initial appearance, when
IV
"Kollontai alone supported him", the only members to be 
reelected were those from the Vyborg District. All the 
other "old" members, however prestigious, had been replaced 
by young radicals. Lenin's return to Russia had enabled him 
to establish the direct contact with the rank and file that 
had been impossible while he was in emigration. The April 
Theses, then, also marked a difference in the mechanics of 
policy formation.
On the other hand, the April Theses, and the subsequent 
national Bolshevik policy that flowed from them, enabled 
the Bolsheviks to regain the ideological ascendancy in the 
alliance with the Left Populists. The establishment of the 
"Kronstadt Republic" of May 1917, and the armed demonstrations 
of July were both products of the Left SR-Anarchist ascendancy, 
which the local Bolsheviks followed with greater or lesser 
enthusiasm. This was very much as it had been before 1915. 
What had changed since April 1917, however, was the response of 
the Bolshevik national leadership. Lenin combined public 
support for these events (and for the Anarchist occupation 
of the Durnovo villa) in the columns of Pravda, with private 
reprimands to the local Bolshevik leadership for allowing themselves 
to be dominated, and with well devised and successful measures 
to prevent the Government reprisals that these events had 
invited. This constrasted with the attitude of the national 
leadership of the PSR, which was at best indifferent and more 
often hostile to its Left Populist rank and file.
The October Revolution was very much in the tradition of 
the Left Populist/Bolshevik alliance that we have traced from 
at least 1905 onwards. The main difference now was that, although 
they remained numerically the smaller partner in the alliance,
Vthe Bolsheviks were now its ideological leaders. The SR rank 
and file interpreted the policies initiated by the fipril Theses, 
and especially the slogan "All Power to the Soviets' 1 , in terms 
of the Left Populist tradition abandoned by their own leader­ 
ship. As they saw it, support for the Bolshevik leadership 
gave the only chance to establish the Republic of Communes. 
The extent to which they had misinterpreted Bolshevik policy 
was only to become clear after March 1918.
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Members and Associates of Glavnyi Kbllektiv pri PK RSDRP(b) 
Arrested Autumn 1915: Sentenced October 1916
Name
SLadkov I.D. 
Pisarev N.
*
Filimonov V 0 
KUzaietsov-Lomakin F.S, 
Pbpov T. 
Khovrin N.A. 
Marusev V.M0 
Khrylev I. 
Varyukhin G. 
Murashev I. 
Erokhin S. 
Filippov M. 
Brendin N. 
Mas'yachenko K. 
Ul'yantsev T.I. 
Vakhrameev A 0 
Peshkov V. 
Egorov IoN.
•
Mikhel'son A, 
Stakun M.
Ship
Rossiya
Rossiya
2 
Rossiya
Fita
Vzryv
Civilian
Civilian
Civilian
Partiinost
B (1911)- Imperator Aleksandr II 
I Baltiiskii flotskii ekipazh 
Uchebno-Artilleriiskii otryad 
Uchebno-Artilleriiskii otryad B (1912) 
Gangut
Imperator Pavel I 
Imperator Pavel I 
Petropavlovsk 
Petropavlovsk 
Poltava 
Tsesarevich 
Diana
B
B (March 1917)
B (pre-1914)
B (1903)
(1) date of joining in brackets; B: Bolshevik
(2) transferred to I Baltiiskii flotskii ekipazh, Kronstadt,
Autumn 1915
sources: A 0 Shlyapnikov, Kanun Semnadtsatogo Goda M. 1923, p 243;
V. Zalezhskii, Bor'ba za Baltiiskii Flot, M-L. 1925, p 9;
Geroi Oktyabrya, L, 1967, i p 611, ii pp 101, 398, 509, 545;
P.Z. Sivkov, Kronshtadt, L. 1972, p 69;
R.N. Mordvinov, ( ed.), Baltiiskie Moryaki 0 .., M-L e 1957, pp 402-07.
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Members of the Kronstadt Comnittee of the Social Movement 
1 March 19171
Name
Zaitsev V.M. 
Gromov F.V. 2
Gredyushko S0 S.
3 Kblobushev
Glasko(v) 
Krasovskii I 0A. 
Khanokh A.
Rank
sailor 
sailor 
soldier 
worker
lieutenant
. 6ensign
student
Unit or ship
»
Mashinnaya shkola 
2 Artillery Regt.
Vernyi
Partiinost
B (1905) 
B (1916) 
B (1917)
SR4
5 Non-party
SR'
SR8
Menders subsequently^o-opted
Kiiprin sailor
Filipenko soldier
Gudimov soldier
Trifonov soldier
Chashchin soldier
Q 
Glukhachenkov I.K. sailor
Okean 
Artillery 
Artillery 
Fort Ino 
Fort Ino 
Nikolaev B (1907 ?)
Notes
1) source: A 0 -Blinov, "Pervye revolyutsionnye organy vlasti
v Kronshtadte v 1917 godu", in S 0 F. Naida (ed a ), Voennye moryaki 
v bor'be za pobedu oktyabr'skoi revolyutsii, M. 1958, p 134.
2) "M.A.Stolyarenko, Syny partii - baltiitsy, L. 1969, p 171, has 
him as V.P. Gromov.
3) Sometimes Kalabushev, P.Z 0 Sivkov, opoCit., p 89.
4) If this is the Kalabushev referred to in PR, 1926, no. 12(59), p ISO,
5) A.K. Drezen (ed.), Biirzhuaziva i poneshchiki v 1917 godu, M-L. 
19*32, p 297.
6) Blinov loc.cit. has him as a civil engineer; Sivkov, loc.cit. 
and Drezen (ed.), loc.cit. both have him as being in the army.
7) Mordvinov (ed.), op.cit., p 389; S.S. Khesin, Oktyabr'skaya 
revolyutsiya i flot, M. 1971, p 73.
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8) Sivkov, op.,cit., p 90 has him as a Narodnyi sotsialist.
9) According to his biography in Pyat'-let krasnogo flota, Pbg, 
1922, p 212. 
No other source mentions him.
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Provisional Kronstadt Committee 
1 March 19171
Zaitsev V.I. (chairman) 
UTyantsev T 0 I 0 . 
Pelikhov S.G 0 
Sladkov I.D 
Zinchenko E.F. 
and others
<
(possibly Gredyushko S.S.'
2 Gromov F.V.
Committee of Social Movement 
Released from prison
11
Ccmnittee of Social Movement
II M II
Partiinost 
1905
••
pre-1914 
March 1917 
1911 
1913
1917
1916
1) source: P.Z. Sivkov, Kronshtadt, stranitsy revolyutsionnoi 
istorii, L. 1972, p 100.
2) Possibility based on the fact that they were on the Conmittee of 
Social Movement, and thus presumably had been prominent enough 
in the mutiny to have won a following.
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Kronstadt Conmittee RSDLP(b) Recognised by the Central Carmittee 
4 March 19171
Partiinost 1
Ul'yantsev T 0 I 0 pre-1914
Pelikhov S 0 G. - March 1917
Sladkov I.D 6 1911
(.
Zinchenko E 0 F 0 1913 "
Gredyushko S 0 S0 1917
2 and others
1) source: R.N 0 Mordvinov (ed 0 ), Baltiiskie moryaki v pcdgotovke 
i provedenie velikoi oktyabr'skoi sotsialisticheskoi 
revolyutsii, M-L. 1957, p 334.
2) I have assumed that Zaitsev at least would have been too 
important to have been consigned to this category.
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Kronstadt Coirmittee RSDLP(b)
Elected at General Assembly of Kronstadt Bolsheviks
*
8 March 19171
Partiinost !
o
Ul'yantsev T„I."(chairman) pre-1914
Pelikhov S.G. March 1917 
SLadkov I.D. " 1911
Kblbin I.N. March 1917
Zaitsev V.M. 1905
Kbndakov D.N. 1912
Zinchenko E0 F. 1913
Gredyushko S.S. 1917
Roshal S.G. 1914 
Egorov I.No (Kirill Orlov) 1903
1) source: P.Z 0 Sivkov, Kronshtadt, stranitsy revolyutsicnnoi 
istorii, L. 1972, p 103.
2) Other sources name Roshal 1 as chairman. I have adopted 
Sivkov's version as he appears more scrupulous with other 
details on this matter„
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Kronstadt Group Going to Helsingfors 
26 March 1917
Dingel'stedt F 0 
Zhemchuzhin B0A 0 
Il'in-Zhenevskii3 A.F. 
Zinchenko E.F. 
Pelikhov SoG.
student 
student 
army officer 
artilleryman 
sailor
1910 (1914)' 
1915
1912
1913 
March 1917
1) F. Dingel'stedt, "Vesna proletarskoi revolyutsii", KL, 1925, 
no.1(12), pp 210-11; A 0F 0 Il'in-Zhenevskii, "Gel'singfors 
vesnoyu 1917 goda", KL, 1925, no 0 2(13), p 2O9.
2) I. Deutscher, The Prophet Unarmed, London^1959, p 430 (date 
in brackets from P. Broue', Le parti bolchevique, Paris 1963, 
p 568.
3) joined the group in Petrograd.
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Comnittee of the Helsingfors Section of the R3DLP 
Elected on 21 March 19171
Garin S.A. 
Khil'yani N. 
Stair nov V. 
Mazik V 0 
Sidorov A. 
Trofimov 
Kraevskii 
Enberg 
Krutov 
Dybenko P 8 E. 
Sakman A 0F 0 
Nozhin 
Brilliantov
sub-lieutenant
worker
university lecturer
worker
sailor 
sailor
ensign
B (1903 r
f
no faction*
B ?
M5 
B ?',6
B (1912)8
1) source: IGS, no. 10, 23 March 1917 0
2) Geroi oktybrya, vol.1, pp 264-65,
3) A.F. II T in-Zhenevskii, "Gel'singfors vesnoyu 1917 goda", KL, 
1925, no.2(13), p 214. —
4) Snirnov apparently did not join the Bolshevik Party, although 
he regularly wrote for Volna; M 0 G. Roshal', "Bol'sheviki 
Gel'singforsa v dni revolyutsii 1917g", IA, 1965, no 0 5, p 153.
5) > Protokoly i postanovleniya Tsentral'nogo komiteta baltiiskogo 
flota, M-L. 1963, p 468.
6) Volna, no 0 8, 8 April 1917 lists him on new Comnittee, but it is 
not certain that it was exclusively Bolshevik.
7) V. Antonov-Ovseenko, V semnadtsatom godu, M. 1933, p 161.
8) Geroi oktyabrya, vol.1, pp 345-48.
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• 
Members of the Sveaborg Sailors' Collective
28 March 1917
Dybenko P.E. 
Khovrin N.A 0 •
Marusev V.M 0 
Dmitriev F.M. 
Svetlichnyi G.A. 
Mal'kov PoD. 
Linyaev 
Pelikhov S.G. 
Zinchenko E.F. 
Il'in-Zhenevskii A 0 F. 
Zhemchuzhin B.A 0 
Dingel'stedt F. 3
storeman
sailor
sailor
sailor
radio operator
medical orderly
?
sailor
artilleryman
army officer
student
student
Shcha 
Pavel I 
Pavel I 
Pavel I1 
Pavel I 
Dianar2
Kronstadt 
Kronstadt 
Petrograd 
Vyborg District 
Vyborg District
Partiinost' 
1912
9
March 1917
1917
?
1904
?
March 1917
1913
1912
1915
1910 (14 ?)
sources: Mordvinov (ed.), op.cit,, pp 343, 385, 391;
Geroi oktyabrya, void, pp 419-21, 455-56, 488-89; vol.2, pp 81-82,
10O-O2, 227-29, 775;
S.F. Naida (ed.), op.cito, pp 244, 574-75, 572;
Kiuru, Boevoi rezerv revolyutsionnogo Petrograda, p 26;
Zalezhskii, Bor'ba za Baltiiskii flot,.p 23.
1) ^Zalezhskii, op.cit.., p 23 has this as Petropavlovsk.
2) Possibly a soldier from Sveaborg fortress, as Kiuru,loc.cit., 
says there was one, and no one else qualif ies»
3) Membership likely, but nowhere listed, possibly because of 
subsequent prominence as a trotskyist 0
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Presidium of Kelsingfors Committee 
Elected 6 April 19171
Sidorov A.
Vast en A.
Dmtriev F.M 0
II'in-Zhenevskii A 0F 0
Zhemchuzhin B.A.
Khovrin N.A 0
Marussv V.M 0
worker
worker
Imperator Pavel I
Petrograd
Kronstadt
Imperator Pavel I
Imperator Pavel I
1) source: Volna, no 0 8, 8 April 1917.
2) Formerly on Committee elected 21 March 1917.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
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CASS 
CSP 
IA 
IGS
IKS 
EPS
ISSR
JCH
KA
KB
KiS
KL
LP.
LS
MS
MZ
NiNI
NZh
PP
PR
PSS
RR 
Socho
SR
SS
USNIP
VB
VI
VIKPSS
VIZh
VLU
VR
Canadian-American Slavic Studies 
Canadian Slavonic Papers 
4 Istoricheskii arkhiv
Izvestiya Gel ' singf orsskogo soveta deputatov armii, 
f lota i rabochikh
Izvestiya Kronshtadt skogo soveta
Izvestiya Petrogradskogo soveta rabochikh i 
soldatskikh deputatov
*
Istoriya SSSR
Journal of Contemporary history
Krasnyi arkhiv
Krasnyi baltiets
Katorga i ssylka
Krasnaya letopis 1
Leningradskaya pravda
Leninskii sbornik
Morskoi sbornik
Morskiya zapiski
Novaya i noveishaya istoriya
Novyi zhurnal
Petrogradskaya pravda
Proletarskaya revolyutsiya
V. Ic Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 
izdanie pyatoe, 55 vols. , M. 197O-75
*
Russian Review
V.I. Lenin, Sochineniya, izdanie tret'e, 
30 volSo, M. 1935
Slavic Review
Soviet Studies
United States Naval Institute Proceedings
Voennaya byl' (Le passe militaire)
Voprosy istorii
Voprosy istorii KPSS
Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal
Vestnik Leningradskogo universiteta
Volya Rossii
Zaprosy zhizni
3OJ *o
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